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God blessed them, and God said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and 
master it ... 
— Genesis 1:28 
 
Rava said: [After a person dies], when he is led in for heavenly judgment, he is asked: 
Did you conduct your business transactions faithfully? Did you set aside fixed times for 
Torah study? Did you engage in procreation? Did you hope for salvation? Did you delve 
into wisdom? When you learned Torah, did you learn it deeply and infer one thing from 
another? But even so, if reverence of God was this person’s resource it is well,  
and if it was not, then it is not well. 
— Talmud Bavli, Shabbat 31a 
 
Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korchah: Whoever raises an orphan in [her or] his home, Scripture 
accounts it is as if [she or] he gave birth to the child. ... Rabbi Yonatan: Whoever teaches 
Torah to his [or her] fellow’s child, Scripture accounts him [or her] as if he [or she] gave 
birth to the child. 
— Talmud Bavli, Sanhedrin 19a 
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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates the ways scientific and biotechnological 
advancement impact and change Jewish law and ethics. It analyzes the contemporary 
Jewish bioethical debate concerning the identification of maternity and paternity in four 
cases of assisted reproductive technologies (ART): in vitro fertilization, gestational 
surrogacy, cloning, and mitochondrial replacement therapy. Unprecedented modes of 
procreation engender new definitions of parenthood, challenging a longstanding Jewish 
framework of theology, law, and ethics. 
Part I develops a conceptual scaffolding for the discrete analyses of Part II, and 
considers the philosophical bases of parenthood, the gendered nature of Jewish legal 
bioethics, the relationship of law and ethics, and ways of relating religion and science. 
For each case of ART, Part II examines the biological science and technology in 
historical context, locates Jewish bioethical concerns within the larger bioethical 
discussion, and critically reviews the epistemological and axiological dimensions of the 
legally oriented analyses of a select group of leading Jewish bioethicists, chosen for their 
copious writings on ART and contextualizing oeuvres: Rabbi J. David Bleich, Rabbi 
  xiii 
Michael J. Broyde, Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, and the collaborative writings of Dr. John D. 
Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler. Insights from Jewish feminist bioethical criticism 
and other notable Jewish bioethical works enhance the analyses. 
Through a focused study of the redefinition of parenthood in Jewish law and 
bioethics, I demonstrate four ways in which advances in science impact Jewish law and 
ethics. One, scientific awareness leads to greater sophistication and nuance of analysis. 
Two, Jewish bioethicists grapple with religion and science relations, and speak directly to 
these overarching considerations. Three, the epistemological and axiological influence of 
religion and science relations correlate with greater openness to new technologies, 
theoretical conceptualizations, and their practical applications. Four, advances in science 
change Jewish legal and bioethical analyses and outcomes through (at least) four possible 
methodological mechanisms – namely, theoretic holism, innovative interpretation, 
indeterminate gaps, and realist realignment. Jewish bioethics are thus shown to illumine 
the intricate interrelationship between religion and science and its impact on Jewish law 
and ethics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This multi-disciplinary, “Religion and Science” doctoral dissertation aims to 
investigate the challenge of assimilating new scientific knowledge and technological 
capability within a religious framework of older, even ancient, theology, law, and ethics. 
At the dialogic junction of religion and science stand competing sources of authority, 
epistemologies, axiologies, and worldviews. The historical encounter of science and 
religion and the determination of their proper relationship form the foundational inquiry 
of the “Religion and Science” academic guild discipline.1 While general schemas of 
science and religion relations have been studied, specific application to Jewish bioethics 
calls for further examination. 
Although there are a variety of Jewish bioethical methodologies (see Chapter 
Two, pp. 39-58, “The History and Foundational Models of Contemporary Jewish 
Bioethics and Medical Halakhah (Jewish Law)”), the forceful legacy of Judaism’s legal 
tradition, i.e., halakhah, and the preponderance of primarily Orthodox, and also 
Conservative, Jewish halakhists, physicians, and academics involved in Jewish bioethics, 
have shaped a principally halakhically oriented Jewish bioethical literature. This 
dissertation directly engages the question of Jewish religion and science relations by 
asking in what ways do greater scientific awareness, changes in scientific understanding, 
and advances in technological capability challenge, and even change, the modes and 
methodologies of Jewish legal and bioethical inquiry. 
                                                 
1 See Barbour 1997, 77-105; Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998, 1-11; Haught 1995, 2-9, 202-03; McGrath 
2010, 1-6, 43-45; Peters 1998, 11-22. 
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I particularly examine how Jewish bioethical scholarship has responded to 
advances in scientific understanding and technological capability in relation to emerging 
assisted reproductive and genetic technologies. More specifically, I do so through a 
focused analysis of epistemological and axiological dimensions of the contemporary 
Jewish bioethical debate concerning the identification of maternity and paternity in four 
current cases of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies: 1. In Vitro Fertilization; 
2. Gestational Surrogacy; 3. Cloning; and 4. Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy. I have 
chosen these cases because the first two are older, now more commonplace, with ample 
Jewish bioethical literature; while the second two are more cutting-edge. Also, the 
respective cases developed successively and cumulatively, as numbered, allowing me to 
track Jewish bioethical development in line with scientific and technological 
development.  
 
Context 
Over the past six decades, we have witnessed the discovery of DNA, identifying 
links between genes and both traits and disease, the development of biotechnology to 
combine and reengineer genetic material, the mapping of genomes, and assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART).2 These rapidly developing fields have yielded 
significant changes in scientific understanding and technological capability that indeed 
challenge Jewish bioethics. All of these scientific achievements have empowered 
                                                 
2 See US Dept. of Energy 2012. For a detailed history of the development and advancement of genetic and 
genomic science, see Mukherjee 2016, especially pp. 201-495. 
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humanity with the ability to alter and even manufacture life in ways previously 
unknown.3  
For example, one of the recent innovations in reproductive and genetic 
technologies is the genetic manipulation and manufacture of human gametes using 
multiple genetic donors.4 Thus, “three-parent babies” develop from an embryo that was 
conceived in vitro with genetic material from a sperm donor; a chromosomal, nuclear 
DNA (nDNA) ovum donor; and a mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) and cytoplasm ovum 
donor. MtDNA replacement, i.e., Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy (MRT), utilizes 
techniques developed in cloning research.5 If the gestator is a surrogate other than one of 
the gamete donors, the resultant child arguably has four biological parents. The primary 
motivation for this assisted reproductive technology is to allow women suffering from 
non-nDNA-caused mitochondrial disease to reproduce healthy offspring who will not 
                                                 
3 Philosophers of biology have begun to contemplate the impact of these technologies on biological 
classification and on the nature of nature, especially considering polygenomic organisms, synthetic biology, 
and potentially transhumanism. See Parry and Dupre 2010. For other futuristic speculations, see Fukuyama 
2002. 
4 On April 6, 2016, scientist John Zhang and his US team of the New Hope Fertility Center in New York 
City, working with an infertile Jordanian couple in Mexico, delivered the world’s first three-parent baby 
boy, see Hamzelou 2016. In January 2017, the Nadiya Clinic for Reproductive Medicine in Kiev, Ukraine 
reported that it helped an idiopathically infertile woman deliver the first three-parent baby girl, and the first 
MRT occurrence of germline modification, see Scutti 2017. 
5 In pronuclear transfer (PNT), the gametes of the intended father and mother are brought together through 
in vitro fertilization to create an embryo. A second embryo from a donor egg and sperm is simultaneously 
created. The pronuclei of both embryos are removed on day one, at the single-cell stage, and the pronuclei 
with the conjoined DNA of the intended father and mother is inserted into the enucleated embryo that 
contains healthy mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from the second ovum donor. Although sperm do contain 
some mitochondria, they do not contribute to the mtDNA of the developing embryo, see Yabuuchi et al. 
2012; Craven 2010. In nuclear genome transfer (NGT), the most recent and promising technique, a donor 
ovum is denucleated and the nucleus of the intended mother containing her nuclear DNA (nDNA) is 
inserted into the donor ovum containing cytoplasm and healthy mtDNA. In vitro fertilization is then 
applied using the intended father’s sperm, see Amato et al. 2014. Other techniques utilized in the recent 
past include maternal spindle transfer (MST), metaphase chromosome transfer (CT) and germinal vesicle 
transfer (GVT), see Yabuuchi et al. 2012.  
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suffer the same malady as the woman with whom the child shares nDNA (Claiborne, 
2016; Kelly 2013; Wong 2013). While tri-gametic embryos aim to free the resultant child 
of its mother’s pathogenic mtDNA and disease, the artificial manufacture of gametes 
from multiple donors also constitutes an example of germline modification in that 
laboratory-induced changes may be passed on to future offspring.6 As technologies 
advance and more complex genetic engineering and gamete manufacture occurs, the 
religious and secular legal, ethical, and social questions multiply. These questions 
impinge on an array of important bioethical and biological concerns, such as eugenics, 
genetic diversity, and human evolution, as well as religious, philosophical, psychological, 
and sociological issues of identity, sexuality, gender, reproductive roles, personal status, 
lineage, family constructs, equitable access, and distributive justice. Translating these 
questions and concerns into fair and functional public policy requires astute insight and 
perspicacious foresight.  
In vitro fertilization, gestational surrogacy, cloning, and tri-gametic embryos 
invite bioethical discussion of the rights and responsibilities, duties and obligations of 
procreation and parenthood in an age of advancing scientific knowledge and technology. 
In this dissertation, I explore the positions considered and claimed by legally oriented 
Jewish bioethicists and assess in what ways they are informed by contemporary science, 
including the axiological influence of secular bioethical discussion and societal mores. I 
investigate how Judaism’s robust textual-interpretive tradition, creative legal process, 
                                                 
6 Since spermatic mitochondria are degraded during fertilization, only female offspring produced through 
MRT could transmit mtDNA to a new generation, thus leading scientists and bioethicists to recommend 
initially limiting MRT trials to male embryos, see Clairborn 2016, 88-95;119-121. For an explanation of 
the biological mechanism leading to the degradation of paternal mtDNA, see Zhou 2016. 
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history of legal precedents, and religious and ethical instruction, develop in light of novel 
scientific understandings and technological capability, as well as changing moral 
judgments.  
 
Method 
 In order to frame systematically and focus my investigation, I will evaluate 
epistemological and axiological dimensions of four representative exemplars of Jewish 
bioethical investigations concerning each of the four aforementioned cases. For 
epistemic orientation, I first examine with precision the relevant biological science and 
assisted reproductive or genetic technology as discussed in current scientific literature in 
its historical context. I then locate the Jewish bioethical concerns within a larger 
bioethical framework. After these essential steps, I critically review the epistemological 
and axiological dimensions of the legally oriented analyses of a select group of leading 
Jewish bioethicists: Rabbi J. David Bleich, Rabbi Michael J. Broyde, Rabbi Elliot N. 
Dorff, and the collaborative writings of Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler 
introduced in Chapter Two (pp. 58-65). I assess the extent that the Jewish bioethical 
scholarship under review displays adequate and sufficient scientific knowledge of the 
case; whether the bioethical issue or dilemma being studied represent an instance of new 
scientific understanding or unforeseen technological capability, and if the new knowledge 
is tentative, sufficient, or complete? I ask: is the new knowledge accepted at least pro 
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tanto and integrated as such?7 How does it align with previous scientific and traditional 
Jewish understandings: is the relationship one of conflict, independence, integration, or 
dialogue?8 Is there a discernible Jewish bioethical methodology being applied? Jewish 
bioethicists, to one degree or another, subscribe to a theory and theology of knowledge 
that affirms both Torah and science, revelation and reason, as sources of knowledge, 
wisdom, and truth.9 In practice, however, conflicts between Torah and science arise and 
are not always easily resolved (see Chapter Three, pp. 107-11, “Strategies for Contending 
with Conflicts Between Torah and Science”). Gauging the epistemic orientation of 
Jewish bioethical scholarship thus directly confronts the mixing of old and new 
knowledge. 
Epistemology and scientific understanding alone cannot settle a bioethical 
dilemma. One’s moral axiology mediates the ethical considerations of new bioethical 
challenges. Therefore, it is also important to clarify the axiological dimensions of Jewish 
bioethical investigations. For each representative exemplar of Jewish bioethics 
concerning the four cases, I aspire to distill the discrete values and ethical concerns 
                                                 
7 Pro Tanto is Latin for “for so much,” and describes a belief or position that is accepted with the 
understanding that it may be overridden by other, more compelling considerations. See B. Brody 2014, 
36n5. 
8 See Barbour 1997, 77-105, for his four-fold typology of ways of relating science and religion. In general, 
the Religion and Science literature dealing with conflicts of science and religion adds helpful perspective 
here. Willem B. Drees’s 3 x3 classification of interactions of religion and science, in particular, considers 
how new knowledge, new views of knowledge and new appreciations of the world impinge upon cognitive, 
experiential, and traditional claims of religion. See Drees 1996, 39-49. 
9 The term Torah in customary Jewish usage may have narrow or wide scopes of meaning, depending on 
context. Torah may simply refer to the combined collection of the five books of Moses in the Hebrew 
Bible. Alternatively, Torah may more generally refer to the entire corpus of Jewish religious literature, 
from biblical times until today. In the phrase, “Torah and Science,” Torah should be understood in its most 
expansive sense. 
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undergirding the Jewish bioethical analysis and evaluate them in comparative 
juxtaposition.  
In halakhically oriented Judaism, there is ambivalence toward whether there is an 
ethic independent of or intrinsic to halakhah. This ambiguity is writ large in the titles of 
the books and articles of Jewish bioethics, some preferring to speak in the idiom of 
medical halakhah and others in terms of bioethics. The question of whether there is an 
ethic independent of Jewish law that can methodologically frame subsequent legal 
analysis or whether meta-ethical considerations are intrinsically embedded within the 
culturally traditioned legal process may be of acute importance when confronting 
previously unimagined ethical scenarios created by novel medical technology and new 
scientific knowledge. I explore this continuing debate and for each of the representative 
Jewish bioethical exemplars of the four cases, I ask three related, important axiological 
questions. First, are halakhic and Jewish bioethical investigations perceived as 
synonymous or as two related, yet distinct activities? Second, does the author conceive of 
an ethic independent of Jewish law? Third, is there an explicit recognition or inferred 
awareness that one’s clarified values and ethics may legitimately help direct both 
halakhic and bioethical examination.10  
For some Jewish bioethicists, an ethic independent of halakhah can be of prime 
importance in Jewish bioethical consideration, as it is precisely in the face of new 
knowledge and novel technologies unanticipated and without parallel within Jewish law 
that intuitive and supererogatory morality may serve an invaluable function. These more 
                                                 
10 David Shatz 2013 engages similar questions in his essay on ethical theories in Orthodox Judaism. 
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general, but fundamental axiological orienting inquiries will be most successful when 
assessing the views of individual Jewish bioethicists who have generated a larger body of 
scholarship. Thus, in choosing Jewish bioethical exemplars for the four cases of assisted 
reproductive and genetic technologies, I privilege those Jewish bioethicists with copious 
writings on ART and contextualizing oeuvres, such as: Rabbi J. David Bleich, Rabbi 
Michael J. Broyde, Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, and the collaborative writings of Dr. John D. 
Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler. Insights from Jewish feminist bioethical criticism 
and other notable Jewish bioethical works will be brought in to broaden perspective and 
enhance the analysis. 
 
Thesis 
 Through a focused study of the redefinition of parenthood in Jewish bioethics and 
medical halakhah, I will demonstrate four ways in which advances in science change 
Jewish law and ethics. One, greater scientific awareness and deeper understanding 
influence the development of medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics by demanding 
greater sophistication and nuance of analysis. Two, while some medical halakhists 
operating within the narrow confines of Jewish legal analysis may seem to ignore larger 
questions of epistemology and moral axiology, Jewish bioethicists indeed grapple with 
religion and science relations, and speak to these overarching considerations in their 
respective analyses. Three, the epistemological and axiological influence of religion and 
science relations correlate with greater openness to new technologies, theoretical 
conceptualizations, and their practical applications. Four, advances in science directly 
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change Jewish legal and bioethical analyses and outcomes through (at least) four possible 
methodological mechanisms, derived from the bioethical writings of this dissertation’s 
four exemplars – namely, theoretic holism, innovative interpretation, indeterminate gaps, 
and realist realignment. Jewish bioethics will thus be shown to inhabit the intricate 
interrelationship between religion and science and illumine its impact on Jewish law and 
ethics. 
Chapter Overview 
 
General Overview 
This dissertation proceeds in two parts. In Part One, “Context and Method: Jewish 
Bioethics, Epistemology, and Moral Axiology,” I will continue to introduce and establish 
the context, method, and conceptual scaffolding of this research project. In Part Two, 
“Application and Analysis: The Identification of Maternity and Paternity in Four Current 
Cases of Assisted Reproductive and Genetic Technologies,” via introduction, I will begin 
with an analysis of the halakhic affirmative duty, i.e., mitzvah, to procreate, assessing its 
implications for identifying the halakhic grounds for parenthood. I will also briefly 
introduce the initial halakhic and Jewish bioethical discussions concerning ovary 
transplantation and artificial insemination, since these inaugural inquiries into ART get 
referenced in subsequent discussions. I will then review the relevant history and science 
of: 1. In Vitro Fertilization; 2. Gestational Surrogacy; 3. Cloning; and 4. Mitochondrial 
Replacement Therapy. For each, I will identify attendant Jewish and secular bioethical 
issues, as well as survey the medical halakhic and Jewish bioethical consideration of the 
identification of parenthood. I will then rigorously analyze the select Jewish bioethical 
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exemplars for each case and assess their epistemological and axiological dimensions. I 
will also chart Jewish bioethical development as the technologies cumulatively progress, 
more generally, as well as more specifically in light of the progressive writings of the 
aforementioned exemplars. 
PART I: Context and Method: Jewish Bioethics, Epistemology, and Moral Axiology 
Chapter One: Defining Parenthood Before and After Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies 
 
 This chapter presents philosophical accounts of parenthood in relation to 
procreation to provide a conceptual framework and vocabulary for assessing halakhic 
grounds of parenthood.  
Chapter Two: Jewish Bio-and-Genetic Ethics 
 This chapter will review the Jewish bioethical literature pertinent to this 
dissertation. It will begin by schematizing “The History and Foundational Models of 
Contemporary Jewish Bioethics and Medical Halakhah (Jewish Law),” seeking to 
accomplish two goals: first, it will establish a common intellectual framework and 
vocabulary, which will be utilized throughout the analyses of Part II; and second, the 
history and development of contemporary Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah itself 
will demonstrate how changing epistemologies and axiologies both reflect and facilitate 
greater and more impactful interactions between science and religion. This chapter will 
also introduce the Jewish bioethicists selected as focal exemplars for this dissertation, as 
well as survey “Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetic Ethics,” to provide 
larger bioethical disciplinary context for this dissertation’s narrower bioethical focus.  
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Chapter Three: Epistemological and Axiological Dimensions of Contemporary Jewish 
Bioethics 
 
 I will more precisely explain what is meant by epistemological and axiological 
dimensions of contemporary Jewish bioethics and outline my intended method of their 
investigation: 1. Understand the current science and its history; 2. Locate the Jewish 
bioethical analysis within a larger bioethical framework. 3. Evaluate the epistemological 
and axiological dimensions of the Jewish bioethical analysis. I will contextualize this 
inquiry through a brief survey of Jewish theories of knowledge, halakhic process, past 
strategies for contending with seeming conflicts between Torah and science, and 
exploring the interrelationship of ethics and halakhah, with particular consideration of 
whether there exists an ethic independent of halakhah. 
PART II: Application and Analysis: The Identification of Maternity and Paternity in 
Four Current Cases of Assisted Reproductive and Genetic Technologies 
 
Chapter Four: Grounding the Jewish Bioethical Discourse Regarding Assisted 
Reproductive and Genetic Technologies  
 
This opening chapter of Part II will ground the Jewish bioethical discourse by 
briefly exploring the Jewish scriptural sources, religious significance, and scope of the 
Jewish biblical commandment to procreate, especially regarding the questions of whether 
utilizing ART leads to the fulfillment of this religious duty, and relatedly, whether there 
is an obligation to pursue procreative outcomes through ART, and if others have a 
religious and moral duty to assist. In addition, this chapter will also briefly review early 
halakhic considerations of ovarian transplants, as well as of artificial insemination with a 
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woman’s husband’s sperm (AIH) or with donor sperm (AID).11 Since these two medical 
therapies were the first assisted reproductive technologies employed to benefit 
individuals or couples struggling with infertility, their foundational discussion among 
halakhists undergirds later medical halakhic and Jewish bioethical considerations of the 
four subsequent cases of ART considered in this dissertation.   
Chapter Five: In vitro Fertilization with Husband-or-Donor Sperm 
 Modern in vitro fertilization, like its much older chronological predecessor 
artificial insemination, initially rattled the scholarly community of medical halakhists, 
especially with the introduction of third-party gametes. Jewish bioethics was then a 
developing field in its earliest stages and new scientific knowledge was slowly being 
assimilated into the halakhic discussion. In the West, sexual mores were going through 
radical change. I demonstrate that the imprint of scientific knowledge, as well as of 
reactive and changing moral-value judgments, may be discerned in the relevant medical-
halakhic and Jewish-bioethical discussion. In this case of ART, as in the subsequent 
cases, I privilege four Jewish bioethicists with a contextualizing oeuvre – namely, Rabbis 
J. David Bleich, Michael J. Broyde, Elliot N. Dorff, and the writing duo of Dr. John D. 
Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler. An intellection orientation is constructed for each 
exemplar evaluating each one’s philosophy and methodology of Jewish law and ethics. 
 
  
                                                 
11 The “H” in AIH is decoded as “homologous,” rather than “husband,” even though it still refers to a 
woman’s husband, as opposed to heterologous artificial insemination, AID, in which donor sperm is used, 
employing a “D” for “donor.”  
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Chapter Six: Gestational Surrogacy and Ovum Donation 
 Gestational Surrogacy advanced the complexity of the halakhic and Jewish 
bioethical consideration of ART by introducing third-party participants, often in an 
ongoing collaborative reproductive process. While initially the Jewish bioethical and 
halakhic conversation seemed to prefer a gestational ground for maternity, this 
conclusion was fraught with two tensions: first, the intentions of the aspiring parents who 
planned to raise the resultant child were at odds with the gestationally based biological 
determination of parenthood being made by halakhists; and second, as an appreciation of 
the molecular-genetic basis of fetal development began to take hold, increasingly new 
opinions were proffered preferring genetic accounts of parenthood over gestational ones. 
Finally, as epigenetics came to be recognized as influential, some returned to reconsider 
gestational accounts, either in a monist or pluralist framework.   
Chapter Seven: Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 With the advent of genetic technologies, the prospect of human cloning 
challenged anew preconceptions of the relationship of procreation and parenthood. 
Epistemological and axiological orientations, already well trained by previous encounters 
with ART, impact the ensuing Jewish bioethical analyses, which remained theoretical due 
to international bans on human reproductive cloning.12 Jewish bioethics also comes into 
its own, since, absent practical queries of actual cases, medical-halakhic discussion 
remains sparse. 
                                                 
12 See Devolder 2016, 1. 
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 Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, as currently construed, utilizes cloning 
technologies to allow a woman with mitochondrial disease to bring offspring into the 
world without transmitting to them her heritable disease, and thus alleviates human 
sufferings. Yet, once again, new participants are added to this novel form of collaborative 
reproduction, deepening questions regarding the grounds for parenthood. The emerging 
Jewish bioethical discussion of this latest form of ART draws upon the positions 
developed and lessons learned from the chronologically prior three cases. Jewish 
Bioethics has reached a certain maturity, and questions of epistemological and 
axiological orientation are more clearly pronounced and therefore discernable.  
Chapter Eight: Conclusion  
 This chapter will restate the thesis question and purpose of this dissertation 
project, and summarize the findings of its case-specific research and analysis in support 
of its thesis. It will review in broader strokes and greater detail: the redefinition of 
parenthood in the assisted reproductive and genetic technologies; the sociology of 
knowledge, subjective intuitionism, and embodied experience as they impact upon this 
study; and inventory four ways advances in science change Jewish law and ethics. The 
chapter will conclude with an articulation of the implications of this work for Jewish 
religion and science relations, as well as for Jewish law and bioethics.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
Defining Parenthood Before and After Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
 
Philosophers of family and bioethicists propose that the status, rights, and 
obligations of parenthood may attach based on one or more of the following grounds: 
genetic, gestational, labor-based, intentional, voluntarist, beneficent, and causal 
conceptions (Brake and Millum 2014, 26-32). They ask: in light of new assisted 
reproductive technologies (ART), how does society rethink its definitions of 
parenthood?13 What are the bases and boundaries of reproductive obligations and 
freedoms? What substantive differences exist between natural and artificial reproduction? 
What are the connections and constraints between sex, procreation, and marriage? What 
personal, psychological, social, and societal implications pertain? And, perhaps, most 
importantly, what judgments and outcomes are in the best interests of the child?14 For 
theologians and religious bioethicists, they add: Does sacred scripture or religious 
tradition identify parental grounds? If so, are they of divine command or communal 
convention?15 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Brake and Millum 2014, 1, 22, credit both changing family structures and demographics, in part born of 
the development and proliferation of ART, as creating a need to interrogate ethical, legal, and public policy 
questions concerning parenthood and procreation. See Weiler 1996, who charts philosophical 
transformations and societal changes regarding conceptions of parenthood through the psychological and 
sociological processes of “differentiation, abstraction, and nihilization.” 
14 See Archard and Benatar 2010; Brake and Millum 2014; Hull 2005a. 
15 For an overview of the philosophy of family, see O’Neill and Ruddick 1979; Blustein 1982; Richards 
2010. 
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Before Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
 
Before the advent of ART, there were two primary paradigms of parenthood: 
natural parenthood and adoption.16 Within natural parenthood, paternity and maternity are 
respectively defined by a man, i.e., the father, whose seed inseminated a woman through 
sexual intercourse, i.e., the mother, who in turn conceived, gestated, and gave birth to the 
child. In other words, natural procreation begot natural parenthood. Before ART and 
maternal genetic identity testing, while it was possible for a natural mother to abandon or 
be compelled to relinquish her child, at least at the time of birth the identity of the natural 
mother was clear. On the other hand, before paternal genetic identity testing, i.e. paternity 
tests, it was possible for the natural father to be unidentifiable, such as in a case of rape, 
consensual casual intercourse with an unfamiliar partner, or within a context of a woman 
having multiple male sexual partners.17 Even within a stable marital relationship, before 
genetic identity testing, fatherhood is assigned either by maternal assertion and/or 
                                                 
16 The use of the modifier “natural” to describe a kind of parenthood requires a defending explanation since 
the claim of “natural” is often considered suspect by sociologists and philosophers, see Bird and Tobin 
2017. Calling something a natural kind indicates that its categorization corresponds to the structure of the 
natural world, and is not merely a social construct based on human action and intention. It is not self-
evident that human fatherhood and motherhood fully meets this criterion. However, “biological” doesn’t 
fare much better since it also may describe parenthood achieved through ART. See also LaPorte 2003. 
17 In Jewish law, a child of unknown paternal parentage is known as a “shetuki,” literally, “undisclosed,” 
and has the legal status of a “doubtful bastard.” A “mamzer,” bastard, is prohibited by halakhah from 
marrying and/or procreating with a non-bastard. Since bastardy is a heritable legal status, halakhah also 
proscribes a “doubtful bastard” from marrying either a known bastard – in case he is, in truth, not a bastard, 
as well as a non-bastard – in case he is, in truth, a bastard. See Schereschewsky 1995c, 435-7. Also see 
Laufer-Ukeles 2014, who argues for greater regulation of ART under the “best interest of children” 
standard, using the State of Israel as her principal example in which unregulated use of ART can affect the 
child’s Jewish and civil legal status, including marriageability, due to the state’s privileging of Jewish law 
in matters of family law.  
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through marital presumption rather than certain knowledge.18 Evolutionary theorists and 
sociobiologists analyze the cost and benefits of such ambiguous paternity.19  
Before ART, therefore, every child has but one natural father and one natural 
mother. It should be noted, however, that some world cultures expand upon these two 
primary paradigms and uphold beliefs in partible paternity and maternity. For example, 
many indigenous South American societies espouse a concept of partible paternity, 
assigning a primary status of paternity to the man who through sexual intercourse first 
inseminates a woman post-menstruation, but also accredit to the pregnant woman’s other 
subsequent sexual partners the status of secondary fatherhood (Beckerman and Valentine 
2002, 4). This multiple paternity concept theorizes that each sexual partner contributes to 
a critical mass of semen, called in some cultures “white blood” or “milk,” necessary for 
the healthy development of the fetus. Similarly, partible maternity privileges the birth 
mother as primary, but recognizes other women who breastfeed the child as secondary 
mothers. This multiple maternity concept, like that of multiple paternity, theorizes that 
both gestation and nursing convey needed mother’s blood to the developing fetus and 
child through the umbilical cord and breast milk, respectively (Just and Monaghan 2000, 
85-6). While these cultures value collective parenting, sibling kinship over marital bonds, 
and non-androcentric authority structures, the underlying idea of partible parenthood 
within these cultures is that each biological contributor to the development of the fetus 
                                                 
18 See Caro, Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer 4:26, who says that even in a known case of an adulterous wife, 
absent clear paternal determination, we credit paternity to the husband since quantitatively the majority of 
sexual relations are presumed to have taken place between husband and wife. 
19 See Beckerman and Valentine 2002, 3; Gray and Anderson 2010, 115 ff.  
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and viability of the child earns through his or her causal contribution a parental status 
(Beckerman and Valentine 2002, 4).20 
Judaism preferentially locates procreation within a sanctified monogamous 
marital relationship,21 prohibits sexual relations out of wedlock,22 and stigmatizes 
children born of adulterous or incestuous sexual encounters23 (Barilan 2014, 124). 
However, in a few instances, Jewish lore recognizes the idea of partible paternity and 
maternity, making ready modern Jewish halakhic and bioethical consideration of partible 
parenthood in cases of collaborative reproduction through ART. Consider the story of 
Goliath, the giant Philistine warrior, who David, as a diminutive youth and not yet king 
of Israel, felled with a slingshot. The Bible calls Goliath in Hebrew “ish habeinayim,” 
literally rendered as “man of the in-between” (Samuel I, 17:4), the exact meaning of 
which is uncertain,24 but which the Babylonian Talmud (TB Sota 42b) understands as 
referring to the notion that Goliath’s extraordinary physical prowess was due to having 
multiple biological fathers. Goliath’s mother, who the rabbis identify as Orpah the 
Moabite, sister of Ruth and daughter-in-law of Naomi,25 sometime after her return to her 
                                                 
20 Beckerman and Valentine 2002, 3 ff., argue that their findings regarding partible paternity challenge the 
“standard model of human evolution,” which posits that monogamy increases male confidence in paternity, 
thereby favoring paternal investment, i.e. providing food and shelter, to a woman and her child, who the 
male presumes is his own. For a review of the “standard model,” see Pinker 1997, 488-90; Wilson 1998, 
170. 
21 See Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer 1:1, “Every man is obligated to marry a woman in order to 
procreate.” For a contemporary discussion of these values, see Blau 2007. 
22 See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, “Laws of Forbidden Sexual Intercourse,” chapter 22; cf. Dorff 2013b. 
23 See Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer 4:13, “Who is a bastard? [A child of one] who has sexual relations 
with one of the [biblically forbidden] illicit unions...” Children born out of wedlock, however much 
discouraged, do not carry the stigma of bastardy. 
24 See Stein ed. 2003, 607, whose Jewish Publication Society Hebrew-English TaNaKh (Hebrew Bible) 
tentatively translates the phrase as “the man of spaces between.” 
25 See Ruth 1:1-15. 
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family in Moab had sexual relations with numerous male partners on the night of 
Goliath’s conception: “What is the meaning of ‘beinayim’? … Rabbi Yochanan said, ‘He 
was the son of a hundred fathers and one mother.’” (Bleich 2015a, 66-7; Lichtenstein 
2014a; Loike and Tendler 2014a, 57n40).26 Despite such extraordinary accounts in 
Jewish lore, before ART, the primary paradigm of natural parenthood, and the only one 
recognized by Jewish law, assumed a unique biological mother and a unique biological 
father. 
The second primary paradigm of parenthood before ART was neither natural nor 
biological, but social and legal – namely, adoption. In adoption, the government, often 
through court decree, artificially creates a legal relationship between a child and his or 
her adoptive parent(s) akin to that of natural parents and child, as well as severs the rights 
and responsibilities pertaining to the child’s natural parents. Adoption is an ancient 
institution, whose earliest written reference appears in the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi and was regulated in the Ancient Near East, as well as in Greco-Roman 
civilization. Indeed, in Ancient Rome, adoption was understood as a legal change in 
parenthood (Huard 1956). However, in modern western civilization, until the mid-
nineteenth century in the United States, and the 1920s in England, adoption was more the 
provenance of common law and informal arrangement than judicially regulated custody 
                                                 
26 Rashi, ad loc., s.v. “Bar Meah,” denies the possibility of multiple fathers and understands the talmudic 
passage as identifying Goliath as being of obscure paternity: “one was his father, the rest adulterers.” 
Tosafot, ad loc., s.v. “Meah,” however, entertain the idea that the sperm of multiple men can contribute to a 
single pregnancy. This is different than the question of superfetation, i.e., a woman’s multiple ova can be 
impregnated by different male sexual partners, either in the case of twins, see Mueller 2015, or months 
apart within a single state of pregnancy, and see Reichman 2009. 
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assignments and legally created and recognized kinship relationships.27 Motivation for 
adoption has also changed. While there has always been a societal need to care for 
orphaned children, in the twentieth century, new emphasis was placed on the desire to 
enable both parentless children and childless couples to experience and enjoy a complete 
family life (Broyde 1988). 
Jewish law, however, has never recognized formal adoption as having the legal 
power to create new kinship relationships that confer upon adoptive parents a halakhic 
status akin to natural parenthood. Instead, the Talmud recognizes adoption as an act of 
righteousness and kindness, i.e., tzedakah and chesed, referring to an adoptive parent as 
“one who raises another’s child” (Broyde 1988, 2005a; Schereschewsky 1995a). Jewish 
religious culture primarily uses patronyms, though sometimes matronyms, in its 
conventional naming practices, such as in the ritual context of being called to the public 
reading of the Torah, or for documentary purposes, e.g., a ketubah, marriage contract, or 
a get, divorce decree.28 In the case of an adopted child, halakhists recommend qualifying 
the use of the adoptive patronyms and matronyms with the phrase “hamegadelo – who 
raised him,” as in, for example, “Isaac the son of Abraham who raised him” (Schachter 
1982, 104 ff.). An adopted child cannot share in the lineage distinctions of his or her 
adoptive parents. Thus, adopted children born to a non-Jewish natural mother require 
                                                 
27 Massachusetts passed the first American adoption law in 1851; Britain in 1926. See Herman 2008 who 
charts changes in adoption culture in the United States over the first seventy-five years of the twentieth 
century through the stages of regulation, interpretation, standardization, and naturalization. See Keating 
2008, 113 ff., for the modern history of adoption in England, especially regarding the Adoption of Children 
Act of 1926. 
28 Jewish law differentiates between documents that serve as evidence, such as a ketubah (marriage 
contract), and documents whose execution effectuates a legal result, such as a get (Jewish divorce). See 
Broyde 2001, 1-25. 
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conversion. Likewise, if the adoptive father is of priestly or levitical lineage, i.e., kohen 
or levi, such familial status, with its attendant rights and responsibilities, cannot be 
conferred upon an adopted child (Schachter 1982, 95, 98-104; Gold 1997). Similarly, an 
adopted child has no natural inheritance rights, though, an adoptive parent may choose to 
will assets and possessions to such a child, as is indeed his or her prerogative toward any 
non-relative.29  
Perhaps the starkest representation of the lack of natural relationship between an 
adopted child and his or her adoptive family can be seen in Jewish marriage law. Adopted 
children raised in the same home may marry each other, or may marry the natural 
children of their adoptive parents, i.e., adopted siblings, since there is no natural 
relationship. Incestuous relations are limited to natural relatives.30 Similarly, the question 
arises as to whether in an adoptive context hilkhot yichud obtain, i.e., the Jewish laws 
regulating seclusion of two unmarried individuals of opposite genders who are not 
immediate relatives.31 Some halakhists apply formal standards of seclusion laws 
independent of social context, and thus prohibit an adoptive parent and adopted child of 
                                                 
29 Some halakhists view adoption through a civil court decree as determinative of legal intent, and thus 
legitimate a legal presumption that adoptive parents intend to treat an adopted child as a natural child for 
purposes of inheritance, see Schachter 1982, 95. 
30 See TB Sota 43b; Caro, Shulkhan Arukh, Evan Ha’ezer 15:11. Even adoptive parental custody cannot 
create an incest prohibition of biblical force between an adoptive parent and adopted child, though other 
concerns of abuse may pertain, and such unions may still be rabbinically proscribed, see Broyde 1988, 147. 
Cf. TB Megillah 13a, where the Talmud cites the teaching of Rabbi Meir regarding Esther 2:7, “‘[He 
(Mordecai) was foster father to Hadassah – that is, Esther – his uncle’s daughter, for she had neither father 
nor mother. The maiden was shapely and beautiful; and when her father and mother died, Mordecai 
adopted her] as his own daughter’ – read not as his own daughter, but as his own household, i.e., as his 
wife.” Such a reading speaks to the varied ways in which orphaned children were cared for in the ancient 
world, as well as exponentially increases the level of intrigue underlying the biblical book of Esther’s 
dramatic narrative. 
31 See Caro, Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer 22:1-20. 
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opposite genders to be secluded absent the presence of the other adoptive parent, 
arguably creating a logistically difficult and psychologically unhealthy living situation. 
While other halakhists, taking note of the permissive and positive judgments of biblical 
and rabbinic examples of adoptive relationships, contextualize the laws of seclusion as 
not applying to adoptive parent-child relationships (Berzon 1987, 107-12). Similarly, the 
laws of mourning, such as the liturgical recitation of the mourner’s Kaddish, being 
primarily of rabbinic legislation, may be assumed by an adopted child qua the parents 
who raise him or her, while they are not imposed upon an adopted child toward his or her 
natural parents (Schachter 1982, 94-5; Broyde 1988, 148-9; 2005, 142-5; Wolowelsky 
2001).32 
Thus, while Jewish law does not confer legal parenthood upon adoptive parents, it 
will treat social parents, at times, but not comprehensively so, akin to natural parents. 
This is because while Jewish law does not principally recognize adoptive parents as legal 
parents, it does recognize them as moral and spiritual parents. Consider the below 
talmudic passage whose intent is to impress a moral and spiritual judgment, rather than 
legal assertion:33 
Whoever raises an orphan in his home, Scripture accounts it is as if he gave birth 
to the child. Rabbi Chanina learns [the above lesson] from here: “And the women 
neighbors gave him a name saying, ‘A son is born to Naomi’” (Ruth 4:17). But 
was it Naomi who gave birth? Didn’t Ruth give birth? Rather, Ruth bore him and 
Naomi raised him. Therefore, he is identified as Naomi’s child. Rabbi Yochanan 
says from here: “And his Judahite wife bore Jered, father of Gedor; Heber, father 
of Soco; Jekutiel, father of Zanoah. There were the sons of Bithiah, daughter of 
                                                 
32 See Lamm 2000, 216-7, who categorizes adopted children mourning “those who have taken them in and 
cared for them” as “discretionary mourners.” 
33 For an overview of the literary sources of Jewish law, see Chapter Two, “Process and Methodologies of 
Halakhah,” p. 89 ff. For their method of citation and abbreviation, and sources of translation, see 
References. 
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Pharaoh, whom Mered married” (I Chronicles 4:18).34 But did Bithiah bear 
Moses? Didn’t Jocheved give birth to Moses?! Rather, Jocheved bore him, but 
Bithiah raised him. Therefore, Moses was identified as her child. (TB Sanhedrin 
19b) 
 
The Talmud then extends further the scope of moral and spiritual parenthood to even 
those who provide for physical sustenance of others, beyond parental-surrogate nurturing 
and rearing:  
Rabbi Elazar learns it from here: “By Your arm You redeemed Your people, the 
children of Jacob and Joseph” (Psalms 77:16). Now, did Joseph father [the twelve 
tribes]? Didn’t Jacob father them?! Rather, Jacob fathered them, but Joseph 
supported and sustained them. Therefore, they [i.e., the twelve tribes] are called 
by his name. (ibid.) 
 
Finally, the Talmud then assigns moral and spiritual parenthood to educators who teach a 
child Torah. 
Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: Whoever 
teaches Torah to his fellow’s child, Scripture accounts him as the child’s parent. 
As it is said, “This is the lineage of Aaron and Moses at the time that the Lord 
spoke with Moses on Mount Sinai” (Number 3:1). But in the very next verse it 
says, “These were the names of Aaron’s sons...” (3:2). [The intent of the Torah 
here is] to say to you that Aaron fathered and Moses taught them, and therefore 
they are [also] called by his name. (ibid.). 
 
This superlative evaluation of raising another’s child as a form of moral and spiritual 
parenthood is indeed practically reflected in natural parent-like obligations of support, 
care, and governance toward the child, and in reciprocal duties of honor by the child 
toward his or her adoptive parents in life and thereafter.35 However, the legal mechanism 
underlying these duties and obligations stem not from a legal status akin to natural 
                                                 
34 The Rabbis interpreted “Jered,” “Heber,” and “Jekutiel” all as alternate names of Moses, and Bithiah, the 
daughter of Pharaoh, is the Egyptian princess that pulled Moses from the reeds of the Nile. 
35 See Wolowelsky 2001. 
25 
 
 
parenthood, but from the consequences of other legal principles and institutions. Thus, 
the adoptive parent who raises another’s child is viewed in Jewish law, alternatively: one, 
as an agent of the natural parents who is empowered to fulfill in their stead their duties 
toward the child (Broyde 1988, 147); two, as an appointed, or de facto, legal guardian, 
i.e. apotropos, of the child, who is duty-bound to care for the child’s lodging, sustenance, 
and education, as well as to serve as a trustee for any property belonging to the child 
(Schereschwersky 1995a, 442; 1995b); three, as a person bound by a promise or oath to 
provide for the welfare of the child, as if it were his or her own (Silverstein 1974). Thus, 
as opposed to American law, for example, Jewish law does not fundamentally recognize 
the authority or power of a governmental agency or court to sever or destroy the bonds of 
natural parenthood, or conversely to create for adoptive parents a full legal status equal to 
that of natural parenthood (Broyde 1988, 149-52). Interestingly, in the modern State of 
Israel, in keeping with contemporary international legal conventions of adoption, the 
1960 Adoption of Children Law empowers district courts, and with consent of all 
interested parties, state-recognized rabbinical courts, to sever pre-existing ties between a 
child and his or her natural parents, and create new familial ties with adoptive parents 
akin to natural parents. However, in deference to Jewish family law, which is 
predominantly determinative of Israeli civil family law, the halakhic prohibitions and 
permissions pertaining to marriage and divorce continue to apply restrictively to natural 
parents and permissively to adoptive custodians and their respective relatives 
26 
 
 
(Schereschewsky 1995a).36 The legal and halakhic status of adoptive relationships has 
significance within ART, since some parental outcomes through ART may be grounded 
in natural parenthood, or, alternatively, by way of legal adoption.  
 
After Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
 
  With the rise of ART, the complexities of collaborative reproduction have 
challenged viewing parenthood solely through the lens of the two primary paradigms: 
natural procreation by a unique woman and man, and adoption. Collaborative 
reproduction involves many participating actors and agents, thus fragmenting the 
procreative process, and perhaps even our understanding and definition of parenthood 
(Margalit, Levy, and Loike 2014). Utilizing third-party gamete providers, employing 
gestational surrogates, and involving genetic counselors, medical fertility clinicians, and 
lab technicians, have all inspired philosophers and ethicists to reconsider the 
philosophical grounds of parenthood. Competing legal claims, courtroom conflicts, and 
inconsistent judicial rulings have led lawyers, jurists, and legislators to adjudicate the 
bases of parental rights and responsibilities. Rapidly advancing assisted reproductive 
technological capabilities, coupled with acute biological, genetic, and genomic 
understanding, have expanded and textured these new philosophical and legal 
considerations of procreation and parenthood (Brake and Millum 2013, 1, 22). 
                                                 
36 Such a legal policy by necessity requires open adoption records, which indeed is the case in Israel. See 
Birenbaum-Carmeli and Carmeli 2010. 
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In this Jewish “Religion and Science” dissertation, I will demonstrate that parallel 
processes of philosophical refinement and legal adjudication are similarly taking place 
within the related disciplines of medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics. While Jewish 
law tends not to create new legal categories, it will necessarily still contend with new 
forms of parenthood born of collaborative reproduction, even as it seeks to frame these 
new forms within the established primary halakhic paradigm of natural procreation and 
parenthood. The interaction of science and religion helps shape epistemological 
orientations, i.e., scientific understanding and the role of new knowledge, as well as 
axiological orientations, i.e., the values undergirding moral and religious judgments. 
Consequently, Jewish religion and science relations impinge on the resultant Jewish legal 
and bioethical analyses and their conclusions. 
 
The Philosophical Grounds of Parenthood 
 
Though nuanced opinions on the philosophical and legal bases of procreation and 
parenthood proliferate in secular and religious Jewish and non-Jewish scholarship, they 
may arguably be reduced to hinging on two fundamental questions: first, should there be 
a monist or pluralist standard for deciding parenthood; and second, should the grounds 
for parenthood be causal or voluntarist? 
 
Monist or Pluralist? 
 Monist accounts of parenthood assert that there ontologically is, or conventionally 
needs to be, one necessary and sufficient philosophical property or condition to generate 
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a parental relationship. Said property or condition defeats all competing claims, despite 
complex real-life circumstances and the relative worthiness of other considerations 
(Bayne and Kolers 2003). Thus, for example, armed with the scientific knowledge of 
molecular genetics as the principal determinant of developmental biology, one may assert 
that genetics ontologically is, or conventionally should be, the necessary and sufficient 
property that rightfully determines paternity and maternity. In monist geneticism, the 
sperm donor is thus always the natural father, and the ovum donor is always the natural 
mother. Should a person or a couple other than the genetic father or genetic mother seek 
to raise the child, this then should be viewed as an adoptive relationship, or some other 
government-sanctioned, legally created, newly socially constructed definition of non-
natural parenthood. If more than one man or one woman contribute genetic material, such 
as in the case of mitochondrial replacement therapy, i.e., “three-parent babies,” or if only 
one person contributes genetic material, such as in the case of cloning, then one must 
admit that strong geneticism, even within a monist account, may allow for more than, or 
less than, two natural parents. Alternatively, in the case of tri-gametic offspring, one 
would have to weigh and compare the relative merits of the genetic contributions, and 
identify a principle by which a determination may be made as to whom should be 
identified as the unique natural mother and father. Thus, in the case of mitochondrial 
replacement therapy, one may argue that nDNA plays the overwhelmingly dominant role 
in developmental biology, and one may therefore view the contribution of mtDNA as 
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relatively negligible.37 The point here is not to advocate for a genetic basis for the 
determination of paternity and maternity, but to demonstrate a monist standard. The 
advantages of a monist standard stem from definitional clarity and purported universal 
applicability. The disadvantages of a monist standard are rooted in definitional 
inflexibility despite extenuating circumstances, and the problem of parity, i.e. not all 
accounts of parenthood apply universally, or equally to mother and father. For example, 
while we can speak of a genetic account of both paternity and maternity within 
parenthood, we cannot do the same with a gestational account since a man cannot gestate 
(Brake and Millum 2013, 26).  
 Pluralist accounts argue that more than one property or condition may sufficiently 
ground parenthood (Bayne and Kolers 2003). Thus, for example, in the case of 
gestational surrogacy, instead of debating the relative merits of using a genetic or 
gestational standard for maternity, one can recognize both properties, possibly among yet 
other candidates, as sufficient to establish maternity. Here too one may allow for more 
than, or less than, two natural parents, such as a genetic mother and a gestational mother, 
in addition to the sperm-donating father. Alternatively, a pluralist account may also seek 
a unique mother and father, but recognize multiple bases as sufficient to make a maternal 
or paternal claim. Deciding between competing claims may be circumstantial, and/or 
arrived at by consensus, contract, or court adjudication. Even though Jewish law only 
recognizes natural parenthood, medical halakhists and Jewish bioethicists also debate 
                                                 
37 See Weiss 2013, an American-born, Israeli halakhist, who argues by way of the legal principle of 
qualitative majority that maternal nDNA, and not mtDNA, is determinative of maternity.  
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whether there should be a monist or pluralist account of parenthood, as will be shown 
below in chapters five through seven. 
 While monist accounts may be arbitrarily chosen and conventionally serve as a 
legal or social construct, more likely, proponents of a particular monist standard will 
argue the necessity, or, at least, superiority of their asserted standard. Pluralist accounts 
likewise may point to at least two larger viewpoints. Should definitions of parenthood be 
seen as culturally conditioned social constructs, then the burden arguably falls upon 
monists to defend why there should only be a single, hegemonic standard. Just like legal 
adoption expands the definition of parenthood beyond the biological, so too in a world of 
assisted reproductive technologies, changing family structures, and shifting demographics 
we should admit a plurality of grounds for parenthood (Lifshitz 2014).38 At the same 
time, should one opine that all legitimate definitions of natural parenthood begin with 
natural procreation, such as in the case of halakhah, then expanded pluralist accounts of 
natural parenthood would necessarily be limited to technologically separable conditions 
of natural procreation, i.e., conception, genetic contribution, gestation, and parturition. 
 
Causal or Voluntarist? 
Whether one adopts a monist or pluralist account of parenthood, one still needs to 
qualify exactly what properties or conditions are potentially sufficient to ground 
parenthood, and thereby morally and legally attach attendant parental rights and 
                                                 
38 For studies of changing family structures in the Jewish communities of North America and Israel, see 
Wertheimer 2005; Fishman 2015. For articles on unconventional families and the social good, see Narayan 
and Bartkowiak 1999. 
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responsibilities. In recent years, philosophers of family, as mentioned above, have 
identified several such conceptual grounds for parenthood: genetic, gestational, labor-
based, intentional, voluntarist, beneficent, and causal (Brake and Millum 2014, 25-32). 
Reducing them further, they arguably break down into two fundamental categories: 
causal or voluntarist. These two elementary groupings may at first seem to track with the 
two aforementioned pre-ART primary paradigms of parenthood: causal with natural 
procreation, and voluntarist with adoption. While there is some truth to this observation, 
after the introduction of ART, the grounds and scopes of causal and voluntary accounts 
of parenthood have extended beyond the more narrowly construed categories of natural 
procreation and legal adoption. 
Causal accounts of parenthood potentially include any biological or non-
biological substantive donation or effort that contributes to the existence of a child. 
Parental candidates therefore include genetic donors, gestational carriers, parturitional 
actors, procreative facilitators, and if extended beyond the moment of birth, any other 
contributors of labor and/or resources to the support and development of the child until 
the child reaches the presumed age or state of self-sufficiency.39 Causation alone, thus, 
generates too broad a grounding for parenthood, therefore demanding further narrowing, 
perhaps by differentiating between necessary and unnecessary causes. However, 
practically, “but for” counterfactuals do not severely enough constrain causal parental 
                                                 
39 Stipulating “until the age of self-sufficiency” is inexact and context dependent. Legal majority may also 
serve as a terminus ad quem. A potentially helpful analogue may be found in adoption laws. Many 
countries do not allow adoption after age eighteen or twenty-one. In Israel, there is no legal adoption for 
persons over eighteen, see Schereschewsky 1995a, 441. In America, adult adoption is permitted and usually 
leveraged for inheritance purposes, see Ratliff 2011.  
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candidates. Consider, for example, the matchmaker who introduced the natural parents, 
or an in-law who pressured a newly married couple to begin a family. They too might 
also be identified as necessary causes, but for whom the child would not have come into 
existence, at least in a particular case at hand (Blustein 1997, 82-3; Brake and Millum 
2013, 31-2). Similarly, fertility clinic doctors and lab technicians, as well as an 
obstetrician, midwife, or surgeon who performs a caesarian section, play essential 
causative roles. Further differentiating between proximate and secondary causes may be 
helpful, though these too can have blurry boundaries. Therefore, it is seemingly best to 
begin with causal accounts factored out from natural procreation and then build out 
causal possibilities from there. 
 
Genetic Accounts 
 Genetic accounts of parenthood directly derive from natural procreation as 
informed by the scientific understanding of the biological mechanisms of conception, and 
molecular genetics as primarily determinative of fetal and human development. Genetic 
accounts ground parenthood in a larger network of familial connections, themselves 
rooted in common genetic origins. A genetic standard points to a necessary and 
proximate causal account, one that provides parity for both paternal and maternal claims 
(Bayne and Kolers 2003; Austin 2004). 
 Critics of simple causal accounts, like genetics, point out that simple causation 
does not require intention or informed, voluntary, and understanding consent, thus 
assigning parenthood to accidental fathers and mothers whose method of contraception 
33 
 
 
failed them, or who didn’t understand the linkage between pregnancy and sexual 
activity.40 Since parenthood is not only a biological or social description, but entails a 
moral relationship, some argue that it is unclear how simple causation generates moral 
responsibility. One would have to say that procreating and causing a child to come into 
dependent and vulnerable existence creates a compensatory obligation of caring for the 
child’s welfare. This view invites several questions, such as: should such procreative 
costs be minimally construed and require only that which is necessary for the child’s 
survival? Or should they be maximally envisioned, including a duty to love, and all other 
efforts required to ensure the flourishing of the child? Additionally, if parenthood is to be 
grounded in compensation for causal harm to the child, do the weighty and enduring 
responsibilities of parenthood equal the procreative costs initially engendered? And, 
should a negative conception of parenthood framed as compensation for causal harm, 
rather than a positive conception born of voluntarist intent, serve as the basis for a 
culturally valorized parenthood (Brake 2010; Brake and Millum 2013, 32)? 
 Some theorists wish to ground the genetic account more deeply by claiming it is 
not a matter of simple causation, but the creation of a child out of one’s own genetic 
material that conveys parental rights and obligations through rights of ownership. The 
child is a product of parental genetic contribution and thus rightfully belongs to them 
                                                 
40 Clearly, accidental pregnancy is much more consquential for a woman than a man. See Millum 2008, 
who combines causation with intention by proposing a “conventional-acts” account. He solves the 
philosophical problem of accidental fathers by upholding parenthood as a social institution that assigns 
paternity and its attendant responsibilities to those who voluntarily commission an act, i.e., sexual 
intercourse, which conventionally leads to the acquisition of paternal responsibilities. This wouldn’t, 
however, help in the case of stolen gametes.  
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(Hall 1999).41 Antagonists to this approach mount four objections: first, property-based 
foundations of parenthood privilege parental rights over responsibilities, to the potential 
detriment of a child’s welfare (Kolers and Bayne 2001); second, if self-ownership 
justifies parental claims over their child, the child’s own self-ownership should likewise 
empower the child to defeat such claims (Archand 1990); third, a sophisticated 
understanding of genetics reveals that genes represent shared information and not 
substantive contribution, thereby privileging form over matter (Silver 2001; Brake and 
Millum 2013, 25-6); fourth, environmental factors, i.e., epigenetics, especially during 
gestation, influence gene modification and expression (Mukherjee 2016, 393-410). 
 
Gestational and Labor-based Accounts 
 Gestational accounts, on the other hand, argue that beyond the first embryonic cell 
of conception, the material development of the child accrues to the female gestator, who 
thus serves as a more formative causal agent (Silver 2001). Additionally, the woman who 
serves as the gestational actor invests significant biological and extra-biological 
resources, i.e., “labor,” to produce a child, including personal discomfort, distress, and 
health risks, thereby better grounding the moral parental relationship in responsibility 
rather than in rights, which is a definition of parenthood to the benefit of the child 
(Narayan 1999). Furthermore, the identity of the gestational carrier is clear at parturition, 
and it is arguably of benefit to the welfare of a child to have a readily identifiable mother 
                                                 
41 Hall 1999 bases her analysis on John Locke’s theory of self-ownership, as articulated in his “Theory of 
[Just] Acquisition” in “Two Treatises of Government.” 
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(Annas 1984). Also, in light of our developing understanding of embryonic development 
and epigenetics, the female gestational host can be said to also play a genetically 
determinative role. Therefore, for example, in a case of surrogacy in which the female 
genetic donor or donors, i.e., ovum or embryo, nDNA and/or mtDNA, are different than 
the gestational carrier, maternity should still be assigned to the “surrogate mother.” 
Finally, the experience of pregnancy and gestation within a woman’s body also creates a 
powerful maternal bond with the developing fetus. For those interested in upholding the 
principle of parity, however, a gestational standard fails to ground paternity (Brake and 
Millum 2013, 26, 28).  
 Framing gestation within a broader “labor-based” account allows theorists to 
extend causal accounts to include non-biological agents. Custodial care-givers and 
adoptive parents who invest labor, love, and finite resources into the rearing of a child 
can earn a parental claim, especially when parenthood is seen primarily as a moral 
relationship of beneficence toward the child (Millum 2010). Labor-based accounts, 
beyond gestational, seemingly combine causal factors with intentional and voluntarist 
accounts. Thus, if several broadly construed, labor-based candidates vie for parental 
status, how do we adjudicate their competing claims? Do we privilege biological causal 
agents or non-biological voluntary ones?  
 
Voluntarist Accounts 
Voluntarist accounts indeed understand parenthood more as a moral relationship 
of responsibilities and rights than a biological claim of kinship, thereby focusing on 
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parental agency rather than biological causality. In an age of ART, proponents of 
voluntarist or intentionalist accounts argue that older categories of conventional 
parenthood fail (Margalit, Levy, and Loike 2014). Especially in cases of collaborative 
reproduction, it is the parents who align the ART medical professionals, arrange the 
contributing parties, oversee and support the process, all the while intending to bring into 
the world a child who they plan to raise as their child, regardless of who provides the 
requisite genetic materials, hosts the fetus through gestation, or achieves the underlying 
technical feats in the medical office and laboratory (Hill 1991). Staking out an ethical 
platform, voluntarists privilege obligations assumed voluntarily and autonomously over 
those imposed heteronomously and therefore involuntarily borne. However, at least three 
objections may be leveled at voluntarism: first, since accidental parents lack 
intentionality at the time of conception should they be absolved of their parental 
obligations?42; second, why should we avoid involuntary obligations for parents when we 
impose filial and sibling duties upon offspring?; and third, voluntarists cannot totally 
avoid the imposition of involuntary obligations upon parents since parental duties and 
expectations are set by law and society and not by individual conscience or volition alone 
(Brake and Millum 2013, 29-31).  
 
The Halakhic Grounds of Parenthood 
 
 Even though Jewish law identifies itself as a heteronomous system of obligations 
and responsibilities expressed through affirmative duties and prohibited actions, 
                                                 
42 See above n40.  
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intentionality and volition still play robust roles. Thus, non-biological, functional parents, 
i.e., those who raise another’s child, are acknowledged and lauded as examples of moral 
and spiritual parenthood. At the same time, halakhah does not recognize the ability to 
socially construct and confer legal status upon non-biological parents; only natural 
parents can acquire full legal parental status. In a pre-ART world, natural parenthood was 
a direct outgrowth of natural procreation, yielding a unique father and mother.43 
However, with the rise of assisted reproductive technologies, especially collaborative 
reproduction, medical halakhists and Jewish bioethicists, like society at large, need to 
look more closely at the grounds of maternity and paternity in our brave new world. As I 
will demonstrate in Part Two (chapters four through seven) of this dissertation, parallel 
deliberations of the grounds of parenthood to those cited above will enter into the 
halakhic analysis and debate surrounding the utilization and outcomes of ART. Among 
halakhists and Jewish bioethicists, we will find monist and pluralist accounts of 
parenthood, as well as causal and even voluntarist considerations employed in 
deciphering parental status. With the arrival of ART, most halakhists and Jewish 
bioethicists first focused on known biological milestones of pregnancy, i.e., conception, 
                                                 
43 The privileging of a unique father and mother is in step with Rabbinic Judaism’s construction of a 
heteronormative Jewish society of men and women whose individual rights and obligations are based on 
pronounced binary gender legal classifications. At the same time, rabbinic literature also employs within its 
logical analysis of gendered topics not only male and female types, but also ambiguously gendered, 
intersexual types, such as the dual-sexed hermaphrodite, i.e., andrigonos, and the non-sexed or 
indecipherably sexed person, i.e. tumtum. See Broyde 1988, 153-7; 2016a; Steinberg 2003b; 2003f. It is a 
matter of scholarly debate as to why the Rabbis explored how to assign gender classifications based on 
human sexual dimorphism to hybrid sexes or non-sexes, i.e., male, female, both, or neither. Was it because 
of these types’ contribution to rigorous logical analysis, or because of their actual phenomenological 
incidence in ancient Greco-Roman Palestine? See Fonrobert 2007. Regardless, it is possible that their 
frequent mention in talmudic literature on topics of gender open future consideration of parenthood 
structures within halakhic analysis beyond the simple father-mother duality. Cf. Ben-Ephraim 2004; Gray 
2015. 
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gestation, parturition, to demarcate parental claims. These distinct occasions are clearly 
identified within older, even ancient discussions of parenthood, such as in the Talmud. 
However, as exposure to advancing scientific knowledge and technological capability has 
grown, medical halakhists and Jewish bioethicists have begun to incorporate 
consideration of genetic grounds for parenthood in their halakhic and bioethical analyses. 
To what extent such new knowledge impinges will be shown to depend on the relation of 
religion and science in the epistemology and axiology of the thinker. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
Jewish Bio and Genetic Ethics 
The History and Foundational Models of Contemporary Jewish Bioethics and 
Medical Halakhah (Jewish Law) 
 
The literature of Jewish bioethics has been steadily growing over the past fifty 
years, primarily in America and Israel. Like in other emerging fields of inquiry, there has 
been a recognizable pattern to the evolution of its literary corpus. First, general treatises 
by trailblazing scholars open the investigation.1 Once a sufficient number of scholars 
demonstrate interest in the topic of study, multi-author compilations of essays are 
produced.2 While the publication of general treatises and compilations continue to fine 
tune and deepen the original framework of scholarly research, specialization soon follows 
greatly expanding the scope of interest and application of ideas. Initial examinations of 
specific topics within the field preliminarily formulated in short articles are soon 
developed into full, book-length treatments.3 Individual articles are first published in 
journals inclusive of more general scholarly interest.4 When a critical mass of authors and 
                                                 
1 Although in 1911, German Jewish scholar Julius Preuss published Biblische-Talmudische Medizin 
(Biblical and Talmudic Medicine), his project better aligns with the nineteenth-century Wissenschaft des 
Judentum scholarly movement focused on textual and historical analysis than with the initiation of Jewish 
Medical Ethics. See Preuss 1993; Rosner 1977. Jacobovitz 1975 (first published in 1959) inaugurated the 
field. See below. 
2 See Rosner and Bleich 2000 (first published in 1979). 
3 The earliest example of this phenomenon would be Feldman’s (Feldman 1968) book-length treatment of 
abortion and contraception in Jewish law. A more recent example would be the question of defining death 
by either cardiac or neurological criteria, see Shabtai 2012. 
4 For example, Judaism, RJJ Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, and Tradition, three 
prominent American scholarly journals of more general Judaic interest, were primary media of the 
publication of Jewish bioethics in the 1960s through the 1980s, after which new journals began to 
proliferate. It should also be noted that more general medical journals and law review journals were also 
utilized for publication during this time period. While specialized journals soon emerged within both the 
general and Jewish study of biomedical ethics, it should be further noted that bioethical publications still 
appear in more general journals and magazines when there is an intention to include a non-professional 
readership. 
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topics has been reached, in large part driven by pressing and problematic actual cases, 
i.e., bioethical casuistry, new journals specifically dedicated to the field of inquiry are 
inaugurated.5 When sufficient research on a broad array of topics has been achieved, 
encyclopedias are produced.6 When concurrent with this literary development 
conferences dedicated to the field are held, professional societies are started, and college 
courses and graduate programs arise, the field of inquiry matures into an academic 
discipline. The development of the field of Jewish bioethics and its literature has indeed 
followed this trajectory.7  
Although there has been a modest history of interaction between Jewish law, 
theology, and medical interventions since Biblical times through the nineteenth century, 
the field of bioethics, more generally, and Jewish bioethics, more particularly, emerged in 
the second half of the twentieth century in the aftermath of the Holocaust, along with 
rapid advances in medical technologies.8 Beginning in 1947 at the Nuremberg Doctors’ 
trials, post-Holocaust concerns regarding the ethics of scientific experimentation on 
humans, eugenics, and the privileging of personal autonomy as a human right, i.e., 
                                                 
5 For example, Assia: A Journal of Jewish Ethics and Halacha (Hebrew), and its English language 
counterpart Jewish Medical Ethics and Halacha (JME), first published in 1989 by the Dr. Falk Schlesinger 
Institute for Medical-Halachic Research, Shaare Zedek Medical Center, Jerusalem, which itself was 
founded in the late 1960s.  
6 See Steinberg 2003a, first published in Hebrew in 1988. 
7 See Halperin 2004, in which he charts the historical development of Jewish Bioethics in Israel from 1948-
1998, which essentially and chronologically tracks stepwise with the American version of the field. The 
most notable difference between American and Israeli Jewish Bioethics is that in Israel the field has a 
marked influence on legislation. See Sinclair 2003. 
8 Newman 1998, 4-14, credits nineteenth-and-twentieth-century liberal Judaism with initiating the critical 
study of ethics due to Reform Judaism’s emphasis on ethics instead of ritual obligation. Interestingly, 
Jewish bioethics, however, was first cultivated by Orthodox Jewish scholars since it was first perceived as a 
specialized inquiry of ongoing development of Jewish law in response to actual cases. See more on this 
below. 
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informed, voluntary, and understanding consent over medical paternalism, led to the 
formulation of the Nuremberg Code directing medical research ethics (Grodin and Annas 
1992). Subsequent advances in scientific knowledge and technological achievement, for 
example, artificial life support, plus the increasingly complicated administration of the 
burgeoning health-care industry, all gave rise to the need for the specialized study of 
medical and biological applied ethics (Barilan 2014, 8).9 In the late 1950s, Immanuel 
Jacobovitz, former Chief Rabbi of Ireland and rabbi of the Fifth Avenue Synagogue in 
New York, later Chief Rabbi of England, published the first book of Jewish bioethics, his 
newly minted Ph.D. thesis, Jewish Medical Ethics (Jacobovitz 1975, first published in 
1959; Crane 2013, 12).10 Jonathan K. Crane (2013, 12-15), a professor of bioethics at 
Emory University, attributes to Jakobovitz two guiding and constraining methodological 
principles that shaped the first few generations of Jewish biomedical ethics: the primacy 
of Jewish law and its attendant push to discover within the Jewish legal textual tradition 
clear and definitive normative conclusions.11 
 As the more general field of medical and biological ethics diversified not only 
regarding topics of interest, but also in terms of ethical theories and methodologies, 
                                                 
9 Dorff and Crane 2013, 1-3, distinguish between “morals,” which refers to judgments about specific issues, 
and “ethics,” which refers to theories of morality. Other define “morals” as a tradition of beliefs 
surrounding right or wrong human conduct, while normative “ethics” refers to the nature and justification 
of decision-making principles. Many authors in Jewish bioethics, however, are not careful about this 
distinction conventional in the academic philosophical study of ethics. 
10 Crane 2013, 12, suggests that Jakobovits was inspired by the then emerging model of Catholic medical 
ethics. In an address in 1958, Pope Pius XII (1958) spoke to medical ethical issues surrounding palliative 
care and end-of-life treatment. For example, his definition of the doctrine of double effect became highly 
influential in subsequent twentieth-century medical ethics, see Treloar 2013. Jakobovits (1975 xxxv, first 
published in 1959), in his introduction, does indeed state: “The Paucity of Jewish works on medical ethics 
contrasts sharply with the profusion of Roman Catholic literary material in this field.” However, he does 
not explicitly reference Pope Pius XII’s address.  
11 See also Newman 1998, 188-91, 198.  
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Jewish biomedical ethics likewise followed suit.12 The involvement of rabbinical scholars 
from non-Orthodox Jewish denominations, as well as Jewish, university-trained 
bioethicists, also helped expand the field beyond the predominantly strictly halakhic 
concerns of Orthodox Jewish scholars. It should also be noted, in keeping with the 
“Religion and Science” thesis of this dissertation (see p. 8 above), that the more general 
and specifically Jewish expansion of bioethical theory and method ultimately has begun 
to influence the theories and methods of some legally oriented Orthodox Jewish scholars, 
as will be demonstrated below, as well as in chapters five through seven.  
Surveying the literary landscape of contemporary Jewish bioethics, Louis E. 
Newman (1998, 188-203), professor of Religion and Jewish Studies at Carleton College 
identifies three foundational Jewish bioethical models: the legal, covenantal, and 
narrative.13 This tripartite division provides us with a helpful schema within which to 
review contemporary Jewish bioethical literature. To these three, we need to add two 
more: feminist Jewish bioethics and judaized bioethics. Judaized bioethics is somewhat 
of a catch-all category that includes a broad variety of bioethical scholarship by trained 
bioethicists, medical practitioners, scientists, and lawyers of Jewish heritage who turn, in 
part or in whole, to the Jewish textual tradition to further develop their philosophical 
inquiries (Crane 2013, 15). Although the legal model is historically dominant in the field, 
we will first take up the covenantal, narrative, feminist, and judaized types in order to 
better appreciate how these models and their own influences have begun to impinge on 
                                                 
12 For example, see Childress 2009, for a presentation on a variety of methods in bioethics. 
13 Also see Crane 2013, 12-15, 30-41, who further develops Newman’s models. 
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the further development of the legal model in the latest generation of halakhically 
oriented Jewish bioethical research. 
 
Covenantal Jewish Bioethics 
 Covenantal ethics are based on the idea that each Jewish person, and the Jewish 
people as a whole, live in dialectical relationship with God to whom Jews are bound by 
their covenantal commitments. On the one hand, it is affirmed that God has instructed the 
Jewish people to perfect the world and has equipped them with the resources and power 
to do so. On the other hand, the application of power usually entails moral decision 
making, and thus it is a Jewish religious duty to grapple with how the use or restriction of 
power better enacts and advances Jewish covenantal values and goals. 
 In a covenantal framework, for example, the safeguarding of human life is a near-
absolute value. Given the covenantal value of esteeming all human life and seeking its 
betterment, how might covenantal ethics then guide a decision of whether or not to abort 
a fetus? On the one hand, abortion, as the ending of life, even at a prenatal stage, 
arguably erodes a respect for all life. On the other hand, an abortion may be motivated by 
the desire to enhance or preserve the quality of life of the mother. A covenantal approach 
to ethical decision making would therefore recognize a question of abortion as a conflict 
between two life-affirming choices and seek the best resolution given the particular 
circumstances (Greenberg 1986).14 
                                                 
14 It is interesting to note that while Greenberg himself is an Orthodox rabbi, his ethical methodology is not 
rooted in the Jewish legal model to be discussed below. Greenberg believes that the Holocaust taught Jews 
not to let law alone decide the right and the good, but to measure the law against larger covenantal values. 
His brief analysis of this weighty issue perplexes as he frames the conflict of values as between a general 
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Additionally, living in faithful covenantal relationship with God requires that 
Jews aspire to continuity with earlier generations of their faith community who similarly 
upheld their covenantal commitments to God, Torah, and Israel (Borowitz 1991). Thus, 
there is always a present need to consult Judaism’s historic religious literature to help 
frame issues within a religio-cultural continuum. At the same time, while Jewish 
covenantal ethicists strive for a continuity of fundamental covenantal values, changing 
cultural and historical circumstances may open their eyes to the need for radical changes 
in their application to real life, such as in redefining Jewish sexual ethics, and 
reevaluating gender roles and relations (Adler 1998). Put simply, a covenantal-ethical 
approach to bioethical issues and dilemmas challenges a Jew to define his or her 
covenantal values and commitments, assess their continuity with the past, reflect upon 
their potential impact on the future, and thereby make moral decisions pertaining to the 
present. Needless to say, covenantal ethics presents a potent, but rather loose rubric by 
which to justify moral decisions.15 This approach aligns best with Reform Jewish 
theology, which upholds full autonomy in personal decision making and does not 
recognize the heteronomous obligations of Jewish law (Marmur 2013). Although the 
Jewish bioethical literature exercising this methodological model is quite limited, given 
the relatively large size of the Reform Jewish community within the overall Jewish 
population, it is a reasonable conjecture that many medical decisions made by American 
                                                 
“weakening of respect for all life,” and the quality of life of a particular mother, for whom an abortion “can 
be the difference between life and a blasted life” (Greenberg 1986, 145-6). It would seem more apt to frame 
the conflict as choosing between the respect for the developing life of a particular fetus, i.e., fetal 
indication, and the respect for the physical and emotional quality of life of a particular woman, i.e., 
maternal indication. For more on Greenberg’s ethics of power, see Greenberg, 1995. 
15 For a cogent critique of the Covenantal method, see Dorff 1995, 163-5. 
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Jews in consultation with their rabbis more than less follow the basic method of 
covenantal ethics.16 The bioethical literature produced by rabbis and scholars of the 
Reform movement utilize traditional Jewish and contemporary bioethical sources to 
create persuasive recommendations, but ultimately affirm the right of the individual to 
make autonomous decisions, preferably in line with Jewish covenantal commitments. The 
bioethical scholarship of the Reform community includes the works of rabbis Philip M. 
Cohen Ph.D., William Cutter Ph.D., Walter Jacob D.H.L., Leonard S. Kravitz Ph.D., 
Mark Washofsky Ph.D., and Moshe Zemer Ph.D.17 As more women entered the Reform 
rabbinate, so did their participation in covenantal Jewish bioethics. The Central 
Conference of American Rabbis Journal of the Reform rabbinical association dedicated 
their Summer 2012 issue to a symposium on Judaism, Health, and Healing, that 
consistently reflects this overall method and trajectory (Crane 2013, 14).18 
 
Narrative Jewish Bioethics 
At least four twentieth-century intellectual currents merge to give rise to Jewish 
narrative biomedical ethics. The first is the reclamation of aggadah by haskalah (Eastern-
European Jewish enlightenment) and Zionist thinkers in the beginning of the twentieth 
                                                 
16 Reconstructionist, Renewal, and other non-halakhic forms of Pluralistic and Post-denominational 
Judaism that privilege personal autonomy over religious heteronomy, should likewise be subsumed within 
this typology for the purpose of this schematization. See Sarna 2005, xix-xx, who prefers the term 
“movement” or “stream” to “denomination” when discussing the Jewish, as opposed to Protestant 
Christain, community. Jews’ strong ethnic ties historically have resisted strict denominational distinctions, 
often emphasizing shared peoplehood over differences.  
17 See Jacob and Zemer 1994; 1995; 1998; 1999; Gordon and Washofsky 2004; Cohen 2005; and Cutter 
2007. 
18 See Golomb, Prince and Wiener 2012. 
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century and continuing with the rise of the modern, culturally Jewish, secular State of 
Israel. Aggadah may best be described as non-legal rabbinic textual source material, but 
is sometimes appropriately translated as legend and lore. Midrash aggadah refers to non-
halakhic biblical interpretations.19 “Rabbinic Narrative” refers to stories about the 
rabbinic sages from the end of the Second Temple Period through the age of the 
Talmud.20 The arcane study of Jewish law was seen by these thinkers as behaviorally 
constraining, removed from real life, and typical of a diaspora mentality. For Zionist and 
Jewish enlightenment thinkers, lore and legend, story and poetry – all endow the Jewish 
people with spirit and vitality, a history and a future, and support a commitment to live 
life fully, not just within the four cubits of the academy, but in the field and on the street. 
For wissenschaft scholars, the academic study of folklore developed during the nineteenth 
century was applied in the early twentieth century to Jewish folklorist traditions.21 
Interest in the academic study of aggadah continued to grow throughout the twentieth 
century (Crane 2013, 22). Twentieth-century advances in literary theory and 
hermeneutics were likewise applied by late twentieth and twenty-first-century Jewish 
scholars to this developing field of interest.22 
                                                 
19 See pp. 19-20 above for an example of midrash aggadah concerning the special strength of Goliath from 
the Babylonian Talmud. See Strack and Stemberger 1996, 233-46, 276-359, for a survey of a survey of the 
extant literary sources of midrash aggadah from the rabbinic and medieval historical periods. See Holtz 
1992, 177-211, for an introduction to midrash aggadah’s exegetical method. 
20 For an introduction to the history of the Second Temple and Rabbinic periods, see Schiffman 1991. For 
an introduction to talmudic aggadah, i.e., rabbinic narrative, see Rubinstein 2002. For an introduction to 
Talmud, more generally, see Solomon 2009, xv-xlviii. 
21 “Wissenschaft” refers to the “Wissenschaft des Judentums” movement – i.e., the scientific study of Jews 
and Judaism that began in the early nineteenth century in Germany by Jewish scholars and continues until 
today in the academic field of Jewish Studies. See Meyer 2004. Louis Ginsberg’s The Legends of the Jews 
(2003), first published in the U.S. in six volumes from 1909-1938, represents renewed academic interest in 
Jewish folklore. See Hasan-Rokem and Gruenwald 2014. 
22 See Rubinstein 1999; Bakhos 2009. 
47 
 
 
The second intellectual current may be credited to Christian theologian Stanley 
Hauerwas. He championed a narrative approach to theology positing that it is our master 
narratives that provide us with the lenses through which we engage and interpret our 
world and find meaning within our life experiences (Hauerwas 1974, 45-6; Newman 
2008, 194-7). Judaism not only has a master narrative of the Exodus, but also a rich and 
diverse tradition of religious narrative in the aggadah.  
The third contributing current begins in 1984 with the landmark essay, “Nomos 
and Narrative,” by the late Yale Law professor, Robert Cover (1984; 1995) who 
acknowledged law and narrative’s respective distinctness, but nonetheless argued 
persuasively for their undeniable interrelatedness. Narrative creates the larger framework 
in which law is made intelligible (Crane 2013, 23). Cover’s thesis not only influenced 
legal studies in the United States and beyond, but also piqued the interest of Jewish 
scholars. Dramatic strides have been made in recent years in the study of the relationship 
of Jewish legal and narrative texts (Wimpfheimer 2011; Simon-Shoshan 2012; Kanarek 
2014). Harvard Law School dedicated a conference to this theme in 2005, the 
proceedings of which have been published in the Jewish law journal Dine Israel (Stone 
2007).  
The fourth and final impetus came from the rise of Christian and general narrative 
bioethics. Christian narrative bioethicists followed Hauerwas’s identification of the 
passion of Christ as the framing story through which to engage and interpret life 
experiences. Non-religious narrative bioethicists have looked to the personal narratives of 
the patient or people directly affected by a relevant bioethical concern or dilemma, as 
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well as beyond casuistry to health-related narratives within the literary traditions of the 
world (Nelson 1997; Charon and Montello 2002; Charon 2008). This new narrative 
bioethical approach inspired a new Jewish bioethical methodology which turns not to an 
analysis of Jewish law, but to engagement with rabbinic narrative as the heuristic guide to 
dealing with bioethical challenges.  
Jonathan K. Crane (2013) currently leads this new narrative approach in Jewish 
bioethics with his recently published, full-length book treatment of a short talmudic 
narrative telling of the martyrdom of Rabbi Chananya ben Teradyon. He investigates the 
history of interpretation of the story and how it has been used to buttress halakhic and 
ethical positions within the euthanasia debate. His goal is less to ascertain the best 
interpretation and its proper application within a legal analysis, but to demonstrate 
through this narrative case study how the innate ambiguities, ambivalences, and pluralism 
of interpretive meanings in narratives illustrate the ways in which life and art mirror each 
other. Real life bioethical conundrums, like their narrative analogues, are inescapably 
fraught with the messiness of life. Crane builds off the previous work in Jewish narrative 
bioethics on end-of-life decision making by Louis E. Newman (1990) and on the topic of 
euthanasia by William Cutter (1995; 2006). Laurie Zoloth (1999) of Northwestern 
University also models Jewish narrative bioethics by applying the biblical story of Ruth 
with its celebrated values of compassion, inclusion, and loyalty, to the social and 
biomedical ethical concern of universal health care. On whole, narrative bioethics remind 
us that we live our lives not as nuanced legal distinctions or pristine halakhic imperatives, 
but as messy, confusing, and even indeterminate occasions. A narrative bioethical 
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analysis thus brings human dimensionality to bioethical consideration. It also tracks wells 
with the clinical practice of medicine, which, at its best, frames patient care as a 
physician’s careful listening to a singular story of a person, in a context of place and time 
(Groopman 2007). 
 
Feminist Jewish Bioethics 
 One could argue that although feminist bioethics emerged as a disciplinary 
concentration in the early 1990s, feminist Jewish bioethics has not yet sufficiently 
developed to stand as an independent model. Indeed, there has yet to coalesce a critical 
mass of scholars and scholarship of feminist Jewish bioethics.23 However, to argue so 
narrowly would ignore the important feminist contributions being made in academic 
Jewish Studies and halakhic scholarship pertaining to issues of biomedical and ethical 
concern, especially as they relate to women’s health, sexuality, family purity laws, 
procreation, reproduction, and parenthood. 24 There are, at least, three categories of 
scholarship that arguably may be subsumed under feminist Jewish bioethics. First, 
religious Jewish women increasingly are being trained in the advanced study of rabbinic 
literature and halakhah, across the Jewish denominational spectrum, and especially within 
Orthodoxy, and have been publishing on topics of Jewish ritual practice and halakhah, 
including medical halakhah, sexuality, family purity laws, and Jewish bioethics.25 
                                                 
23 See Donchin and Scully 2015, for an introduction to Feminist Bioethics. See also Messer 2015; Thatcher 
2015. 
24 “Family Purity Laws” refers to halakhic regulation of intimacy between wife and husband before and 
after a menstrual cycle. See Zimmerman 2005. 
25 Rosenberg 2012 charts the growth of women’s Torah learning and concludes her article (pp. 197-200) by 
engaging the question of how has the nascent women’s Torah learning movement contributed new insights, 
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Women’s voices and perspectives are thus being added to a scholarly culture and 
worldview that until the late twentieth century has been predominately populated by men. 
Second, the robust disciplinary concentrations of Jewish gender studies and Jewish 
feminist ethics have applied feminist critique to a myriad of Jewish scholarly disciplines, 
including procreation and reproduction, viewing Jewish law, history, and textual 
interpretation through the lenses of power relationships and dynamics, and the 
contingency of gendered and embodied experience, as part of a social movement whose 
goals include global justice and equality for women.26 Ronit Irshai’s Fertility and Jewish 
Law: Feminist Perspectives on Orthodox Responsa (2012) is a notable contribution of a 
feminist critique of reproductive halakhah.27 Third, feminist Jewish bioethics as a 
disciplinary concentration within Jewish bioethics continues to develop.28  
 
Judaized Bioethics 
 Several professional bioethicists of Jewish heritage write works within general 
bioethics that are explicitly informed by their knowledge of Jewish studies, or write on 
Jewish bioethics informed by their knowledge of general bioethics. Baruch Brody (2003) 
                                                 
perspectives, and methods, thereby influencing the predominantly male orbit of Orthodox Torah study. 
Baumel Joseph 2007 anticipates that this new wave of women’s rabbinic scholarship will radically 
challenge the halakhic status quo.  
26 See Donchin and Scully 2015 4, 24-25, for fundamental aspects of feminist critique. For essays on 
procreation, contraception, fertility and infertility, and women’s involvement in birth and death ritual 
practices, see Millen 2004; Wahrman 2005. Also see Rosenfeld 2008 on formulating a contemporary 
Modern Orthodox sexual ethic, and Rosenfeld and Ribner 2011 who offer a psychologically informed 
primer on first experiences of marital intimacy for Orthodox Jewish newlyweds. 
27 See also Lasker and Parmet 1990; Kessler 2009. 
28 For an introduction to “Feminist Jewish Ethical Theories,” see Plaskow 2013. Laurie Zoloff’s (2016) 
Northwestern University research webpage heralds the coming publication of “Second Text: Essays 
Toward a Feminist Jewish Bioethics.” 
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of Baylor and Rice Universities champions the theory of pluralistic casuistry over and 
against the rigid “principlism” of some contemporary bioethics. Writing primarily in 
general bioethics, but at times in Jewish bioethics, Brody uses each of these related 
knowledge-sets to inform the other. The late Benjamin Freedman (1999) of McGill 
University likewise employed his Judaic and bioethical knowledge to construct a new 
Jewish bioethic based on the notion of duty. Laurie Zoloth, mentioned above, likewise 
fits this typology, as do Michael Grodin of Boston University, Alan Jotkowitz of Ben 
Gurion University,29 Hava Tirosh-Samuelson of Arizona State University,30 and many 
others. Jewish scholars of American and Israeli law who study the intersection of 
bioethics, secular law, and Jewish law, as well as medical practitioners, health care 
workers, and scientists who also study bioethics and Jewish bioethics also fit within this 
type. Their contributions can usually be found within the pages of law reviews and 
medical journals. Daniel B. Sinclair’s (2003) Jewish Biomedical Law: Legal and Extra-
legal Dimensions models the study of the intersection of law, halakhah, and bioethics, as 
do the writings of Rabbi Michael J. Broyde (see “Exemplars” below, p. 61). 
 
Jewish Legal Bioethics 
Jewish legal analysis dominates the field of Jewish biomedical ethics as its 
framing method and decisive hermeneutic. As noted above, much of the literature of the 
field even prefers the term medical halakhah to Jewish bioethics, or at least uses both 
                                                 
29 See Jotkowitz and Glick 2009; Jotkowitz 2010. 
30 See Tirosh-Samuelson 2005, 2009; and Tirosh-Samuelson and Mossman, eds. 2012. 
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terms interchangeably. In this model, Jewish legal discussions, debates, and case 
precedents from the variegated, multi-millennial, religious, legal, Jewish textual tradition 
are mined, marshaled, analyzed, and exercised to contend with contemporary bioethical 
challenges, concerns, and conundrums. Through conceptual analysis of ancient sources, 
as well as by employing analogical reasoning to apply seemingly unrelated precedents to 
novel circumstances, the contemporary scholar arrives at a normative conclusion. This 
was precisely the approach trail blazed by Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovitz when he 
inaugurated the field of Jewish medical ethics in the 1950s. This approach also finds 
consistency and continuity with the ongoing Jewish legal tradition. The most notable 
difference is that what would now be categorized as a bioethical question deserving of its 
own full analysis and explication had been previously asked and answered as a halakhic 
query about specific cases whose resolutions can be found scattered throughout halakhic 
responsa literature. Jakobovitz applied established halakhic research and analysis in a 
novel way to nascent topics of contemporary biomedical concern. 
 Two of the most prolific early and ongoing writers on Jewish medical ethics 
within this model are Rabbi J. David Bleich Ph.D. (see “Exemplars” below, p. 60) and 
Fred Rosner M.D. (1977, 2000). Rosner is professor emeritus at Albert Einstein and 
Mount Sinai medical schools, former Director of the Department of Medicine at Queens 
Hospital Center, and former chair of the Medical Ethics Committee of the State of New 
York. Rosner has produced nearly eight-hundred publications on Jewish Medical ethics, 
and Bleich’s literary output is similarly impressive (Crane 2013, 30-34). At the end of the 
introduction to Rosner and Bleich’s co-edited early compilation of essays in Jewish 
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Bioethics, Bleich tellingly mandates a bioethical approach of strict legal formalism and 
positivism.31 He concludes that there is only one way to answer bioethical questions: “He 
must examine them through the prism of halakhah for it is in the corpus of Jewish law as 
elucidated and transmitted from generation to generation that God has made His will 
known to man (Bleich 1979a, xxiii).” Numerous articles and books written in Hebrew 
and English by rabbinical scholars in the United States and Israel, such as rabbis 
Abraham S. Abraham M.D., Michael J. Broyde J.D. (see “Exemplars” below, p. 61), 
Mordechai Halperin M.D., the late Moshe Hirschler, Avraham Steinberg M.D., and 
Moshe D. Tendler Ph.D. (see “Exemplars” below, p. 63), on a vast array of bioethical 
topics have been produced according to this model.32 Avraham Steinberg’s (2003) multi-
volume Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics provides entries for an expansive 
collection of bioethical topics, each concluding with a short bibliography of secondary 
sources primarily within the legal model. 
To this literature must be added works that are unambiguously halakhic 
scholarship and not bioethics investigations, despite their addressing issues of medical or 
bioethical concern and their citation within the Jewish bioethical literature of the legal 
model. While these works are penned by learned rabbinical scholars, the most important 
contributions are made by poskim (decisors) – that is, the leading talmudists and 
                                                 
31 Although legal philosophers distinguish between “soft” and “hard” positivists, for our purposes 
positivism refers to the understanding that law determines morality, see L. Green 2009. Formalism assumes 
that clearly formulated legal rulings provide for all valid judgments, without the need for individual 
discretion in the application of legal rulings. See Korn 2002, nn7,8. Bleich asserts that Jewish law will 
sufficiently navigate choices between the five fundamental ethical categories: the morally imperative, 
commendable, neutral, odious, and proscribed, see Bleich 1979a, xv-xvi. 
32 See Hirschler 1980; Abraham 1993; 2000; 2003; 2004; 2009. 
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halakhists of the generation who are renowned for their breadth of Torah knowledge, 
depth of analysis, and exemplary piety, who publish their halakhic decisions responding 
to actual cases in collections of responsa. For example, the responsa of twentieth-century 
poskim, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe) in America and Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg 
(Tzitz Eliezer) in Israel frequently deal with questions of medical halakhah.33 Thus, 
arguments and positions in the halakhic literature are weighted not only by their intrinsic 
worth and ideational persuasiveness, but also by their association with recognized 
rabbinical authorities. One of Bleich’s ongoing contributions for the past forty years to 
Jewish Bioethics is his topical halakhic literature review in the quarterly rabbinical 
journal Tradition of the Rabbinical Council of America (the largest Orthodox rabbinical 
association) that frequently deals with issues of bioethical concern. These reviews have 
been collected and published in seven volumes of Contemporary Halakhic Problems 
(Bleich 1977; 1983; 1989; 1995; 2005a; 2012; 2017a).  
  Conservative Judaism, like Jewish Orthodoxy, defines itself as a halakhic 
tradition.34 Two primary methodological differences distinguish Conservative Jewish 
bioethics from that of Orthodoxy. First, Orthodox scholars use halakhic sources more 
diachronically in an overall orientation akin to legal formalism and positivism. In keeping 
with the Wissenschaft roots of the Conservative movement that was founded by rabbis 
who were also academic scholars, Conservative scholars tend to historically contextualize 
halakhic source material, what is sometimes called the “positive-historical” method.35 
                                                 
33 See Rosner 1990; Jotkowitz 2015; Jotkowitz and Gesundheit n.d.; Steinberg 1980; Tendler 2001.  
34 See Cherry 2013 for an overview of “Ethical Theories in the Conservative Movement.” 
35 The “positive-historical” approach was coined and developed by the nineteenth-century Bohemian-
German rabbi and historian Zacharias Frankel, was adopted by the late nineteenth-and-early-twentieth-
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This approach views Judaism as historically and culturally contingent, recognizes 
changes in ideas, values, and practices through the sweep of Jewish history, and 
proactively leverages this knowledge in contemporary halakhic decision making. Second, 
the Conservative movement is less persuaded by appeals to individual rabbinic authority 
than by compelling legal argumentation per se. In keeping with this more democratic 
ethos, the Conservative movement also has the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, 
which decides upon binding community protocols, though in practice there is great 
autonomy exercised by Conservative rabbis and lay members of the movement.36 Rabbis 
Elliot N. Dorff Ph.D., the late David Feldman Ph.D., David Golinkin Ph.D., Aaron L. 
Mackler Ph.D., Avram Reisner Ph.D., and Leonard Sharzer M.D. stand out as leading 
Conservative Jewish bioethicists. Feldman (1968) wrote one of the earliest full book-
length treatments of a bioethical issue: Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in 
Jewish Law. Mackler (2012) edited an over five-hundred-page compilation of bioethical 
essays penned by Conservative rabbis and scholars. Some of the articles, like Feldman’s 
book, are nearly indistinguishable from Orthodox Jewish bioethical scholarship. Others 
reflect differences in fundamental methodology and authority structures.  
 
 
 
                                                 
century Moldavian-born rabbi and scholar Solomon Schechter, who founded Conservative Judaism in the 
early twentieth century. See Dorff 1996a, 17 ff. Compare this approach with that of Steven Shapin, and 
other historians of science, who scholarly orientation is captured nicely by the title of Shapin 2010: “Never 
Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It was Produced by People with Bodies, Situated in Time, Space, 
Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority.” 
36 For more on the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, see Mackler 2012, 8-10. 
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Toward Methodological Holism in Jewish Bioethics 
 The diversification of Jewish bioethical models not only expands the emerging 
discipline but also further informs and develops the established models. Interest in 
covenantal ethics, as well as trends in twentieth-century Jewish philosophy and theology, 
inspired Orthodox and Conservative scholars within the legal bioethical model to 
consider more deeply the relationship of law and ethics (see Chapter Three below). 
Advances in general and Judaized bioethics have raised the level of scholarly inquiry and 
discourse amongst more parochial writers. They have also challenged the rigidity of 
established methodologies by renewing the dialogue between Torah and Western moral 
philosophy. Noam Zohar’s (1997) Alternatives in Jewish Bioethics models this dialogue. 
Even methodological historicism traditionally identified with Conservative rather than 
Orthodox Jewish scholarship has begun to find expression in the later. The articles of 
Rabbi Edward Reichman M.D. (1998-99; 1993; 1996), Associate Professor of 
Emergency Medicine and of Education and Bioethics at the Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine of Yeshiva University, that track the development of medical halakhah with the 
history of medicine are an important contribution to this effort. Another important 
historically contextualizing study of medical halakhah is Yechiel Michael Barilan’s 
Jewish Bioethics: Rabbinic Law and Theology in Their Social and Historical Context 
(2014). Medical halakhic and Jewish bioethical writings by Jewish women and feminist 
scholars will continue to exert a shaping influence, especially on matters of procreation, 
reproduction, and parenthood.  
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Lastly, while Jewish narrative bioethics does not construe itself as a halakhically 
oriented method whose goal is to arrive at normative directives, interest in literary 
criticism and narrative ethics also has begun to influence legal method (Halbertal 1999). 
For example, Alan Jotkowitz, an Orthodox Jewish bioethicist at Ben Gurion University, 
legitimates the use of narrative in halakhic decision-making. He cites the example of how 
the late, great, twentieth-century halakhic decisor Rabbi Moshe Feinstein arrived at a 
halakhic protocol for end of life care, in part, through the application of moral principles 
at play in a talmudic narrative (TB Ketubot 104a) that tells how the handmaiden of Rabbi 
Judah HaNasi, taking account of his grievous suffering and intending to allow him to die, 
audibly shattered an urn to distract and thereby interrupt the prayers of Rabbi Judah’s 
colleagues and students that were keeping him alive (Jotkowitz 2013a; 2013b).  
Rabbi Ezra Bick of Yeshivat Har Etzion in Israel (1993; 1997) has argued that in 
novel biomedical cases for which there is no normative halakhic precedent or parallel, 
rabbinic narrative may be utilized conceptually to reconstruct adjudicating rabbinic 
principles for normative Jewish legal determinations. For example, in the absence of any 
talmudic parallel to modern ovum donation, Bick believes that a conceptual analysis of 
talmudic narratives supports the view that the rabbinic sages viewed pregnancy and 
motherhood as akin to an agricultural process of nurturing and cultivating the seed of a 
man, thereby leading to the conclusion that Jewish law favors maternal identification 
with the gestating woman, who is akin to the seeded ground, rather than with a female 
ovum donor. Even though Bick limits the use of rabbinic narrative in Jewish legal inquiry 
to novel cases without conceivable parallel or precedent, J. David Bleich (1994; 1997b, 
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113-14) rejects the legitimacy of even this narrow application. Bleich counter-argues that 
there may be halakhic questions without available answers. He writes: “The one thing we 
must not do is engage in ‘desperate attempts to preserve a semblance of halachic 
reasoning’ – including the drawing of inappropriate analogies, construction of conceptual 
models, and derivation of halachic norms from philosophical or aggadic notions.” 
Jotkowitz, on the other hand, is willing to entertain a more robust and broader narrative-
ethical approach within Orthodox Jewish bioethics. Akin to Cover and Crane referenced 
above, Jotkowitz believes that narrative informs nomos, in that narrative constructs our 
normative universe and makes intelligible the laws that govern it. While he agrees with 
Bick in utilizing narratives more narrowly to engender conceptual models that more 
easily align with legal process and methodology, he also sees narrative as generating core 
values, and thus serving more globally as moral guides, similar to Jon Rawls’s 
methodology of “Reflective Equilibrium” (Jotkowitz 2013a, 972).37 This approach of 
applying Jewish narrative bioethics within the legal model also seems to invoke Jewish 
covenantal ethics, which shares similarities with Rawl’s “Reflective Equilibrium” by 
emphasizing the need to aspire to religious and moral coherence. 
 
Exemplars of Medical Halakhah and Jewish Bioethics Concerning Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies 
 
 The medical-halakhic and Jewish-bioethical literature regarding the specific 
assisted reproductive technologies of In Vitro Fertilization, Gestational Surrogacy, 
                                                 
37 Rawls looks to moral coherence in our decision-making process. See Rawls 1999 (Orig. pub. 1971); 
Daniels 2013. 
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Cloning, and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, i.e. “Three-Parent Babies,” as well as 
of Artificial Insemination and Ovarian Transplantation, will be cited, analyzed, and 
critiqued within chapters four through seven. These biotechnologies and their attendant 
Jewish bioethical concerns, especially regarding the identification of maternity and 
paternity, will be discussed in depth in this study of Jewish religion and science relations. 
However, as part of this literature review, it is appropriate to explain why this dissertation 
focuses specifically on the Jewish bioethical writings of J. David Bleich, Michael J. 
Broyde, Elliot N. Dorff, John D. Loike, and Moshe D. Tendler. Bleich, Broyde, Dorff, 
and Tendler are all rabbis who have been both scholars in the academy and active rabbis 
within the Jewish community. They are therefore recognized masters of theory and 
application, guidance and practice. Each of these scholars has made prolific contributions 
to Jewish bioethical literature and medical halakhah, including the ethics of ART. They 
have also each written on the methodology of Jewish law and ethics, and the relationship 
of Judaism and science. All consider themselves halakhically observant Jews and 
halakhically oriented bioethicists. Bleich, Broyde and Tendler are all Orthodox; Dorff is 
Conservative. Some denominational differences impinge on Jewish religion and science 
relations and will be highlighted, as appropriate. Loike features among these exemplars 
because of his scholarly partnership with Tendler on Jewish bioethical analyses of ART, 
and therefore, Loike and Tendler will primarily be considered together as a team, even 
though each one’s respective scholarly achievements can surely stand independently. I 
have chosen these scholars as Jewish bioethical exemplars of “Religion and Science” 
relations for the four cases of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies primarily 
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because their respective copious writings form a contextualizing oeuvre that will allow 
for a more robust and grounded analysis. It is important to note that no women scholars 
appear in my list of exemplars. This is not due to intentional exclusion, but to the 
circumstance of the available literature of the current field. Notable books and articles by 
Jewish women bioethicists and scholars, as well as relevant singular works of importance 
by other rabbis and scholars, will be referenced, as appropriate, as will feminist critiques 
of medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics concerning ART.  
 
Rabbi J. David Bleich, Ph.D.  
Rabbi J. David Bleich is a Rosh Yeshiva (literally, head of the academy, but used 
as a superlative honorific for a professor of Talmud and Jewish law) at the Rabbi Isaac 
Elchanan Theological Seminary, an affiliate of Yeshiva University, where he is the head 
of its postgraduate halakhah institute for the study of family law and rabbinical civil 
jurisprudence, i.e., Yadin Yadin Kollel. He is also Professor of Law at Yeshiva 
University’s Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, and the Herbert and Florence Tenzer 
Professor of Jewish Law and Ethics at Yeshiva University. Bleich holds a Ph.D. in 
philosophy from New York University, has served as a congregational rabbi at 
Manhattan’s Yorkville Synagogue for almost five decades, and has published widely on 
Jewish law (1977; 1983; 1989; 1995a; 2002; 2006b; 2012; 2017a), bioethics (1979a,b; 
1981a; 1991b; 1998a; 2002; 2006a), the intersection of Jewish and US law, and Jewish 
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ethics and theology (1993; 2013a), in both English and Hebrew.38 He has also been a 
Woodrow Wilson Fellow and a postdoctoral fellow at the Hastings Center (Bleich 
2016a). 
Concerning the bioethics and medical halakhah of ART, Bleich has written on all 
four cases of ART pertinent to this dissertation over a period of 36 years: “Test-Tube 
Babies (1979c), “In Vitro Fertilization: Questions of Maternity and Conversion” (1997a), 
surrogate motherhood and the halakhic grounds of maternity (1972; 1981a,b; 1983; 1994; 
1995a; 1997a,b; 1998a; 2002), cloning (2006a; Bleich and Jacobson 2015), 
“Mitochondrial DNA Replacement: How Many Mothers?” (2015a), and “Posthumous 
Paternity” (2016b). The chronological span of his writings will better allow for gauging 
development and consistency of ideas. His writings on larger issues of the method and 
theology of Jewish law will also better frame “Religion and Science” relations in his 
bioethical and medical halakhic analyses.39 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde, J.D. 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde is Professor of Law and a senior fellow at the Center for 
the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, with specialization in family law, as 
well as law and religion, Jewish law and ethics, and comparative religious law. He 
received his J.D. from New York University School of Law and was ordained by the 
Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary. He has served in the past as the director and 
                                                 
38 There are numerous individual articles by Bleich not referenced, some of which, however, were collected 
into the full book-length works books that have been referenced here. For a recent academic reader of 
Bleich’s thought on halakhah and philosophy, see Tirosh-Samuelson and Hughs 2015.  
39 For a full intellectual portrait, see Resnicoff 2015. 
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as a rabbinical judge of the Beth Din of America, the rabbinical court associated with the 
Rabbinical Council of America.40 He was the founding rabbi of the Young Israel of Toco 
Hills, Georgia, as well as of the Atlanta Torah Mitzion Kollel, i.e., institute for advanced 
talmudic study. He has over 75 publications, including articles, book chapters, and books 
(Broyde 2016b).  
In the areas of family law and ART, Broyde too has published on topics directly 
relevant to the concerns of this dissertation: the establishment of maternity and paternity 
(1988), child custody (1994; 1999b), marriage and family structure (2001b; 2005a); 
assisted reproductive technologies (1999a; 2005b), cloning (1997; 1998a,b; 1999a; 2000), 
and “Genetically Engineering People: A Jewish Law Analysis of Personhood” (2001a). 
 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, Ph.D. (2016) 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff is Rector and the Sol & Anne Dorff Distinguished Service 
Professor in Philosophy at American Jewish University, Visiting Professor at UCLA 
School of Law, and has chaired several scholarly associations, and was awarded the 
Journal of Law and Religion’s Lifetime Achievement Award. He has served in several 
bioethical advisory roles to the US government, including Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 
1993 Health Care Task Force, testifying in 1997 and 1999 before the President’s 
Bioethics Advisory Commission on human cloning and stem cell research, the Surgeon 
General’s commission to draft a “Call to Action for Responsible Sexual Behavior” in 
1999 and 2000, and the National Human Resources Protections Advisory Commission in 
                                                 
40 See JTA 2014. 
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2000 to 2002 to establish renewed federal guidelines on human scientific research 
subjects. He is also chair of the Conservative Movement’s Committee on Jewish Law and 
Standards (Dorff 2016). Dorff is one of the most prolific writers of Conservative Jewish 
bioethical literature, philosophy and theology of Jewish law (1977; 1978; 1988; 1989; 
1992a; 1996a; 2005b; 2007; 2014; Dorff and Rosett 1988), as well as on topics of Jewish 
ethics more broadly (2002a; 2003; Dorff and Crane 2013). His Matters of Life and 
Death: A Jewish Approach to Modern Medical Ethics (1998b) is particularly masterful at 
explicating bioethical discourse, biomedical information, and halakhic considerations in a 
clear and accessible fashion.  
Dorff has written broadly on changing family structures (1996b; 2005a), sexual 
ethics (2013b), assisted reproductive technologies (1993; 1994a,b,c; 1996b; 2013a), and 
genetic ethics (2008; Dorff and Zoloff 2015). Specifically, pertinent to this dissertation, 
Dorff has published on: artificial insemination, IVF, and the ethics of collaborative 
reproduction (1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1996b; 1999; 2002b), cloning (1998); and 
“Judaism and Germline Modification” (2008). He has also written on Jewish “Religion 
and Science” relations, including “Applying Jewish Law to New Circumstances” (2014). 
 
Dr. John D. Loike, Ph.D. and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler, Ph.D.  
Dr. John D. Loike is Director for Special Programs for the Center for Bioethics, 
Co-Director for Graduate Studies in the Department of Physiology and Cellular 
Biophysics at Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, founder and 
faculty editor of Columbia University’s Journal of Bioethics, and an advisory board 
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member of the Columbia University Center for the Study of Science and Religion. His 
academic interests span the realm of bioethics, including special interest in Jewish 
bioethics, stem cell research, cloning (1999; 2016b; Loike and Steinberg 1998), 
neuroethics, bioterrorism, tri-gametic offspring and the grounds of parenthood (Loike, 
Hirano and Margalit 2013; Margalit, Levy and Loike 2014), and science and religion 
relations, more generally. He earned his Ph.D. in Biology from the Albert Einstein 
College of Medicine of Yeshiva University and has also published copiously in biology, 
with research interests in cancer-related inflammation and neurodegenerative disease 
(Loike 2016a). 
 Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler is a Rosh Yeshiva at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan 
Theological Seminary, the rabbinical seminary affiliated with Yeshiva University, and is 
the Rabbi Isaac and Bella Tendler Chair in Jewish Medical Ethics and Professor of 
Biology at Yeshiva University (Tendler 2016a). He is the son-in-law and disciple, and 
was the scientific advisor, of the late Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who was renowned as the 
leading halakhic decisor of Jewish law in twentieth-century America. Tendler earned his 
Ph.D. in Biology from Columbia University. He has written extensively on medical 
halakhah and Jewish bioethics (1968; 1969), with special focus on beginning-and-end-of-
life issues, including Jewish family purity laws (1988), assisted reproductive technologies 
and infertility, care of the critically ill (2001; Loike, et al. 2010); the neurological criteria 
of death, i.e., “brain death” (1990; Tendler and Rosner 1989; 1993), euthanasia, and 
organ donation, for which he is also a staunch advocate and activist. Tendler has also 
written on the relationship of Torah and science (1994; 2004). He is the spiritual leader of 
65 
 
 
the Community Synagogue in Monsey, New York. He chairs the bioethical commission 
of the Rabbinical Council of America, is former president of the Association of Orthodox 
Jewish Scientists, former chair of the Medical Ethics Task Force of UJA-Federation of 
Greater New York, and has served on several ethics commissions (Tendler 2016b).  
 Directly relating to the interests of this dissertation regarding assisted 
reproductive technologies, Loike and Tendler have collaborated more generally on 
halakhic bioethical guidelines (2011) and genetic ethics (2014b). More specifically, they 
have written together on stem cell research, human-animal chimeras, and halakhic criteria 
for defining human beings (2003; 2007; 2008; 2009), gestational surrogacy (2013a; 
2013b); cloning (2014a); and mitochondrial replacement therapy (2015). Their partnered 
publications, along with their independent scholarship, combine to provide rich insight 
into developing Jewish bioethical views within the context of religion and science 
relations. 
 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Genetic Ethics  
 
While this dissertation will principally focus on the Jewish bioethical concern of 
the identification of maternity and paternity in cases of ART, it is important to recognize 
the range of bioethical concerns engendered by the advancing and converging related 
fields of assisted reproductive technologies and genomics.41 A discrete bioethical inquiry 
does not emerge within a vacuum and thus should be considered within a larger matrix of 
                                                 
41 Other fields of scientific research and application also participate in this convergence, such as NBIC, i.e., 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science (Frankel and Kapustij 2008, 
56). 
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other bioethical issues of relevance. Also, an appreciation of the larger web of bioethical 
concerns invites more informed deliberation of the advisability of governmental 
regulation, legislative policy, and professional self-regulation. According to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 2014 there were 460 fertility clinics 
operating in the United States. Although “The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and 
Certification Act (FCSRCA)” of 1992 requires mandatory annual reporting of ART 
procedures by fertility clinics to CDC, there is little regulation of ART at both the federal 
and state levels (CDC 2014; Asch and Marmor 2008).42 Similarly, even within religiously 
observant Jewish communities, per the thesis of this dissertation, bioethical 
considerations of ART and the establishment of halakhic communal norms arguably best 
take place within a more comprehensive view of both the science and ethics involved. 
 
Essential Issues in Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Reproductive medicine rapidly developed with the opening and operation of 
fertility clinics in the 1980s. Since then, fertility clinics have demonstrated increasingly 
                                                 
42 CDC’s annual report protects consumers of ART by providing data related to the quality and reliability 
of fertility clinics, their laboratories, and procedures. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) protects 
public health by supervising drugs, biological products and medical devices, and the screening and testing 
procedures of reproductive tissues. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), under the 
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA), regulates all U.S. laboratory testing performed on humans. 
See ASRM 2010, 5-7. Interestingly, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM 2010, 1, 11) 
claims: “ART is already one of the most highly regulated of all medical practices in the United States.” 
ASRM highlights the above governmental regulation, as well as reproductive medicine’s professional self-
regulation. However, aside from mandatory annual reporting of ART procedures to CDC, and some state-
specific regulatory requirements for the handling of reproductive tissues, most of the examples of oversight 
cited by ASRM are standard to medical practice in the United States. The American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine website, www.asrm.org, provides a web portal for reproductive medicine 
professionals to access clinical resources and current research.  
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successful track records of alleviating infertility through ART amidst concomitant greater 
numbers of individuals seeking ART services (Wang and Sauer 2006; CDC 2014). There 
is an expansive literature dealing with ethical issues in the new reproductive 
technologies, from embryo creation, selection, and disposition, to social and societal 
issues, such as cost, coverage, and access in light of principles of fairness and distributive 
justice (Asch and Marmor 2008; Breitowitz 1997; Bleich 2016b,c). Bioethicists also 
consider the legal and moral claims of procreative rights and liberties, questions of 
paternity and maternity, and technology-specific concerns such as the use of fertility 
drugs, sale of gametes, and compensation for gestational services (Hull 2005a; Benatar 
2010). Jewish bioethicists, medical practitioners, and rabbinical scholars likewise have 
produced significant literature on these and also specifically Jewish-themed topics, such 
as the question of Jewish identity of children born through ART (Feldman and 
Wolowelsky 1997; Irshai 2012; Mackler 1997b; Schenker 2000, 2008a). As the 
technologies continue to advance, new ethical issues arise, as we are currently witnessing 
with cloning technologies, including mitochondrial replacement therapy. 
 
Genetic Testing and Screening 
Clinical genetics includes genetic testing and screening. Genetic disease carrier 
testing has the goal of informed family planning. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and 
prenatal and postnatal genetic screening aim to empower reproductive choice and 
anticipate potential medical interventions (Brown 1990; Smith 1998; Baily 2008; Press 
2008). For example, a person or couple who tests positive as carriers of a genetic disease 
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may attempt to fertilize healthy embryos and avoid transmitting genetic disease and/or 
genetic disease predisposition, i.e., being a carrier, to the next generation by using 
assisted reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis. Only genetically screened, disease-free embryos would be selected for 
implantation. This will not only avail the aspiring family in question, but also lead to a 
reduction in disease incidence, as in the case of Huntington’s disease (Die-Smulders 
2013).43 Regarding reproductive choice, there is, of course, an expansive literature 
dealing with the ethics and laws surrounding abortion (Steinbock 2008). Despite the 
unsettled debate around fetal termination, genetic disease carrier testing and prenatal 
genetic diagnostics have become medically commonplace and regularly encouraged as 
part of a medically informed procreative process. The art and science of genetic 
counseling adds human dimension to this emotionally fraught field.44 It should be noted, 
however, that the current state of genetic testing and screening only relates to a relatively 
small group of genetic diseases (NIH 2016a). Genetic testing and screening are also 
necessary prerequisites for the emerging field of pharmacogenomics, i.e., drugs 
customized to a person’s genetic makeup as part of personalized medicine (NIH 2016c). 
Concerns about privacy and stigma associated with being identified as either a 
carrier of or individual with a genetic disease or defect have also raised ethical and legal 
issues for clinical practice, medical reporting, and insurance coverage (Zoloth 2013). 
                                                 
43 In epidemiological terminology, incidence refers to the rate of new cases of disease, whereas prevalence 
refers to existing cases. 
44 For example, see David et al. 2012, “Genetic Counseling for the Orthodox Jewish Couple Undergoing 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis.” Also, see Nelson 1994, 46-64; Kilner, Pentz, and Young 1997, 146-
55; Finkelstein and Finkelstein 2000; Barris and Comet 2005; David, Weitzman, Hevre, and Fellous 2012; 
U. Cohen n.d. 
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Additionally, many research hospitals and laboratories collect and store biospecimens, 
e.g., human blood, surgical tissues, etc., which they subject to genetic analysis. Such 
“biobanks” and their genetic research programs raise questions of legal ownership of 
biospecimens, as well as concerns about informed consent, privacy, and transparency 
(Maschke 2008).45 In 2008, with the above concerns in mind, the federal government 
passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).  Several states likewise 
have enacted legislation to protect against genetic discrimination (Press 2008).  
 
Biogenetic Therapies and Enhancements 
On April 12, 2003, the fiftieth anniversary of James D. Watson and Francis 
Crick’s discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA, and a little over a century since 
the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s study of inheritance, the Human Genome Project 
(HGP) proclaimed the completion of the mapping and sequencing of the approximately 
three billion DNA base pairs of the haploid human genome’s two sex chromosomes and 
twenty-two autosomes. This achievement in molecular biology was heralded by scientist 
and statesman alike as laying the foundation of twenty-first-century science and medicine 
(Gannet 2014, 1). Progressive understandings of heredity, gene expression, “epigenetic” 
gene-environment interactions, as well as advances in genetic modification, DNA editing, 
and synthetic biology, promise new frontiers in assisted reproductive technologies, 
biogenetic medical therapies, and human enhancements. Concerns of equitable access, 
                                                 
45 The best-selling The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks has made the ethics concerning biospecimens a 
question of popular consciousness and national interest, see Skloot 2010. 
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distributive justice, and possible harms persist here too, as with the advent of other 
medical therapies and biotechnologies (Gannett 2014). Additionally, legal and ethical 
questions about patenting genomes and genetic sequences arise (Magnus, Caplan and 
MacGee 2002; Cook-Deegan 2008).  
However, in the shadow of the Holocaust, perhaps the greatest bioethical 
concerns relate to human enhancements and eugenics (Goering 2014). In the 1930s, when 
the Nazis came to power, they implemented social-Darwinist policies involving 
compulsory sterilization and state-sponsored population eugenics.46 While genocide was 
perpetrated by the Nazis against the six million Jews of Europe primarily through 
persistent, efficient mass-execution, the annihilation of world Jewry was first conceived 
in racial theories of sexual contamination, i.e., Rassenschande, which led to eugenic 
sterilization, then to forced abortions and euthanasia, and finally developing into a 
comprehensive plan of extermination.47 At the same time, the Nazis sought to engender 
an elite, Aryan race through their systematic “lebensborn” program of selective breeding 
by encouraging and supporting “pure” German marital and pre-marital childbearing. 
Women’s reproduction was thus at the front and center of the Holocaust (Chalmers 
2015). Even seventy years later, the Holocaust and Nazi science still press upon genetic 
ethics and reproductive bioethics.48 
                                                 
46 Bruns and Chelouche (2017) have demonstrated that the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi doctors adhered to 
its own medical ethic based on Nazi moral and political values, which was systematically taught to medical 
students in Germany during the Third Reich. 
47 The Nazis likewise murdered between five and six million other people, including disabled persons, 
Romani (Gypsies), homosexuals, political prisoners, and prisoners of war, some of whose systematic 
annihilation should also be categorized as genocide, see Berenbaum 1990. 
48 For literature on Nazi eugenics, science, and medicine, and their legal aftermath, see Kevles 1985; Lifton 
1986; Proctor 1988; Grodin and Annas 1992, 2007; Magnus and McGee 2000; Bashford and Levine 2010; 
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Ethicists differentiate between coercive, “authoritative” eugenics, like those 
practiced by the Nazis, and voluntary, “liberal” eugenics. They also distinguish between 
positive-enhancement eugenics and negative-eliminative eugenics. While eugenics 
certainly has a dark history, contemporary ethicists explore morally permissible forms of 
eugenics, especially in light of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies. If there is 
a parental moral obligation to promote healthy children through a loving family 
environment, proper nutrition, adequate health care, and education, does this obligation 
likewise extend to ensuring good genes and a good birth? Should scientists and medical 
practitioners endeavor to eliminate disease, deformity, and disability through genetic 
testing, screening, engineering, and modification? May parents leverage these 
technologies to maximize their child’s physical and intellectual excellence or to apply 
aesthetic preferences? What are the eugenic aims, philosophical justifications, and 
boundaries of permissible, contemporary genetic therapies, enhancements, and 
procreative interventions (Caplan, McGee and Magnus 1999; Magnus and McGee 2002; 
Goering 2014)? 
At present, there are, at least, six categories of human genetic engineering 
discussed in the bioethical and scientific literature: three therapeutic and three non-
therapeutic genetic interventions.  
 
 
                                                 
Mukherjee 2016, 128-38. For a brief history of the British and American eugenics movement, see 
Mukherjee 2016, 64-85. 
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Therapeutic Genetic Engineering 
First, somatic cell gene therapy aims to cure genetic diseases, like certain 
immuno-deficiencies, cancers, or single-gene diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Gaucher’s 
disease, hemophilia, sickle-cell anemia, and thalassemia (Clark 1997). Gene therapy can 
be accomplished in several ways. To treat certain cancers, for example, defective and/or 
mutated genetic material, e.g. bone marrow, is eliminated or removed, and replaced with 
healthy donor material. Similarly, healthy DNA in a gene could be substituted for 
mutated DNA through “homologous replacement.” Alternatively, genes can be forced to 
structurally reverse mutations, yielding healthy, functioning genes. Certain chemical 
therapies can also inactivate and thereby neutralize mutated genes. To reach numerous 
cells, virus vectors can be engineered to “infect” targeted cells with a healthy copy of a 
gene (The Center for Health Ethics 2016; NIH 2016b). The principal ethical concern here 
is of unforeseen risk of harm. However, therapeutic, human genetic engineering enjoys 
wide approbation amongst ethicists and medical practitioners if safety concerns and risks 
are within reasonable parameters (NIH 2016b). This is because it clearly falls within the 
medical mandate to promote human health and welfare. Also, since it affects only the 
patient and not future generations, it does not constitute human germline modification, 
nor aspire to eugenic aims.  
Second, somatic cell gene therapy, reproductive biotechnologies, and molecular 
biology also come together in stem cell research and emerging stem cell therapies. Stem 
cells are undifferentiated cells that can be stimulated to specialize into distinct 
differentiated cell types, e.g., blood, bone, muscle, organ tissue, potentially recreating 
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essential body parts. Although adults do generate some stem cells, embryonic stem cells 
are pluripotent – that is, they have the greatest capacity for and scope of cellular 
differentiation. Induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, created by reversing differentiation 
in reprogrammed skin cells, do not yet adequately serve as substitutions for embryonic 
stem cells. Stems cells may be used to reverse neuro-degenerative and/or auto-immune 
diseases. For example, diabetes may be cured by stimulating the growth of new insulin-
secreting pancreatic cells (Hyun 2008). The potential for significant therapeutic advances, 
as well as theological and ethical questions carried over from the abortion debate 
regarding the status of the embryonic tissue, animate this promising, yet contentious area 
of scientific research (Nisker et al. 2010; Mackler 2004; Waters & Cole-Turner 2003; 
Zivotofsky and Jotkowitz 2009; Dorff and Zoloth 2015).  
Third, germline gene therapy alters reproductive cells’ genetic material so that 
heritable genetic diseases are not passed on to offspring and resultant offspring are 
completely free of the mutated genes. The biomechanisms here are similar to those 
described above for somatic cell gene therapy. However, the risks and potential harms are 
exacerbated by the transgenerational reach of germline modifications. This eliminative 
eugenic intervention is ethically justified by considerations of individual welfare and 
social good when applied with informed, voluntary, and understanding consent (Goering 
2014). Utilizing cloning technologies, “three-parent babies” is one of the first genetic 
therapies seeking approval that can modify the germline, at least in the case of female 
embryos, i.e., XX nDNA, and therefore has been subject to more vigorous debate 
(Frankel and Hagen 2011). 
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Non-Therapeutic Genetic Engineering 
The next three categories of genetic engineering represent non-therapeutic genetic 
modifications with unabashed eugenic aims. First, armed with genomic understanding, 
parents could utilize ART and genetic engineering to select for positive physical traits 
they would like to see in their child, for example eye color, hair color, height, thus 
earning the popular name “designer babies.”49 These physical traits are relatively easily 
identifiable in the human genome. Ethicists ask whether selecting for these traits is any 
worse than selecting for sex, which is routinely done by contemporary users of ART.50 
Genetic modification has become commonplace in the pharmaceutical and agricultural 
industries, i.e., GMOs, though there continues to be professional, political, and public 
debate regarding its human application (Frankel and Kapustij 2008; National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2016). 
Second, more aggressive eugenic genetic engineering would aim to alter complex 
human traits, such as athleticism, intelligence, and personality, each of which is coded by 
many interacting genes acting within an environment. At present, such human 
enhancement is still beyond current genomic understanding. Thus, broad reaching, 
eugenic, human-genetic engineering is still undeveloped, especially given the field’s 
uneven self-regulatory bans.51 Some worry that the lack of cautious approval, along with 
                                                 
49 See Andrews 2006. 
50 For a Jewish discussion of sex selection, see Carmy 2007; Wolowelsky and Grazi 2007; Bleich 2000; 
Wahrman 2002, 126-40. It should be noted that sex selection can also be utilized to correct a 
demographically profound imbalance in gender, which may have significant societal consequences.  
51 Mukherjee (2016, 229-35) points to the Asilomar II conference is February 1975 as a watershed in the 
history of genetic science. The participating scientists faced a crucial choice as whether to self-regulate the 
boundaries of safe and appropriate experimentation, or to relinquish that role to government regulators. 
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governmental regulation, will lead to clandestine research (Resnick 1998).52 Bioethicists 
routinely debate the merits and demerits of eugenic enhancements (Almond and Parker 
2003, 129-76; Golinkin 1994; McGee 2000b; Juengst and Moseley 2016).  
Third, the emerging CRISPR-Cas9 genome editing and engineering 
biotechnology will likely progress germline modification, along with disease treatment 
(Ledford 2016; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2017). 
Further, advancements in synthetic biology, i.e., the artificial construction of genomes, 
herald technological capacities to create radically enhanced human beings, as well as new 
forms of life, such as human/non-human chimeras (Achenbach 2016b; Garfinkel, Endy, 
Epstein, and Friedman 2008; Kahn 2012; Loike and Tendler 2003; Pollack 2016; 
Streiffer 2015). These positive eugenic biotechnological capabilities demand full 
bioethical study and consideration of legislative and regulatory oversight.  
 
Genetic Ethical Debate 
Those who oppose genetic enhancement marshal an array of arguments. Using 
theological language, some, often from the religious sector, argue that humans should not 
“play God,” and that scientific hubris often ends in unforeseen disaster (Catalono 2012; 
Kilner, et al. 1997, 49-74; Nelson 1994; Waters and Cole-Turner 2003). Others see 
genetic enhancement and the commoditization of reproductive choices as diminishing 
                                                 
Since that time, scientific associations, in general, have chosen to self-regulate, though, at times, 
government agencies or legislative bodies intrude, with varied outcomes internationally. 
52 On May 10, 2016, approximately 150 researchers gathered at Harvard University Medical School for a 
closed-door, no-press-allowed conference on synthesizing a full human genome, thereby raising the 
possibility of creating human beings with no parents. The secrecy of the conference’s proceedings aroused 
ethical debate about the transparency of scientific practice. See Achenbach 2016b; Pollack 2016. 
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fundamental human rights, freedoms, and dignity. It can also lead to hierarchical social 
stratification based on differential genetics and unfair competition (Annas 2000; 
Fukuyama 2002; Spier 2002). Yet others argue that genetic enhancement reduces people 
to genetics, focusing on enhancing children rather than their lives, and further stigmatizes 
disability (Fletcher 2002; Wolpe 1997). Some bioethicists, however, assert that sound 
science policy needs to be based on serious discussion of the morality of genetic 
modification and its actual consequences, but not on specious philosophical objections. 
They contend that the commonly cited arguments against genetic modification, i.e., the 
(curtailing of personal) freedom argument, the (commodification of) giftedness argument, 
the (reduction of) authenticity argument, and the (denial of) uniqueness argument, are all 
based on an assumption of genetic determinism, which they dispute (Resnik and Vorhaus 
2006). The concerns over genetic reductionism, essentialism, and determinism, and their 
impact on personal identity, freedom, and dignity is a common trope in the literature of 
the debate over genetic enhancement.53  
William Kristol and Eric Cohen (2002) have compiled a collection of op-ed 
articles, congressional hearing testimonies, and even selections from modern fiction, that 
give voice to wide-ranging opinion on genetic engineering and germline modification, 
much of it expressing ethical concern and social fear. It is important to remember that this 
debate plays out on the street through popular media and in Washington through 
legislation and political influence, as much as in the laboratory and the academy, and thus 
                                                 
53 Holmes Rolston III (1999) offers a scientifically informed philosophical analysis of the multiple valences 
and values that comprise genetic identity. The philosophy of identity is a longstanding and well-trodden 
inquiry that may also be helpful here. See Noonan and Curtis 2014; Olson 2016.  
77 
 
 
governmental regulation, as well as NIH funding policies, may curtail abuses, as well as 
impede research and development. While current users of ART are primarily motivated 
by overcoming infertility and disease prevention, and not motivated by enhancement 
(Banger and McGee 2006), a survey of American medical students shows that our future 
doctors on whole do not distinguish between therapeutic and enhancement uses of 
reproductive biotechnologies, perhaps portending greater acceptance of genetic 
enhancement in the near future (Meisenberg 2009). Looking to the international scene, 
some predict that competitive economic and geo-political pressures will likely force the 
United States to allow these technologies for genetic enhancement (Catalano 2012; 
Swedin 2006). 
 The majority of full book-length published works on genetic enhancement by 
bioethicists seem to argue in favor of allowing this nascent biotechnology. All of them 
engage and counter the above-cited arguments, and usually encourage regulated, cautious 
advancement. Some of the most ardent promoters frame their argument as humanity 
taking responsible control of evolutionary process. John Harris (2007), Professor of 
Bioethics and University of Manchester School of Law, joint editor-in-chief of the 
prestigious Journal of Medical Ethics, and a member of Britain’s Human Genetics 
Commission, argues along this line in Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for 
Making Better People. Ethicists Ronald Green (2007), Gregory Stock (2002), Glenn 
McGee (2000a, 2000b), and Russel Blackford (2014), all make similar cases.54  
                                                 
54 See Doherty and Sutton 1997, and Stock and Campbell 2000, for a full collection of articles on the 
“ethics of altering the genes we pass onto our children.” See also Powell and Buchanan 2011. 
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Jewish Genetic Ethics 
 In the literature of Jewish bioethics, there has been a recent increase of interest in 
genetic ethics, presumably in line, if slightly delayed, with trends within general 
bioethics. There indeed has been a history of occasional articles published on Jewish 
views of genetic concern. Late twentieth-century advances in clinical genetic diagnostics 
and therapeutic interventions moved Jewish medical ethicists and poskim to consider the 
utilization of these new technologies, often permitting them (Green 1985; Rosner 1991, 
181-96; Perlin 1994). Jewish writers on genetic engineering likewise have been 
cautiously favorable, seeing genetic engineering overall through a therapeutic lens. At 
times, Jewish writers utilize supportive theological language of applying scientific 
advances to co-author with God humanity’s redemption (Broyde 2001a; Burack 2006; 
Dorff 2008; Golinkin 1994). Jewish views of even germline modification, including 
cloning, if done for therapeutic purposes or to alleviate infertility, are generally of 
cautious and conditional approval (Breitowitz 2002; Broyde 1998a; Cohen 199; Dorff 
1998a,b, 2008, 2013a; Golinkin 1994; Lipschutz 1999; Werber 2000). There has been 
particular interest in the elimination of the so-called Jewish genetic diseases and their 
attendant ethical questions, as well as regarding using genetics for Jewish genealogy 
(Wahrman 2002, 87-108, 141-65; Zimmerman 2012). Overall interest in genetic ethics 
seems to have reached a critical point as Elliot Dorff and Laurie Zoloth (2015), have 
recently published a multiple-author, five-hundred-page book on Jewish genetic ethics. 
Our deepening knowledge of the human genome and our increasing ability to alter it as 
part of a procreative process, whether for the therapeutic treatment of infertility and 
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disease, or futuristically, as a part of an intentional project of human eugenic and genetic 
enhancement, emphasizes the need for ongoing serious bioethical consideration, 
oversight, and regulation, and for the person of faith, a conscious appreciation of the 
bilateral relations of religion and science.55
                                                 
55 For a Christian theological view, see Deanne-Drummond 2005. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Epistemological and Moral-Axiological Dimensions 
of Contemporary Jewish Bioethics 
 
 Rapidly evolving scientific understandings and technological capabilities, amidst 
changing moral judgments in larger society, provide a unique window into Jewish 
religion and science relations in contemporary Jewish bioethics. This dissertation 
investigates how Judaism’s robust textual tradition, creative legal process, and history of 
legal precedents and religious and moral instruction, respond to and develop in light of 
scientific and technological advancement. More specifically, as introduced in Chapter 
One, this exploration is grounded in a focused analysis of epistemological and moral-
axiological dimensions of the contemporary Jewish bioethical debate concerning the 
identification of maternity and paternity, and their attendant halakhic and bioethical 
considerations, in four current cases of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies: 
1. In Vitro Fertilization; 2. Gestational Surrogacy 3. Cloning; and 4. Mitochondrial 
Replacement Therapy, i.e., “three-parent babies.” In this chapter, I will explain more 
precisely what I mean by “epistemological and moral-axiological dimensions” of 
contemporary Jewish bioethics and more fully describe my method for their examination.  
In philosophy, “epistemology” refers to the study of knowledge, its sources, 
structure, boundary conditions, limitations, modes of acquisition and dissemination, as 
well as its justification (Steup 2014). In this study of the interface of Judaism and science 
within Jewish bioethics, I am more narrowly interested in the question of what constitutes 
recognized sources of warranted knowledge toward the elucidation of Jewish bioethical 
inquiries and the resolution of bioethical dilemmas, such as the definition of maternity 
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and paternity in ART. I am particularly interested in how Jewish bioethics integrates new 
scientific knowledge and technological capability when such contemporary 
understandings and capacities have not been anticipated by, and may even conflict with, 
more ancient Jewish knowledge, such as Torah and talmudic texts and their rabbinic 
interpretive traditions. In this chapter, I will contextualize this dissertation’s study of the 
epistemic orientation of the representative exemplars of Jewish bioethics (chapters five 
through seven) with a brief review of Jewish theological theories of knowledge, Halakhic 
process, and schemata of religion and science relations, more generally, and specific to 
Judaism in cases of seeming conflicts of Torah and science.  
  In moral philosophy, “axiology” refers to the identification, evaluation, 
classification, and assessment of ethical values, of the right and the good, whether in 
meta-ethical or normative ethical inquiries (Schroeder 2012).1 In this study, I am more 
narrowly interested in the adopted and adapted ethical values as expressed or implied in 
discrete Jewish bioethical analyses of the four aforementioned cases of assisted 
reproductive and genetic technologies. Since one’s moral axiology helps navigate the 
ethical considerations and consequences of new bioethical challenges, I aim to identify 
the values at play, evaluate their potential sources (which partially crosscuts with my 
above-explained epistemological interests), and consider how they orient and impinge 
upon the pertinent Jewish bioethical analyses. In order to better contextualize the role of 
ethical values in Jewish bioethics, I will explore the interrelationship of ethics and 
                                                 
1 In philosophy, more generally, “axiology” refers to the study of values, whether morally relevant or not. 
The etymology of “axiology” points to this more general usage, since ἄξιος means “worthy.” However, in 
this dissertation, “axiology” will be used refer to ethical values.  
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halakhah, with particular consideration of the Jewish theological issue of whether there 
exists an ethic independent of halakhah.  
 Finally, I will conclude this chapter by reviewing and outlining my method of 
investigation. I will explain how I incorporate the above mentioned philosophical and 
theological considerations into my dissertation’s investigative method. I will also present 
the assessment matrix that I used to research and identify the epistemological and 
axiological dimensions of the contemporary Jewish bioethical debate regarding the 
definition and identification of maternity and paternity in the new assisted reproductive 
technologies.  
 
Contextualizing Epistemological Dimensions: Jewish Theological Theories of 
Knowledge 
 
The two primary origins of knowledge recognized in the intellectual history of 
Judaism are revelation and reason. Generally, revelation refers to the divine self-
communication of knowledge to humanity, while reason refers to humanity’s 
autonomous generation of knowledge. Of course, theologically, the two are also 
inextricably linked. Since revelation is experienced by a human prophet, one of whose 
primary roles is to further communicate the received divine knowledge to others, by 
necessity the prophet’s rational faculties are required to mediate the prophetic process. 
Human beings will then exercise their reason to interpret, apply, and elaborate upon the 
prophetic message being received.2 Further, some Jewish philosophers more 
                                                 
2 In Judaism, the exercise of human reason within the study of divine revelation is itself considered a 
mitzvah (divine commandment). See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, “Laws of the Study of Torah.” 
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fundamentally identify human reason as the “image of God” (see Genesis 1:27) within 
human beings, thus connecting all human cognition to divine intelligence.3 At the same 
time, divine knowledge, at its most basic level, is believed to exist independent of human 
reason, and human reason is understood to be capable of generating knowledge 
independent of divine revelation. The nature of revelation and its relationship to human 
reason constitutes one of the main topics in the Jewish philosophical study of the 
epistemology of religion, especially during the medieval period. The philosophical 
warrants of belief in God and divine revelation have been of interest to modern Jewish 
and Christian theology considering the epistemological challenges of modern philosophy, 
the scientific revolution, biblical criticism, and new bio-cultural understandings of 
religion.4 
Prophetic revelation forms the sacred scriptures of Judaism, i.e., the twenty-four 
books of the Hebrew Bible, also known as TaNaKh, which serves as an acronym for 
Torah (the five books of Moses); Nevi’im (the eight books of the prophets: Joshua, 
Judges, Samuel, Kings, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the Twelve Minor Prophets, which 
itself includes the prophetic works of Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, 
Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi (so-called “minor” 
                                                 
3 See Maimonides 1963, Guide 1:26. 
4 A full elucidation of the themes adumbrated in this paragraph is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For 
an overview of prophecy and revelation in medieval Jewish philosophy, see Rynhold 2009, 104-130. For an 
overview of medieval Jewish philosophers, their intellectual history, and areas of philosophical interest, 
including prophecy and revelation, see Sirat 1996. For a more general philosophical consideration of 
prophecy, see Davison 2014, and Wolterstorff 1995. For an introduction to the epistemology of religion 
and modern theological warrants for belief, see Forrest 2014. For an investigation of the impact of the 
scientific revolution on religion, see Brooke 1991; and Barbour 1997, 3-76. For biblical criticism, see 
Grassie 2010, 133 ff., and Brettler 2005, 1-37; cf. also Berman 2017. For an explanation of the bio-cultural 
approach to the study of religion, see Wood 2014. 
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because of the size of the literary legacy, and not the import of their message); and 
Ketuvim (the eleven books of the writings: Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Ruth, 
Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles). Judaism, 
however, affirms a dual-Torah system comprised of the Written Torah, i.e., the 
aforementioned twenty-four books of the Hebrew Bible, and the Oral Torah, i.e., the 
teachings of the Rabbis, continually developing and expanding from ancient times until 
today through ongoing study, interpretation, commentary, statutory codification, and 
normative halakhic application. The multi-genre, diachronic, voluminous, and expanding 
canon of the Oral Torah, now written down, enjoys a privileged epistemological status 
within Judaism. On the one hand, the rabbis of the Talmud assert, and later rabbis affirm, 
that the Oral Torah represents an unbroken chain of the transmission and conservation of 
divine knowledge prophetically received by Moses at Sinai through the generations until 
today.5 On the other hand, throughout Jewish history, the literature of the Oral Torah has 
been clearly and consistently generative, not merely conservationist. Theologically, the 
early rabbis justified this generativity as the actualization of the divinely-set, interpretive 
potential of the Hebrew Bible and of the ancient traditions of the Oral Torah, and thus 
newly generated rabbinic scholarship is fully sanctioned as part of the Oral Torah 
tradition.6 The epistemic orientation of religious Jewish scholarship, including Jewish 
bioethics, thus begins with the literary sources and interpretive traditions of the Written 
                                                 
5 Contemporary ultra-Orthodoxy tends to espouse a maximalist theology that emphasizes the revelatory 
origin of the entire Oral Torah tradition. Silber (1994) argues that this maximalist theology is a modern 
invention developed to safeguard traditionalism, obstruct modernization and assimilation, and better control 
halakhic innovation. 
6 See Alexander 2007. 
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and Oral Torah, and their ongoing interplay of revelation and reason. This certainly holds 
true for Orthodox Jewish scholarship that asserts a belief in the divine origin of the 
Written and Oral Torah. It also, arguably, holds true for liberal interpretations of Judaism 
that embrace modern and post-modern critiques of religion and reject more traditional 
religious truth claims. The warrants for the liberal-Jewish epistemological privileging of 
the Written and Oral Torah, though, may vary depending on the theological, cultural, and 
social bases for understanding religious covenant and commitment. 
While there is consensus within Judaism regarding the privileged status of the 
literatures of the Written and Oral Torah, there has been debate throughout the ages as to 
the epistemological legitimacy of other forms of rational knowledge, such as philosophy, 
including natural philosophy – i.e., what we call science. During the medieval period, 
these debates raged throughout the Jewish communities of Europe, Africa, and Asia, and 
are collectively known in Jewish intellectual history as “the Maimonidean 
controversies.”7 Moses Maimonides was a twelfth-century Spanish rabbi who lived the 
majority of his adult life in Fostat (Old Cairo), Egypt, and there rose to great local and 
international prominence as a Jewish leader, scholar, and physician.8 Maimonides’s 
literary legacy is a vast collection of major works, minor treatises, epistles, and responsa 
concerning talmudic commentary, rabbinic law, Jewish theology, medicine, and natural 
philosophy. His three major works are: Commentary on the Mishnah, written in Judeo-
Arabic and completed in 1168; Mishneh Torah, a monumental restatement and 
                                                 
7 See Sarachek 1935, and Septimus 1982.  
8 See Davidson 2005, 3-74, for an overview of Maimonides’s life; as well as Kraemer 2005. 
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codification of the entire corpus of Jewish law, written in Hebrew and completed in 1180; 
and The Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides’s Jewish theological treatise wrought from 
both his reconciliation of Aristotelian philosophy with Jewish theology, as well as his 
own systematic, creative analyses and interpretations, written in Judeo-Arabic, and 
completed in 1190. All of Maimonides’s works, and certainly his oeuvre as a whole, 
display his native genius, his total mastery of biblical and rabbinic Jewish literature, and 
that he had been educated in the Hispano-Arabic Jewish cultural synthesis of classical 
Greek, Islamic, and Jewish intellectual traditions.9 
Perhaps this can best be exemplified by the structure and content of Mishneh 
Torah, his encyclopedic compilation and reorganization of all of Jewish law, including all 
laws currently binding, those relating to the era preceding the destruction of the second 
Temple in 70 CE, and those anticipating the messianic era and the restoration of the 
Jewish national state.10 Maimonides divides the entire corpus of Jewish law into fourteen 
books, each having many topical subdivisions of numerous chapters: 1. Knowledge 
(theology and ethics); 2. Love (ritual practice directly cultivating God awareness); 3. 
Festivals; 4. Women (marriage and divorce law); 5. Holiness; 6. Separation (vows and 
oaths); 7. Seeds (agricultural laws); 8. Worship (Temple service); 9. Sacrificial Offerings; 
10. Purity Law; 11. Injuries (criminal and tort law); 12. Acquisition (laws of the 
marketplace); 13. Judgments (civil law); and 14. Judges (governance).11 It is noteworthy 
                                                 
9 See Davidson 2005, 122-537; Stroumsa 2009. 
10 The establishment of the State of Israel has brought to the fore questions regarding the modern 
application of Jewish law to Israeli law. For example, both Steinberg 2003 and Sinclair 2003 in their 
surveys of topics in contemporary Jewish bioethics include Israeli statutory law in their presentations and 
analyses. 
11 See Twersky 1980 for a full analysis of Maimonides’s Mishneh Torah. 
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that Maimonides’s first book, Sefer haMad’a (The Book of Knowledge), in this series 
purporting to be a complete codification of Jewish law, is a tract devoted to matters of 
belief, theology, and ethics.12 Maimonides clearly believes that philosophical and 
theological contemplation is an affirmative religious duty, worthy of standing first and 
foremost among Jewish legal directives.13 In Mishneh Torah (Book of Knowledge, “Basic 
Principle of the Torah,” 2:1-2) and The Guide of the Perplexed (1963, 3:28), Maimonides 
also champions the idea that the universe, as a creation of God, is a material expression of 
divine will and knowledge, and thus, should be regarded, like Torah, as a form of 
revelation. The contemplation of the universe, what Maimonides calls “ma’aseh bereishit 
– the works of creation,” often translated as “physics,” in contradistinction to 
“metaphysics,” whose study Maimonides also advocates, has great spiritual benefit in 
that it leads to fear, awe, and love of God.14  
For Maimonides, Torah, physics, and metaphysics have epistemological 
legitimacy and inspire the interplay of revelation and reason, including through the study 
of law, ethics, and medicine.15 In the ongoing Maimonidean controversies, the scholarly 
elites of the medieval Jewish world divided into camps of those who supported or 
opposed the theological program and expansive epistemology of Maimonides. In truth, it 
would be misrepresentative of the great diversity of nuanced Jewish theological views 
                                                 
12 See Davidson 2005, 231n184, for additional sources on non-legal aspects of the Mishneh Torah. 
13 See Davidson 1974. 
14 The use of “physics” and “metaphysics” here is drawn from the Aristotelian-philosophical lexicon. For 
more on Maimonides and the sciences, see Langermann 2003; Stroumsa 2009, 125-52. 
15 In his “Introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah,” Maimonides differentiates within the Oral Torah 
between unequivocal truth representing the rabbinic traditions originating with Moses at Sinai, and 
contingent truths arbitrated by the interpretive methods and decisional protocols of the rabbis. See Hartman 
1976, 102-38; Ross 2004, 63.  
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and epistemological positions to reduce them all to “for or against” the study of 
philosophy and science.16 At the same time, the epistemological legitimacy of non-Torah 
forms of rational thought, such as science and philosophy, and the license to study them 
in addition to works of Torah, continued to be debated through modern times, and indeed 
is still a debate within segments of the contemporary Orthodox Jewish community. This 
perhaps is most apparent when seeming conflicts of Torah and science emerge (see 
below, “Strategies for Contending with Conflicts Between Torah and Science,” p. 107 
ff.).  
All Jewish bioethicists, by virtue of the scholarly framework and conventions of 
the discipline, affirm, at some level, an epistemology that recognizes the legitimacy and 
authority of Torah traditions, scientific knowledge, and philosophical contemplation.17 
However, the same may not be claimed for all halakhists writing on medical issues, and 
whose talmudic commentary, responsa, and legal decisions often serve as the Torahitic 
source material for Jewish bioethicists. This is not to claim that such halakhists are anti-
science, per se, but simply that in the epistemological hierarchy of truth claims Torah 
traditions stand supreme. Medical halakhists, and even some Orthodox Jewish 
bioethicists, at times, will regard scientific claims, secular ethics, medical 
recommendations, and bioethical analyses with a strong hermeneutic of suspicion. 
Therefore, new scientific understandings and technological capabilities, unanticipated by 
                                                 
16 For contemporary Jewish theologies of the integration of Torah traditions and worldly knowledge, see 
Lamm 1990; Lichtenstein 1997. For a historical overview of Judaism’s encounter with other cultures and 
worldly knowledge, see Schacter 1997. 
17 While Reform Judaism embraces personal autonomy over traditional authority, Torah sources still enjoy 
pride and privilege of place as foundational, thought-shaping traditions, even if subject to modern critique 
and change. 
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and perhaps even in conflict with more ancient Torah traditions, present fertile case-
studies for Jewish religion and science relations, especially regarding their 
epistemological dimensions. 
 
Process and Methodologies of Halakhah 
 
Beginning with the Wissenschaft des Judentum movement in nineteenth-century 
Germany until today, there has been a persistent effort to deconstruct and detail the 
halakhic system.18 Vered Noam (2007) insightfully identifies a certain irony in the 
academic study of Jewish law. For those who study Jewish law, historically 
contextualizing its different layers and establishing rigid principles of methodological 
procedure, Halakhah can get stifled, even trapped within all of the constructed categories, 
conventions, and boundary conditions. On the other hand, most of those who study, write, 
and live Jewish law, i.e., primarily Orthodox Jews, do not usually engage in such 
dispassionate and detached analysis. Their experience of Jewish law is one of native, 
creative, organic development. Thus, medical halakhists, employing great literary and 
legal interpretive ingenuity, produce views and positions that emerge out of and are 
resonant with the whole of their religious-cultural experience, in keeping with their 
theological and ethical commitments. At the same time, Jewish bioethicists with a wider 
epistemological embrace of scientific knowledge are likely to be more open to new ways 
of looking at older issues, such as the definitions of maternity and paternity.  
                                                 
18 Regarding the origins of Wissenschaft des Judentum beginning with Leopold Zunz, see Schorsh 2016. 
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 Any academic study of halakhah first requires a review of its legal literary 
sources, placing them in the historical context of halakhah’s development, as well as a 
brief introduction to their defining legal methodologies.19 Biblical and Second Temple 
scholars study legal texts in comparison to other ancient near eastern legal codes and 
documents.20 Intellectual historians of the rabbinic, medieval, and modern eras will often 
analyze the legal method of particular works, schools, or of individual talmudists and 
halakhists in their historical context.21 Scholars of Jewish and comparative law will often 
look at more discrete principles, methods, and mechanics of Jewish law, as well as 
engage in comparative topical analyses.22 Others study the role, status, and authority of 
Jewish folk custom and its relation to the development of Jewish law.23  
Broadly speaking, the primary genres of rabbinic literature, i.e., the 
aforementioned Oral Torah, are: Talmud, Midrash, talmudic and biblical commentary, 
legal codification and commentary, and responsa literature. After the Biblical and Second 
Temple periods, continuing in broad sweep, rabbinic literature and Jewish law developed 
chronologically within distinct geo-political spheres within three different time periods: 
the Rabbinic, Medieval, and Modern Eras. Beginning with the Rabbinic Era, from the 
                                                 
19 A thorough, compact presentation of “The Structure of Jewish Law” comprises the first chapter of Rabbi 
David Feldman’s early landmark study, Marital Relations, Birth Control, and Abortion in Jewish Law 
(1968, 3-20). The most comprehensive review can be found in the third volume of former Israeli Chief 
Justice Menachem Elon’s Jewish Law: History, Sources and Principles (1994, vol. 3). Elon’s Jewish Law 
also reviews the systemic principles and fundamental concepts of Jewish law more broadly construed 
(1994, vols. 1 and 2). His edited collection of Encyclopaedia Judaica articles on issues of Jewish law 
pursues a similar exploration, and also provides brief summaries of the topics that Jewish law has 
traditionally addressed (Elon 1995). 
20 See Brettler 2005, 61-72. 
21 See, for example, Katz 1971; Soloveitchik 2013. 
22 See, for example, Broyde 1988 and 2001b. 
23 See, for example, Sperber 1990-2007. A full review of these scholarly literatures is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
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end of the Second Temple period in Roman Palestine, circa first century BCE, through 
the sixth century CE in Palestine and Babylonia, the foundational rabbinic literatures 
were produced: the Midrashim; the Mishnah, a highly-categorized, literary repository of 
oral rabbinic legal opinion; and the Palestinian and Babylonian commentaries on the 
Mishnah known as the Gemara.24 The Talmud, comprised of the Mishnah and its 
extensive Gemara commentary, primarily deals with Jewish ritual law, and civil and 
criminal law and jurisprudence, though it also contains non-halakhic sections, i.e., the 
aggadah, featuring rabbinic narratives.25 Midrash collects hermeneutical interpretations of 
the Bible and comes in legal and non-legal varieties: respectively, midrash halakhah and 
midrash aggadah.26  
Commentary on the Hebrew Bible and the foundational literatures of the Rabbinic 
Era, along with the introduction of new literary genres and works, including halakhic 
responsa and codes, begins to take place during the early medieval, Gaonic Period in 
Islamic Babylonia, the Levant, North Africa, and Spain (eighth to eleventh centuries),27 
through the High Middle Ages (eleventh to twelfth centuries) within the Islamic empire28 
and in Western European Christendom, i.e., Ashkenaz.29 Talmudic and biblical 
commentary expand the rabbinic literary tradition with novel insights and new 
                                                 
24 See Schiffman 1991. 
25 There are two Talmuds, each based on the origin of their respective commentary on the Mishnah: the 
Babylonian Talmud (TB), and the Palestinian Talmud, also known as the Jerusalem Talmud (TY). See 
Solomon 2009. 
26 See Holtz 1992. 
27 See R. Brody 1998; Stillman 1998.  
28 See Stillman 1998. 
29 See Kanerfogel 2012. 
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methodologies of interpretation of biblical and rabbinic texts.30 Legal codification and its 
attendant voluminous commentaries aspire to distill the numerous halakhic debates and 
commentaries on the Talmud and codes into statutory legal determinations. Responsa 
literature collects the practical legal questions and scholarly rabbinic answers that make 
up the case law of halakhah.  
Following the Spanish expulsion of Jews in 1492, the Early Modern Period in the 
Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) ushered in 
widespread and extensive Jewish legal codification and commentary.31 The production of 
new talmudic and biblical commentary, as well as legal codification and commentary, 
continued through the pre-Holocaust Modern period in Western, Central and Eastern 
Europe (nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries), as well as in Jewish 
communities in Muslim lands, and continues still today in America and the State of 
Israel. However, the Modern Era perhaps can best be identified by its proliferation of 
responsa literature and the establishment of an expansive matrix of case law.32 Statutory 
law, i.e., halakhic codification, and case law, i.e., responsa literature, together form the 
basic structure of the halakhic system. 
In Jewish law, literatures of earlier eras are generally considered more 
authoritative than those of later eras. Scholars of the Modern Era, for example, cannot 
contradict positions taken by Medieval or Rabbinic Era sages.33 Neither modern nor 
                                                 
30 See Kanerfogel 2012; Greenstein 1992. 
31 See Twersky 1967, and Davis 2002. 
32 See Elon 1994, vol. 4, for the development of case and statutory Jewish law in the civil and rabbinical 
court systems in the modern State of Israel. 
33 For a history and analysis of the scope, prerogatives, and limits of rabbinic authority, see M. Berger 
1998; and Elon 1994, vol. 1, 240 ff. 
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medieval rabbis have the authority to generate law through midrashic exegesis, as did 
their Rabbinic Era forebears. This methodological constraint becomes particularly acute 
when confronting questions answered in earlier times based on pre-modern scientific 
knowledge.  
Among contemporary Orthodox Jewish halakhists, (at least) three pivotal 
methodological debates impact greatly on the formation and adjudication of 
contemporary medical halakhah.34 The first debate concerns interpretive autonomy and 
judicial discretion verses binding precedent and legal formalism. Does a contemporary 
halakhist have the authoritative license to base his legal conceptions, categorizations, and 
especially normative determinations on autonomous creative readings of foundational 
sources, or is he fundamentally constrained by the weight of legal precedent of previous 
talmudic commentary and responsa case law? This question speaks to the source, scope, 
freedoms, and constraints of rabbinic authority. Generally, theoretical analysis permits 
great creative autonomy, but normative application is highly constrained by legal 
precedent. However, earlier theoretical constructs may ultimately seep into later 
normative halakhic discussion and determinations. In addition, singular poskim indeed 
may boldly create new legal precedents by virtue of their legal creativity and 
acknowledged authority.  
                                                 
34 Ross 2004, 49-99, provides a thorough analysis of halakhic methodologies and process, focusing her 
attention, in particular, on the roles, rights, and responsibilities of Jewish women in Jewish law. See also 
Stone 2010. 
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 Professor Tamar Ross of Bar Ilan University (2004, 60-3), attributes this 
phenomenon to what she calls, “the legal realist position of Ultra Orthodoxy.”35 Legal 
realism, a jurisprudential theory of the first half of the twentieth century, roots the 
determination of law in the discretionary power of the judiciary, rather than in the 
formalities of legal exegesis. In this model of Jewish law, the authority of novel decisions 
inheres less in the persuasive interpretation and application of rabbinic texts and Jewish 
law, and more in the charismatic authority of the recognized posek (decisor).36 For 
example, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, one of the most prolific and widely accepted poskim of 
the twentieth century, especially for medical halakhah, including issues of ART, was 
known to make definitive rulings based on his autonomous creative readings and 
interpretations of foundational rabbinic sources. Although Rabbi J. David Bleich, one of 
the bioethical exemplars of this dissertation, agrees that a worthy posek may issue an 
unprecedented decision if his determination does not conflict with an already widely 
accepted view, he strongly believes that normative Jewish law, in general, must be 
formalist, and determined by the weighting and weighing of prior legal opinions and 
precedents of the legal codes and case law (Bleich 1977, xvi-xvii). Bleich’s view brings 
us to the next debate. 
                                                 
35 Although it should be noted that Ross (ibid.) acknowledges that such legal realism is arguably rooted in 
the Hebrew Bible, and often attested to in the Talmud, as well.  
36 Legal realism and the sociology of halakhah – that is, the study of how halakhah works in actual practice 
rather than in scholarly theory, adds further insight into halakhic process. The role of charismatic authority, 
intra-and-inter-denominational politics, and religious coercion through a state-recognized Chief Rabbinate 
in Israel all complicate legal theory with questions of social compliance and deviation. See Tucker 2014, 
425; Ben-Menachem 1991, 1997.  
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 The second methodological debate relates to halakhic positivism verses 
contextualism. In other words, does contemporary Jewish law build-off precedent, i.e., 
previously adopted legal opinion within a highly-regulated system of halakhic 
adjudication, regardless of original intent or new knowledge, or should the purported 
original reasons and understandings help to decide how best to interpret and apply earlier 
sources to contemporary situations?37 Ross (2004, 63-70) associates this question and 
debate with the meta-halakhic ideologies ascendant in Modern Orthodoxy, which identify 
most elements of the halakhic system as formally fixed due to their unchanging, religious 
and ethical integrity, while admitting that other elements are socially and historically 
contextual, and thus subject to revision or change. Ross aligns this model with legal 
positivism, which comes in strong and weak forms, and in formalist and non-formalist 
versions. As opposed to legal realism, legal positivism looks not to judicial discretion and 
subjective evaluation, but to a self-enclosed halakhic system of predetermined rules of 
conceptualization and analysis, hierarchies of authority with protocols for the 
adjudication of conflicting opinions, and the democratization of legal process based on 
persuasion rather than personality.38 Positivism posits that law’s essential grounding is in 
the system of legal rules, categories, and values, while formalists and non-formalists 
                                                 
37 Ross 2004, 63, points out that in the case of halakhah, positivism is used is a figurative sense, since true 
legal positivism emerged as a rejection of natural law and universal morality in favor of “positing” social 
institutions, whether governmental, legislative, or jurisprudential, as the source of law. 
38 See Yuter 1987. Additionally, the rise of internet-based communication and information distribution has 
further democratized halakhic discourse and has created new sources of halakhic material, such as online 
“Q & A” websites. See Steinitz 2011. At the same time, there has been a longstanding, increasingly 
documented phenomenon of radical differences between publicly published and privately delivered 
halakhic rulings by poskim, which undermines said democratization by obfuscating the full scope of case 
law available as legal sources and precedents, see Irshai 2014.  
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debate the rigidity of the nature of law and its process of deliberation. For the formalist, 
subjective judgment and contextualization are applicable only in cases of gaps in the 
halakhic literature, or in supererogatory public policy formulation. For the non-formalist, 
embedded within the laws of the halakhic system are higher level principles of ethics, 
political theory, public policy, and religious ideology. The non-formalist, positivist 
halakhist aims to look beyond the letter of the law, and read between its lines, for these 
higher level principles, which are then applied to legal precedents, as well as to legal 
lacunae and ambiguities, such as ART (Ross 2004, 54-5; 64-5). For example, the noted 
Israeli Jewish educator and posek Rabbi Yoel Bin Nun employs a contextualist-halakhic 
method that attempts to ascertain the intent and telos of a particular halakhic norm or 
precedent, and then apply anew these higher-level determinations in normative 
application to the contemporary scene, whether for stringency or leniency (Zuckier 
2010). At the other end of the spectrum, Rabbi J. David Bleich rigorously and thoroughly 
subjects halakhic questions and considerations to formalist, positivist analysis and 
adjudication (Bleich 1977).  
The third methodological debate concerns legal certainty and judicial doubt. For 
cases in which there are several, perhaps conflicting, halakhic opinions, must the final 
legal determination try to assimilate as many legal opinions as possible, often resulting in 
stringency due to redundant accommodation, or may a halakhist responsibly arrive at a 
novel, certain determination upon which others may rely without concern for conflicting 
views? In cases of ART, this debate is particularly weighty given that definitions of 
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maternity and paternity affect religious status and social standing, and thus one 
individual’s halakhic positions and practice affects an interacting communal whole.39 
 Halakhists within the Jewish Conservative movement also grapple with similar 
questions. Rabbi Joel Roth, a leading halakhist of the Conservative movement and 
professor of Talmud and Jewish Law at the Jewish Theological Seminary, in The 
Halakhic Process: A Systematic Analysis (1986), presents a systemic analysis of Jewish 
law, including a full analysis of halakhic decision-making, the tension between precedent 
and judicial discretion, the pertinence of historical context, and the source and scope of 
rabbinic authority. Of interest is his inquiry into extralegal sources within halakhah, 
including medical and scientific data, and his open approach to new legal sources within 
halakhah. Roth, like most Orthodox halakhists, adopts a positivist approach to Jewish 
law, which is especially important to his justifying his religious commitments to Jewish 
legal obligation in light of his theology of a fully human-mediated Torah tradition (Roth 
1986, 9-11). Rabbi Elliot Dorff (2007), one of this dissertation’s bioethical exemplars, 
published his own philosophy of Jewish Law, in which he develops a non-positivist 
approach that allows for more organic change within the halakhic tradition, especially in 
light of historical contextualization. His philosophy of law is influenced by covenantal 
ethics, discerning core Jewish values through “depth theology,” and a principled 
affirmation that Jewish legal positions are decided together by scholar and community. 
Moshe Zemer (Zemer 1999, Jacobs and Zemer 2002), an Israeli Reform rabbi studies the 
                                                 
39 Such as halakhic determinations that affect socio-religious status, e.g. Jewishness, bastardy, lineage, etc. 
See Grazi 2005b, 25-8 on the problem of consensus. For a discussion of the public consequences of private 
choices in secular bioethics, see Fenwick 1998. 
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pluralism and flexibility of the halakhic system, and advocates for a progressive halakhah 
to inform and help guide individuals and communities in reflective Jewish decision 
making. In this way, he follows in the footsteps of Rabbi Solomon B. Freehof, the 
leading Reform Jewish legal scholar of the twentieth century who sought to move beyond 
classical Reform and engage the religious literary legacy of Judaism with a philosophy of 
“guidance, not governance” (Friedman 2013). 
 All halakhists intrinsically, and many Jewish bioethicists by intellectual and/or 
religious orientation, espouse an epistemology that privileges the Written and Oral Torah 
traditions, even amidst great variation in theology, halakhic methodology, and legal 
philosophy. New scientific knowledge and technological capability, however, will 
manifest different influences and impacts upon halakhic process and bioethical outcomes 
depending on their place in one’s epistemology. Thus, studying the epistemological 
dimensions of medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics opens a new and important window 
into Jewish religion and science relations, as will be demonstrated in this dissertation. 
 
 Schemata of Religion and Science Relations 
 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the first generation of scholars of the 
nascent “Religion and Science” guild within the academic discipline of Religious Studies 
considered and proposed typological schemata for the possible or actual interactions of 
religion and science. Alternative typologies and schemata were subsequently suggested in 
response to earlier proposals. While contemporary scholars of “Religion and Science,” to 
a large degree, have moved beyond this elementary discussion, considerations of such 
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typologies and schemata are important intellectual rites of passage for students new to the 
guild, and may even provide refreshing insight to those mature scholars already steeped 
in next-generation issues. Viewing Jewish religion and science relations through the lens 
of the epistemological and axiological dimensions of Jewish bioethics can likewise 
benefit from a contextualizing review of foundational religion and science typologies and 
schemata, in particular those of Professors Ian Barbour, Ted Peters, and Willem B. Drees, 
as well as the alternative perspective of Neils Henrik Gregersen.  
Ian Barbour (1997, 77-105) in Religion and Science: Historical and 
Contemporary Issues proposed the first schematization of religion and science 
relationships. His four-fold typology of “Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and 
Integration” was a reductionist effort to collapse religion and science encounters into a 
memorable and instructive, essentialist, typological schema. Within “Conflict,” Barbour 
places post-enlightenment scientific materialism and biblical literalism at the extremes. 
Both these intellectual commitments overreach into the other’s domain, and, thus, end up 
in conflict. The “Independence” typology represents the post-enlightenment, Kantian 
truce. It was upheld by Protestant Neo-Orthodox existentialist theologians, such as Karl 
Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, as well as scientists such as Albert Einstein and Stephen J. 
Gould, the later having declared science and religion as “NOMA,” i.e., non-overlapping 
magisterium. Barbour references Langdon Gilkey’s observation that religion and science 
employ different languages, and thus are stuck in their respective culturally contingent 
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discourses.40 “Dialogue,” which Barbour seems to favor best, allows for the mutual 
exploration of similarities in philosophical approaches and methodological parallels. 
“Dialogue” allows for learning and reformulation, but admits that there may be 
irreconcilable differences. The typology of “Integration” is both old and new. The long 
history of cosmological argument from Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas in medieval 
times, to the natural theology of William Paley of early modernity, to the anthropic 
principle of contemporary thinkers such as Richard Swinburne and Nathan Aviezer, all 
represent a type of integration of religion and science, albeit one that will theologically 
only produce an impersonal, creator God.41 Others advocate for a theology of nature, like 
Arthur Peacocke, or for a systematic synthesis of science and religion with a new, 
comprehensive metaphysic, like Alfred North Whitehead and his disciples.42 With this 
four-fold typology, Barbour minimally aims to help categorize discrete religion and 
science encounters, as well as invite contemplation about which typology more broadly 
best represents the science and religion relationship.  
Ted Peters (1999) in “Science and Theology: Toward Consonance” counts “Eight 
Ways Science and Theology Battle and Make Peace.” On the one hand, Peters may be 
suggesting an alternative typology to Barbour. More likely, though, he is beginning a 
                                                 
40 Gilkey 1985, 108-16. Gilkey famously distinguished between religion that asks ultimate “why” or 
meaning questions, and science that asks here-and-now, causes and facts, “what” and “how” questions. 
This distinguishing trope can be found in many introductory books on religion and science relations. See 
Gilkey 1993; as well as Rolston 1997, 22-6; and Sacks 2011, 19-56. 
41 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Book of Knowledge, “Basic Principle of the Torah,” 2:1-2; Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae Ia2.3; Paley 2008; Swinburne 2004; Aviezer 1990. 
42 Peacocke 1993; Whitehead 1979; see also Hartshorne 1982.  
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phenomenological catalogue of types of religion and science encounters.43 He resists 
Barbour’s minimalist schema because he believes that it forces dissimilar types into the 
same narrow boxes. Peters’s eight ways are: “Scientific Materialism,” “Scientific 
Imperialism,” “Ecclesiastical Authority,” “Biblical Literalism” (all of which arguably 
collapse into the “Conflict” typology), “Two languages” (which corresponds to Barbour’s 
“Independence” typology), “Hypothetical Consonance” (which in its weaker formulation 
seems to correlate to “Dialogue,” and in its aspirational ideal corresponds to 
“Integration”), “Ethical Overlap” (which Peter’s claims can function even in the 
“Independence” typology, though it would seem to belong more to “Dialogue”), and 
“New Age Spirituality” (which best corresponds to “Integration”). Once in 
phenomenological mode, one can continue to add to the catalogue, for example, as with 
the new categories of “Shared History,” “Political Alliance,” and further specialized 
categories of “Bioethics,” “Environmental Ethics,” etc.… Peters aims to extend the 
conversation beyond Barbour’s too-rigid classification, but more importantly wants to 
advocate for hypothetical consonance, which he believes maintains the integrity of each 
domain, but still allows for conversation and points of contact, crossover, and conflation. 
Willem Drees (1996, 39-49) in Religion, Science and Naturalism, rejects Barbour, 
and by implication Peters, as offering an inadequate analysis. He believes that Barbour 
and others like him have failed to define and consider adequately what is meant by both 
religion and science. He identifies three epistemological challenges to religion: new 
                                                 
43 See Peters 1999, endnote 5, where Peters admits that his eight ways can be collapsed into Barbour’s four 
types.  
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scientific knowledge; new ideas about the nature of knowledge, and new appreciations of 
the world and universe. He places these along a “y-axis.” Along an “x-axis,” Drees 
emphasizes a more sophisticated understanding of religion, which he essentializes, per 
George Lindbeck (1984), into three categories: cognitive claims, religious experience, 
and lived linguistic-cultural traditions. The three new epistemological challenges posed 
by science to religion and the three categories of religious understanding track with and 
against each other in a 3 x 3 matrix, a new schema to help explore points of contact and 
conversation between science and religion.  
Table 3.1. Willem B. Drees’s (1996, 40) “A classification for areas of discussion concerning the 
relationship of religion and science.” 
 
Character of 
Religion (x-axis) ˃ 
Challenge (y-axis) 
˅ 
1. Cognitive 
 
2. Experience 
 
3. Tradition 
 
 
a. New knowledge 
1a. Content: 
i. Conflicts 
ii. Separation 
iii. Partial 
adaptation 
iv. Integration 
2a. Opportunities for 
experiential 
religion? 
Religious 
experience and the 
brain. 
3a. Religious traditions 
as products of 
evolution. 
 
b. New views of 
knowledge 
1b. Philosophy of 
science and 
opportunities for 
theology. 
2b. Philosophical 
defenses of 
religious 
experiences as 
data. 
3b. Criticism and 
development of 
religions as 
“language games.” 
 
c. Appreciation of 
the world 
1c. A new covenant 
between humans 
and the Universe? 
2c. Ambivalences of 
the world and 
implications for 
the concept of 
God. 
3c. A basis for hope? 
Or religions as 
local traditions 
without universal 
claim? 
 
 
Each of the matrix’s nine boxes represents an area of theological and 
philosophical dialogue through which religion and science relations may be more deeply 
explored. Drees thus aspires to provide not a typology, but a schema that serves as a 
research apparatus for reflection upon science and religion encounters. So, for example, 
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matching new scientific knowledge against religious cognitive claims might indeed break 
down into Barbour’s four-fold typology. However, that is only one box of consideration. 
Our new knowledge of neuroscience or evolutionary psychology can help us better 
understand experiential religion. Our new knowledge of linguistics and culture can help 
us better understand the formation, perpetuation, and activity of religious traditions. New 
views of knowledge in the philosophy of science may create new opportunities for 
theological models, as well as permit the consideration of religious experience as 
scientific data to be analyzed. The critical study of the development of religion is 
enhanced when deconstructed as the language games of a given tradition. A new 
appreciation of our world might suggest new ways of envisioning the covenant between 
God, humans, and our world/universe; have implications for the types of religious 
experience we seek; and may serve to stretch the ethical scope and help reformulate the 
goals of religious traditions. In sum, Drees is less interested in typology or 
phenomenology than in creating a schema of methodological guidelines to help direct 
constructive reflection on science and religion encounters.  
Each of the above-mentioned three thinkers believes that the typological and/or 
schematic exercise creates meaningful reflection and conversation. Each, coming from a 
critical-realist perspective, ultimately aspires to a unity of knowledge of which science 
and religion are a part.44 However, there are those who dispute this aspiration of 
integration or consonance and offer an alternative instead. The socio-historicist and 
                                                 
44 Critical realism affirms a correspondence theory of truth and reality, but recognizes that since all data are 
theory-laden, theoretical truth claims must be evaluated by a complex set of (Kuhnian) criteria, such as: 
agreement with data; coherence; scope; and fertility. Thus, critical realism is confident in its realism, but 
humbly tentative and critical in its certainty about specific truth claims. See Barbour 1997, 106-10. 
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linguistic views of the production of knowledge, along with a holistic appreciation for the 
cultural ladenness and historical contingency of religious and scientific traditions, has led 
to a post-modern epistemological critique of both religion and science.45 While Barbour, 
Peters, and even Drees all subscribe to a variation of a critical-realist orientation, others 
dispute the ability to make such cognitive claims. Mary Gerhart and Allan Russel in 
Metaphoric Process: The Creation of Scientific and Religious Understanding (1984) 
focus on how science and religion relate through a unified strategy of metaphor which 
allows for the comparison of known to unknown in the apprehension of the entirely other. 
The growth of knowledge in both science and religion depends on the mediation of 
experience by theoretical understanding. The metaphoric process provides the common 
structure of new explorations and imaginings. While a typologist would say that this 
constitutes dialogue or consonance, Gerhart and Russel believe that the starting point for 
consideration is simply a shared rationality. 
Niels Henrik Gregersen (Gregersen and van Huyssteen 1998) also believes that 
there is a growing challenge of cognitive pluralism which undercuts such typologies and 
schemata.46 He proposes a “contextual coherence theory” in which science and theology 
interface when the consequences of science are interpreted in cultures. Like J. Wentzel 
van Huyssteen (ibid.), he is against philosophical foundationalism and scientific realism, 
and is less interested in comparative method than in cumulative progress. Contextual 
                                                 
45 See Kuhn 1996, 1998; and Wittgenstein 2008.  
46 For a Jewish epistemology that leverages cognitive pluralism to articulate a theology of Jewish law, see 
Soloveitchik 1984, 1986; Sacks 1988, 78-9; and Shatz 2016. For the role of theology in Jewish medical 
ethics, see Jotkowitz 2013c. 
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coherence theory aims to be realist in the sense of grappling with the pluralistic character 
of understanding reality and in the avoidance of trying to homogenize knowledge.  
Formulating such schemata of the relationship of science and religion, as well as 
considering their critiques, serve an important heuristic function for those who study and 
think about religion and science relations. Considering the relationship of these two 
disciplines with historical perspective, philosophical reflection, religious appreciation, 
and psychological self-awareness can allow one to be a more focused and disciplined 
thinker about religion and science, human experience, truth claims, and the search for 
meaning within the world/universe we inhabit. The beginning of such a project starts with 
consideration of definitions of both science and religion, identification of positions taken 
within each about ontological and metaphysical presuppositions, epistemological 
frameworks, and other religious and cultural biases and commitments. Creating a schema 
not only empowers scholars of religion and science to reflect upon these issues for 
themselves, but also to relate the thinking of others to the analytic categories proposed.  
 We can see these advantageous and helpful processes at play in the very 
consideration of the three aforementioned early typologies and schemata of religion and 
science relations by Barbour, Peters, and Drees. Barbour created what he saw as an 
essentialist typology. As a first-generation thinker, Barbour set the agenda. Peters follows 
Barbour’s typology in broad strokes, but shows greater nuance of position and expands it 
into eight ways. He probably could have done more because, rather than fundamentally 
disagreeing with Barbour, he creates a phenomenological study of relations, citing 
different examples of thinkers for each, as well as identifying their religious, 
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philosophical, and epistemological commitments. Drees too is inspired by Barbour, but 
locates Barbour’s entire typology in the first box of his matrix regarding the challenge of 
new knowledge to the cognitive claims of religion. Drees expands the consideration of 
religion and science relations beyond cognitive claims to larger issues of epistemology, 
axiology, and experience.  
 This dissertation is also predicated on the scholarly assumption that Jewish 
religion and science relations can similarly be assessed through an investigation of the 
epistemological and axiological dimensions of Jewish bioethics. Points of conflict, 
independence, dialogue, and integration may be discerned. A phenomenology of 
interactions may be catalogued, and a multi-valenced analysis of interactions may be 
undertaken. If religion and science indeed constitute different domains of constructed 
human thought and experience with fundamentally different epistemologies, then there 
may indeed be little to no interaction between them; each will stand independently. 
However, philosophers of science opine that science isn’t as epistemically special as 
commonly thought, and that both religion and science as domains of human knowledge 
share a common rationality the undergirds the two disciplines.47 Scholars of science, and 
of religion, and of the relationship of religion and science, all look to develop 
investigative methods and frames of understanding that give insight into the principles, 
context, complexity, and historical contingency of knowledge claims and their normative 
applications.  
                                                 
47 There is a debate among scholars of how to identify this common rationality. On the one hand, there are 
foundationalists who turn to rational thinking and/or empiricism to create indubitable premises from which 
they wage sound argument. Alternatively, there are non-or-post-foundationalists who understand scientific 
and religious knowledge to be complex forms of social knowing.  
107 
 
 
Strategies for Contending with Conflicts Between Torah and Science  
 
Within Jewish religion and science relations, the epistemological exploration of 
theological and legal strategies employed in resolving seeming conflicts of Torah and 
science is of pertinence to the study of Jewish bioethics. Such an investigation helps 
provide better understanding of halakhic process, as well as of how Jewish law may 
respond to changes in scientific understanding and technological capability. Rabbi Natan 
Slifkin has written several books on the relationship of Torah and science. He identifies 
five approaches to the reconciliation of ostensible conflicts between them (Slifkin 2003, 
2007; Reichman 2004).48 First, the “Divine Knowledge Approach” asserts a position of 
Torah and rabbinical inerrancy. As divinely revealed wisdom, the Torah cannot be 
mistaken. The rabbinic interpreters of the Torah likewise have been blessed with divine 
inspiration, and therefore possess superior, if not near-perfect knowledge. Torah truth is 
eternal, while scientific knowledge is humanly constructed and thus subject to revision 
and reversal.49 Rabbi Moshe Meiselman (2013), who holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics from 
MIT and is currently a Rosh Yeshiva in Jerusalem, is a vocal proponent of this position.50 
This deep skepticism of scientific and humanistic knowledge, as well as of modern 
society, limits all biomedical concerns to formalistic and positivist medical halakhah. 
                                                 
48 See also Horowitz 1991-2; Steinsaltz 1994; Sprecher 1996; Bleich 2011, and 2017a, 73-100. 
49 Members of this theological school posit this as an argument akin to the pessimistic meta-induction in the 
philosophy of science, i.e. we can infer that our current scientific theories will be overturned from past 
reversals.  
50 The “Divine Knowledge Approach” can be found among a significant number of Orthodox Jewish 
thinkers since the advent of the Scientific Revolution and especially as a backlash position in the aftermath 
of the rise of Reform Judaism. In the context of the reception of Copernicanism, see Brown 2013; Student 
2014. For another example of this approach, see Zimmerman 1979. 
108 
 
 
 The second, “Changes of Nature Approach,” dissolves seeming conflicts between 
Torah and science by asserting that they are both correct. The reason why Torah appears 
mistaken is because nature has changed since biblical and rabbinic times. For example, 
talmudic understandings of human and animal anatomy, as well as fetal development, are 
substantively different than those of our time (Sternberg 1997; Carmell and Goldberger 
1998; Reichman 1996, 2008a,b). The Talmud posits, for further example, that seventh-
month fetuses are viable, but eighth-month fetuses are not (Reiss and Ash, 1988; Student 
2001). According to this approach, the talmudic sages were not wrong; simply, nature has 
since changed. This strategy originates in the scholastic talmudic commentaries of the 
Tosafists of medieval Ashkenaz (twelfth through fourteenth centuries, Franco-Germany). 
Rabbi Neriah Gutal (1998a) documents and analyzes the application of this approach 
throughout talmudic commentary and halakhic literature.51 The benefit of this strategy is 
that it frees contemporary consideration of biomedical questions from the constraining 
force of halakhic positions developed through a different understanding of the scientific 
reality. Gutal (1998b), however, cleverly argues that to apply this principle proactively in 
contemporary Jewish bioethics would require that one actually believes in the “Change of 
Nature” thesis. If one doesn’t believe that nature has changed in the past 2000 years, then 
one cannot with integrity take advantage of this liberalizing strategy. However, it is worth 
considering whether one can indeed apply aspects of this pedigreed approach in 
                                                 
51 For shorter English analyses see Cohen 1996, and Steinberg 2003d. For a Maimonidean critique of the 
Tosafist position, cf. Malakh 1998. 
109 
 
 
contemporary situations in which technological achievement has indeed changed nature, 
such as in assisted reproductive and genetic technologies. 
 The third and fourth approaches are the “Different Meaning Approach” and the 
“Metaphor Approach.” The strategy is similar for both. Either we misunderstand the 
talmudic sages’ intent and mistakenly conclude that they erred in scientific 
understanding, or the sages were speaking metaphorically, and not in any realistic 
capacity. The metaphoric strategy is also marshalled to explain seeming inconsistencies 
between biblical descriptions of reality and our current scientific understandings.52 Both 
strategies seek to uphold the inerrancy of the sages despite their being at odds with 
contemporary understandings of science.  
 The fifth “Empirical Knowledge Approach” admits rabbinic fallibility. The sages 
were expert in Torah scholarship, not scientific knowledge, and, at their best, shared the 
scientific understandings of their times. Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler (2004), one of this 
dissertation’s exemplars, cleverly combines the “Changes of Nature” approach with the 
“Different Meaning” approach in light of the “Empirical Knowledge Approach,” and says 
that the “Changes of Nature” approach should be decoded as our understanding of nature 
has changed.53 While this approach admits to progress in scientific knowledge, the 
question at hand is what to do when halakhic precedent is based on erroneous science. On 
the one hand, one could argue a realist position that mistakes should be corrected and 
                                                 
52 Many medieval and early modern talmudists and halakhists were proponents of metaphoric 
interpretations of supernaturalistic biblical and rabbinic passages, as well as of passages and positions that 
defied their contemporary understanding of the world. Slifkin 2003, 2007 details such authorities and cases. 
See also Lamm 1990; Schacter 1997; Kimche 1999; Sacks 2011. 
53 Tendler credits this view to Rabbi Moses Isserles (1520-1572, Cracow, Poland), She’elot uTeshuvot 
haRamo 6. See Tendler 2004; Loike and Tendler 2011, 114, 114n47. 
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Jewish law reformulated (Sternberg 1997).54 On the other hand, one could counter with a 
strong constructionist stance that halakhah creates its own legal reality. Most 
contemporary espousers of this position, however, adopt a more nuanced position. On 
matters of ritual, on should continue to practice per established halakhic positions, even if 
they were originally conceived in error. For example, Kashrut, Judaism’s ritual dietary 
code, should still be followed even if originally formulated based on erroneous science, 
for example, mistakes in animal anatomy.55 In matters of health and medicine, on the 
other hand, halakhists should pursue the best course of action to safeguard and advance 
life in light of our best scientific understandings (Rabinowitz 1987). This compromise 
has apparent precedent, as, for example, by medieval times, talmudic medicine was 
considered discredited and routinely ignored (Halevi 1997). 
However, there does not appear to be a developed protocol as to when and how to 
change halakhah in light of changes in scientific understanding. At best, there is a 
recommendation to consider such matters case by case (Student 2001; Dorff 2014). This 
                                                 
54 In a published interview with Rabbi Hershel Schachter, prominent Rosh Yeshiva at Yeshiva University’s 
affiliated rabbinical seminary, Schachter supported the idea that it is possible for halakhah to change in 
light of new scientific knowledge: “But if there is a Halakhah that is clearly based on a [scientific] mistake, 
that you cannot interpret differently and is outright incorrect, how can you continue observing it? It’s based 
on a mistake. We believe in Torah min Hashamayim (Torah from Heaven) – it’s a divine code. If there is a 
mistake, it’s a man-made mistake. HaKadosh Barukh Hu (the Holy One blessed be He) doesn’t make 
mistakes.” See Bashevkin 2014, 50. See also Neuberger 1991-2; Adlerstein, Fryshman, Brody, Aviezer, 
and Buchman 2014; and Torah and Science Blog n.d.a,b. 
55 Even here more nuance is necessary. The subsection of kosher laws regarding meat called tereifot – a 
specific ancient tradition listing kosher-disqualifying anatomical injuries and abnormalities purportedly 
predictive of the death of the animal within a year, may still formally attach even if anatomically or 
physiologically erroneous given that rabbinic tradition classifies these laws as “Halakhah leMoshe miSinai 
– laws given to Moses at Sinai.” However, see Buchman 2007, who argues that Jewish law should neither 
epistemologically or legally privilege these laws. Other kosher laws not classified as such, however, may 
be subject to revision in light of new scientific knowledge. For example, at present, Israeli halakhic 
authorities are debating whether stainless steel kitchen utensils should be subject to the laws of flavor 
absorption and expunging in light of empirical testing in a laboratory that demonstrates that stainless steel 
does neither. See Frank, et al. 2014, 2105; Henkin 2014; and Melamed 2016.  
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holds true for cases of long-known phenomena in which current understandings need to 
be reconciled with past conflicting rabbinical understandings. There is little written 
concerning novel, emergent technologies, and anticipating paradigmatic changes in 
scientific understanding. Such a protocol would need to formulate a theory and theology 
of knowledge, including the relationship of law and ethics, a philosophy and a 
methodology of halakhah, all in light of a philosophically attuned understanding of 
scientific progress and achievement.56 This would be a positive contribution to Jewish 
bioethics and medical halakhah. In this dissertation, I analyze the epistemological 
dimensions of the encounter of, and, at times, conflict between, ancient Torah sources 
and new scientific knowledge in the thought of Jewish bioethicists, as well as how they 
use both old and new knowledge together to address contemporary bioethical challenges.  
 
Contextualizing Axiological Dimensions: The Interrelationship of Ethics and 
Halakhah 
 
For the Jewish bioethicist and medical halakhist, openness to methodological 
approaches beyond the strictly legally positivist and halakhically formalist may depend 
on where one stands regarding the question of whether one thinks that there is an ethic 
independent of halakhah. Plato famously has Socrates ask in Euthyphro (10a): “Is what is 
holy, holy, because the gods approve of it, or do they approve of it because it is holy?” 
Divine command theory posits that the rulings of the gods, or God, or mitzvah 
(commandment), i.e., Jewish law, determine the right and the good (Harris 2003). 
                                                 
56 See Fisch 2007, 2008, who begins to consider how Jewish epistemologies and hermeneutics can relate to 
the philosophy of science. 
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Alternatively, some thinkers believer that there does indeed exist an independent ethic by 
which God’s commands are valuated. Presumably, those who side with a divine 
command theory will likewise embrace greater legal formalism in responding to life 
situations, whether they are of a purely ritualistic or of an ethical nature. Part of the 
challenge of identifying who holds what opinion among halakhists is that the vast 
majority of halakhists do not ask the question, leaving us with little insight into their 
overall philosophy of halakhah absent a thorough, independent analysis of their oeuvre. 
Of those who do ask the question, they tend not to answer it in an either/or fashion but 
offer highly qualified and nuanced responses.  
The question, “Does Jewish tradition recognize an ethic independent of 
Halakhah?,” was the topic of an oft-cited 1975 article by the late, prominent rabbinical 
scholar Aharon Lichtenstein, Rosh Yeshiva of Yeshivat Har Etzion in Israel (Lichtenstein 
1975). Lichtenstein’s careful response to the question pivots on a second question: how 
are we defining “halakhah?” If halakhah refers to the individual laws that comprise 
Judaism’s legal tradition, then the answer is unequivocally yes, there is an independent 
ethic. Lichtenstein supplies copious and compelling talmudic support for his stance that 
halakhah is not morally self-sufficient. However, Lichtenstein further states that 
Halakhah with a capital “H” refers to the system as a whole, which incorporates 
supererogatory, supra-legal, but not extra-legal, duties. The Halakhah itself mandates 
going beyond its legal rulings and niceties to pursue larger ethical goals.57 For example, 
                                                 
57Lichtenstein 2003a, 117, by way of example, cites three strategies in which ethical goals beyond 
particular legal compliance can be achieved: voluntarily assuming obligation despite personal exemption; 
disregarding technical exclusions; and most far-reaching, expanding the scope of the law. 
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the Talmud speaks of the duty of “lifnim mishurat hadin” – that is, of going between the 
lines of the law, or more colloquially, beyond the letter of the law. Halakhah as an overall 
system and worldview requires, at times, that its adherents uphold its grand moral vision 
by reading between its lines and going beyond its letters.58  
Another question, though, needs to be asked: what inspires the moral impulse to 
transcend the clear regulations of halakhic legislation? If there is an ethic independent of 
halakhah, what are the sources of ethical insight which can impinge upon halakhic 
decision-making? Is it an objective or subjective ethic? Is it based on a theory of natural 
law and morality, or rooted in culture and tradition? Is it a function of act or agent 
morality? Does ethical intuitionism play a legitimate role?59 In the wake of Lichtenstein’s 
article, there has been a robust dialogue about these questions. 
The late Yeshayahu Leibowitz of Hebrew University denied the question in its 
totality. He believed ethics were outside the purview of Jewish law, which he interpreted 
more narrowly and defined solely as the submissive service of God. Pointing to 
Maimonides’s views on the ideal purity of religious motivation, Leibowitz considered 
any ulterior motivation, even ethical, in the service of God to be tantamount to idolatry. 
This did not curtail the need for ethics, which he believed governed interpersonal 
relationships and matters of polity, but just their framing and motivation (Leibowitz 
1995, 3-29; Rynhold 2011). The late Marvin Fox of Brandeis University affirmed the role 
of ethics in Maimonides’s halakhic system; however, he thought that Maimonides 
                                                 
58 See Lichtenstein 2003a, 107-9. Although he posits that mitzvot (divine commandments) either have 
inherent axiological significance, or ritualistically aim to inspire obedience, which itself is religiously and 
ethically salubrious, he also affirms meta-ethical principles and purposes.  
59 For an introduction to intuitionism in ethics, see Stratton-Lake 2014. 
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subscribed to a divine command theory (Fox 1990, 2003). Most others, however, argue 
that Maimonides acknowledged that Jewish law and ethics were accountable to an 
independent ethic given Maimonides rationalist orientation, i.e., God too is a rational 
agent (Sagi and Statman 1995a, 1995b). 
 J. David Bleich (1980; 1987; 2013a,b), one of this dissertation’s exemplars, 
asserts that the Talmud recognizes natural law and morality, deems it of objective 
integrity, and thereby Jewish law developed incorporating the values of objective natural 
law and morality within its strictures and affirmative duties. Thus, Bleich embraces legal 
formalism, because while he agrees that there is an ethic independent of halakhah, this is 
of no practical relevance since it is already entailed within the law. Bleich (1987) also 
locates manifestations of the ethic independent of halakhah in the Midrash and Talmud’s 
aggadic stories and maxims modelling and championing supererogatory ethical behavior. 
However, Bleich (1997b) at the same time denies the aggadah any normative application 
to halakhic decision-making, as stated in Chapter Two. Although Bleich and Lichtenstein 
agree that Halakhah as a system acknowledges an independent ethic, Lichtenstein allows 
much greater personal discretion in judging the applicability and scope of supererogatory 
actions (Lichtenstein 1975; 2003b).60  
 One of the reasons for Lichtenstein granting great scope to and autonomy within 
the realm of the supererogatory is that he is not only interested in act morality, i.e., what 
the moral agent does, but also in agent morality – i.e., the ethical character of the agent. 
                                                 
60 Several studies explore supererogation within Jewish law, more generally, and “lifnim meshurat hadin – 
going beyond the letter of the law,” more particularly. See Berman 1975, 1977; Diamond 1979; Hartman 
1985; Hartman 1987; Kirschenbaum 1991; Meir 2012; Shilo 1978; Weiss Halivni 1978. For investigations 
of morality and halakhah more generally, see Spero 1983; Statman 2010; Rosen 2010. 
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In other words, by cultivating personal virtue, the halakhist and religious ethicist sharpen 
his or her abilities to make ethical decisions beyond the letter of the law. For 
Lichtenstein, much more than Bleich, the cultivation of virtue is accomplished not only 
by the study of Torah and performance of mitzvot (commandments, plural of mitzvah), 
but also through more humanistic studies and endeavors, thus crosscutting moral 
axiology with epistemology (Lichtenstein 2006-2007). Agent morality and virtue ethics 
have roots in Maimonides’s ethical system, as well as antecedents in rabbinic literature 
(Blau 2000). Once we can speak of a virtuous agent and not just a halakhic actor, there is 
a larger role for moral conscience and intuition. Bleich too affirms basic moral intuition, 
for example regarding the value of the intrinsic sanctity of life, but writes: “For Jews 
committed to guiding their conduct on the basis of a divinely revealed corpus of law, the 
question of the validity of an a priori moral cognition is largely irrelevant” (Rosner and 
Bleich 2000, xxii). However, even given a divinely revealed corpus of law, shouldn’t 
moral intuition have a role to play in the human-mediated interpretation of said corpus 
over the generations? 
 The late Orthodox Jewish philosopher, Rabbi Walter Wurzberger uses the idea of 
moral intuition to create a role for covenantal ethics within a halakhic orientation.61 In 
Ethics of Responsibility: Pluralistic Approaches to Covenantal Ethics, Wurzberger 
(1994) adopts the position that human beings can know ethical truths without appealing 
to revelation, thus making virtue culturally traditioned, and therefore subjective and 
                                                 
61 In the discussion of covenantal ethics in Chapter Two, this typology was primarily associated with 
Reform Jewish thinkers due to their embrace of personal autonomy and the abrogation of halakhic 
obligation. 
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pluralistic, and not simply a function of objective natural morality.62 In order to ensure 
ethical decision-making in line with Jewish law, he advocates for and frames an ethic 
independent of halakhah as needing to be conditioned by covenantal ethics. In other 
words, studying and living life per Jewish law and tradition shapes one’s virtue and moral 
intuition. This covenantal virtue ethic supports an admittedly subjective independent 
ethic, but one that naturally aligns with the halakhic system, itself a product of Jewish 
tradition (Shatz 2009). 
 The relationship of ethics and Jewish law and the question of whether there exists 
an ethic independent of halakhah continue to inspire dialogue and debate. In 2012, the 
Association for the Philosophy of Judaism held an online symposium on Lichtenstein’s 
1975 article (Mittleman and Statman 2012). This question intrigues the student of Jewish 
legal process and philosophy of ethics and law, in general, but also specifically regarding 
Jewish bioethics. Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff (2002a, 241-61; 2003, 337-44; 2007, 211-44), one 
of this dissertation’s examplars, revisits this question in almost every one of his books on 
Jewish ethics and philosophy of halakhah, including his book on Jewish medical ethics 
(Dorff 1998b, 395-416). An ethic independent of halakhah is arguably especially of 
prime importance in Jewish bioethics, as it is precisely in the face of new knowledge and 
novel technologies unanticipated and without parallel within Jewish law that intuitive and 
supererogatory morality serves an invaluable function. 
 
 
                                                 
62 See Wurzberger 1994, chapters one and two. 
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Axiological Dimensions of Halakhic and Jewish Bioethical Process and Methodologies 
Ethical considerations in halakhah consistently interest and may even motivate 
many of those who engage in the academic study of Jewish law. The late Jewish 
philosopher Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits constructed a philosophy of Jewish law and a 
pragmatic program for halakhic reconsideration of pressing contemporary issues, 
especially regarding gender status and Jewish divorce law, based on the need to frame all 
halakhic inquiry in ethical relief (Berkovitz 1983; Shatz 2013a).63 Feminist scholars of 
Jewish law likewise examine Jewish legal questions of tradition and change through the 
lens of gender-aware ethical sensitivity, utilizing feminist scholarship in halakhah, 
theology, and critical legal theory (Irshai 2010). Ronit Irshai (2012) has applied this 
approach to deliberations on fertility-related issues in contemporary halakhic literature. 
Philosopher Tamar Ross (2004) grounds feminist halakhic critique in a theology of divine 
ethical concern, and cumulative and ongoing revelation. Ethical concerns often frame the 
dialectical discussion of tradition and modernity, and of continuity and change in Jewish 
law (Zohar 2007).  
 The priority of the ethical as an essential, as well as supererogatory, component of 
the halakhic system invites questions about the process, principles, methodologies, and 
mechanics of halakhah, as well as the shaping role of ethics within halakhic process. 
Given the native, organic development of halakhah within Jewish covenantal 
communities, which themselves, in varying degrees, participate in larger culture, one 
                                                 
63 Per Shatz 2013b, 254n14, Berkovitz, however, believes that axiological dimensions are all native to 
internal Jewish judgments. 
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would expect to see axiological changes over time. It is worth noting, however, that even 
allowing for such societal influence, natural evolution of moral norms within Judaism 
may still be at odds with the contemporary ethical sensibilities prevalent in larger society 
if the later appear to be contrary to Torah ethics. Reactionary religious responses to 
changing societal ethical judgments and moral norms may likewise yield disjunction.  
 David Shatz (Shatz 2013b), an Orthodox Jewish scholar of general and Jewish 
philosophy, distinguishes between Modern Orthodox and Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) legal 
ideology by pointing to the overt role that values should play in halakhic decisions.64 
Shatz opines that Modern Orthodox halakhic process should not be strictly constructivist 
and formalist, but that poskim should be able to use external ethical standards in halakhic 
decision making.65 A Modern Orthodox halakhic philosophy should affirm the following: 
an ethic independent of halakhah (what Shatz calls, “the validity thesis”), that humans 
can know ethical truths without revelation (“the knowledge thesis”), that every legal 
system entails a certain indeterminacy and can produce untoward results (“the 
jurisprudential thesis”), and that halakhah should seek to reconcile ethically troubling 
biblical practices and rabbinic pronouncements with contemporary morality (“the 
reconciliation thesis”).66 While Shatz compellingly constructs a philosophy of halakhah 
                                                 
64 For an intellectual orientation and reader of Shatz, see Tirosh-Samuelson and Hughes, 2016. 
65 This assertion seemingly goes beyond the validation of ethical intuitionism within halakhic process, in 
that Shatz affirms that a posek’s personal ethical intuition and ideology may indeed have been influenced 
by factors external to Jewish law. For examples of the recognized roles that ideology and ethical intuition 
may play in halakhic process, see Shapiro 2016a, 2016b. Shatz 2013b, 246, justifies this position, in part, 
by pointing to the talmudic principle, “’ein ledayan ela mah she’einav ro’ot – a rabbinical judge has naught 
but what his eyes see” (TB Niddah 20b), which recognizes that a posek may yield fallible rulings, but has 
license to make halakhic determinations based on the resources at his disposal, including ethical judgments. 
66 Shatz 2013b, 247-50, argues that an ethic independent of halakhah helps resolve legal indeterminacy by 
allowing for the ethical ranking of legal determinations, as well as checks untoward results. Shatz, 250-2, 
also explains that ethically troubling biblical passages or rabbinic pronouncements may be reconciled by 
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that could be leveraged within the legal model of Jewish bioethics, several of his 
prescriptions may also be used in descriptive analysis of Jewish religion and science 
relations in contemporary Jewish bioethics. 
 
Methodological Parallels in Contemporary Bioethical Theory 
  
 Contemporary secular bioethics operate in three distinctive spheres of 
engagement and influence: academic, policy oriented, and clinical bioethics. Clinical 
bioethics aims to provide ethical guidance to discrete bioethical questions or dilemmas. 
Policy oriented bioethics aspires to establish normative guidelines for clinical application 
and consistent decision making. Academic bioethics usually deals in theory, with the goal 
of influencing bioethical policy. Bioethical theory itself can be further subdivided into 
three groups: high theory, “anti-theory” casuistic particularism (or narrative bioethics), 
and theory-modest bioethics featuring guiding mid-level norms. High theorists favor top-
down, deductivist modes of thinking, which systematically order moral principles and 
apply them to hypotheticals.67 Particularistic casuistry or narrative bioethics recognizes 
that our moral lives are culturally contingent and messy, and thus sees individual cases 
and questions of bioethics as fraught with unique particulars, requiring bottom-up 
consideration (Arras 2013). Jonathan Dancy (2006, 2013), for example, argues for 
                                                 
any of the following apologetic strategies: justifying the law in general ethical terms; limiting its scope and 
applicability through reinterpretation; judging favorably its larger impact on aretaic ethics, i.e., virtue; or 
through a Maimonidean-style accommodation, for example by contextualizing the original rule in light of 
the morality and/or social norms of ancient times. 
67 Arras 2013 charts the development of bioethics as a contemporary discipline of applied ethics, beginning 
in the 1970s with the “heroic phase” which aspired to tackle practical challenges with high moral and 
political theory, e.g. consequentialism, deontology, natural law and rights, and even metaphysics. 
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epistemological moral-particularism, contending that all sound moral judgments depend 
on the particularities of a situation in their individualized complexity.68 Theory-modest 
bioethics tries to strike a balance between espousing consistent principles and affirming 
unique particulars. Beauchamp and Childress’s (2009) “Principlism,” still perhaps the 
most utilized approach in applied bioethics, emphasizes four theoretical fundamentals 
undergirding most particular ethical analyses and judgments: autonomy (stemming from 
a fundamental respect for person), beneficence, non-maleficence, and (distributive) 
justice. Similarly, John Rawls’s (1971) reflective equilibrium, whether in its narrow or 
wide interpretations, aspires to find balance between generally espoused moral principles 
and particular intuitive responses to the situation at hand in order to arrive at a reasoned 
choice (Daniels 2013; Arras 2013).69  
 Jewish bioethicists, like secular bioethicists, also wrestle with these dialectics of 
general theory verses particular circumstances, and prescriptive norms verses responsive 
intuitions. The epistemological and axiological dimensions of medical halakhic and 
Jewish bioethical analyses and their normative determinations impact upon how best to 
balance the high theories of halakhah and Jewish ethics, the theory-modest mid-level 
norms of halakhic codes, and the particular casuistry of the responsa case law and current 
cases in situ. Scientific understanding, legal philosophy, halakhic process and method, 
the role of ethical principles and intuition, and the particular details of the case under 
                                                 
68 See Arras 2013 for other anti-theory types, such as Stephen Toumlin’s “strong particularistic casuistry,” 
and Albert Jonsen’s “modest casuistry.” 
69 Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE), as opposed to narrow reflective equilibrium (NRE), entails a more 
developed and wider scope of background theoretical commitments, such as moral and political 
philosophical views of human agency, personhood, and social systems, see Norman 2013, and Arras 2013. 
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consideration – all come together to produce an academic analysis, policy position, 
and/or practical clinical application in Jewish bioethics. The challenge working 
backwards from a finished bioethical presentation is to tease out and identify each of 
these essential elements. Focusing on the relationship of religion and science in Jewish 
bioethical deliberation turns our attention more specifically to epistemology and moral 
axiology.   
 
Method of Investigation and a Research Assessment Matrix 
 
 Four current cases of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies, i.e., 1. in 
vitro fertilization; 2. gestational surrogacy; 3. cloning; and 4. mitochondrial replacement 
therapy, i.e., “three-parent babies,” all introduce unprecedented forms of collaborative 
reproductive processes with varying degrees of novel reproductive outcomes. When 
considered through the lens of Jewish bioethics, each case, and all of them over time in 
cumulative progression, offer important windows into Jewish religion and science 
relations. In this dissertation, I focus more narrowly on the Jewish bioethical debate 
concerning the identification of maternity and paternity, and their attendant halakhic and 
bioethical considerations, in each of the four aforementioned cases. For each, I will 
pursue the following method of investigation: 1. Understand the current science and its 
history by preliminarily providing a scientific and medical orientation; 2. Locate the 
Jewish bioethical concerns within a larger bioethical framework; and 3. Evaluate the 
epistemological and axiological dimensions of the Jewish bioethical analysis of this 
dissertation’s four Jewish bioethical exemplars introduced in Chapter Two (pp. 58-65): 
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1. Rabbi J. David Bleich; 2. Rabbi Michael J. Broyde; 3. Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff; and 4. the 
collaborative team of Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler. 
In order to analyze the epistemological and axiological dimensions of these 
exemplars’ bioethical analyses, expositions, and determinations, I will seek to answer the 
following extra-and-meta-halakhic questions: 
Epistemological Dimensions: 
1. In what ways does the case being studied represent an instance of new scientific 
understanding and/or unforeseen technological capability?  
2. Is the new knowledge tentative, sufficient, or complete?  
3. Does the Jewish bioethical scholarship under review display adequate and 
sufficient scientific knowledge of the case? 
4. How does the current scientific understanding align with previous scientific and 
especially traditional Jewish understandings? 
5. Is the new scientific knowledge accepted at least pro tanto and integrated as such? 
6. What are the epistemological statuses of Torah and science? 
7. Is the relationship between them one of conflict, independence, integration, or 
dialogue?  
8. If “conflict,” how is the conflict explained or reconciled? 
9. Is there a discernable, overarching Jewish bioethical or halakhic methodology 
being applied to the meeting of new knowledge and ancient tradition?70  
                                                 
70 This last question invites a return to a consideration of Jewish bioethical models, i.e., covenantal, 
narrative, feminist, judaized, legal, and methodologically holistic bioethics (Chapter Two, p. 39 ff.), as well 
as to an evaluation of halakhic method, as described earlier in this chapter. 
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10. Is it one of high theory, particularistic casuistry, or theory-modest, mid-level 
norms? 
Axiological Dimensions:  
1. Are halakhic and Jewish bioethical investigations perceived as synonymous or as 
two related, yet distinct activities?  
2. Does the bioethicist under consideration take into account an ethic independent of 
Jewish law and believe in its valid application?  
3. Are axiological commitments discernably influenced by new knowledge and 
contemporary ethical or cultural norms? 
4. Is there an explicit recognition or inferred awareness that one’s clarified moral 
values and ethics may legitimately help direct both halakhic and bioethical 
intuitions, examinations, and normative determinations? 
5. What discrete values inform the Jewish bioethical analysis and guide its halakhic 
consideration? 
Metaphysical Dimensions: 
 Although not the focus of my inquiry, it may at times be helpful to take note of 
the metaphysical dimensions undergirding a Jewish bioethical analysis. Metaphysical 
assumptions and frameworks crosscut with epistemology and can impact upon moral 
axiology. For example, the beginning of human life and the status of personhood are 
metaphysical concerns. 
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Epistemological and Axiological Assessment Matrix 
 To help identify the epistemological and axiological dimensions of the Jewish 
bioethical analyses of the aforementioned exemplars, and for each, respectively, answer 
the above questions, I have applied the following assessment matrix to their writings 
during my research (Table 3.1, next page). Of course, one size rarely fits all. Nonetheless, 
it has served as a helpful heuristic device to aid in and advance my analyses. 
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Table 3.2. Epistemological and Axiological Assessment Matrix 
Case of ART: _________________________________________________________ 
Exemplar: ____________________________________________________________ 
Paper/Book: __________________________________________________________ 
 
From 
exemplar’s 
perspective 
Torah: 
Written and 
Oral 
Science: 
ART 
Jewish Bioethics Secular 
Bioethics 
New Scientific 
Knowledge  
 
and/or 
 
Technological 
Capability 
Torah and 
Science relations. 
 
Conflict, 
Independence, 
Dialogue, 
Integration 
 
Alternate 
schema? 
Rival theories and 
theory choice. 
 
Knowledge is 
tentative, 
sufficient, 
or complete? 
 
Accepted pro 
tanto? 
 
New views of 
knowledge? 
Religion and 
Science relations 
 
Issues of Jewish 
bioethical 
concern? 
Awareness of 
issues of secular 
bioethical 
concern and 
their ethical 
analyses? 
Epistemology Torah truth 
claims: absolute, 
contingent, or 
contextual? 
Philosophy of 
Science: e.g., 
realist/non-realist 
 
Sociology of 
knowledge 
Jewish bioethical 
model, mode, and  
method? 
Model, mode, 
and Method: 
High Theory, 
Particular 
Casuistry, Mid-
level Norms? 
Moral Axiology Sources of ethical 
values: Jewishly 
internal or 
external? 
 
Heteronomous or 
autonomous?  
 
Torah and/or 
Jewish tradition 
dependent or 
independent? 
 
 
Is scientific 
theory value-free? 
Ethic independent 
of Halakhah? 
 
Self-awareness of 
ethical intuitions 
or impulses? 
 
Metaethics? 
 
Discrete values? 
Influence of 
secular 
bioethical 
theory? 
 
Discrete values: 
conflict or 
consonance 
with Jewish 
values? 
 
Progressive or 
conservative vis 
a vis 
technology? 
Metaphysics      
Grounds of 
Parenthood 
Causal or 
voluntarist? 
 
Monist or 
pluralist? 
How does science 
influence 
philosophical 
deliberations? 
Causal or 
voluntarist? 
 
Monist or 
pluralist? 
Causal or 
voluntarist? 
 
Monist or 
pluralist? 
Definition of 
Maternity  
    
Definition of 
Paternity  
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
Application and Analysis: The Identification of Maternity and Paternity in Four 
Current Cases of Assisted Reproductive and Genetic Technologies 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Grounding the Jewish Bioethical Discourse 
Regarding Assisted Reproductive and Genetic Technologies 
 
 In the United States, bioethical considerations of ART often begin with a 
discussion of rights, i.e. procreative liberty and the legal and especially women’s moral 
claims for assistance in reproduction.1 Several Supreme Court rulings have established 
the right not to procreate, whether through the use of contraception, or through the 
abortion of a pregnancy, due to the substantial burdens upon women of an unwanted 
pregnancy and child rearing, as well as concerns for personal privacy and the right to 
self-determination regarding one’s body.2 At the same time, until the arrival of ART, the 
United States government had little reason to interfere in or regulate procreative liberty, 
which is conceived of as a basic human dignity, although societies historically have 
tended to prefer marriage as the appropriate context through which to exercise this 
fundamental human right.3 With the advent of ART, numerous legal and moral questions 
have arisen regarding the right to procreate, including the welfare right to assistance in 
                                                 
1 See Hull 2005a, 1-53, who begins Ethical Issues in the New Reproductive Technologies precisely with the 
question of procreative liberty and its legal and moral claims. See also Brake and Millum 2013, who 
discuss procreative autonomy, including the philosophical claims for and against the negative right against 
interference and the positive right of assistance.  
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4.79 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood 
v. Danforth, 482 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); and City of Akron v. Akron 
Reproductive Center, 103 S Ct 2481 (1983). See Hull 2005a, 18n2. Hull 2005a, 14-6, identifies six grounds 
for which a person may potentially have a moral duty not to reproduce in light of the principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence to the resultant child and the social good: 1. transmittable infectious or 
genetic disease; 2. unwillingness to provide proper pre-natal care; 3. inability to rear children; 4. likelihood 
of psychological harm to offspring; 5. overpopulation; 6. non-marriage.  
3 Consider the “United Nations Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations 1948, Article 16.1: “Men 
and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry 
and found a family.” One notable exception to procreative liberty in the United States is states’ right to 
involuntarily sterilize intellectually disabled (then called “mentally retarded”) persons, i.e., Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200 (1927). For a brief history of Buck v. Bell, see Mukherjee 2016, 78-85. The coerced 
sterilization of criminals has similarly been proposed in legal arguments before the Supreme Court.  
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reproduction, i.e. health insurance coverage, professional medical assistance, and the 
availability of gamete providers or gestational carriers (Hull 2005a, 9-21). 
 In Jewish bioethics, with Judaism’s emphasis on covenantal duties, i.e. the 
mitzvot – divine commandments, considerations of ART begin not with a discussion of 
rights, but of responsibilities.4 The first commandment in the Torah is the charge to 
procreate: “Peru urevu – Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28; 9:1). This opening 
chapter of Part II will ground the Jewish bioethical discourse by briefly exploring the 
Jewish scriptural sources, religious significance, and scope of the procreative imperative, 
especially regarding the questions of whether utilizing ART leads to the fulfillment of 
this religious duty, and relatedly, whether there is an obligation to pursue procreative 
outcomes through ART, and if others have a religious and moral duty to assist. In 
addition, this chapter will also briefly review early halakhic considerations of ovarian 
transplants, as well as of artificial insemination with a woman’s husband’s sperm (AIH) 
or with donor sperm (AID).5 Since these two medical therapies were the first ARTs 
employed to benefit individuals or couples struggling with infertility, their foundational 
discussion among halakhists undergirds later medical halakhic and Jewish bioethical 
considerations of the four subsequent cases of ART considered in this dissertation.   
 
 
                                                 
4 For example, rabbinic and halakhic literature do not speak of the right not to procreate, but of exemptions 
from the obligation to reproduce. See “The Prohibition of Sexual Intercourse in a Time of Famine,” Irshai 
2012, 47-52. 
5 The “H” in AIH is decoded as “homologous,” rather than “husband,” even though it still refers to a 
woman’s husband, as opposed to heterologous artificial insemination, AID, in which donor sperm is used, 
employing a “D” for “donor.”  
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The Mitzvah of “Peru uRevu” – The Commandment of “Be Fruitful and Multiply” 
 
Scriptural Sources and Religious Significance of the Mitzvah of Procreation 
The Talmud (TB Yevamot 65b) identifies the scriptural source for the mitzvah of 
procreation in the verse addressing Adam and Eve, the first persons, immediately 
following their creation on the sixth day: “And God blessed them, and God said to them, 
‘Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and master it; have dominion over the fish of the 
sea, and over the birds of the sky, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth” 
(Genesis 1:28).6 In another place, the Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 59a) identifies two alternate 
sources. The first charges humanity, more generally, with procreative repopulation in the 
aftermath of the world-destroying flood, through the Noahide covenant: “And God 
blessed Noah and his sons, and said to them: ‘Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth’” 
(Genesis 9:1).7 To add this charge to the Children of Israel’s Sinaitic covenant, the 
                                                 
6 Maimonides (1138-1204), Sefer Hamitzvot, positive commandment 212, and Mishneh Torah, Sefer 
Nashim, “The Laws of Marriage,” 15:1, points to this verse as the source of the commandment of 
procreation. Locating the charge in the context of the first woman and man underscores the rabbinic idea 
that within each person inheres the capacity to populate, over the generations, a whole world, just as did 
Adam and Eve, see Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5; Maimonides, ibid., 15:16. The medieval Spanish Jewish bible 
commentator Abraham ibn Ezra (1089-1167; ad loc., Genesis 1:24), opines that the verse addressing Adam 
and Eve is solely a blessing and not a command, since this verse is similar to the blessing at the conclusion 
of the fifth day of creation addressed to the fish and birds, who are not subject to commandments like 
willful human beings: “And God blessed them, saying, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the waters in the 
seas, and let the birds multiply in the earth’” (Genesis 1:22). See also Rashi (1040-1105) and 
Nachmanides’s (1194-1270) commentaries on Genesis 9:7; and Tosafot (12-14th centuries) Yevamot 65b, 
s.v. “veLo.” However, others, such as Rabbeinu Nissim (1320-1380) in his biblical commentary (ad loc. 
Genesis 1:28), parse the verse as containing both blessing and commandment: “And God blessed them” – 
this clearly establishes an orientation of benediction; “and God said to them” – this refers to the additional 
valence of commandment in the verse. For a full discussion of the scriptural source of the commandment of 
procreation, see Ciment 2010, 188-9. 
7 The Noahide covenant refers to the prohibitions and affirmative duties that God imposed upon Noah, his 
family, and their descendants after the flood. The apocryphal book of Jubilees 7:20-8, as well as the New-
Testamental book of Acts 15:1-31, refer to “Noahide laws,” which likely parallels this rabbinic tradition. 
The second-century-CE rabbinic Tosefta (Avoda Zara 9:4) lists six prohibitions and one affirmative duty as 
comprising the “seven mitzvot of the Children of Noah”: 1. denial of God; 2. blasphemy; 3. murder; 4, 
illicit sexual relations; 5. stealing; 6. eating the limb of a living animal (prohibitions); 7. the establishment 
of just laws and courts (affirmative duty). The Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 59a ff.) cites this Tosefta and 
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Talmud cites a second source. In recounting the revelation at Sinai to a new generation, 
Moses, in his deuteronomic farewell oration, recalls God instructing him after the giving 
of the commandments: “Go say to them (i.e., the Children of Israel), ‘You shall return to 
your tents’” (Deuteronomy 5:27). The Talmud understands this verse allusively and 
euphemistically charging the people to return to their marital beds to procreate. The 
talmudic sage Rava (TB Yevamot 62a) discovers further grounds for a commandment of 
procreation in the prophetic words of Isaiah (45:18): “For thus says the Lord who created 
the heavens; God Himself who formed the earth and made it; He has established it, He 
created it not in vain, lashevet yetzarah – He formed it to be inhabited; I am the Lord; and 
there is no one else.” Through the populating of the world, humanity partners with God in 
the ongoing creation of the world thereby progressing its intended purpose. Additionally, 
the Talmud (TB Yevamot 62b), cites the opinion of Rabbi Joshua that the procreative 
imperative applies in one’s old age, just as in one’s youth, based on a metaphoric reading 
of a verse in Ecclesiastes (11:6): “In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening, do 
                                                 
provides the halakhic midrashim through which several of them are exegetically derived from the verses of 
Genesis. In is interesting to note that the commandment of procreation is not including in this list of seven 
Noahide commandments. The Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 59b) asserts that any commandment explicitly 
charged to the Children of Noah, but not repeated to the Children of Israel at or after Sinai, became 
incumbent solely upon Israelites, and was no longer binding upon gentiles. Other rabbinic voices, however, 
demur, and expand the list of Noahide laws beyond the seven enumerated above. The Talmud, for example, 
cites the opinion of ‘Ulla (TB Chulin 92a,b) who claims that there were thirty commandments included in 
the Noahide covenant. Although the Talmud doesn’t identify all thirty, Rabbi Menachem Azaria de 
Fano (1548-1620) in Asarah Ma’amarot (Ma'amar Chikur Din 3:21) reconstructs the identity of all thirty, 
and indeed includes the commandment of procreation among them. See Tosafot Sanhedrin 59a s.v. “Veha 
priyah verivyah”; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Book of Judges, “Laws of Kings” 8:11; 9:1-10:6; Bleich 
1997c; Broyde 1997b; Lichtenstein 1986; and Novak 1983. 
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not withhold your hand; for you do not know which shall prosper, either this or that, or 
whether they both alike shall be good.”8 
 
The Scope of the Mitzvah of Procreation 
The Mishnah (Yevamot 6:6) reads: “A person should not refrain from [the 
mitzvah of] being fruitful and multiplying unless he has children. The House of Shammai 
say: [‘Children’ is minimally defined as] two males; and the House of Hillel say: a male 
and a female, as it says, ‘male and female He (i.e., God) created them’” (Genesis 1:27).9  
According to the House of Hillel, the minimal measure of the fulfillment of the 
commandment mirrors its original context and intent: a male and a female offspring have 
the capacity, like Adam and Eve, to populate the world.10 According to the House of 
Shammai, apparently once the world has been populated, the minimum contribution of 
two male offspring constitutes the basic requirement of procreation, regardless of whether 
or not daughters have also been born.11 When a person has reached the minimal measure 
of procreative accomplishment, the obligation to reproduce detaches. In contradistinction 
                                                 
8 This section on the commandment to procreate was influenced by a self-study, professional education unit 
prepared for Yeshiva University’s Center for the Jewish Future by Rabbi Joshua Flug, see Flug 2012a,b,c. 
9 The Talmud (TB Eruvin 13b) establishes the rule that the law always accords with the House of Hillel. 
TY Kilayim 8:4 notes three exceptions to this rule; Tosafot Sukkah 3a, s.v. “Deamar,” note an additional 
six exceptions. 
10 This symbolically holds true despite brother and sister being proscribed by incest laws from actually 
mating themselves. 
11 The Gemara (TB Yevamot 61b-62a) in its commentary on this Mishnah cites explanations for the House 
of Hillel and the House of Shammai’s respective positions. Either the House of Hillel bases their view on 
the original charge in Genesis to Adam and Eve, or by the divine telos for creation as described by Isaiah 
45:18. The House of Shammai models their measure on the example of Moses who had two sons, and 
subsequently, per rabbinic biblical interpretation, withdrew from engaging in sexual relations with his wife 
Tzipporah. Alternatively, based on the example of Adam and Eve, who after Cain murdered Abel, had only 
one additional child, a son, Seth. Further opinion in the Gemara asserts that it is actually the opinion of the 
House of Shammai to require a male and a female, and reduces the House of Hillel’s minimum measure to 
one male or one female, see TB Yevamot 61b. 
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to these minimums, the aforementioned teaching of Rabbi Joshua to procreate in both 
one’s youth and old age seemingly mandates an ongoing obligation, though many 
authorities rank Rabbi Joshua’s imperative as a second level obligation, either of 
rabbinical, as opposed to biblical force, or as supererogatory, in fulfillment of an 
independent quasi-obligation of “shevet – inhabitation,” per Isaiah, which goes beyond 
the basic minimal biblical requirement of procreation as debated by the Houses of 
Shammai and Hillel.12  
 The same Mishnah (ibid.) also teaches: “A man is commanded regarding [the 
mitzvah of] being fruitful and multiplying, but not a woman. Rabbi Yochanan ben 
Beroqah says: regarding both of them it (i.e., the Torah) says: ‘And God blessed them 
and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply’” (Genesis 1:28). Although procreation 
naturally requires the participation of a woman in addition to a man, the halakhah 
somewhat surprisingly follows the anonymous first opinion of the cited Mishnah 
obligating only the man, despite Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroqah’s competing opinion of 
equal obligation.13 The Gemara justifies the exclusion of women from the commandment 
of procreation based on midrash halakhah (rabbinic hermeneutical exegesis): 
How do we know this? Said Rabbi Ila’a in the name of Rabbi Elazar ben Rabbi 
Shimon: [juxtaposed with the command to be fruitful and multiply,] Scripture 
said: “fill the earth and conquer it” (Genesis 1:28). It is the way of a man to 
                                                 
12 Rabbi Joshua’s statement is one of several sagacious interpretations of Eccelsiastes 11:6, and may be 
intended more as wise counsel than legal prescription. See Irshai 37-47, for a full survey of interpretations 
and normative applications of Rabbi Joshua’s statement. Irshai frames the whole question of procreative 
obligation in light of the duty of Torah study, alleging that minimal obligations allow greater opportunity 
for participation in elite, rabbinic study culture, while maximal obligations limit such opportunities.  
13 See Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer, 1:1,13. It should be noted that per the formalized rules of the 
adjudication of competing halakhic opinions in the Mishnah, the halakhah is usually decided in favor of the 
anonymous first opinion, which is often attributed to the rabbis, or to Rabbi Judah the Patriarch, the scholar 
to whom the compiling of the Mishnah is attributed. 
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conquer and not the way of a woman (thus, teaching her exclusion by 
implication). But Scripture wrote: “conquer it” (in the plural)? This implies two 
(i.e., both male and female were obligated)! Said Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: it is 
[actually] written [in the singular], “conquer it.”14 Rav Yosef said: We learn it 
from: “I am El Shaddai. Be fruitful and multiply (singular verbs)” (Genesis 
35:11); it does not say: “Be fruitful and multiply (plural verbs).” (TB Yevamot 
65b) 
 
Despite the formal textual reasons for exclusion of women from the mitzvah of 
procreation provided by the Talmud, talmudic and biblical commentators, as well as 
Jewish historians and feminist critics have sought to provide the underlying explanations 
for this counter-intuitive, normative, halakhic position. Rabbi Meir Simchah of Dvinsk 
(1843-1926), in his biblical commentary Meshekh Chochmah (ad loc. Genesis 9:1), 
explains that since pregnancy and parturition carry life-threatening risks, the Torah, 
whose ways are the “ways of pleasantness” (Proverbs 3:17), did not obligate women in 
procreation. The medieval, Spanish, talmudic commentator Rabbeinu Nissim (1320-
1380) nonetheless posits a woman’s ability to voluntary fulfill the biblical imperative (for 
men) to procreate, assuring her religious significance of, and heavenly reward for, her 
non-obligatory reproductive efforts.15  
 Today, some historians and feminist scholars look to a larger patriarchal frame of 
rabbinic culture to explain the seeming privileging of male spirituality through greater 
mitzvah obligation, including procreation, and the consequentially legislated 
subservience and depersonalization of women by relegating them to functional utility for 
                                                 
14 While biblical Hebrew distinguishes between plural and singular nouns and verbs, biblical Hebrew is 
written without vocalization making it sometimes difficult, absent context, to identify a word’s number. 
Thus, while the vocalized reading of the word “vekivshuah – and conquer it” in Genesis 1:28 is in the 
plural, per the simple contextual reading, the actual written form of the word is morphologically in the 
singular. 
15 Responsa of Ran, no. 32. 
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men’s fulfillment of their religious duties.16 Ronit Irshai (2012, 30-5), however, argues 
for a feminist reading of women’s exemption from the mitzvah of procreation as creating 
greater flexibility in what today we would call family planning. A women’s exemption 
from the mitzvah allows her the option of contraception, saving her from difficult 
pregnancies and dangerous labors, and further grants her the discretion to limit the 
number of children she bears. She asserts these practical outcomes while remaining 
agnostic about the original motivation of the rabbis in excluding women from the 
procreative commandment (ibid., 34). Irshai (ibid., 53-110) contends that over time, and 
especially in contemporary Orthodoxy, restrictions on contraception and a maximalist 
theology of family building, rather than planning, has substantively reduced such 
flexibility. 
 
The Mitzvah of Procreation: Action or Result Oriented? 
 Talmudic commentators of the later Modern era in their conceptual analysis of the 
mitzvah of procreation have pinpointed the nature of the mitzvah as hinging on the 
following dialectical investigative question: Is the religious obligation to procreate action 
or result oriented?17 In other words, is the mitzvah to try to have children by engaging in 
lawful sexual relations whatever the outcome (i.e., action oriented), or is the mitzvah 
                                                 
16 See Daube 1981, 57; and Wegner 1988, 42, 171. Others, however, argue that while rabbinic society was 
certainly patriarchal, the rabbis esteemed women and women’s spirituality, and championed their material 
and spiritual welfare, see Hauptman 1998, 140-41.  
17 Babad 1998, mitzvah 1; Ciment 2010, 188, 1:4. For the history and dialectical methodology of modern, 
conceptual talmudic analysis, see Adler 1989, and Blau 2006.  
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actually to produce offspring (i.e., result oriented)?18 The answer to this question 
produces a marked practical difference – namely, if the mitzvah is action oriented then a 
couple struggling with infertility fulfills the mitzvah of procreation simply by trying to 
have children, despite the negative outcome. While fulfillment of the mitzvah per se will 
not satisfy their desire for children, it does have potential halakhic ramifications as to the 
duty, or even permissibility, to pursue ART. A myriad of secondary issues may also pivot 
on whether there is a halakhic obligation to pursue ART including the expenditure of 
personal financial resources, emotional investment, and the obligation upon others to 
assist. 
 Two perplexing talmudic hypotheticals inspired this conceptual analysis and led 
to this demarcating dialectical question. The first considers the case of a convert to 
Judaism who procreated and produced children while still a gentile. Upon conversion, 
does his having had children in his gentile past automatically yield fulfillment of his 
newly assumed mitzvah to procreate, or must he procreate anew? The second concerns a 
Jew whose children have died. Does his fulfillment of the mitzvah survive their deaths or 
do their deaths nullify his fulfillment and obligate him anew? The Talmud records the 
following debates: 
It was stated: If he had children while still an idolator and then converted – Rabbi 
Yochanan said: “He has fulfilled [the mitzvah of] ‘Be fruitful and multiply.” And 
Reish Lakish (Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish) said: “He has not fulfilled ‘Be fruitful and 
multiply.’” Rabbi Yochanan said that he fulfilled ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ since he 
already has them; Reish Lakish said that he has not fulfilled ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ 
since a proselyte who converts is likened to a newborn child (without former familial 
                                                 
18 Similarly, if an act is required, does this need to be a sexual act or is a medical procedure sufficient? In 
other words, is an act of artificial insemination sufficient to fulfill the ma’aseh mitzvah – the mitzvah action 
of procreation. See Steinberg 2003c, vol. 1, 63, and 63n49. 
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connections). … It was stated: If he had children and they died – Rav Huna said: “He 
has fulfilled ‘Be fruitful and multiply.’” Rabbi Yochanan said that he has not fulfilled 
‘Be fruitful and multiply.’ Rav Huna said that he fulfilled ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ in 
accordance with Rav Assi, for Rav Assi said that the son of David (i.e., the messiah) 
will not come until all the souls have been bodily ensouled, as it is said, “[For I will 
not always contend, I will not be angry forever,] for the spirit that enwrappeth itself is 
from Me, and the souls which I have made (Isaiah 57). Rabbi Yochanan said that he 
has not fulfilled ‘Be fruitful and multiply’ since “lashevet yetzarah – He formed it to 
be inhabited,” and [since they died] there is no inhabitation. (TB Yevamot 62a) 
 
Rabbi Yosef Babad (1801-1874), in his commentary Minchat Chinukh (1998, 2, 
section 14) on the medieval Sefer Hachinukh’s enumeration of the six hundred and 
thirteen mitzvot of the Torah, explains these debates in light of the aforementioned 
dialectic. The mitzvah of procreation is unlike other mitzvot whose fulfillment is their 
activity, for example waving a lulav (palm-frond) on the festival of Sukkot, or eating 
matzah on the night of Passover. The mitzvah of procreation is result oriented, i.e., about 
populating the world, or depleting the heavenly reservoir of souls. The mitzvah to 
procreate attaches at marriageable age and persists until one attains exemption of further 
obligation by having the minimal requisite number of children.19 Should those children 
die then the exemption disappears and the obligation returns. Should a person with 
children convert, then although he did not fulfill the mitzvah of procreation while not 
Jewish, since non-Jews are not obligated in the Sinaitic covenant, upon becoming Jewish 
                                                 
19 Although, technically, a young man becomes obligated in all the mitzvot upon reaching the age of 
majority and physical maturity, usually estimated as age thirteen, the halakhic tradition recognizes that 
marriage is best delayed until a later age of maturity. In charting the chronology of a recommended life-
course, Mishnah Avot (5:25) counsels: “…eighteen [years of age] for marriage…” Maimonides, Mishneh 
Torah, Sefer Nashim, “Laws of Marriage” 15:2, advises age seventeen, which confuses his supra-
commentators, leading some to believe that he may have had an alternate textual tradition of the above-
cited Mishnah, see Maggid Mishnah, op. cit. Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer 1:3, rules: “It is a mitzvah 
upon every man to marry a woman at age eighteen, and whoever advances to marry at age thirteen 
[performs] the choicest mitzvah…” For a world history of marriage, including marriageable ages, see 
Westermark 1922; Coontz 2005. 
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he is exempt from his newly attached obligation to procreate by virtue of the fact that his 
biological children currently populate the world. 
 Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986) in his responsa Igrot Moshe (1973, Even 
Ha’ezer 2:18) alternatively posits that the mitzvah of procreation is action oriented – that 
is, one must engage in sexual relations that in normal circumstances have the capacity to 
lead to conception and produce children. Feinstein’s primary prooftext is the 
aforementioned Mishnah (Yevamot 6:6) which reads: “A person should not refrain from 
[the mitzvah of] being fruitful and multiplying unless he has children…” It does not read, 
as one might expect, “How many children is a person required to produce?” Instead, it 
requires a person to engage normally in marital relations – “a person should not refrain” – 
until the requisite number of offspring satisfies the obligation. A person with children, 
even if produced before conversion, thus doesn’t have the affirmative duty to engage in 
procreative sexual relations.20 According to Feinstein, therefore, a couple struggling with 
fertility challenges is not required to pursue ART since they have fulfilled their obligation 
through their normal sexual efforts at conception, regardless of their success.  
 
Infertility, Jewish Theology, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
 
 According to a midrash (Pesikta deRav Kahana 20:1), seven biblical women (six 
personalities and one personification) struggled with infertility: Sarah (Genesis 11:30), 
Rebecca (Genesis 25:21), Rachel (Genesis 29:31; 30:1-2), Leah (Genesis 29:31,35; 30:9), 
                                                 
20 The rabbis of the Talmud believed that non-procreative sex is still a marital obligation, and of personal 
benefit and human need, independent of reproductive purpose, and thus should be engaged in by an 
infertile or post-fertile couple. See, for example, the extended talmudic discussion in TB Yevamot 61b-62b. 
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the Wife of Manoah (Judged 13:3); Hannah (I Samuel 1:2); and Zion (Isaiah 54:1). 
Another midrash (Genesis Rabbah, “Ki Tavo,” parashah 7) attributes infertility’s primary 
cause to divine providence: “Rabbi Yochanan says: Three keys are in the hand of the 
Holy One blessed be He and no other creature controls them, not an angel nor a seraph, 
and they are: the key to the resurrection of the dead, the key to infertility, and the key to 
rain …The key to infertility, as it says: “And He (God) opened her womb…” (Genesis 
29:31).21 This accords with another talmudic tradition that depicts God as the third, silent 
partner in every process of reproduction: 
Our Rabbis taught: There are three partners [in the creation] of a person: The Holy 
One blessed be He, the father, and the mother. The father seminates the white 
substance, from which are derived the bones, nerves, fingernails, brain, and the white 
of the eye. The mother seminates the red substance, from which are derived the skin, 
muscle, hair, and the black of the eye. The Holy One blessed be He provides the 
spirit, the breath, the facial features, vision for the eyes, hearing for the ears, speech 
for the mouth, movement for the legs, understanding, and intelligence. When the time 
comes for a person to depart this world, God takes his contribution, leaving behind 
the contributions of the mother and father.22 (TB Niddah 31a) 
 
                                                 
21 See TB Ta’anit 2a for a parallel tradition: “Rabbi Yochanan said: Three keys are in the hand of the 
Holy One blessed be that do not pass into the hand of an agent, and they are: the key to rain; the key 
to life; and the key to the resurrection of the dead...” Tosafot, TB Niddah 16b, s.v. “Malakh 
hamemuneh ‘al haherayon,” note a contradiction between these sources that assign sole providential 
control over conception and TB Nidah 16b: “Rabbi Chanina bar Papa expounded: The angel 
appointed for conception is named Leila, i.e., night. He takes a drop (presumably of semen), and 
stands it before the Holy One blessed be and says: ‘Master of the Universe, this drop, what will be 
regarding it? Mighty or weak? Wise or stupid? Rich or poor?’” Tosafot, per their dialectical 
methodology of reconciliation of conflicting sources, answer that there is an angel appointed for 
conception, but not for parturition, which is more accurately what is solely superintended by God. 
Tosafot qualify, though, that on rare and extraordinary occasion God may choose to entrust the keys 
of these three powers to others, as seemingly is the case in the biblical texts Tosafot cite. 
Alternatively, Tosafot Rosh, ad loc., say that God solely superintends conception, after which angels 
may become involved. The upshot of these commentaries is to safeguard a theology positing God’s 
sole providential power over matters of fertility. 
22 This Rabbinic view accords with that of Hippocrates (Greece, fifth century BCE) who believed that both 
male and female emit seed, each making a unique contribution to the resultant child. See Grazi 2005b, 7. 
For a fuller treatment of “The Rabbinic Conception of Conception,” see Reichman 1996. Also, see the 
below section “Early History of Assisted Reproductive Technologies,” pp. 141 ff. 
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Rabbi Yitzchak asks in the Talmud (TB Yevamot 64a): “For what reason were our 
forefathers infertile?” He answers: “Because the Holy One blessed be He desires the 
prayers of the righteous.”23 Rabbi Yitzchak thus presents a theodicy regarding infertility, 
at least for the biblical patriarchs and matriarchs, in which suffering is justified by its 
spiritual benefit and character shaping influence. Infertility is thus perceived and 
conceived of as a religious challenge, as much as a medical problem. It is worth noting 
that each of the seven cases of biblical infertility identified by the aforementioned 
midrash ends with the divinely blessed, even if complicated, joyous arrival of a child or 
children. Outside of biblical narratives, both historically and in contemporary cases of 
infertility, not every narrative happily concludes with the birth of a child. 
 Judaism has long recognized the divinely sanctioned license to heal, and does not 
see medical interventions as subversions of the divine will (Bleich 1979).24 The Talmud 
(TB Bava Kamma 85a) locates the permission to heal in the verse, “And he shall cause 
him to be thoroughly healed” (Exodus 21:19), which speaks to the tort liability of 
providing medical care to someone a person injured: “From here [by implication] the 
physician is granted license to heal.” A midrash (Midrash Temurah, 11:580-1) compares 
medicinal healing to farming, teaching by analogy that God expects humanity to engage 
nature, even intervene in natural processes, to yield desirable, life-sustaining outcomes.25 
Maimonides (Commentary on the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:4) understands the obligation to 
                                                 
23 Note that Rabbi Yitzchak asks about the infertility of the forefathers, not foremothers! 
24 See Rashi, ad loc., TB Bava Kamma 85a, s.v. “Natnah Reshut”; Tosafot, ad loc., s.v. “Shenitnah”; 
Rashba, ad loc., s.v. “Verapo Yerapeh.” 
25 For a Jewish theology of human-divine partnership in creation, including technological mastery of 
natural processes, see Soloveitchik 1965, 1984. 
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proffer medical care as being entailed in the religious and moral duty of rescue, as 
demanded by the verse, “And you shall return it to him” (Deuteronomy 22:2), which the 
Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 73a) applies to all types of lost property, and which Maimonides 
extends to including the restoration of health. Nachmanides (1194-1270) further locates 
the duty to cure or provide for healing from the foundational ethical and religious 
principle, “And you shall love your neighbor as you love yourself” (Leviticus 19:18). 
Rabbi Joseph Karo (1488-1575), in Shulkhan ‘Arukh (Yoreh De’ah 336:1), the 
authoritative code of Jewish law, sums it up as follows: “The Torah gave permission to 
the physician to heal; moreover, this is a religious precept and it is included in the 
category of saving life; and if the physician withholds his services it is considered as 
shedding blood.”  
Infertility is understood to be an exceedingly difficult spiritual, psychological, and 
physical malady. Many narratives in the Bible seem to assume female, rather than male, 
deficiency as accounting for infertility. Regarding the biblical matriarch Sarah’s 
infertility, Rashi (1040-1105), in his bible commentary, explains the unusual usage of the 
Hebrew root meaning “to build” in Sarah’s request of Abraham to take her maidservant 
as another wife: “And Sarai said to Abram: Behold now, the Lord has prevented me from 
bearing; please come into my maidservant, perhaps I will be built up through her…” 
(Genesis16:2). Rashi (ad loc.) comments: “This teaches that one without children is not 
built, but in ruin.” Similarly, the Talmud (TB Nedarim 64b) hyperbolizes: “Rabbi 
Yehoshua ben Levi says: ‘Any person without children is considered as without life.’” 
After all, the biblical matriarch Rachel herself had said to Jacob: “Give me children, or I 
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shall die” (Genesis 30:2). Arguably, seeking for one’s self, or assisting another’s, 
treatment of infertility fulfills the duty to heal, restore health and life, and manifests 
loving oneself, or loving another as oneself (Billet 2005, 75).26 
 
Early History of Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
 From classical Greco-Roman times through the early centuries of the scientific 
revolution, many incomplete, and often erroneous, conflicting hypotheses and asserted 
factual claims abounded regarding human anatomy and physiology, including 
reproductive organs and processes. While Hippocrates (460-370 BCE) theorized that both 
the male and female contributed semen that mixed and then developed into a fetus in 
utero, Aristotle (384-322 BCE) saw reproduction through an agricultural lens, believing 
that a woman solely provided the fertile ground that ripened the male seed into a child. 
Hippocrates believed that the reproductive seed derived from material collected from the 
entire body, i.e., the pangenesis doctrine. Aristotle, on the other hand, thought that the 
male seed was composed of congealed blood, i.e., the hematogenic doctrine. Per 
Aristotle, the male seed provided the form and propelling movement, while the menstrual 
blood provided the material substance. Other Greek thinkers subscribed to the encephalo-
myelogenic doctrine which posits that the male seed originates in the brain and travels by 
way of the spinal cord to the reproductive organs. Early rabbinic literature, along with 
                                                 
26 These beliefs and values motivate contemporary Jewish organizations assisting those struggling 
with fertility challenges, such as Machon Puah (www.jewishfertility.org and www.puahonline.org); 
Yesh Tikvah (www.yeshtikva.org); and A Torah Infertility Medium of Exchange (www.atime.org). 
See also Nishmat’s “Jewish Women’s Health: A Guide for Health Professionals” list of Jewish 
infertility support organizations: www.jewishwomenshealth.org/article.php?article=62. See also 
Kumer n.d. at Chabad.org. 
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Galen (130-200 CE), seemingly aligned with the view of Hippocrates (Reichman 1996, 
35-41). 
In the seventeenth century, the natural-philosophic theorizing and 
experimentation of William Harvey, Jan van Horne, Jan Swammerdam, Neils Stensen, 
Regner de Graaf, and Francesco Redi led to the idea that all female life forms, including 
human beings, generate eggs. For the next one hundred and fifty years, theories of 
embryonic development divided into the new Harveian “ovist” views and the older, 
Aristotelian “spermist” views, which were supported by Leeuwenhoek’s discovery of 
spermatozoa in 1677 with his newly invented microscope (Clift and Schuh 2013, 21; 
Cobb 2006a, 2012; Snyder 2015, 278-8.).27 Some subscribed to an embryological theory 
of epigenesis believing that organs and limbs developed sequentially. Others embraced 
notions of preformation, believing that within the female egg (ovists), or within the male 
sperm (animalculists/humunculists), there exists a tiny person who enlarges during 
gestation (Reichman 1996, 36).  
 Until the nineteenth century, with the development of cell theory, Mendelian 
genetics, and ongoing research in selective breeding and disease inheritance, the equal 
contribution of egg and sperm to embryonic formation was not the regnant theory of 
either group. It was only in 1827 that Karl Ernst Von Baer observed mammalian ova 
under the microscope, leading Matthias Schleiden and Theodor Schwann to propose as 
part of their cell theory that both sperm and eggs have similar reproductive function.28 In 
                                                 
27 Harvey had declared, “Ex Ova Omnia – everything from the egg,” see Lopata 2009. 
28 Reinier De Graaf first described the egg follicle in 1672, but it was only in 1827 that Karl Ernst Von Baer 
microscopically observed ova and reported his finding and its description, see Reichman 1996, 35.  
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the 1830s, heredity studies in both agriculture and medicine supported equivalent roles 
for egg and sperm, and paved the way for Mendel and Darwin’s future discoveries (Cobb 
2006b). In 1876, Oscar Hertwig microscopically observed the fusion of egg and sperm 
nuclei during fertilization, substantiating the new view of conception featuring equal 
contributions of egg and sperm (Clift and Schuh 2013, 21). From the 1870s until the 
1950s, it was believed that the primitive ova present in infant ovaries degenerated and 
were replaced with definitive ova during and after sexual maturation. In 1951, Solly 
Zuckerman (1951) refuted this theory and posited that in mammalian ovaries no postnatal 
oogenesis occurred. This has remained the dominant theory, though in 2004, Joshua 
Johnson, Jonathan Tilly and others challenged this dogma by proposing that ovarian stem 
cells do allow for postnatal oogenesis. This new theory is still highly controversial, and 
thus the biological timeframe for oogenesis remains unsettled (Wu, et. al. 2017; Johnson, 
et al. 2004; Greenfield and Flaws 2004; Gura 2012). 
 In pre-modernity, therefore, the treatment of infertility involved religious ritual 
and personal prayer, unfounded medicinal treatments, and folk remedies (Grazi 2005b, 6-
14).29 Jewish law required a man to divorce his wife after ten years of infertile marriage, 
presuming that the likely cause of infertility inheres in the wife.30 It was only in the 
                                                 
29 On the role of Jewish prayer in contemporary medical situations, see Loike and Tendler, 2016. It is worth 
noting that Grazi 2005b, 11, a Modern Orthodox Jewish physician, editor of Overcoming Infertility: A 
Guide for Jewish Couples, explicitly states, akin to Reichman 1996, 1998, and 2003, that rabbinic literature 
should be understood within its historical context, in light of the then regnant scientific theories.  
30 See TB Yevamot 64a ff. which explains that a childless marriage need end in divorce to allow the 
husband, who is commanded by the Torah to procreate to fulfill his obligation. See Maimonides, Mishneh 
Torah, “Hilkhot Ishut,” 15:8; and Shulkhan Arukh, Even Ha’ezer 154:10. Cf., Rama, Even Ha’ezer 1:3, 
154:10, however, who rules that nowadays couples are not accustomed to divorce due to sustained 
infertility. If it is clear that the cause of infertility lie with the husband, all agree that there is no duty to 
divorce. 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries that an adequate knowledge of reproductive anatomy 
and processes, including ovulation, and ovum and sperm function, was achieved through 
the evolution of reproductive theory, accompanied by developments in modern scientific 
method, technological advances in microscopic observation, and safe surgical technique 
(ibid., 14-9). Thereafter, the cause of infertility could also be better ascribed to either the 
man or the woman. During this time of medical and scientific progress, new techniques 
of assisted reproduction were developed. In 1785, John Hunter performed the first 
artificial insemination of a woman utilizing her hypospadiac husband’s sperm (Ombelet 
and Van Robays 2015). A century later, in 1884, William Pancoast was the first to use 
donor sperm, which he collected from “the best looking medical student in the class,” to 
inseminate his patient without the prior knowledge of her husband (Yuko 2016). 
Artificial insemination’s basic technique of collecting several seminal emissions and then 
using a syringe for direct insemination of the combined seminal fluid into a woman’s 
vaginal tract or uterus remained essentially unchanged until the HIV/AIDS epidemic of 
the 1980s required safer protocols (Steinberg 2003c, 59-60; Grazi 2005b, 14). 
  
Ovarian Transplants 
In 1895, Dr. Robert Tuttle Morris submitted a letter to the editor of the New York 
Medical Journal reporting the first two cases of “ovarian grafting.” The first patient, age 
twenty, had never menstruated, and after an ovarian graft from a donor into the fundus of 
her uterus began to menstruate. The second patient, age twenty-six, was infertile due to 
scarred and obstructed ovaries and fallopian tubes as a result of longstanding, septic tubal 
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disease. Morris harvested a small piece of the patient’s own diseased ovary and 
transferred it to the interior stump of one oviduct. A month after the procedure, the 
patient became pregnant, but then miscarried in the third month (Morris 1895b). In 1902, 
Morris excised polycystic sclerotic ovaries (he called them “cirrhotic”) from a twenty-
one-year-old woman who had stopped menstruating at age nineteen. He transplanted 
segments of ovaries obtained from another thirty-three-year-old patient into slits of the 
peritoneum, parallel with the oviduct. Four months later, the woman started menstruating 
again. In 1905, she became pregnant, and in 1906 she gave birth to a healthy girl (Morris 
1906; 1906-7).31 Subsequently, she successfully bore two other children (Morris 1935, 
216). Reports of Morris’s ovarian transplantations and their successful treatment of 
infertility were published in the United States, France, and England, and circulated 
internationally. Morris’s achievement spurred much ethical and legal debate, including 
the question of the definition and identification of maternity in this case.32 Morris is 
remembered as a pioneer in human ovarian transplant, and credited with advances in 
understanding of the endocrine function of the ovaries and its role in women’s general 
and reproductive health (Simmer 1970).33 
                                                 
31 Morris himself recognized that it was possible, though unlikely, that ovarian tissue remained in his 
patient after her 1902 oophorectomy which may have been responsible for her subsequent pregnancy. This 
doubt was raised from time to time over the years as a challenge to his transplantation achievement, see 
Simmer 1970, 320, and 320nn1,13,46,72.  
32 See Recihman 1998, 35-7. 
33 Ovarian transplantation continued through the 1920s and then ceased due to its limited success. Morris’s 
hetero-transplant in 1902 is the only known case which led to a successful pregnancy before 2009, see 
Simmer 1970, and Reichman, 1998, 36-7. However, gonadotoxicity of chemotherapy for cancer patients 
has led to a renewed interest in ovarian transplantation. Dr. Sherman J. Silber has performed several 
successfully transplantations of ovarian tissue from a monozygotic twin into her sister, and new techniques 
in the viable cryopreservation of reproductive materials has led to elective ovarian resection, 
cryopreservation, and auto-transplantation of ovarian tissue. See Reichman 1998, 53-4; Silber, et al. 2005; 
Lee 2007.  
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Ovarian Transplants and Medical Halakhah 
 Although artificial insemination as a fertility treatment preceded ovarian 
transplants by over a century, the halakhic consequences of ovarian transplants were 
discussed first in 1907 in the Austro-Hungarian biweekly Torah journal, Wajlaket Joszef, 
in a question posed by Rabbi Jacob Gordon of Southport, England:34 
I submit a question for which I am in doubt as to its halakhah. The physicians 
have discovered a stratagem to transplant the reproductive organs from a woman 
into an infertile woman who will then be able to bear children. Is it permissible to 
remove the reproductive organs from a mother and transplant them into her 
daughter? And if you say that it is indeed permissible, what is the rule regarding 
the status of a firstborn child who needs to be a womb’s first issue, and here the 
womb is of another woman? And, in general, who should be considered the 
mother of the child, the first or second woman? (Gordon 1907) 
 
The question is first responded to by Rabbi Eliezer Chaim Deutsch (1850-1915, 1907a), 
Av Beit Din (Chief Rabbinical Justice) of Bonyhad, Hungary, and father-in-law of the 
journal’s editor, Rabbi Josef Schwartz. He responded to the concern of whether the 
husband of the woman who receives a uterine transplant harvested from her mother 
transgresses an incest prohibition of cohabitation with one’s mother-in-law. Citing 
numerous rabbinic sources, he answers that no such transgression occurs for two reasons: 
first, one cannot commit incest with a body part, only with a living person; and two, once 
transplanted, the donated material is assimilated into and takes on the identity of the 
recipient. 
                                                 
34 Gordon’s question was also addressed during this same time period by rabbinic scholars in another 
Hungarian Jewish periodical, Tel Talpiyot, and later by the Romanian rabbi Betsalel Ze’ev Safran (1866-
1930). Independently, Rabbi Yekutiel Kamelhar (1871-1937) of Chicago, attended a medical conference in 
Chicago in 1910/11, during which he learned of Morris’s ovarian transplant and responded with his own 
halakhic analysis. In the 1930s, the Eastern European Torah journal Habe’er also featured an exchange of 
halakhic scholarly opinion on the topic. See Reichman 1998. 
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 It is worth noting that both questioner and respondent seemingly got wrong the 
facts of Morris’s renowned ovarian transplantation. Gordon at first speaks more generally 
of transplanting “klei leidah,” literally “vessels of birthing,” perhaps best translated as 
“reproductive organs.” Then Gordon specifically speaks about the transplantation of a 
“rechem” – “womb.” Beginning with the Mishnah (Niddah 2:5), early rabbinic literature 
recognized basic female anatomy as the uterus, vaginal canal, and bladder: “The Sages 
drew a parable regarding a woman: The chamber, the corridor, and the upper chamber.” 
Although medieval and early modern talmudists and halakhists often became familiar 
with the medical theories of their time, it is unclear whether Gordon had specific 
knowledge of the ovaries and their function.35 Further, it would appear that Deutsch’s 
answer assumes that sexual relations between the husband and his transplant-recipient 
wife involves direct physical contact between the male member and the transplanted 
organ, which would be incorrect regardless of whether the transplanted tissue was 
ovarian or uterine.36 
                                                 
35 Neither the ovaries nor the fallopian tubes are mentioned in the Bible or the Talmud, see Steinberg 
2003a, vol. 3, 1111. The existence of the ovaries, however, was known to some medieval and modern 
talmudists (Reichman 1996, 37-41). See, for example, Nachmanides’s commentary on Leviticus 12:2, in 
which he references a women’s “beitzim,” literally eggs, but usually an anatomical term for testicles to 
which Nachmanides here compares a woman’s ovaries. See also Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, “Laws of 
Forbidden Intercourse,” 5:4. For studies of rabbinic anatomy in the context of advancing medical 
knowledge, see Reichman 2008a,b, and 2010. Reichman 1998, 1n1, also significantly points out that before 
technologies of mass communication, news of changes in scientific knowledge and technological capability 
could take decades, even centuries, to disperse. Gordon (1908, 75), however, writes: “[News] of this new 
phenomenon (transplantation) has already been publicized in all of the journals of our country (England) 
and the United States, and with my own eyes I have read of this matter.” Thus, assuming Gordon indeed is 
referring to news of Morris’s ovarian transplantation, then it is hard to understand how he got the facts 
wrong, or why he would choose to simplify or change the facts in his rabbinical correspondence. 
36 Reichman 1998, 38, posits that Deutsch understood that the entire female reproductive tract, including 
external genitalia, was transplanted.  
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 In a letter to the editor published in a later issue of the journal, Rabbi Benjamin 
Aryeh Weiss, Av Beit Din of Czernowitz (1841-1912), submits his own responsum to the 
question of the maternal identity of the resultant child. He writes: 
I am deeply skeptical of this rumor [of reproductive organ transplantation]. 
Nonetheless, if the matter turns out to be true, it is certainly forbidden to do so a 
priori, even in the absence of danger (i.e., medical risk), since [the procedure] 
entails the sterilization of the first woman, which minimally is forbidden by 
rabbinical force, and according to some by Torah law. However, if they went 
ahead and did it, in my humble opinion the child is the son of the second 
[woman] in all respects. In my opinion, the source which opens to [determine] 
this halakhah is the ruling explained in TB Sota 43b regarding the grafting of a 
fledgling tree onto a mature tree with regard to the mitzvah of ‘Orla (literally, 
“uncircumcised” fruit). (Weiss 1908) 
 
The Torah (Leviticus 19:23) prohibits the consumption of a tree’s fruit until its fourth 
year of producing fruit. In the case of a graft, the branch harvested from a fledgling tree 
assumes the identity of the body, i.e., the mature tree, to which it has been attached, and 
thus its fruit would be permitted immediately. By legal analogy, any human organ-graft 
or transplantation assumes the identity of its new host, and thus the organ recipient would 
be the mother of any child subsequently born. Weiss’s responsum aligns with the 
previously published position of Deutsch. Weiss, however, directly speaks to the question 
of maternal identity, and introduces a supportive halakhic argument by way of a legal 
analogy to agricultural law. 
 The late prominent and prolific Jerusalem posek and medical halakhist Rabbi 
Eliezer Waldenberg (1915-2006) cites Weiss’s published responsum (post-1908), and 
applies its rationale to an implanted embryo conceived through IVF with a donated ovum, 
thus identifying the gestator as the resultant child’s mother arguing that the embryo 
should be considered akin to a graft, and assumes the identity of its host (Waldenberg 
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1990, 15:45; and 1992, 19:40).37 Rabbi Aviad Trop, however, disputes the application of 
Weiss’s argument in the case of IVF with ovum donation. He avers that a maternal 
relationship with the ovum donor was established in vitro at the time of conception, and 
thus accrues to the egg donor, and that relationship cannot be subsequently defeated at 
the time of embryo implantation (Trop, 2000, 106; Hollander 2011, 51-2). The above 
cascade of sources demonstrates how a halakhic discussion made in the context of 
incomplete or inaccurate scientific knowledge establishes a legal precedent upon which 
subsequent medical halakhists will draw in another context, in this case regarding a more 
advanced assisted reproductive technology. Waldenberg is not wrong in connecting the 
two cases on the basis of the identification of a foreign body with the host into which it is 
assimilated. However, Trop rightfully distinguishes between organ transplantation and 
IVF. After all, the sperm donor still maintains a paternal relationship with the embryo 
despite its assimilation into the body of the woman who gestates and gives birth to the 
child.  
Several methodological questions arise here. First, may a halakhic discussion that 
deals with a question based on erroneous facts be subsequently cited as a halakhic 
precedent? Second, if our scientific knowledge changes, what impact should this have on 
previously formulated halakhic argumentation and rulings? For example, should Weiss’s 
original analogy to tree grafting still hold once our scientific knowledge has progressed to 
understand that any ova produced by a transplanted ovary were all prenatally generated 
                                                 
37 Waldenberg 1990, Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 7, section 48, chapter 5, n16, also cites Weiss 1908 and post-1908, 
perpetuating the reference to a presumed factual, but, in fact, nonexistent earlier case of uterine 
transplantation. See Reichman 1998, 51-2. 
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and existing prior to the ovary’s transplantation, containing the nuclear and mitochondrial 
DNA of the original donor.38 Should transplantation and bodily assimilation continue to 
defeat this newly understood scientific fact? Logical and halakhic arguments might 
indeed be applicable if adapted to the new circumstances and knowingly applied to a new 
set of facts and the bioethical and medical halakhic questions that they trigger.39 These 
questions specifically speak to the epistemological dimensions of the medical halakhic 
discussion of reproductive organ transplantation of the early twentieth century. While 
open and responding to the new medical knowledge of their times, the rabbinical scholars 
primarily relied on the anatomical knowledge provided by Torah sources, and, 
presumably, their rabbinical education. Further, Deutsch (1907b) doubted the veracity of 
the report of a successful reproductive organ transplantation, going so far as to advance a 
rabbinic proof as a basis for his incredulity. The Talmud (TB Yevamot 64b) attributes the 
matriarch Sarah’s infertility due to a congenital malformation that left her without a 
uterus. If uterine transplantations were possible, Deutsch argues, surely God would not 
have had to resort to miraculous intervention to restore her fertility. Underlying 
Deutsch’s doubt is arguably a championing of Torah knowledge as superior to scientific 
knowledge, thus yielding suspicion of progressive medical claims.40 The axiological 
                                                 
38 This would even hold true for Johnson, et al. 2004, who propose the possibility of postnatal oogenesis 
given that the ovarian stem cells present in the ovary contain the nDNA and mtDNA of the original donor. 
39 Reichman 2003, cites the case of a successful human uterine transplantation performed in April of 2000, 
and reported in the medical literature in March of 2002. Gordon’s aforementioned question of 1907 that 
mistook a report of ovarian transplantation for uterine transplantation might now have become a newly 
relevant, factually grounded medical question based on older halakhic discussion. For more on uterine 
transplantation, human uterus transplantation into animals, and artificial uteruses, see Margalit, Levy, and 
Loike 2014, 125-9, 126n72. 
40 Although many of Morris’s contemporary colleagues likewise doubted his claim of successful ovarian 
transplantation, their doubts were rooted in their contemporary medical knowledge. Even Weiss’s (1908) 
expressed doubts seemingly spoke to the unlikelihood of the claim, rather than an epistemically principled 
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dimensions of the exchange likewise appear to be solely shaped by halakhic concerns of 
sterilization of the donor, medical risk and injury to both donor and recipient, and the 
potential for incestuous or adulterous sexual relations, without apparent reference to or 
influence of the concurrent ethical discussion taking place in the medical community.41 
Dr. Edward Reichman, a rabbi, physician, Jewish bioethicist, and medical 
historian, advocates for interfacing medical history with halakhic research in addressing 
contemporary questions of medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics. He recommends a 
two-pronged methodology involving what he calls a “contextual and a comparative 
historical approach.” The contextual approach requires that each halakhic source relating 
to medicine be contextualized in light of the scientific knowledge of its time. Equipped 
with this understanding, sources can then be compared and applied to current questions 
avoiding imposing our current scientific understandings in analyzing older sources, as 
well as preventing the misinterpretation of older sources and/or their incongruous 
application to contemporary issues (Reichman 1998, 31-32). While Reichman does not 
apply his methodology to axiological dimensions of Jewish bioethical and medical 
halakhic inquiries, he does directly address epistemology. 
 
 
 
                                                 
suspicion. Reichman 1998, n62, observes: “This reasoning seems to negate the notion of advancement in 
medicine and science…” Gordon (1907, 75) takes Deutsch to task for this, arguing that nature has changed 
and medicine has advanced. 
41 Reichman 1998, 37, rightfully points to significant overlap in the interests of both the medical and 
halakhic communities: “It will be evident that the rabbinic authorities shared many of the same factual, 
legal, and ethical concerns as their medical counterparts.” 
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Artificial Insemination 
 Although experimentation in artificial insemination occurred in the late-
eighteenth, nineteenth, and early-twentieth centuries, especially in animal husbandry, 
human artificial insemination only became a widespread assisted reproductive therapy in 
the second half of the twentieth century with greater access to and cultural acceptance of 
donor sperm, along with advances in the freezing and banking of sperm. Artificial 
insemination is primarily helpful in cases of male-factor infertility. While AIH can be 
used to achieve pregnancy in cases of male-factor subfertility due to a husband’s 
physiological or psychological dysfunction, more often AID or AIHD is needed in cases 
of severe oligospermia (low sperm count), azoospermia (no sperm in seminal fluid), or 
for men with Y-chromosomal linked genetic diseases (Ombelet and Van Robays 2015).42 
Only with the rise in use of AIH and AID during the late 1950s and later did questions 
regarding their permissibility and other attendant halakhic issues get addressed to poskim, 
generating a halakhic literature on the topic. Among the issues discussed were: the 
mitzvah of procreation; questions of adulterous relations in the case of AID and AIHD; 
the definition and identification of maternity and paternity; the status of the resultant 
child vis a vis Jewishness, bastardy, and classification as a priest (kohen), levite, or 
firstborn; and issues of sperm procurement and onanism.43 Additionally, the halakhic 
                                                 
42 AIHD was a commonly used technique in which seminal fluid from both the husband and the donor were 
mixed and used to inseminate a woman. If paternity is never tested, the resultant child may be 
psychologically thought of as possibly being the offspring of the husband. Fertility specialists have since 
developed a technique to isolate and harvest sperm directly from the testes, i.e., intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (ICSI), for use in IVF, reducing the need to use donor sperm in both artificial insemination and 
IVF, unless the husband’s male factor infertility is absolute. See Steinberg 2003e. 
43 See Cohen 1987. 
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analyses were layered with moral-axiological concerns including: modesty and 
immorality; the spirituality of marital intimacy; effects on family structure; the 
psychological health of husband, wife, child, and donor; and the fear that collaborative 
reproduction will lead to extramarital sexual relations or cultural assimilation (Steinberg 
2003c, 64; Sinclair 2003, 68-95). Some of these, like the psychological aspects, go 
beyond the strict halakhic concerns raised in the early-twentieth century, and indicate an 
expanded epistemology and moral axiology, arguably due to the cultural paradigm shifts 
within society regarding psychological awareness initiated by Freud and others.  
 
Bathtub Insemination 
 Even though artificial insemination is a modern fertility treatment, medical 
halakhists found ready material with which to begin their analysis in the ancient legal 
analogue of “bathtub insemination,” a legendary case of achieving pregnancy without 
sexual relations. The Talmud raises the question of whether a kohen gadol (chief priest), 
who by Torah law must marry a virgin (Leviticus 21:13), is allowed to marry an 
ostensible virgin who became pregnant: 
They (the rabbis) asked Ben Zoma: A virgin who has become pregnant, what [is 
her permissibility] to [marry] a chief priest? Are we concerned for [the opinion] 
of Shmuel? For Shmuel said: “I am capable of intercourse many times [with a 
virgin] without causing bleeding (i.e., shallow penetration will not rupture the 
hymen, and thus even though she has an intact hymen, she is in fact not a virgin, 
and thus forbidden).” Or perhaps [the scenario] of Shmuel is uncommon, and we 
suspect that perhaps she became pregnant in a [public] bath (into which a man 
previously emitted semen)? But didn’t Shmuel say that any semen that is not shot 
like an arrow cannot inseminate? Originally, [when it was emitted into the bath,] 
it also shot like an arrow. (TB Chagigah 14b-15a) 
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While a woman with an intact hymen who had engaged in sexual relations would be 
prohibited in marriage to a chief priest, a woman who inadvertently became pregnant 
through bathtub insemination is still considered a halakhic virgin, and thus permitted to a 
chief priest in marriage.44  
 Jewish lore recounts one famous case of alleged bathtub insemination. The 
Alphabet of Ben Sira, likely a medieval work attributed to Shimon Ben Sira (second 
century BCE), author of the apocryphal work, The Wisdom of Ben Sira (Sirach), tells the 
story of Ben Sira’s conception.45 Ben Sira’s mother is said to have been the daughter of 
the biblical prophet Jeremiah, who was coerced by wicked men into spilling his seed into 
the waters of the public bath, in which Jeremiah’s virgin daughter subsequently bathed. 
Seven months later, Ben Sira was birthed as the firstborn son of a virgin mother. The 
Alphabet of Ben Sira even points out that the numerical values of the Hebrew letters 
spelling both Jeremiah and Sira are equal, presumably confirming their relation 
(Reichman 1996, 45).  
There are many reasons for scholars of previous generations to discount this 
wondrous story. First, aside from The Alphabet of Ben Sira, this narrative does not appear 
anywhere in rabbinic literature. Second, the prophet Jeremiah lived in the seventh century 
BCE; Ben Sira in the second century BCE. Third, The Wisdom of Ben Sira offers a 
different parental genealogy for him. Nonetheless, this story was widely known, cited, 
                                                 
44 The institution of the chief priesthood only existed until the second Jerusalem temple was destroyed by 
the Romans in the year 70 CE, after which the chief priesthood became defunct absent a temple service. 
45 The book of Ecclesiasticus, alternatively known as Sirach, Wisdom of Sirach, Wisdom of Ben Sira, etc., 
is not part of the Jewish Bible, though it is considered biblical for some Christians, like Catholics and 
Eastern Orthodox, for example. For Jews, it is considered part of the apocryphal writings. See Brettler 
2005, 11; and Schiffman 1995, 124-5. Regarding the Alphabet of Ben Sira, see Reichman 1996, 45. 
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and most importantly for contemporary halakhic considerations of ART, nowhere is it 
asserted or even questioned that Ben Sira had the status of a mamzer (bastard), even 
though such would be the case for a child born of even inadvertent, incestuous sexual 
relations between a father and daughter.  
The story of Ben Sira’s conception and the idea of non-sexual insemination 
earned further standing as a legitimate halakhic source and potential legal precedent for 
artificial insemination by the late-thirteenth-century French Tosafist, Rabbeinu Peretz ben 
Elijah of Corbeil. Rabbeinu Peretz, in his glosses to Sefer Mitzvot Katan, Rabbi Isaac of 
Corbeil’s enumeration of the six hundred and thirteen mitzvot, rules that a woman may 
sleep on her husband’s bed sheets even in her menstrual state, during which time sexual 
relations would normally be proscribed, but she may not sleep on the sheets of a man 
other than her husband lest she become impregnated by the residue of another man’s 
seminal emission.46 The seventeenth-century Av Beit Din of Vilna, Rabbi Moses ben 
Isaac Judah Lima, in his commentary, Chelkat Mechokek (1:8), on Shulkhan Arukah, 
Even Ha’ezer, moves the discussion from a question of prohibition to one regarding the 
affirmative fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation: “There is [cause] to be in doubt [in 
the case of] a woman who became impregnated in a bathtub, whether the father fulfills 
the mitzvah of procreation and if [the child] is called his son for all matters…” Rabbi 
Samuel ben Uri Shraga Phoebus, a Polish contemporary of Rabbi Moses, in his 
commentary Beit Sh’muel (1:11), aspires to resolve Rabbi Moses’s doubt and prove that a 
                                                 
46 If a woman while still halakhically in her menstruant state, i.e., before ritual immersion in a mikvah 
(ritual bath), were to become impregnated through her husband’s semen-soiled sheets, the child would not 
even be considered a “ben niddah – the child of a menstruant.” 
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child resulting from a bathtub pregnancy is fully the son of the sperm provider. He refers 
back to Rabbeinu Peretz of Corbeil’s concern about a woman lying on bed sheets of a 
man other than her husband, and to a commentary on this ruling made by the prominent 
sixteenth-century Polish halakhist Rabbi Joel Sirkis in Bayit Chadash (Yoreh Deah, 
section 195). Sirkis explains that the reason a woman should not lie on the bed sheets of 
another man is because if she becomes pregnant, then the resulting child, whose halakhic 
father would be unrecognized, might inadvertently marry his or her paternal sibling.47 
Note, however, that the articulated concern is not that her pregnancy would constitute a 
transgression of adultery, thereby marking the child with the halakhic status of bastardy.  
Purported reports of inadvertent artificial insemination circulated in Jewish, 
Christian, and Muslim communities, and were discussed by scholars from medieval times 
through the eighteenth century (Reichman 1996, 44-50; Emanuel 2011). While these 
discussions centered upon inadvertent conception through non-sexual insemination, the 
rabbinic textual source material pertaining to bathtub insemination found new relevance 
in the second half of the twentieth century with the advent of ART. Post-facto 
determinations, especially in cases of inadvertency, however, can often be quite different 
than a priori deliberations. 
The topic of artificial insemination engendered robust analysis and debate by 
leading halakhists in the second half of the twentieth century. The issue of contention, 
however, never explicitly focused on the question of whether reproduction through any 
                                                 
47 Cf. Rabbi David Halevi Segal in Turei Zahav, Even Ha’ezer 1:8, who disputes Sirkis’s argument. 
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means other than natural procreation should be considered anathema to the divine will.48 
Here moral axiology plays a shaping role. Judaism’s life-affirming emphasis on health 
and procreation, combined with social and psychological sensitivity to the cultural 
pressures in the observant Orthodox community to have children and produce large 
families, as well as a positive approach toward new technology led to halakhic rulings 
largely supportive of conceiving through artificial insemination, when necessary, at least 
when using the husband’s sperm.49  
Artificial insemination using donor sperm, on the other hand, became the subject 
of a bitter debate in the early-1960s between two prominent rabbis and halakhic 
authorities in New York City: Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, and the Chassidic Rabbi of the 
Satmar sect, Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum. Feinstein (Responsa Igrot Moshe 1961, Even 
Ha’ezer vol. 1, section 71) permitted a couple whose husband was infertile to utilize 
AID, provided that the donor sperm originate from a non-Jewish man. He reasoned that 
absent sexual intercourse there is no transgression of adultery, per the aforementioned 
talmudic passage (TB Chagigah 14b-15a) and ruling of Rabbeinu Peretz. The sole 
concern then is lest the resultant child grow up and inadvertently marry an unrecognized 
                                                 
48 Sinclair 2003, 72-6 contrasts the strong naturalism found in Catholicism, perhaps best represented by the 
Catholic doctrine known as the “inseparability principle” – i.e., it is forbidden to separate procreation from 
marital sexual relations. While Judaism does not espouse a strong naturalism, Sinclair identifies what he 
calls a weaker form of naturalism in some early Jewish bioethical writings on ART. He believes that this 
reflects moral discomfort with some implications of ART, as well as serves as a note of caution lest 
technological exploitation lead society astray. He also briefly identifies similarities between Jewish and 
Islamic legal approaches to ART. For a review of naturalism, natural law, and Judaism, see Bleich and 
Jacobson 2015, 362-8. 
49 Regarding procreative social pressures in the Jewish community, see Jakobovitz 2005. For Judaism’s 
positive attitude toward technology, see Sinclair 2003, 72n17, who credits Jewish law as abiding by the 
principle that if something isn’t prohibited then it is permitted. See Rabbi Israel Lifschitz, Tiferet Yisrael 
1887, Yadayim 4:3. 
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paternal sibling, thereby leading to an incestuous union and any offspring born of the 
inherently illicit marriage having the status of a mamzer – a bastard. However, children 
born of a Jewish woman and a non-Jewish father do not share halakhic lineage, and thus, 
halakhically unrecognized siblings who inadvertently marry would not technically 
transgress a prohibition of incest, and any resultant offspring would be free of the taint of 
bastardy. 
From 1961-1965, the American Torah journal Hamaor published numerous 
responsa disagreeing with Feinstein, and often attacking him ad hominem, primarily on 
moral grounds (Sinclair 2003, 80-81n42). Teitelbaum (Responsa Divrei Yoel vol. 2, 1983, 
Even Ha’ezer, nos. 107-10), also hotly disagreed with Feinstein. His primary critique 
regards the halakhic definition, scope, and purpose of the biblical prohibition of adultery. 
Adultery is not only a transgression of illicit sexual relations, but also one of introducing 
lineage confusion. Nachmanides, in his commentary on the Torah (ad loc., Leviticus 
18:20), uses this explanation as a possible reason for the particular formulation of the 
biblical text (ibid.): “And with the wife of your fellow, do not lie carnally lezer’a – to 
seed, and [thus] defile yourself with her.” Nachmanides suggest that the use of the 
infinitive “to seed” provides the reason for the prohibition. The resulting child will have 
unknown paternity, and thus abominations (i.e., incest) may ensue. Sefer Hachinukh 
(Yitro, no. 5), the fourteenth-century Spanish enumeration of the six hundred and thirteen 
mitzvot, likewise cites this reason in explaining the seventh of the Ten Commandments, 
i.e., “Thou shall not commit adultery” (Exodus 20:13). Thus, for Teitelbaum, AID 
constitutes adultery since it intentionally introduces lineage confusion and any resulting 
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children should be considered bastards. Teitelbaum interprets Rabbeinu Peretz as 
dismissing the taint of bastardy only as a post-facto determination, since the pregnancy 
was achieved absent any intent, unlike in the case of AID. Teitelbaum also appeals to 
Jewish mysticism claiming that adulterous artificial insemination causes great unseen 
damage to the world. Finally, Teitelbaum fundamentally disagrees with Feinstein’s 
halakhic methodology. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Feinstein was renowned for 
arriving at halakhic conclusions based on primary rabbinic sources, without lending too 
much weight, if at all, to later authorities and the legal precedents established through 
their writings. Feinstein (Igrot Moshe 1964, Even Ha’ezer, 2, no. 2) defends his definition 
of adultery as being principally concerned with forbidden sexual relations. Avoiding 
lineage confusion may be an exegetical rationale, but does not transform clear, 
normative, halakhic precepts. Furthermore, Nachmanides’s commentary on the Torah, as 
well as mystical concerns, are not admissible as bona fide halakhic source material. 
Feinstein writes:  
All my opinions are based solely on Torah knowledge and are completely free of 
external ideas. The laws of the Torah are true whether they be strict or lenient. 
There is no halakhic legitimacy in the use of external ideas or inclinations of the 
mind, even if they lead to protective strictness. The idea that a strict ruling is more 
pure or holy than a lenient one is false. (ibid.) 
 
After a book was published in Brooklyn in 1965 carrying a forged retraction of Feinstein, 
he published a third responsum (Igrot Moshe 1973, Even Ha’ezer, vol. 4, no. 32) 
affirming the stated positions and halakhic argumentation of his previous two responsa 
(Sinclair 2003, 80-5). 
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 In assessing the two sides of this halakhic debate, it is important to note its 
epistemological and axiological dimensions. Feinstein asserts a purely halakhic 
orientation that responds to advances in technology. While he clearly aims to assist an 
infertile Jewish couple in actualizing their desire to birth and raise a child, and create a 
family, he explicitly disavows external epistemological and axiological factors in his 
legal method, be they mystical, moral, aggadic, or policy concerns. Teitelbaum, on the 
other hand, embraces a wider-scope Jewish epistemology and halakhic methodology that 
legitimates the use of extra-halakhic sources of knowledge, such as mysticism and non-
purely halakhic rabbinic commentary. Furthermore, both he, and other rabbis opposed to 
Feinstein, apply extra-legal, moral concerns to guide the formation of their policy 
opinions and legal determinations.  
 While prominent Israeli halakhist Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (1958) and 
Holocaust survivor Rabbi Yechiel Yakov Weinberg of Switzerland (Seridei Eish 1977, 
vol. 3, no. 5), agreed with Feinstein’s halakhic rationale for his permissive ruling, as did 
most halakhists on theoretical grounds, in practice, the majority of prominent authorities 
rejected Feinstein’s leniency on meta-halakhic, moral grounds (Steinberg 2003c, 66; 
Sinclair 2003, 86-7). Weinberg (ibid.) argued that the introduction of a stranger’s sperm 
into a married woman should be considered “an ugly abomination of Egypt.” In 
introducing the biblical litany of forbidden sexual relations, the Torah says: “You shall 
not copy the practices of the Land of Egypt where you dwelt, or of the land of Canaan to 
which I am taking you…” (Leviticus 18:3). Rabbi Jacob Breisch (Responsa Chelkat 
Ya’akov 1992, vol. 1, no. 17) of Switzerland concurs, and adds that AID offends general 
161 
 
 
religious sensibility, and if the Catholic Church prohibits on moral grounds, Jews should 
not appear any less concerned with morality.50 Finally, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (Tzitz 
Eliezer 1990, vol. 3, no. 27), reintroduces the concern of lineage confusion, though unlike 
Teitelbaum, he does not posit it as a halakhic objection per se, but as a spiritual and moral 
concern. The Talmud (TB Yevamot 42a) asserts that God’s presence indwells only 
among those with certain and unadulterated lineage.  
The history of medical halakhah and science demonstrates that they have always 
been in dialogue, though at times that dialogue has broken down into conflict or aligned 
in integration. The relationship of Judaism and science often is shaped by epistemology 
and moral axiology. Both epistemology and moral axiology indeed play a normative and 
determinative role in medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics. Now that we have grounded 
the Jewish bioethical discourse regarding ART through analyses of the mitzvah of 
precreation and the theological challenge of infertility, the need to view discrete halakhic 
views through the lens of the history of science, and halakhic responses to early 
treatments of infertility, we can now enter into an analysis of the epistemological and 
axiological dimensions of the contemporary Jewish bioethical debate regarding the 
definition of maternity and paternity in current assisted reproductive and genetic 
technologies.
                                                 
50 See Sinclair 92n91. Sinclair also believes that underlying Breisch’s discomfort is a sense that the whole 
enterprise is immodest. Matters of reproduction and procreation should be private, and not publicly pursued 
or discussed. For Breisch’s (1992) full discussion, see responsa Chelkat Ya’akov, Even Ha’Ezer, sections 
12-21.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
In Vitro Fertilization with Husband or Donor Sperm 
 
 This chapter, focusing on in vitro fertilization (IVF) and embryo transfer 
(ET), begins our analysis of the epistemological and axiological dimensions of the 
contemporary Jewish bioethical debate concerning maternal and paternal identity 
and the new assisted reproductive technologies (ART). As previously explained at 
the end of Part I, “Context and Method: Jewish Bioethics, Epistemology, and Moral 
Axiology,” (see Chapter Three, pp. 121-5), my method of investigation is: 1. 
understand the current science and its history; 2. locate the Jewish bioethical 
concerns within a larger bioethical framework; and 3. evaluate the epistemological 
and axiological dimensions of the Jewish bioethical analysis regarding maternal and 
paternal identification. Thus, I begin this chapter with the history of IVF and ET, 
the science of conception and infertility, and the clinical practice of IVF/ET assisted 
reproductive treatment.  
After briefly reviewing general and Jewish bioethical concerns relating to 
IVF/ET, I will then turn to each of the four Jewish bioethicist exemplars of this 
dissertation. For each, I will provide an epistemologically and axiologically 
informed intellectual orientation by introducing their philosophy of halakhah and 
Jewish ethics as it relates to their bioethical methodology. I am particularly 
interested in highlighting their theoretical understandings of and approaches to: 
legal interpretation and judicial discretion; the roles of change, innovation, and 
historical contextualization in the development of halakhah; views on legal 
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certainty and judicial doubt; the relationship of law and ethics; and the relationship 
of religion and science – in other words, all the relevant philosophical and 
methodological issues reviewed in Part I of this dissertation. I will then present each 
one’s views on the question of maternal and paternal identity when IVF/ET is 
employed, and subsequently analyze their epistemological and axiological 
dimensions. I will also highlight apparent religion and science interactions. 
Regarding maternity, this chapter will only consider the IVF scenario in which the 
ovum contributor is also the gestator and birth-mother, and intends to raise the 
resultant child. Gestational surrogacy will be fully examined in the next chapter. 
Regarding paternity, this chapter considers IVF/ET cases involving both the 
husband’s and third-party donor sperm.  
 
The History and Science of In Vitro Fertilization 
 
 The history of IVF presents a fascinating study into the development of late-
nineteenth-and-twentieth-century biomedical technologies. IVF’s history highlights the 
evolving, interdependent processes of basic scientific research, scientific theory 
development, and clinical application, all set within a complex human context of 
professional competition, personal intrigue, interactions of science and religion, 
legislation, litigation, and the power politics of research funding. For IVF to become a 
successful, assisted reproductive technology for human beings, at least four scientific 
challenges had to have been mastered: 1. the harvesting from women of sufficient 
numbers of cytoplasmically and meiotically mature ova; 2. the ability to fertilize said ova 
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in vitro; 3. the successful culturing of preimplantation embryos; and 4. techniques of 
embryo transfer into women capable of gestation. Each of these challenges, in turn, 
demanded advances in scientific understanding and clinical medicine born of ongoing 
laboratory research, animal trials, and ultimately human experimentation. The history of 
IVF thus entails the modern history of cell biology, embryology, endocrinology, 
gynecology, immunology, laboratory technology, urology, reproductive medicine, 
surgical techniques, among other disciplines. Since IVF creates life in the laboratory and 
separates procreation from sexual intercourse it also engenders intense ethical debate and 
deep concerns regarding its potential social impact on the normative institutions of 
marriage and family, including concepts of motherhood and fatherhood, as well as 
religious considerations of the metaphysical status of the embryo (Bavister 2002; Biggers 
2013).  
 Historians of IVF credit its inception to Samuel Leopold Schenk, an embryologist 
at the University of Vienna, who in 1878 fertilized rabbit ova in vitro (Bavister 2002, 
182; Grazi 2005b, 16). Twelve-years later, in 1890, British embryologist Walter Heape 
successfully transferred IVF rabbit embryos to a doe rabbit that subsequently birthed 
healthy offspring. Heape and other investigators continued to develop animal IVF and ET 
techniques through the 1970s. In the 1930s, IVF/ET succeeded in rats, sheep, and goats; 
in the 1940s in mice and cows; in the 1950s in pigs; and in the 1970s in horses 
(Westmore 1984, 2 ff). Among scientists and historians of medicine, however, there is 
significant controversy as to whether Schenk, Heape, and others’ early attempts at 
IVF/ET were indeed successful. Changing standards of research confirmation and peer 
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review lead some to credit the first IVF of mammalian ova to Harvard biologist Gregory 
Goodwin Pincus and E. V. Enzmann’s in 1936. They successfully harvested an ovum 
from one doe rabbit, achieved IVF, and then ET to an unmated, second doe rabbit that 
subsequently gave birth. Following this recognized achievement, in 1937, an anonymous 
letter to the New England Journal of Medicine extolled the potential of IVF/ET in helping 
overcome human infertility: “What a boon for the barren woman with closed (fallopian) 
tubes!” (The New England Journal of Medicine 1937). The author of the letter was later 
revealed to be John Rock, a Harvard-based gynecologist who in the 1940s, along with his 
laboratory assistant Miriam Menkin, worked to fertilize human oocytes in vitro. In 1944, 
Rock and Menken claimed that they successfully achieved the first human pre-embryo 
conceived through IVF. Ten years later, Landrum Shettles of Columbia University 
likewise claimed to have successfully fertilized human ova in vitro by duplicating Rock 
and Menkin’s protocol.  
In the 1950s, however, advances in the understanding of gamete physiology led 
scientists to doubt all previous claims of IVF. Researchers had already increasingly 
become aware of the biochemical role that the female endocrine system plays in the 
necessary maturation of ova for fertilization. It was only in 1951, though, that American 
reproductive biologist Min Chueh Chang and English embryologist Colin Russell Austin 
independently discovered that mammalian spermatozoa also require biochemical 
conditioning. For fertilization to take place, the acrosomal head of the sperm needs to be 
destabilized so that its enzymes can break down the zona pellucida, i.e., the outer 
membrane of the ovum, allowing for fusing of both gametes’ haploid nuclei. This process 
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of spermatic “capacitation” occurs in the vaginal tract through changes in pH and 
biochemical concentrations. It may also be simulated in vitro, but without this spermatic 
conditioning fertilization is not seemingly possible, thus the incredulity toward earlier 
claims of successful mammalian IVF (Bavister 2002; Biggers 2013, 8-9). 
In the 1960s, British physiologist Robert G. Edwards began to synthesize the 
findings of previous twentieth-century basic research regarding the role of hormones in 
the ovulatory cycle and in the maturation of oocytes, the fertilization of oocytes in vitro 
with capacitated spermatozoa, the culturing of the developing pre-embryo in specially 
formulated chemical media, and the successful transfer of embryos into a woman’s 
uterus. In 1968, Edwards began to collaborate with British gynecologist Patrick Steptoe 
who was developing laparoscopic surgical techniques to view inside the pelvic cavity for 
reproductive diagnostic purposes, as well as to retrieve oocytes through a pipette needle 
technique known as aspiration. Edwards and Steptoe diligently worked for over a decade 
with hundreds of patients, without the support of government funding, before their 
increasingly refined technique achieved the first IVF/ET human birth.1 Louise Brown, 
born on July 25, 1978, was the world’s first “test-tube baby.”2 Although in 1980, the 
                                                 
1 In September of 1973, Landrum Shettles of Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital in New York City attempted 
human IVF for Doris and John Del-Zio. However, Shettles did not inform the hospital of his intentions, nor 
did he follow proper protocols regarding human experimentation. Upon learning of his rogue attempt, 
Shettle’s department chair, Raymond Vande Wiele, interrupted the IVF process, thereby irreversibly 
ruining the attempt. Later, Doris and John Del-Zio successfully sued the hospital and Vande Wiele for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Henig 2004. See Biggers 2013, 12, regarding a controversial 
claim of an IVF/ET baby being born in India 67 days after Louise Brown that went unrecognized by the 
scientific community.  
2 The origin of the phrase “test-tube baby” is unknown, often credited to the press in the 1930s. The term, 
however, was first used in relation to artificial insemination, not IVF, and graced the title of Dr. Hermann 
Rohleder’s 1934 book entitled: Test Tube Babies: A History of the Artificial Impregnation of Human 
Beings. Additionally, technically Louise Brown was conceived in a Petri dish and not in a test-tube. 
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success rate of IVF/ET was only 16.55%, by 1983 it had risen to 30%, and continued to 
rise even higher as IVF/ET progressed (Steinberg 2003g, 572). To date, more than five-
million children worldwide have been born through IVF/ET (Knapton 2016).3 In 2010, 
Edwards was awarded the “Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine” for the development 
of IVF (Biggers 2013, 16ff).  
 
The Science of Natural Conception 
 For conception to occur naturally in vivo, i.e., in (something) alive, many 
physiological processes must precisely align. Oogenesis occurs during female fetal 
development, equipping a newborn female with two to four million oocytes in her 
ovarian reserve. Sexual development during female puberty leads to menarche (the onset 
of menstruation). There are at least five essential, interconnected physiological processes 
within the menstrual cycle, whose length can be twenty-four to thirty-four days: the 
endometrial cycle; the pituitary hormone cycle; the sex hormone cycle; the ovarian cycle; 
and the ovulatory phase – all of which are required for fertility. 
For the first five to seven days of the endometrial cycle, the vascular and 
glandular cells of a woman’s uterine lining lose their physiological integrity, resulting in 
the menstrual flow. During this time, the hypothalamus secretes gonadotropin-releasing 
hormone (GnRH), a neuroendocrine agent that triggers the pituitary gland to release 
                                                 
3 Although early-on, there was significant concern regarding the longterm health impacts of IVF/ET upon 
children born of its technology, longitudinal studies primarily indicate that IVF/ET creates healthy 
outcomes for families facing fertility challenges, see Sutcliffe 2002. However, Louis Brown, the oldest 
IVF-born person is only 39 years old and some scientists assert that it is too early to gauge completely the 
longterm health implications of IVF, see Knapton 2016. Longitudinal studies of people conceived by IVF 
thus continue. 
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follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH), which, in turn, stimulates the maturing of an egg 
follicle within the ovary. The renewal of hypothalamus pituitary hormone cycle also 
restarts the sex hormone cycle, in which the ovarian follicle secretes estrogen, causing the 
uterine lining to once again increase in vascularity and glandular cells during the 
proliferative phase. About midway through, at days thirteen to fifteen, the pituitary gland 
triggers a surge of luteinizing hormone (LH), which causes the matured vesicular follicle 
to burst, releasing the oocyte into the fallopian tube, i.e., ovulation. During the luteal 
phase of the ovarian cycle, the follicular cells originally surrounding the oocyte, i.e., the 
corpus luteum, begin to function as a gland, producing progesterone which induces the 
continuing building-up of the endometrial lining of the uterus with more vascular and 
glandular cells thereby increasing blood supply and providing the nourishment necessary 
for implantation (ASRM 2015; Chudnoff 2011). 
Sexual intercourse allows the male’s ejaculate containing between forty million 
and one billion spermatozoa to enter the female vaginal tract. During ovulation, changes 
in the pH and chemical concentrations of the cervical fluid will capacitate the sperm.4 
Spermatogenesis takes place in the male reproductive tract over a period of 
approximately 74 days, beginning at puberty and continuing throughout life. A man’s 
testes produce about two hundred million spermatozoa daily. If sexual intercourse takes 
place during a woman’s ovulatory phase, the newly hyperactivated, capacitated, motile 
spermatozoa will make their way up her cervical canal, into the uterus, and then up into 
                                                 
4 The halakhot (laws) of taharat hamishpachah (family purity laws) which prohibit any physical contact 
between husband and wife during the five days, on average, of menstruation, and for seven more “clean 
days,” maximize fertility by permitting the sexual reunion of spouses following the wife’s immersion in a 
mikvah (ritual bath) at the time most likely coinciding with ovulation, see Tendler 1988, 8-12.  
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the fallopian tube where male and female gametes will mix, allowing the enzymes of the 
capacitated spermatozoa to weaken the zona pellucida, i.e., outer membrane of the 
oocyte. When a single spermatozoon binds with the oocyte, fusing both cells’ haploid 
chromosomes, a cortical reaction blocks further spermatozoa from also binding with the 
oocyte, thus avoiding lethal polyspermy (Gadella 2010). The fallopian tube’s cilia and 
mucous secretions propel the zygote, i.e. fertilized egg, toward the uterus, during which 
time the zygote begins to undergo cellular cleavage on day one, dividing and doubling its 
pluripotent stem cells until it becomes an eight-cell compacted morula on day four. 
Beginning on day five, the inner and outer cells of the morula begin to differentiate, 
yielding a blastocyst, which on day eight attaches to the mucosa in the uterus. Continuing 
to divide, the blastocyst’s inner group of cells become the embryo, and its outer group of 
cells develop into the placenta, that conducts nourishment between the developing the 
embryo and the endometrial lining. The embryo achieves full uterine implantation by day 
fourteen after conception (Chudnoff 2011). The growing placenta supplies additional 
pregnancy hormones that maintain the uterine environment. However, should conception 
fail to occur, then there is a rapid decline in both estrogen and progesterone levels, 
triggering the destabilization of the vascular and glandular cells of the endometrium, 
leading to menstruation and the beginning of a new cycle (Tendler 1988, 12). 
 
Obstructions to Natural Conception, Infertility, and IVF/ET 
  Given the above-described complexity of female and male reproductive 
physiology, there are many conditions that may interfere with natural conception. First, a 
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woman’s fertility may be affected by: anatomical abnormalities, such as: damaged or 
blocked fallopian tubes5; peritoneal factors, such as endometriosis, i.e., the abnormal 
growth of uterine tissue outside of the uterus; an abnormally shaped uterus or cervix; 
polyps, myomas (fibroids), or tumors; among other conditions. Second, there may be an 
ovulatory disorder that interferes with one or more of the aforementioned parts of the 
menstrual cycle. Polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS), and hypothalamic and/or pituitary 
dysfunction, all cause hormonal imbalances that disrupt aspects of the menstrual cycle 
and ovulation. For example, hyperprolactinemia, i.e., too much pituitary produced 
prolactin, reduces estrogen production, thereby negatively affecting the endometrial 
cycle. Third, ovarian abnormalities, such as diminished ovarian reserves and premature 
ovarian failure, also called primary ovary insufficiency, can result due to an autoimmune 
response, or through toxic exposure, such as chemotherapy (Mayo Clinic 2016a; ASRM 
2012).  
 For men, anatomical obstructions and abnormalities can also impair fertility, such 
as undescended testicles and varicocele veins, i.e., enlarged testicular veins, both of 
which raise the body temperature of the testes, impeding healthy spermatogenesis. Other 
causes of abnormal spermatogenic male-factor infertility are toxic exposures through 
occupational hazards, medications, and chemotherapy; disease impact, such as from 
mumps; Y-chromosome micro-deletions and other genetic anomalies; and metabolic and 
                                                 
5 A preliminary fertility evaluation often include a diagnostic hysterosalpingogram (HSG), a special x-ray 
of the female reproductive tract in which catheter-injected dye fills the vaginal tract, cervix, uterus, and 
fallopian tubes, revealing their morphological structure and identifying any obstructions, scarring, or other 
types of abnormality or damage, see ASRM 2012, 7-8. Uterine abnormalities can also be identified through 
hysteroscopy or a saline sonohysterogram (SHG), see ASRM 2012, 11. 
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hormonal dysfunction. Abnormal spermatogenesis can create conditions such as 
oligospermia, i.e. low sperm production; teratospermia, i.e., deformed sperm; and 
astenospermia, i.e., non-fully motile sperm. Azoospermia denotes the absence of any 
sperm, though this condition may be caused by anatomical obstructions which sometimes 
can be surgically corrected. Varicoceles and undescended testes also can often be 
surgically repaired. Disease and infections can be treated, though fertility may not be 
restored. Metabolic and hormonal dysfunction may be treated through medications and/or 
hormonal injections. Erectile dysfunction and premature ejaculation, among other sexual 
dysfunctions, may be treated through medication and/or counselling. In cases of severe 
sexual dysfunction, anatomical abnormalities and obstructions, as well as abnormal 
spermatogenesis, different assisted reproductive techniques of sperm extraction can still 
collect sufficient fertile spermatozoa for IVF (Mayo Clinic 2016b; Turek 2016).6  
 Age, general health, and lifestyle choices can likewise affect both male and 
female fertility. Couples who are unable to achieve pregnancy after one year of trying are 
medically considered to be struggling with infertility, though individuals thirty-five years 
or older will often seek treatment sooner. A preliminary fertility evaluation of a woman 
struggling with infertility will consider anatomical as well as endocrinological causes. 
                                                 
6 Testicular sperm extraction (TESE), an early technique of the 1980s, surgically removes testicular tissue 
from which spermatozoa are subsequently isolated and harvested. Testicular fine needle aspiration 
(TEFNA) extracts testicular fluids, in which fertile spermatozoa may be present. Microdissection (micro-
TESE) is like TESE in that testicular tissue is surgically removed, however, much less tissue is required. 
Consequently, there is much less injury and scar tissue, see Bernie, Ranjith, and Schlegel 2013. A testicular 
biopsy, sperm mapping, and a sperm chromatin structure assay (SCSA) can help identify which method of 
sperm retrieval will be best for a given situation (ASRM 2008a,b; Turek 2016). 
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35% of all female infertility problems are due to tubal or peritoneal factors.7 25% are due 
to ovulatory problems. In 40% of infertile couples, the male partner is either a 
contributing or sole cause of infertility. 10% of infertility cases are idiopathic, i.e. there is 
no easily identifiable reason for the inability to achieve pregnancy. Often, separate male 
and female factors both contribute to a couple’s infertility, and in a minority of cases, 
infertility is caused by the mixing of otherwise healthy gametes, i.e. through an 
immunological reaction of sperm and a women’s naturally occurring, anti-sperm 
antibodies (ASRM 2012).8 
 IVF/ET was first identified as an ART for female tubal-factor infertility. 
However, over time it was recognized that it can assist any number of the above-cited 
causes of both female and/or male-factor infertility, as well as to avoid transmitting 
genetic disease, especially when combined with other ARTs.9 For example, in cases of 
                                                 
7 Although fallopian transplantation, replacement, and surgical repair are possible, IVF’s relatively non-
invasive procedure with excellent rates of successful outcomes has made fallopian surgery essentially 
obsolete, see Sotrel 2009. 
8 The CDC’s 2013 National Summary (2013) identifies that IVF accounted for >99% of ART usage. Of the 
almost 200,000 IVF cycles reported, 13% had a patient diagnosis of tubal-factor; 14% ovulatory 
dysfunction; 32% diminished ovarian reserve; 9% endometriosis; 5% uterine factor; 33% male factor; 15% 
other factor; 13% unknown. 12% of infertility cases were female-factor only; while 17% were known to 
have both female-and-male-factors causing infertility. 
9 When IVF/ET success rates were still relatively low, and longterm health outcomes were completely 
unknown, three other early ARTs were practiced. In the 1980s, gamete intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT), was 
performed for a female with normal, healthy fallopian tubes and for a male with healthy sperm. In GIFT, an 
oocyte is retrieved transvaginally by needle aspiration from a woman, and her male partner’s sperm sample 
is collected and washed (explained below). The gametes are then combined in a catheter, though kept 
separate by an air bubble. The gametes are then directly deposited into the fallopian tube, enabling a more 
“natural” process of conception. It was then speculated that GIFT may be healthier than IVF/ET. 
Additionally, some Catholic theologians licensed GIFT as morally acceptable since conception occurs 
naturally, unlike in IVF, which is religiously and morally disapproved of by the Catholic Church due to the 
Church’s theological insistence on reproductive naturalism, see Haas 1998; Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith 1987 and 2008; Paul VI 1968; and Pius XII 1958. Zygote intra-fallopian transfer (ZIFT), unlike 
GIFT, is a form of IVF, with fertilization of a harvested oocyte by collected and washed spermatozoa 
occurring in vitro. However, rather than culturing the zygote in vitro until it matures into an embryo that 
can be transferred directly to the uterus, in ZIFT, the zygote is transferred surgically through laparoscopy 
directly into the fallopian tube where it will naturally mature into an embryo and travel to the uterus for 
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male-factor infertility, such as severe teratospermia or obstructive azoospermia, IVF can 
be combined with assisted reproductive techniques of sperm extraction and specialized 
IVF, such as intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), in which a single fertile 
spermatozoon can be directly injected into the oocyte by a fine needle under a 
microscope (Boulet, et al. 2015). In cases for which there is a significant probability of 
genetic disease transmission to offspring, IVF can be combined with preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), in which pre-embryos and blastocysts are subjected to genetic 
analysis for embryo selection and implantation.10 In cases of anticipated infertility, such 
as a fertile woman with cancer who requires chemotherapy or radiation treatments which 
will potentially leave her infertile, she may choose to have oocytes harvested now and 
cryopreserved for IVF later, or IVF now with the resultant embryos cryopreserved for 
later implantation (Steinberg 2003g, 573).11 Since IVF, for the most part, is accomplished 
without surgery and has proven to yield excellent rates of successful and healthy 
reproductive outcomes, even more cost-effectively than intrauterine insemination, IVF 
has become the most utilized assisted reproductive technology (CDC 2013, 2014; Bower 
and Hansen 2005).  
                                                 
implantation. Tubal embryo transfer (TET), is similar to ZIFT, except that the zygote is allowed to mature 
into a pre-embryo in vitro before laparoscopic transfer to the fallopian tube. Since IVF/ET outcomes have 
proven to be just as good as, if not better than ZIFT and TET, and since IVF/ET doesn’t require surgery, 
ZIFT and TET are rarely performed today (ASRM 2015, 12-3; Steinberg 2003g, 574; Toner 2002). 
10 Polymerase chain reaction (PCR), florescent in situ hybridization (FISH), multiplex fluorescence in situ 
hybridization (m-FISH), are all current technologies for PGD. Which method of genetic analysis is used 
depends on the discrete concerns raised by prior genetic screening. See Demko, Rabinowitz, and Johnson 
2010; Anderson 2010. Current research is exploring PGD by single-cell genomic sequencing, see Van der 
Aa, et al. 2013. For the ethics of selective reproduction, see Wilkinson 2010. 
11 Oocyte, spermatozoa, and embryo cryopreservation techniques have been improving, especially within 
the past few years for oocytes with the advent of vitrification, a flash freezing technique that works better 
for cells with higher fluid content, see ASRM 2015, 12; Edgar and Gook 2012. 
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The Clinical Process of IVF/ET 
 When IVF is recommended to overcome infertility, there are several steps to the 
process: ovarian stimulation, ova retrieval and sperm collection, fertilization, embryo 
culture, and embryo transfer (ASRM 2015).12 For a woman struggling with infertility, 
ovarian stimulation begins with hormonal therapy. To maximize IVF cycle opportunities, 
fertility drugs are used to induce the ovulation of several follicles at once through a 
process called controlled ovarian hyperstimulation.13 It has been believed that such 
hormonal therapies carried with them increased risks of adverse long term health impacts, 
such as ovarian, endometrial, and cervical cancers. However, recent longitudinal 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses have concluded that there have been no significant 
associations of hormonal fertility therapies with these cancers (Siristatidis 2013). Risks of 
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) and other side effects still obtain (Mayo 
Clinic 2016a).14  
After ovulation, oocytes are retrieved by transvaginal ultrasound aspiration. An 
vaginal ultrasound probe identifies the location of the follicles, and a pipette needle 
                                                 
12 This brief schematization will note the major milestones of an IVF treatment process. For a full, step-by-
step description of the process, see Wood and Trounson 2012; Gurevich 2016; ASRM 2015. 
13 Multiple follicles are induced because not all oocytes will fertilize, or develop normally, and sometimes 
an inventory of embryos is desired for multiple cycles of ET. There are numerous hormonal agents that 
may be utilized for ovarian induction, each differentially indicated for specific goals and/or circumstances, 
and each having attendant health risks. Medications for ovarian stimulation include: Clomiphene citrate 
(Clomid or Serophene); letrozole; human menopausal gonadotropins (hMG: Pergonal or Repronex) for 
luteinizing, urinary FSH (Metrodin), recombinant FSH (Gonal F and Follistim), and human chorionic 
gonadotropins (hCG: Ovidrel, Novarel, and Pregnyl). Medications used to prevent premature ovulation 
include: gonadotropins, such as GnRH agonist (Lupron), and GnRH antagonist (Antagon, Ganirelix, 
Orgalutran, and Cetrotide). See Gurevich 2016; ASRM 2014; Grazi 2005c, 283-96. 
14 Oral contraceptive pills are often used in IVF pre-treatment to reduce the incidence of OHSS and ovarian 
cysts, see Karande 2014. GnRH agonists and antagonists also reduce the risks of premature ovulation, see 
ASRM 2014, 6. 
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connected to a suction device is inserted transvaginally, i.e. through the vaginal wall, to 
the retrieve the oocytes directly from the ovarian follicles. The oocytes are temporarily 
incubated in an IVF culture medium or cryopreserved for later use.15 An embryologist 
will evaluate harvested oocytes for maturity and viability. If they have not matured 
enough, they still may be able to be conditioned through in vitro maturation (IVM), as 
well as preimplantation assisted hatching (AH), a pre-ET micromanipulation in which the 
zona pellucida is punctured to assist the hatching of the embryo (Gurevich 2016; ASRM 
2015, 10).  
 A sperm sample must be collected either from the husband/male partner or 
through donation.16 Sperm can be collected through masturbation, post-coital vaginal 
collection, use of a sterile condom during sexual intercourse, or by electronic stimulation 
of the prostate by a pulsator (Jakobovits 1993; Bleich 1995b). If necessary, sperm can be 
extracted from the testicle, epididymis, or vas deferens. Cryopreserved, “banked” sperm 
previously collected or donated can be thawed for current use. All sperm collections are 
“washed,” i.e. motile sperm are separated from non-motile sperm and spermatic mucus 
by density gradient centrifugation.  
 Fertilization is accomplished in vitro by gametic mixing, or when necessary, by 
ICSI.17 Zygotes are matured in culture until the pre-embryo or blastocyst phase, when 
                                                 
15 While 95% of pre-IVF hormonal treatment yields at least one oocyte, on average between eight and 
fifteen oocytes are usually harvested, see Gurevich 2016. 
16 Sperm donors are tested for infectious disease, as well as are screened for medical and genetic history. 
Donor sperm is frozen for at least six-months before use in order to allow for a post-latency period re-
testing of the donor for infectious disease, see ASRM 2015, 14. 
17 In the case of gametic mixing, an embryologist places each oocyte into a separate culture dish with 
approximately 10,000 washed sperm, which is then incubated for twelve to twenty-four hours to facilitate 
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they may be subjected to preimplantation genetic diagnosis, cryopreserved, or implanted 
into the woman through embryo transfer by way of a catheter, i.e. a long, thin sterile tube, 
through the vaginal tract, past the cervix, and into the uterus. Sometimes the 
recommended fertility protocol indicates the redundant implantation of several embryos 
in order to maximize the possibility of some implantations taking hold for full gestation. 
High-order multiple pregnancies (three or more) add risk to the viability of the pregnancy 
with each additional implantation, and incur other health risks as well. If too many 
embryos begin to develop into fetuses, there may be need for multifetal pregnancy 
reduction. Unused viable embryos can be cryopreserved for future cycles, or they can be 
donated. After implantation, a regimen of progesterone supplementation for the woman 
helps build the uterine environment for gestation (Gurevich 2016; ASRM 2015, 11; Grazi 
2005d).18 
If a woman cannot produce viable oocytes, donor eggs may be fertilized by her 
husband/partner’s sperm in vitro and implanted within her uterus for gestation. If neither 
she nor her husband/male partner can produce viable gametes, but she has a uterus, donor 
embryos can be used. Donor eggs and embryos will be considered in Chapter Six, 
“Gestational Surrogacy.” 
 
 
                                                 
fertilization, see Gurevich 2016. Approximately 60% of U.S.-based IVF is through ICSI, see ASRM 2015, 
8. 
18 Depending on the age of the female patient, miscarriage rates are 15% for women under 35; 25% for 
women ages 40-42; and 35% for women over age 42. Patients are also monitored for the possibility of 
ectopic pregnancy, see Gurevich 2016.  
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Issues of General and Jewish Bioethical Concerns Relating to IVF/ET 
 
 Although the ART of IVF/ET is practiced worldwide today in developed 
countries, numerous bioethical questions have been raised concerning IVF/ET ever since 
the first IVF child was born almost four decades ago. In the first ten years of IVF/ET 
(1978-1988) in the United States, more than seventy-four ethics committee statements 
were produced regarding its usage (Walters 1988). Since spousal IVF is similar in intent, 
and in some ways, practice, to the earlier ART of AIH, these two ARTs share common 
bioethical and religious concerns. Both raise questions of procreative liberty, privacy, and 
governmental regulatory control. Both evoke the question of whether infertility is a 
disease, and the distributive justice discussion of the right to health care, cost, coverage, 
and access. 
However, IVF is also sufficiently different from AI as to raise novel issues. IVF 
more strongly introduces the question of the metaphysical, moral, and legal status of 
eggs, sperm, and embryos. Who owns fertilized embryos and are they subject to contract 
agreements and/or court assigned custody? Are they property or progeny? May unused 
embryos be discarded, destroyed, donated, or be subjected to medical research? May 
embryos be created a priori for non-procreative, research purposes, such as stem cell 
research? IVF also entails greater health risks due to the required hormonal 
manipulations, and, at times, minor surgical interventions, raising the old question of the 
elective assumption of health risks. IVF/ET sometimes entails PGD and embryo 
selection, raising questions of eugenics and morally acceptable criteria for embryo 
selection. IVF/ET also sometimes involves high-order embryo implantations that may 
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later lead to the need for fetal reduction, returning the conversation to bio-and-religious 
ethics concerning pregnancy termination.  
Ethicists have also looked beyond individual interests to societal needs. Should 
society be taking better responsibility for children needing adoption and foster care rather 
than developing technologies that ignore the plight of these children in favor of creating 
new children for homes that may otherwise have been primed for adoption and foster care 
due to infertility? Do individuals need to set aside their personal hopes and desires for the 
public welfare and national and global interests? Social debate has also been triggered 
when IVF is used to produce children for non-traditional family structures, such as single 
mothers or same-sex couples. Similar questions arise regarding whether there should be 
age limits on child bearing through ART, or limits on the number of IVF-cycle attempts. 
Is it in the best interest of society or of newborn children themselves to have parents past 
their mid-life? Third-party gamete donation further complicates the ethical and legal 
issues involved in the selection and sale of gametes, and the rights and responsibilities of 
third-party reproductive collaborators (Asch and Marmor 2008; Hull 2005a, 95-160; 
Steinberg 2003g, 581-3).  
 Jewish bioethicists, being attuned to general bioethical scholarship, likewise 
engage these issues. Medical halakhists and poskim, being of a Jewish-legal orientation, 
tend to focus on issues of more exclusively Jewish-religious concern, such as: Is IVF 
halakhically permissible or not, and why? Does IVF fulfill the mitzvah of procreation? 
What are the halakhically permissible methods of semen procurement given prohibitions 
of masturbation? Is there a need for rabbinical supervision of gametes, beyond standard 
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IVF clinic operational protocols, in order to guarantee the avoidance of lineage confusion 
resulting from misidentifications and mix-ups, not unlike the rabbinical supervision of 
production required in the kosher food industry?19 Is fetal reduction or selective 
termination permissible? The more narrow interests of medical halakhah, in turn, also 
affects the focus of Jewish bioethical interests, especially for Jewish bioethicists of a 
legal orientation.  
Ronit Irshai (2012, 264-8) argues that medical halakhah and legally oriented 
Jewish bioethics tend to ignore the larger bioethical concerns, as well as pertinent gender 
considerations, due to two primary factors: first, the literature is largely generated by 
men, who are unattuned to women’s perspectives and feminist critique; and second, the 
pronatalist views of traditional Judaism incline to permit “all reproductive technologies 
… in that sense, they consider the end to justify all the means.” While Irshai substantiates 
her critique of a male-gendered perspective dominating much of legally oriented 
bioethics and medical halakhah, and indeed demonstrates the pervasive pronatalism of 
medical halakhah and legally oriented Jewish bioethics, her claims also overgeneralize. 
Of the four male exemplars of this dissertation, only three permit and encourage the 
ARTs discussed. Further, the progression from prohibition to allowance regarding ART 
tracks with changing social mores in larger society and their influence on Jewish cultural 
attitudes and ethical reformulations. Irshai’s cogent critique notwithstanding, many 
                                                 
19 For more information on rabbinical supervision within the food industry, see Fishkoff 2010; Lytton 
2013; Horowitz 2016. 
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factors shape the epistemological and moral-axiological dimensions of Jewish 
reproductive law and ethics. 
 
IVF and Parenthood: Epistemological and Moral-Axiological Considerations 
 
 Besides essential questions of the halakhic permissibility of the different ARTs, a 
foundational question that consistently emerges from the Jewish bioethical and medical 
halakhic literature concerns parentage. In each of the available ARTs, with due 
consideration of the specific circumstances, collaborative parties, and reproductive 
materials utilized, medical halakhists and Jewish bioethicists ask: who is the resultant 
child’s mother and father? We now turn our attention to the epistemology and moral 
axiology guiding what halakhic and bioethical considerations are taken into account to 
answer this foundational question. In particular, I will analyze the Jewish bioethical 
writings of the four Jewish bioethical exemplars introduced in Chapter Two (pp. 58-65): 
1. Rabbi J. David Bleich; 2. Rabbi Michael J. Broyde; 3. Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff; and 4. the 
collaborative duo of Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler. 
 
Rabbi J. David Bleich’s Epistemological and Axiological Orientation  
 
 Rabbi J. David Bleich and his voluminous scholarship have had far-reaching, 
shaping influence on the development of medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics over the 
past fifty years. Bleich’s mastery of rabbinic literature and Jewish law, his training in 
philosophy, and his expertise in comparative U.S. and Jewish law, have come together in 
his comprehensive, extensively detailed and annotated, legally oriented, Jewish bioethical 
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writings.20 A recently published intellectual profile of Bleich states: “Rabbi Bleich’s 
scholarship is remarkably broad … Bleich demonstrates a detailed knowledge of such 
diverse fields as chemistry, commerce, comparative religion, grammar (in several 
languages), history, medicine, philosophy, and secular law (e.g. Roman, English and 
American). In each instance, and with apparently equal ease, Bleich adduces apt Jewish 
and secular sources, both ancient and modern” (Resnicoff 2015, 6). Bleich’s capacity for 
clear understanding and felicity of lucid expression allows him to translate, make 
accessible, and thereby popularize the arcane concepts and dialectics of talmudic 
commentary, Jewish legal codes, and especially Jewish responsa literature. Besides 
teaching in several schools of Yeshiva University, including its affiliated rabbinical 
school and law school, Bleich has served on numerous governmental and non-
governmental panels and committees, and is often consulted by rabbis, health-care 
professionals, jurists, ethicists, and religiously observant Jews (Resnicoff 2015, 6-7). 
Bleich is self-reflective about his faith commitments, as well as his philosophy and 
methodology of Jewish law and ethics, and has written extensively about them.21 His 
writings demonstrate that he is a steadfast, consistent thinker over time, expanding on 
earlier formulations but rarely changing them. In order to assess the epistemological and 
                                                 
20 Bleich’s scholarly interests are remarkably broad, extending beyond bioethics to any and all matters of 
Jewish law and their intersection with contemporary law and society, including business law, family law, 
Jewish ritual law, etc... See Resnicoff 2015, 6. He is particularly interested in novel phenomenon and 
circumstances, and their halakhic adjudication by poskim, thus his column on “Survey of Recent Halakhic 
Periodical Literature” in the journal Tradition and their collection in his, to date, seven-volume 
Contemporary Halakhic Problems. 
21 See Bleich’s introductions to Contemporary Halakhic Problems, vols. 1-7, 1977, 1983, 1989, 1995, 
2005, 2012, and 2017a; Bleich 1979a; 1980; 1987; 1988; 1993; 2002; 2006b; 2013a; 2015b. See also, 
Bleich and Jacobson 2015. 
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axiological dimensions of Bleich’s bioethical writings on ART, it is necessary and 
helpful to delineate in brief Bleich’s theology, his philosophy and methodology of 
halakhah and ethics, and relevant interactions of religion and science in his thought.  
 
Interpretive Authority and Limited Judicial Discretion 
 As an Orthodox Jewish thinker and halakhist, Bleich affirms his belief in the 
divinity of the written and oral Torah, both of which he professes were revealed to Moses 
by God at Sinai. Bleich predicates any authentic, accurate, and authoritative 
understanding of Jewish law upon Judaism’s foundational, theological doctrines, of 
which Sinaitic revelation is primary (Bleich 2015b, 124-5).22 In his writings, Bleich 
adumbrates a sophisticated theology of revelation giving non-literalist depth to more 
seemingly simple, doctrinal assertions, such as: “Even that which a conscientious student 
will one day teach in the presence of his master was already revealed to Moses at Sinai” 
(Palestinian Talmud, Pe’ah 2:4). He writes:  
All of Halakhah is inherent in the original revelation at Mt. Sinai. Some portions 
of the Halakhah were fully formulated; others remain latent, awaiting 
investigation and analysis. Often it is the need of the hour, a specific query or 
problem which serves as the impetus to discover what has been inherent in the 
Halakhah from the moment of its inception. The result is not a change or a new 
construct. It is a priori in the sense that it was always present in Torah; it is 
synthetic only in the sense that it requires a stimulus to prompt the investigation 
which serves to reveal that which had already been available to the human mind at 
any time in any age. (1980, 31) 
 
                                                 
22 Bleich (Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 15) upholds the rabbinic belief that “legal revelation is a once in an 
eternity phenomenon” with no possibility of a “second, superseding revelation.” On the centrality of belief 
and religious doctrine in Judaism per Bleich, see Bleich 1993; 2013a 1-31. 
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Bleich presents a Kantian notion of a synthetic a priori to model halakhic development. 
He writes:  
The proposition ‘7 plus 5 equals 12’ is not usually regarded as an empirical 
generalization. It is a proposition whose truth transcends human experience. Yet, 
bereft of a physical universe containing objects grouped in sets, the proposition ‘7 
plus 5 equals 12’ would never present itself to the human mind. The experience of 
separately counting the members of two distinct sets, then recombining both sets 
and finally counting the members of the resultant new set triggers the intellect and 
serves as an empirical stimulus for the contemplation of what is essentially an a 
priori truth. (1980, 30-1) 
 
Yet, as a master of the Jewish literary tradition, Bleich is astutely aware of the great 
diversity of textual interpretation and legal opinion, often mutually exclusive and 
conflicting, within the corpus of rabbinic literature, commentary, and law. Bleich asserts 
the belief that God deliberately composed the divinely dictated text of the Torah, i.e., the 
Pentateuch, to be “ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations” (Bleich and 
Jacobson 2015, 8-9). God desires human partnership as part of the divine vision for 
creation, and more specifically, God desires the participation and partnership of Torah 
scholars in the study, interpretation, and application of Torah to life’s circumstances, 
including novel situations. Once given, the Torah is no longer in heaven (Deuteronomy 
20:12; TB Shabbat 59b), but delivered to the stewardship of Torah sages (Bleich 1977, 
xiv). Torah study is thus a religious obligation and spiritual discipline of extraordinary 
responsibility and power. Per Bleich (1983, xvi): “Since, ‘Even that which a 
conscientious student will one day teach in the presence of his master was already told to 
Moses at Sinai’ (Palestinian Talmud, Pe’ah 2:4) the Torah is, in a fundamental sense, 
incomplete until that novellum has been formulated.”  
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 For Bleich, the absolute truth of Judaism is thus refracted in the diversity of 
authentic interpretations and halakhic opinions. In the words of the Talmud (TB ‘Eruvin 
13b): “These and those are the words of the living God.” In the words of Bleich (Bleich 
and Jacobson 2015, 8-9): “The conclusions reached by the inquiring mind of a qualified 
scholar are, in a fundamental sense, infallible.” Yet, despite this positive theological 
valuation of conflicting opinions, the poskim of the Jewish community need to follow 
rules of judicial procedure and decision making to adjudicate between competing 
interpretations and legal positions in order to arrive at normative praxes (Bleich and 
Jacobson 2015, 12). Each posek must arrive at a normative conclusion by rigorous 
analysis, conceptual creativity, due consideration of competing views, and sensitivity to 
circumstance (Bleich 1977 xvi-ii; Resnicoff 2015, 8). 
 
Legal Positivism and Anti-Contextualism 
 The discovery – or rediscovery – of new Torah insights, and the formulation of 
laws and regulations, says Bleich, should not, however, be misconstrued as change: “The 
divine nature of Torah renders it immutable and hence not subject to amendment or 
modification” (1983, xiv).23 In a polemical essay against the “positive-historical” 
approach to Jewish law associated with the Conservative Jewish movement (see pp. 54-5 
above), Bleich writes (1980, 31): “Let it be stated unequivocally: Jewish law does not 
change – the ‘brilliant and dedicated research’ of the scholars of the historical school 
                                                 
23 See also Bleich 1980, 36. 
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notwithstanding.” Bleich does not deny the force of historical circumstances or their 
influence. In his recent “Reflections”, Bleich observed: 
Society articulates its desires very forcefully. Jews are quite impressionable with 
the result that Jewish mores strongly approximate those of the dominant society. 
Jews of today in disproportionate numbers desire gender parity, personal 
autonomy, relaxation of impediments to marriage, and religiously unimpeded 
access to technological advances even on Shabbat. (Bleich 2015b, 126)  
 
He denies, however, that a rabbi of stalwart faith, reverence, “fear of heaven,” and 
mastery of the rabbinic tradition, is similarly influenced:  
…But vox populi is not vox Dei. Neither public desire nor even public need 
necessarily reflect the divine plan for regulation of the human condition … 
halakhic decision-making is an exercise in applying eternal verities to the case at 
hand. The result lies in whatever direction halakhic reasoning dictates. Policy 
decisions and the like dare not be permitted to intrude. That is not to imply that in 
the decision-making process the halakhic decisor is oblivious to either personal or 
societal needs and aspirations, whether spiritual or mundane. Ultimately such 
concerns may influence the stance commended to the observant community. At 
times, such a stance is described as da’at Torah or Torah wisdom. Da’at Torah is 
simply Jewishly informed policy and care should always be taken not to equate 
such policy formulations with halakhic mandates. (ibid., 126) 
 
Bleich decries rabbis and religious leaders, whom he identifies as students 
inadequately trained in halakhic methodology, who seize “upon stray precedents, 
crude analogies, or sheer sophistry,” to yield contemporary halakhic decisions 
motivated by a preconceived, societally influenced conclusion (ibid., 126-7). 
Subjectivity, “volitional inclinations,” and the proactive appeal to meta-halakhic 
ethical values make for a “travesty of the halakhic process.” Conclusions must be 
“reached in as detached and dispassionate a manner as is humanly possible” (1977, 
xv). Bleich asserts (ibid.): “The dialectic of halakhic reasoning has always been 
conducted in the spirit of ‘yikov ha-din et ha-har – let the law bore through the 
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mountain. The law must be determined on its own merit and let the chips fall where 
they may.” Bleich’s philosophy of halakhah embraces context only in so far as it 
defines casuistic circumstances. Halakhic method and process themselves are 
formalistic and positivistic.  
 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt 
 Although one of the roles of a posek is to follow judicial protocol and rules 
of decision making to provide clear, definite answers to halakhic queries, there may 
at times be impediments to legal certainty. The circumstantial knowledge of the 
case may be tentative and inconclusive. Alternatively, the circumstantial knowledge 
may be sufficiently trusted to be accepted pro tanto, however, several halakhists 
offer conflicting legal determinations, undermining trust in the affirmation of one 
approach/answer above others.24 This is especially true when the question at hand 
impacts upon people other than the questioner, especially when it extends to the 
whole of the Jewish community, or even to society at large, such as in 
determinations of identity. Sometimes avoidance of doubt is accomplished by 
relying on a definitive conclusion of a trusted posek. For Bleich, and many other 
halakhists, however, more often avoidance of doubt in halakhic practice is achieved 
by meeting the terms of multiple legal determinations, even if they are mutually 
exclusive, either by fulfillment of the terms of each view of an affirmative duty, i.e., 
                                                 
24 In halakhic terminology, circumstantial doubt is called “safek bemetziyut,” while legal doubt is called 
“safek badin.” 
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positive commandment, or by avoiding transgression of the terms of each view of a 
prohibition, i.e., negative commandment. Depending on the circumstances, and 
after a reasoned assessment of the cost/benefit of stringency versus leniency, in a 
case for which some poskim prohibit and others permit, in order to avoid halakhic 
doubt, it may be preferable to abstain in deference to those who prohibit, rather than 
rely on those who permit. Bleich asserts that, generally, ideal religious practice 
requires avoiding halakhic uncertainty. In his words (2017a, 9-10): “The most 
fundamental expression of ‘Zeh Keli ve-anvehu – This is my God and I will 
beautify Him’ (Exodus 15:2) is scrupulous avoidance of halakhic doubt in 
performance of mitzvot.” 
 
Halakhah and Ethics 
 For Bleich, Jewish law encapsulates Jewish ethical values. As part of the 
oral Torah tradition, Jewish ethics is “not only objective, rather than subjective, but 
is accurately speaking, merely a sub-category of Halakhah” (1985, 58).25 While 
Bleich is open to the notion of natural morality, i.e., moral principles can be 
apprehended by reason alone, and cites rabbinic texts supporting such a notion, 
Bleich rejects natural law as part of Jewish legal theory (1981a; 2013a, 85-124).26 
                                                 
25 In a later version of “Is there an Ethic Beyond Halakhah?,” Bleich (2013a, 135) supports this contention 
with Rabbi Ovadia Bartenura’s comment on the opening teaching of Mishnah Avot, colloquially known as 
Ethics of our Fathers (ad loc., M. Avot 1:1): “’Moses received the Torah from Sinai…’ indicating that the 
ethical qualities and moral maxims which are [contained] in this tractate were not the fancies of the Sages 
of the Mishnah, but that even they were revealed at Sinai.” 
26 Bleich (2013a, 112-3) limits a theory of natural law in Jewish thought to the idea that reason alone can 
and should lead one to accept the authority of and commit to the observance of divine commandments. If 
reason compels belief in God either through an a priori awareness or demonstrable rational argument, then 
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Similarly, autonomous ethical reasoning, i.e., natural morality, adds little to Jewish 
law. Bleich explains: 
This is reflected in the fear expressed in some rabbinic circles concerning 
concentration upon “ethical” obligations as distinct from normative Halakhah. 
The “disdain” of the ethical is born of two considerations. The dictum, “Would 
that they would forsake Me but observe My Torah (Palestinian Talmud, Haggigah 
1:7) means nothing other than “Would that they were concerned with normative 
law rather than with ethical conduct.” Reflected in this concern is the fear that 
undue concentration upon an attempt to capture the essence of the divine and 
attendant obligations which transcend normative law may degenerate into 
antinomianism. The second concern is that ethical reflection can, after all, add but 
little to what may be discovered by an examination of normative law…. (2013a, 
140) 
 
Jewish legal determinations usually break down into three categories: obligatory, 
permitted, and proscribed. Ethical systems likewise seek to identify, evaluate, and assign 
actions to five possible categories of ethical valuation: the morally required, 
commendable, neutral, odious, or proscribed (2000, xv-vi). In Jewish law, since not 
everything permitted must be done, it is indeed possible to ask whether that which is 
permitted in a particular context is commendable, neutral, or odious. Often conflicting 
ethical values underlie this judgment. Thus, Jewish ethics rooted in Jewish law and 
tradition best help direct such judgments. As opposed to other ethical systems which may 
be relativist or intuitionist, Bleich depicts Judaism as “religionist,” focusing ethical 
decision-making as a category of Jewish-legal determination (ibid.). Bleich points out 
that Jewish law itself, as a self-contained system, entails supererogatory mandates to go 
between the lines of the law and beyond its letters (2013a).27 Additionally, the Torah 
                                                 
“reasons demands both that man make an effort to discover God’s will as expressed in revelation to man 
and that man obey the revealed will of God.”  
27 Bleich (2013a, 128-31) cites eight categories of talmudic supererogation.  
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itself (Deuteronomy 28:9) commands: “ve-halakhta biderakhav - you shall walk in His 
ways.” The mitzvah of imitatio Dei, however, is not precisely formulated in the canons of 
Jewish law. The Talmud (TB Sota 14a; TB Shabbat 113b) charges a person both to 
emulate God’s noble characteristics as well as emulate God’s manifest actions as 
depicted in the Bible and highlighted by the rabbis. However, Bleich (2013a, 141) 
recognizes that the content of Jewish ethics cannot always: “be captured in precise, 
unequivocal formulae. This is so, at least in part, because it is so highly relative and 
because it is both commensurate with, as well as derivable from, an individual’s 
metaphysical comprehension of the nature of the Deity.” It is for this reason, Bleich 
(ibid.) says that “to the extent that it (i.e., Jewish ethics) is recorded it is recorded in the 
Aggadah rather than in the Halakhah.” Thus, per Bleich (ibid.): “God’s essence can be 
discovered not from the study of ethics, but from the pages of the Talmud.” And yet, 
while Bleich understands the ethically shaping role that the study of aggadah plays in the 
development of the ethical intuition of the halakhist, aggadah itself cannot be utilized as a 
legal argument per the canons of halakhic decision-making (1997b, 113-14).  
 
Halakhah as Science and Art 
 Bleich’s denial of subjectivity and innovation in halakhic process leads him to 
compare halakhah to science. He writes in the introduction to his fourth volume of 
Contemporary Halakhic Problems: 
This much is certain: There is nothing in these volumes – or in others of this genre 
– that is innovative in the true sense of that term, just as there is nothing 
innovative in a treatise on physics. Both disciplines have as their subject matter a 
closed, immutable system of law – physical in the case of the latter, regulative in 
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the case of the former. To be sure, the theoretical physicist may propose a 
previously unexpounded thesis in an attempt to explain the operation of the laws 
of nature; so also may a rosh yeshivah develop conceptual novella in the course of 
an endeavor to explicate the meaning of the revealed law. In physics, a newly 
developed hypothesis may have a predictive value with regard to empirical 
phenomena; likewise, Talmudic novella may yield heretofore unarticulated 
halakhic propositions. But both in physics and in Halakhah the outgrowth is likely 
to be marginal to each of the systems viewed in its entirety. In each case the thesis 
must be tested against the totality of the system. Generally, contradiction by other 
aspects of the system is tantamount to demonstration of an inherent fallacy in the 
thesis. 
Halakhah is a science in the sense that, in its pristine form, there is no 
room for subjectivity. That is not to say that there is no room for disagreement. 
Disagreement abounds in the natural sciences no less so than in Halakhah. But, in 
picking and choosing between contradictory and conflicting theses, the scientist 
acts on the basis of the canons of his discipline as understood by his quite fallible 
intellect, not on the basis of subjective predilections. The halakhic decisor faces 
the same constrains (1995a, xii-iii).28  
 
Bleich (2015b, 122) also appeals to ideas originating in the philosophy of science to 
typify what he sees as the science-like methodology of halakhah, what he “somewhat 
tongue in cheek” dubs “halakhic positivism”: “Judaism sees the entire universe through 
the prism of Halakhah. Every human act is subject to halakhic scrutiny in one way or 
another and often in multiple ways. An act or phenomenon that is not circumscribed by 
Halakhah is, to the halakhic positivist, devoid of meaning” – just as a proposition that 
cannot be verified or disproved, for the logical positivists, is devoid of meaning.29 Bleich 
(ibid., 123) disclaims that he intends to take this notion of halakhic positivism too 
                                                 
28 Bleich 2005, xi; reprinted in 2006b; also compares halakhah to science.  
29 See also Bleich 2013a, 137. Bleich (2005, xxvii) discusses modes of verification in halakhic positivism. 
After introducing a “Hakirah” – that is, a conceptual dialectic through which a Jewish law is analyzed, 
Bleich writes: “The conceptual difference between the two formulations is clear, but is there any halakhic 
difference that flows therefrom? [The thrust of such a question I would term “halakhic positivism,” i.e., the 
ultimate meaning of a hakirah is its verification in a concrete nafka minah (i.e., practical difference), just as 
logical positivism insists that the meaning of a proposition is its mode of verification.]” It is important to 
note that Bleich’s use of “positivism” here stems from the philosophy of science, and not the philosophy of 
law, which sees law as empirically rooted in social institutions, and not theoretically founded upon divine 
command, rational abstractions, or nature, see L. Green 2009. 
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literally, and yet, at the same time, judges the import of non-halakhic disciplines and 
genres, like Jewish philosophy, by their relevance to making halakhic concepts 
understandable.  
Although Bleich compares halakhah to science, in great measure to deny 
subjectivity and historical contingency as legitimate factors in its development and 
adjudication, Bleich also recognizes that halakhic methodology resembles an art.30 
Analytic conceptualization relies on creativity and imagination, and despite formal rules 
of decision making, halakhic process requires artfulness in evaluating relevant facts, 
precedents, arguments, and other circumstantial variables affecting the case at hand. 
Bleich (1995a xiv-v) believes that such artistic talent is “partially innate and partially 
acquired.” One can train a student in the scientific methodology of halakhah by 
modelling conceptual thinking, demanding mastery of source material, and teaching the 
rules of halakhic process and decision making. However, ultimately, the art of halakhah 
depends on the skill of a particular halakhist: “The decisor must have a keen 
understanding of the underlying principles and postulates of Halakhah as well as of their 
applicable ramifications and must be capable of applying them with fidelity to matters 
placed before him. No amount of book learning can compensate for inadequacy in what 
may be termed the ‘artistic’ component” (ibid.). Similarly, since Bleich (2013a, 141) does 
believe that “there is an ethic beyond the recorded Halakhah … it is precisely for this 
reason that Halakhah is an art rather than a science.” 
                                                 
30 Bleich compares halakhah to both science and art in Bleich 1995a, xii-iv; 2005, xi-iii; 2006b, 87-9; and 
2015b. See also Resnicoff 2015, 14-5. 
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 Bleich also invokes the philosophy of science when he seemingly considers the 
epistemology and moral axiology of halakhah in light of what has been called theoretic 
holism, often associated with the thinking of Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000). 
Holism recognizes the interconnectivity of all parts of a whole, and posits that the 
meaning of individual parts can only be constructed in reference to the whole, including 
its other constituent parts.  Bleich writes: 
In order to appreciate the nature of Jewish law, it is necessary to recognize that it 
constitutes a self-contained system. It is founded upon a complex set of axiological 
premises, or grundnorms, that serve as the matrix of its internal coherence. A 
philosopher of science understands full well that the entire complement of the laws 
of nature as posited by science cannot be tested simultaneously. Any given 
hypothesis can be confirmed or disconfirmed only by assuming, at least for the 
purposes of that investigation, the constancy of all other axioms comprising the 
corpus of scientific knowledge.…Much the same is true of the nature of halakhic 
discussion and dialectic. (Bleich and Jacobson 2015, vii)  
 
Similarly, Bleich (1995a, xix) opines that in halakhah, “…no value is discrete and no 
teaching stands alone. All individual values are part of a system of values and all 
particular teachings are part of an all-inclusive corpus.”31 
 Bleich’s appeal to both logical positivism and Quineian holism raises questions of 
epistemological coherence. Bleich argues against a conceptualization of halakhic 
innovation by advancing a theory of “halakhic positivism,” in which any new halakhic 
statements or propositions should be understood as a synthetic a priori, as explained 
above. His embrace of Quineian holism, however, seemingly undermines this 
conceptualization. Pierre Duhem in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1954) 
                                                 
31 Bleich 2017a, 7, further locates Jewish mores and values in “mesorah” – that is, a mimetic-tradition, 
“encapsulated in familial, social and cultural experience.” For an analysis of the concept of a mimetic-
tradition, see Soloveitchik 1994. 
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advances the underdetermination thesis, positing that theory is always underdetermined 
by fact for two primary reasons. First, the non-separability thesis asserts that empirical 
statements are interconnected, and thus, they cannot be singly disconfirmed. Second, the 
non-falsifiability thesis argues that in the face of disconfirmation, a particular statement 
can be upheld as true by simply adjusting another interconnected statement. Willard van 
Orman Quine in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1998), extends Pierre Duhem’s (1954) 
underdetermination thesis from science as applicable to all knowledge. Quine argues that 
semantic holism dissolves the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic a priori 
propositions.32  
In the philosophy of science, Quineian holism has been construed as an attack on 
the objectivity of science. Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996) 
appeals to holism and to examples from the history of science to describe scientific 
method as paradigm dependent, and thoroughly subjective.33 Historians of science 
likewise support the subjectivism of scientific method and theory through “historical 
studies of science as if it was produced by people with bodies, situated in time, space, 
culture, and society, and struggling for credibility and authority” (Shapin 2010). 
Historical context helps contribute to the disciplinary matrix through which science, and 
arguably halakhah, develop and by which puzzles and problems are solved.  At the same 
                                                 
32 Cf. Putnam 1975 (Orig. pub. 1960), who argues that despite Quine’s cogent arguments, a small class of 
analytic statements can be salvaged, a notion Shirley 1973 disputes. However, even per Putnam, Bleich’s 
analogy fails. For more on the analytic/synthetic distinction, see Rey 2016. For more on semantic holism, 
see Jackman 2017. For the impact of theoretic holism on observation, see Bogen 2014. 
33 Kuhn 1998, in “Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice,” refines his paradigm theory to soften 
its subjectivity by pointing to the rationality of science. Competing theories share epistemic values, in 
addition to the non-rational factors impinging upon scientific method within a paradigm. Cf. Laudan 1984. 
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time, the success of science, its generation of reliable knowledge, predictive powers, and 
technological innovations exhibit cumulative progress unparalleled by any other 
culturally created human institution, thereby tempering, even if not negating, strong 
claims of paradigm-dependent scientific subjectivity (Laudan 1984; Wootton 2015).34 
 Although Bleich denies a role to subjectivity and historical contingency in 
halakhic methodology and process, he does implicitly admit their presence through his 
subtle qualification of halakhic objectivity. For example, Bleich (1977, xv) writes that 
halakhic conclusions must be reached “in as detached and dispassionate a manner as is 
humanly possible” (emphasis mine). In a recent article on “The Nature and Structure of 
Jewish Law,” Bleich (Bleich and Jacobson, 2015, 17) recognizes extra-halakhic 
subjectivity, yet is confident that qualified halakhic scholar can rise above such 
influences: “Their charge is to navigate new waters with utmost fidelity to received 
instructions and to resolve novel issues on the basis of ancient sources. In doing so they 
have always been keenly aware that they must strive to sublimate subjective predilections 
in endeavoring to uncover the mysteries of divine reason.” Bleich’s epistemological and 
axiological assertion that halakhah is a self-contained system limits the influence of 
contemporary science to clarifying the circumstances of a halakhic query and the 
application of its halakhic determination. He writes: 
The halakhic enterprise, of necessity, proceeds without reference or openness to, 
much less acceptance or rejection of, modernity. Modernity is irrelevant to the 
formulation of halakhic determinations. Torah is timeless and eternal. Modern 
insights may help us to understand and appreciate both principles and minutiae of 
Halakhah in ways heretofore unknown, but they do not at all effect particular 
determinations of Halakhah … Modernity has also given rise to social as well as 
                                                 
34 See Curd and Cover 1998, 83-253. 
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technological phenomena unknown in days gone by. Those problems and those 
phenomena must be appreciated by a halakhic decisor functioning in the modern 
age, but his decisions are made within a transcendental framework in which the 
term “modernity” has no cognitive meaning. (1995a, xvii-iii) 
 
In recent “reflections,” Bleich (2015b, 134) describes how advances in the 
biological sciences and medical technology have: “resulted in the emergence of a new 
academic discipline – bioethics – an interdisciplinary investigation involving specialists 
in the diverse fields of philosophy, theology, medicine, law, and science, devoted to 
endeavoring to formulate answers to the questions that are now being raised.” However, 
for Bleich, Jewish bioethics is synonymous with medical halakhah: 
Jewish medical practitioners and patients committed to a Jewish lifestyle must 
perforce look both to Halakhah for a determination of normative rules and to 
Jewish tradition for the values against which any contemplated procedure must be 
examined. … the challenge lies in teasing out the halakhic issues, uncovering 
relevant sources and precedents, and reaching normative determinations through 
the application of halakhic dialectic … Bioethics is but a particular and 
specialized facet of Halakhah.” (ibid., 135; italics mine)35  
 
An analysis of the epistemological and axiological dimensions of Bleich’s 
bioethical writings on ART supports his commitment to framing Jewish bioethics as a 
subset of a self-enclosed halakhic system, yet also shows in what ways changing 
scientific understanding and technological capability, and their secular legal and 
bioethical consideration, impact upon Bleich’s own Jewish bioethical analysis beyond 
simply defining circumstances. In his formulations of halakhic process and conceptual 
analysis, Bleich invokes comparisons to western legal philosophy and method (Bleich 
2005, xv ff.; 2006b; 2015, 126). The very Quineian holism that Bleich embraces 
                                                 
35 Although Bleich denies secular bioethics an influential role in Jewish bioethics, he avers that secular 
bioethics look to religious traditions, including Judaism, for moral coherence (Bleich 2015b, 135).  
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regarding the concept of a self-enclosed halakhah also supports the notion that Bleich’s 
formulations and thinking on halakhic method and other matters of interest would be 
different absent his active knowledge of western philosophy and comparative law.36  
The imprint of such knowledge on his above-described formulation of Jewish theology, 
and his philosophy and methodology of halakhah, itself demonstrates the shaping 
influence of an expanded epistemology and broadly informed moral axiology.  
 
Table 5.1. Summary of Epistemological and Axiological Findings for Affirmed Intellectual 
Orientation 
 
Rabbi J. David Bleich’s Philosophy and Methodology of Halakhah and Jewish Bioethics 
Philosophy of Halakhah Legal Positivism. 
Historical Contextualism Anti-Contextualism.  
Theory of Change Circumstances change; Halakhic fundamentals do 
not. 
Scientific Epistemology Hard science is epistemically special and 
moderately privileged. 
Jewish Moral Axiology Internally self-sufficient.  
 
Medical Halakhah and Jewish 
Bioethics 
Jewish Bioethics is Medical Halakhah. 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt Strongly avoid doubt. 
 
 
                                                 
36 Westreich 2017 argues that the very interaction of civil law and Jewish law regarding family law matters 
in Israel has substantively changed both. 
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Rabbi J. David Bleich on IVF/ET and Parenthood 
 Shortly after the first IVF baby was conceived and born in 1977, Bleich (1978) 
discussed “Test-Tube Babies” in his quarterly “Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical 
Literature.”37 After reviewing the basic science, he declares his stated goal: “We shall 
here endeavor to delineate the specific questions involved and to show how those 
questions may be resolved in light of earlier precedents in Jewish law” (Bleich 1978, 86-
7; 1981a, 86).38 Per Bleich, the artificiality of the ART is not a halakhic concern per se. 
Judaism, unlike the Catholic Church, does not adopt a position of reproductive naturalism 
and natural law: “In the absence of a specific prohibition, man is free to utilize scientific 
knowledge to overcome impediments of nature” (Bleich 1978, 87).39 Drawing off the 
contemporary bioethical discussion, Bleich presents the first question as the “moral 
legitimacy of research involving fetal experimentation” (ibid., 87). At this early stage of 
IVF in the late 1970s, there was great concern regarding the short and long term health 
impacts upon the resultant child. Bleich cites Protestant bioethicist Paul Ramsey of 
Princeton University who regarded IVF/ET as an “immoral experiment” given the 
unknown potential harms to the child.40 Bleich asserts that this position is consistent with 
the “norms of Torah ethics” (ibid.). His adduced prooftext is a talmudic prescription (TB 
                                                 
37 This was reprinted with minor additions and changes in Jewish Bioethics (Bleich 1979c), one of the first 
collections of articles on Jewish bioethics by an array of scholars of the emerging field, as well as in 
Judaism and Healing: Halakhic Perspectives (Bleich 1981a), a compendium of short articles by Bleich on 
Jewish medical ethics.  
38 Bleich demonstrates that in researching this topic he consulted both popular and professional discussions 
of the science and medicine. For example, Bleich 1981a, 91n5 laments: “Regrettably, detailed descriptions 
of the techniques employed in in vitro fertilization have not appeared in scientific journals.” 
39 For the Catholic Church’s position on reproductive naturalism, see above pp. 157n48, 172n9. 
40 See Ramsey 1975. 
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Yevamot 64b) that a man should not wed a woman from a family with a history of 
seizures, presumably epilepsy, or of leprosy, in order to avoid producing children who 
will suffer from these maladies. Bleich avers (ibid., 88): “It follows, a fortiori, that overt 
intervention in natural processes which might cause defects in the fetus would be viewed 
with opprobrium by Judaism.” Further, Bleich cites Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Iggrot 
Moshe, Even Ha’ezer 3:12) who rules that women have no marital contract to bear 
children outside of normal, sexual intercourse, and are not obligated in the mitzvah of 
procreation, therefore even if halakhically permissible and morally unobjectionable, 
submitting to IVF would certainly not be required of an infertile Jewish woman, 
especially since pregnancy and childbirth entail pain and health risks (ibid., 88).41 Bleich 
(ibid., 90), however, concludes on a hopeful note that IVF may prove healthy and 
beneficial in time, thus allowing infertile couples to achieve “the happiness and 
fulfillment of parenthood”.42  
 In 1986, at a conference of the Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco on “Ethical 
Problems Raised by the New Techniques in Human Reproduction,” Bleich (1998a, 204) 
began his remarks with the statement: “Jewish scholars have not welcomed artificial 
                                                 
41 More precisely, Feinstein rules that couples who engage in normal sexual relations with the intent of 
conceiving fulfill the biblical commandment of reproduction, regardless of whether the woman actually 
conceives, see above, Chapter Four, p. 137. See also Bleich 1995b, 53-6; 1998a, 147-8. Regarding 
discretionary IVF/ET, Bleich (1978, 86) cites the then Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Shlomo 
Goren, as judging IVF “morally repugnant, although halakhically unobjectionable.” He also cites the then 
Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, who gave IVF “qualified approval.” 
42 Bleich (1981a, 88) asserts that “Jewish ethics knows of no Miranda principle which would bar the use 
after the fact of information obtained by illicit means.” Thus, even if, in line with Ramsey, Jewish ethics 
would not sanction discretionary IVF until proven safe in terms of both short and long term health 
outcomes, the morally unconscionable standing of early IVF human experimentation would not proscribe 
later benefit from the results of said experimentation. See Bleich1979e. 
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forms of procreation with a great deal of enthusiasm.”43 Despite the fact that Judaism is 
pro-family and pronatalist, and that Jewish law does not object to overcoming natural 
obstacles through artificial means, artificial procreation does not fulfill the divine 
commandment of reproduction, which, per Bleich, requires a natural sexual act. Jewish 
meaningfulness is defined as the fulfillment of the divine will as articulated through the 
mitzvot. Nonetheless, “as a religion of law, the basic principle is that if a specific act or 
course of action is not proscribed as a contravention of a divine prohibition, or 
condemned as a violation of the spirit of the law, then, by definition, the action is 
permitted” (Bleich 1998a, 204). However, Bleich (ibid., 208-13) finds three categories of 
direct and ancillary problematics that create an overall negative ethical assessment of 
artificial procreation: violation of marital bonds when donor sperm is utilized;44 
prohibited destruction of unused embryos; and the duty to avoid unknown and unseen 
potential harms, once again citing Paul Ramsey’s views on fetal experimentation, as well 
as adding concerns for other health risks, psychological impacts, and demographic 
influences. 
 
 
                                                 
43 It should be noted that in recent “Reflections,” Bleich (2015b, 136) emphasizes that the findings of 
Jewish bioethical investigations “can and should be presented differentially to disparate audiences … My 
essays in bioethics are not all of the same genre precisely because each is designed for one or another 
readership.” At the same time, Bleich republished his remarks in Morocco in Jewish Bioethical Dilemmas: 
A Jewish Perspective (1998a) along with essays targeting Torah-learned, observant Jewish audiences, and 
thus all his writings arguably should be taken as reflective of his thinking along its stages of development.  
44 Bleich 1998a, 215nn11-2 respectively lists those halakhic authorities who view AID and IVF-D as 
adultery and those who do not. However, Bleich (208-9) opines that even those poskim who do not believe 
adultery is transgressed absent a sexual act “would agree” that donor semen “infringes upon the spirit of the 
law and hence, de minimis, is to be regarded as a form of quasi-adultery or prostitution.” 
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IVF/ET and Maternity (Non-Surrogacy) 
While Bleich does not directly address the question of maternal identity in his 1978 
article, it is implied that the woman who bears an IVF/ET child is unquestionably the 
halakhic mother. This conclusion also directly follows from earlier halakhic and Jewish 
bioethical discussions of artificial insemination for which the birth mother is assumed to 
be the legal mother (Bleich 1981a, 80-4). In a later article, Bleich (1991) cites the opinion 
of Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (1990, vol. 15, no. 45) who in 1980 suggested that an IVF 
child has neither a halakhic mother nor father. Waldenberg presents three arguments for 
his position: one, in vitro conception is an unnatural process that relies on the 
“intermediacy of a third power”; two, non-sexual reproduction inherently separates 
conception from genealogy; and three, the removal of the ovum prior to conception 
likewise severs a woman’s maternal genealogical connection to her own gametes, even if 
the same woman subsequently gestates and bears the child. Bleich (1991, 82-3) judges 
Waldenberg’s arguments, “which are not based upon precedent or analogy to other 
halakhic provisions,” as appearing “to be without substance.” Bleich disputes the idea 
that a Petri dish constitutes a “third power” since neither the container nor its culture 
medium directly effects fertilization.45 Arguments two and three are deemed by Bleich as 
unsupported, conclusory contentions. No evidence is brought to connect genealogy solely 
                                                 
45 Bleich 1991, 96n6, recognizes that culture mediums affect cellular metabolism, but nonetheless supports 
his objection to considering a Petri dish a “third power” through a more sophisticated scientific 
understanding and attendant legal analysis. 
201 
 
 
with natural conception, while contrary to Waldenberg, there is rabbinic-textual evidence 
that parturition itself determines maternity.46 
 
IVF/ET and Paternity with Husband-and-Donor sperm 
While in his early essay on “Test-Tube Babies,” Bleich (1978) doesn’t directly 
address maternal identity, Bleich does explicitly address the question of paternal identity 
and leaves the matter unresolved. He asks:  
Does a filial relationship exist between the father and a child born in this manner? 
Does the child enjoy the status of the father as a kohen or levite? Is the child 
considered to be an heir to his father’s estate? These questions have been 
analyzed with regard to children born of artificial insemination and such 
discussions appear to be equally germane to the case of children born as a result 
of in vitro fertilization. In any event, the resolution of these questions has no 
bearing upon the permissibility of in vitro fertilization. (ibid., 89) 
 
Although Bleich does not answer these questions, he unequivocally proscribes IVF with 
donor sperm: “Such procedures can, of course, be sanctioned only if the sperm of the 
husband is used exclusively. Under no circumstances should the sperm of any person 
other than the husband be utilized” (Bleich 1978, 89; 1981a, 89).47 This position also 
follows from earlier halakhic and Jewish ethical assessments of AID. Bleich reports that 
even “those authorities who do not regard A.I.D. as adultery nevertheless view it as a 
repugnant violation of the martial relationship which entitles the husband to divorce his 
wife without being obliged to satisfy the financial obligation specified in the marriage 
contract” (Bleich 1981a, 81-2). 
                                                 
46 Bleich 1991, 96, also cites and dismisses the opinion of Rabbi Judah Gershuni (d. 2000) (1979; 1980, 
361-7), who similar to Waldenberg, argues that an IVF child has neither halakhic mother nor father.  
47 Bleich 1981a, 89, asserts that safeguards to avoid the inadvertent mix-up of gametes must be established 
for IVF procedures. 
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 In a later article, Bleich (1991, 83) clarifies that “there is a significant 
disagreement among rabbinic authorities with regard to whether a paternal relationship 
may occur as a result of artificial insemination or whether such a relationship can arise 
only as the result of a sexual act.” In a footnote to this sentence, Bleich credits Sefer 
Mitzvot Katan of Rabbi Isaac of Corbeil, who ascribes fatherhood to the man whose 
ejaculated semen on a bedsheet impregnates a woman, as the primary source for 
identifying the sperm donor as the halakhic father (see Chapter Four, pp. 155-6). Bleich 
proceeds to cite fifteen halakhic authorities who rule accordingly, as well as five 
authorities who oppose, and one who remains in doubt (Bleich 1991, 96n8).48 It is 
precisely because of the likely designation of the sperm donor as the halakhic father that 
                                                 
48 Per Bleich 1991, 96n8 (chronological and minor citational expansions have been added and minor errors 
corrected): 
1. The views supporting paternal identification for sperm donor: Isaac of Corbeil (d. 1280), Hagahot 
Semak, referenced by Judah Rosanes (d.1727), Mishneh leMelekh, Hilkot Ishut 15:4; Joel Sirkes 
(d. 1640), Bach, Yoreh De'ah 195; and Samuel Phoebus (d. 1706) Bet Shmuel, Even Ha‘ezer 1:10. 
Other support includes: Moses Lima (d.1670), Chelkat Mechokek, Even Ha’ezer 1:6; Simeon ben 
Zemach Duran (d. 1444), Teshuvot Tashbatz, 3:263; Aryeh Leib ben Asher Gunzberg (d. 1785) 
Turei ‘Even, Chaggigah 15a; Jonathan Eybeschutz (d. 1764), Benei Ahuvah, Hilkhot Ishut 15; 
Jacob Ettlinger (d. 1871), Arukh laNer, Yevamot 10a; Mishneh leMelekh, Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah 
17:13; Jacob Emden (d. 1776) She'ilat Ya'avetz, 2:97; Moses Schick (d. 1879), Maharam Shik ‘al 
Taryag Mizvot, no. 1; Malkiel Zvi Tannenbaum (d. 1910), Teshuvot Divrei Malkiel, 2:107; 
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (d. 1995), No'am, I (5718/1958), 145-166, especially 155; Israel Zev 
Mintzberg (d. 1962), No'am, I, 129; Joshua Baumol (d. 1948), Teshuvot ‘Emek Halakhah, 1:68; 
Avigdor Nebenzahl (b. 1935), Assia, V (5746), 92-93; and Ovadiah Yosef (d. 2013), quoted by 
Moshe Drori (b. 1949), Tehumin, I (5740), 287, and Abraham S. Abraham (b. 1935), Nishmat 
Avraham, Even Ha’ezer 1:5, sec. 3. Broyde (1988, 120n23) adds: Ovadiah Yosef, Yabi’a Omer 
1:6; Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (d. 1966), Seredei Eish 3:5; Moshe Feinstein (d. 1986), Igrot 
Moshe, Even Ha’ezer 1:10; Menashe Klein (d. 2011), Mishneh Halakhot 4:160; Eliezer 
Waldenberg (d. 2006), Tzitz Eliezer 27:3; Yoel Teitelbaum (d. 1979), Divrei Yoel 2:110;  
2. Views who do not identify sperm donor as father: David HaLevi Segal (d. 1667) Taz, Even 
Ha’ezer 1:8; Chaim Yosef David Azulai (d. 1806), Birkei Yosef, Even Ha’ezer 1:14; Ovadiah 
Hedaya (d. 1969), No'am, I, 130-137; Moshe Aryeh Leib Shapiro (d. 1972), No'am, I, 138-142; 
and Ben Zion Uziel (d. 1953), Mishpetei Uzi'el, Even Ha’ezer, no 19, reprinted in Piskei Uzi'el 
(Jerusalem, 5737), pp. 282-283. However, Broyde 1988, 120n23 notes that Taz (ibid.) may not 
dispute ascribing paternity to the sperm donor, but rather does not believe a child born as a result 
of a “bed-sheet conception” fulfills the commandment of procreation.  
3. Leaves the matter unsettled and in doubt: Mordechai Yaakov Breisch (d. 1976), Teshuvot Chelkat 
Ya'akov, 1:24.  
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Bleich strongly argues against and proscribes both AID and IVF with semen donated by a 
man other than the husband. In order to avoid future consanguineous marriages, among 
other halakhic concerns and ramifications, a person needs to know who are his or her 
natural parents. AID and IVF-D introduce lineage confusion and thus are to be avoided 
(Bleich 1978; Bleich 1991, 82, 89). 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Dimensions: Bleich on IVF/ET and Parenthood  
 Several observations can be made regarding the epistemological and axiological 
dimensions of Bleich’s early writings on IVF (and AI). First, Bleich aspires to thoroughly 
familiarize himself with the medical and scientific background of the topic under 
consideration, thereby enabling greater sophistication and nuance of analysis. He 
demonstrates that he seeks scientific understanding and information in both popular and 
professional scientific resources. Although there is indication that twentieth-century 
American, European, and Israeli poskim also sought understanding of the medical 
context, there is no comparable representation in their writings that they thoroughly 
educated themselves through researching scientific literature. Scientific competency and 
literacy is a distinguishing factor between medical-halakhic literature and Jewish 
bioethical writings.  
 Second, Bleich also shows familiarity with non-Jewish religious ethics and 
secular bioethical literature. For example, he contrasts the Catholic church’s insistence on 
reproductive naturalism with Judaism’s theoretical embrace of artificial interventions. 
Additionally, his dispositive citation of Paul Ramsey’s bioethical views on fetal-
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experimental therapies demonstrates the influence of general bioethics on the 
development of his own thinking.49 Minimally, familiarity with the concerns considered 
by secular and non-Jewish religious bioethics helps Bleich better “issue-spot” as part of 
his own process of Jewish bioethical analysis.50 Maximally, such familiarity will directly 
influence Bleich’s own thinking, as it may have upon reading Paul Ramsey. Further, this 
cross-fertilization, as it were, of acute scientific understanding, general bioethical 
awareness, and informed Jewish-legal analysis represents a synergistic modality of 
religion and science dialogue. 
 Third, Bleich displays axiological conservatism in tune with the conservatism of 
halakhic authorities whose writings he studies and cites. Although Bleich understands 
Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah as being synonymous in a fundamental sense, he 
does at times use the differentiated language more common to Jewish ethics rather than 
the more common conclusory binary of permitted/recommended or prohibited/not 
recommended of codifactory halakhah. For example, he speaks of the halakhically 
permissible and morally problematic and odious. While his axiological conservatism at 
times limits the progressive application of scientific knowledge and technological 
capability, he displays openness to their utilization when halakhically permissible and 
morally unproblematic.  
                                                 
49 Bleich’s aforementioned talmudic prooftext counselling the consideration of family health history when 
choosing a spouse in and of itself would unlikely lead to Bleich’s judgment of IVF as unethical fetal 
experimentation.  
50 Bleich 2005, xv, identifies “issue-spotting,” a term borrowed from law school education meaning the 
ability to identify with precision legal problematics in a case study, as a necessary skill for a halakhist.  
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 Finally, maternal and paternal designations in cases of IVF/ET display minor 
complexity. The identification of parenthood remains the monist standard of a unique 
father and mother, with little thought applied to the causal basis of said standard. Bleich 
and the halakhists he studies consider the possibility that the new assisted reproductive 
technologies may complicate parental identifications, possibly – though rejected by 
Bleich – even denying a child halakhic parents and denying parents an unambiguous 
genealogical connection to their biological child.51 However, regarding IVF/ET, even the 
failure to meet a monist standard of natural parenthood does not introduce a pluralist 
standard, which comes into Bleich’s consideration of gestational surrogacy.52  
 
 
Table 5.2. Summary of Attitudes Toward ART and Definitions and Account of Parenthood 
 
Rabbi J. David Bleich’s Jewish Bioethical Views on Parenthood and Procreation Through AI/IVF  
Attitude Toward AI and IVF AIH and IVF-H: Negative Attitude. Tentatively 
forbidding. 
AID and IVF-D: Prohibiting. 
Definition of Maternity  Monist Causal Account of maternity. 
Account of Paternity and its Definition Monist Causal Account of paternity. 
Paternity is always sperm donor. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 In Bleich’s (1991, 96n8) aforementioned list of halakhic authorities’ positions on paternal identification 
in a context of AI and IVF, he references, but does not discuss, Rabbi Moshe Aryeh Leib Shapiro (1958, 
138-142) who in a case of AI with husband’s sperm credits the technician/physician who injects the sperm 
as child’s halakhic father. Per Shapiro, the injector causally transgresses the prohibition of adultery by 
injecting sperm into the vaginal tract of a woman married to another man.  
52 In 1972, Bleich addressed the question of maternal identity in a case of ET after natural conception, 
before IVF/ET with a surrogate became a live issue. In that earlier context, he did indeed begin to consider 
a pluralist standard of maternity that would become more pertinent with the advancement of IVF/ET. See 
Bleich 1972. 
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Rabbi Michael J. Broyde’s Epistemological and Axiological Orientation 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde’s prolific writings present a profile of a legally oriented 
scholar deeply interested in the relationship of law, religion, and society, especially as 
they intersect in both Jewish law and United States law, often in comparison to one 
another.53 Broyde has often simultaneously served as a professor of law at Emory 
University, congregational rabbi in Atlanta, and rabbinical court justice in New York 
City, perhaps explaining his particular interest and expertise in comparative and Jewish 
family law.54 His scholarship also has entailed Jewish-legal explorations into and 
expositions upon the interactions of science, technology, and society, including numerous 
publications on the new assisted reproductive technologies. Broyde writes for both 
professional and popular, secular-academic and Jewish journals, and like Bleich, has 
made accessible to a broad readership the technical and arcane discussions of Jewish law 
on issues of contemporary relevance and resonance. Broyde consistently utilizes his 
analyses and presentations of discrete topics to teach more generally about Halakhic 
methodology and Jewish legal process. Broyde’s writings demonstrate that he is self-
reflective about his philosophy and methodology of Jewish law and ethics, and that over 
time, his views on these topics have developed. His writings show a growing awareness 
of how epistemology and moral axiology – knowledge and ways of knowing, ethics and 
values – impinge on the development of Jewish law, especially in light of sociological 
                                                 
53 See Broyde 2017a. 
54 Rabbinical courts today in America primarily focus on matters of family law and personal identity 
through the administration of Jewish religious divorces and conversion processes. They also serve as 
arbitration panels in monetary disputes, as well as provide other religious administrative services, often in 
partnership with the Israeli Rabbinate, see Broyde 2017b. Congregational rabbis, likewise, often deal with 
family law matters and issues of personal status.  
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and technological changes. In order to assess the epistemological and axiological 
dimensions of Broyde’s bioethical writings on ART, we first more generally consider 
Broyde’s philosophy and methodology of halakhah and ethics, especially with regard to 
scientific and technological advancement.  
 
Interpretive License and Judicial Discretion 
As an Orthodox Jewish scholar, Broyde’s fundamental theological commitments 
are similar to those of Bleich, with whom Broyde himself studied to become an ordained 
rabbinical judge.55 Although, unlike Bleich, Broyde does not often write on classical 
Jewish philosophical and theological topics, Broyde affirms in his writings the divine 
nature of the Sinaitic revelation of the written and oral Torah, as well as other normative 
theological doctrines of Jewish Orthodoxy.56 Broyde, however, does diverge from Bleich 
regarding the notions of innovation and change within Jewish law. Whereas Bleich 
fundamentally and consistently denies the idea of change and innovation in Jewish law, 
as Broyde’s own thinking on the philosophy and methodology of halakhah matured, he 
came to embrace and explicate change and innovation in the development of Jewish law. 
For example, writing in 1988 on, “The Establishment of Maternity and Paternity in 
Jewish and American Law,” Broyde states in his conclusion: “Jewish law is objective and 
unchangeable” (Broyde 1988, 118), by which he seemingly means that the principles of 
                                                 
55 Broyde received “Yadin Yadin” ordination at the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary in its 
postgraduate institute for the study of talmudic jurisprudence and family law, which is headed by Bleich, 
see Broyde 2005d, 299; 2016; 2017a; Bleich 2017b. 
56 For example, see Broyde 2010, 133: “Though Torah is God-given, halacha is neither static nor stagnant; 
rather, it demands human involvement…” 
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Jewish law remain unchanging, even if their circumstantial application results in variety 
or novelty. Broyde states this explicitly in a 2000 article on, “Halachic Responses to 
Sociological and Technological Change”: 
Although halacha appears to change, insofar as the answer provided to an 
identical question might be different in different generations or locations, it is 
actually the same principles now being applied to new circumstances. … it is vital 
to conceptually distinguish between changes in the principles used by halacha and 
differences in results provided by halacha to questions based on novel social and 
technological situations. (Broyde and Wagner 2000, 95-98)57 
 
However, in 2010, Broyde published a monograph on, “Innovation in Jewish 
Law: A Case Study of Chiddush [i.e., novel interpretation] in Havineinu [i.e., a short 
form of the ‘Amidah, the principal daily Jewish prayer],” in which he presents a more 
nuanced theory of innovation and change in the evolution of Jewish law.58 In this work, 
Broyde continues to uphold the idea that apparent changes in Jewish law born of 
sociological shifts and technological advances are not to be confused with fundamental 
changes, but, rather, are to be understood as novel applications of ancient principles in 
radically new circumstances (Broyde 2010, 4, 134). At the same time, Broyde propounds 
a robust theory of halakhic change and innovation through “chiddush” – that is, novel 
talmudic commentary and legal interpretation.59 Broyde opens his book’s “Preface” by 
acknowledging and rejecting different popular views on change in halakhah: 
                                                 
57 See also Broyde and Jachter 1993, 89: “Advances in technology require halacha to apply previously 
developed principles to new settings.” 
58 Explaining the reasons for choosing the Havineinu prayer as the case study through which to explore 
change and innovation in Jewish law, Broyde (2010, 6) writes: “It is an area far removed from ideological 
controversy, which given the potentially charged nature of any discussion about the process of change in 
Jewish law, should decrease the intensity of the heat and debate and increase the clarity of the light.” 
59 The word “chiddush,” referring to interpretive creativity, is a well-known term in the cultural lexicon of 
the Beit Midrash – i.e., the Jewish study hall, as well as a yiddishism refering to a discovery, innovation, or 
novelty. See Weiser 1995, 14, s.v. “chi-dush.” For another exposition of the role of chiddush in Jewish 
scholarship, see Lamm 2002, “The Future of Creativity in Jewish Law and Thought,” 3-16. 
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One of the most controversial discussions raging in both the academic and 
popular discourses about Jewish law, halacha, addresses the question of how 
Jewish law undergoes change, if in fact, it does. A survey of the various opinions 
seems to portray few options as normative. One belief is that Jewish law does not 
change. An opinion on the other end of the spectrum is that the rabbis can change 
Jewish law in well-nigh any way they wish. A third school of thought emphasizes 
Rabbinically enacted decrees and ordinances (takkanot and gezeirot) as modern 
tools of change and development within Jewish law. 
In fact, while all of these approaches contain elements of truth, both as a 
matter of theory and as a matter of practice, none of them provides any sort of 
true image of how substantive Jewish law actually functions. Jewish law has been 
neither rigid throughout the ages, nor malleable to every desired outcome; Post-
Talmudic Rabbinically-enacted decrees and ordinances have played only a minor 
role in amending Jewish law in the last millennium. In fact, the primary 
mechanism that causes change in Jewish law is not accurately described by any 
one of these approaches. (Broyde 2010, 1) 
 
Broyde contends that there are two ways that a fixed-legal system can change: legislation 
and legal interpretation. In United States law, for example, only twenty-seven 
amendments have met the high procedural and legal threshold to alter the Constitution. 
However, there has been abundant constitutional change through legal interpretation and 
judicial rulings (ibid., 2). While post-talmudic legislation is limited by the halakhic 
system to the above-mentioned, rabbinically enacted communal decrees and ordinances, 
such instances have been few and far between. At the same time, Jewish legal 
interpretation has throughout the evolution of Jewish law introduced moderate, gradual 
change, and, on rare occasion, more radical transformations. Broyde explains: 
The Sages of the Talmud, and their modern day heirs, are charged with the duty to 
study, infer, and apply halacha, answering questions of Jewish law for its 
adherents in every generation. Without explicitly invoking change, each scholar 
and each generation has an inclination to accept the validity of particular types of 
arguments or particular sources. Thus, normative halacha changes continuously 
through the process of study and analysis. Sometimes this change is through the 
decision of an authority that one approach – previously thought incorrect – is in 
fact correct; sometimes it is through the reinterpretation of sources motivated by 
the search for truth; sometimes it is because economic pressures force the re-
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evaluation of the sources; and sometimes Jewish law responds to a new reality, as 
technology, society and social conditions, or scientific knowledge change. (ibid., 
2-3) 
 
Per Broyde, it is precisely the interpretive license and judicial discretion responsibly 
applied by the halakhist that drives the engine of innovation, change, and the evolution of 
the halakhic system. 
 
Evolutionary Halakhah and Modest Contextualism 
 Broyde identifies three contexts and causes that facilitate halakhic change through 
the process of legal interpretive innovation: abstract study, technological change, and 
social and economic changes. Like Bleich before him, Broyde too points to the 
ambiguities inherent in Torah texts, the plurality of inconclusive opinions engendered by 
their disambiguation, and the need to conceptually analyze talmudic and halakhic texts, 
their commentaries, and the case law of the responsa literature to arrive at adjudicating 
halakhic rationales and principles. Although the Torah is of divine origin, once revealed 
to the Jewish people, it requires human partnership through study, interpretation, and 
application to bring it to its teleological fulfillment (ibid., 133). Unlike Bleich, however, 
Broyde explicitly recognizes this process as innovative and evolutionary:  
Clearly, interpretation is inherent within halacha; it is a necessary and natural 
process, not a conscious, unbounded act of modification. ... Ultimately, the 
difficulties within the text … lead to [innovative] interpretation and adaptation … 
Jewish law’s evolution – the incremental change in practice that anyone who has 
studied halacha clearly sees – is a result of incremental innovation caused by the 
interplay of changing realities. (ibid., 136, 140, 149-50) 
 
Like Bleich, Broyde relies upon the religious, ethical, and professional integrity of the 
halakhist to interpret as part of a “faithful search for truth,” respecting the original intent 
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of rabbinic texts, and burdened by both accountability to the received tradition and the 
normative responsibility to respond to present individual and/or communal questions and 
needs (ibid., 135-6,140-1). 
 As mentioned above, in his monograph on innovation in Jewish law, Broyde 
(ibid., 4, 134) is careful to say that halakhic responses to technological advances and 
socio-economic shifts do not represent fundamental changes to halakhah, but merely are 
examples of poskim plying unchanging halakhic principles to novel circumstances. 
Broyde has indeed penned articles demonstrating this qualification. For example, in an 
article on, “Shaving on the Intermediate Days of the Festivals,” Broyde (1996b) notes 
that technological advances, social changes, and economic pressures coalesced 
encouraging halakhists to find legal license for shaving at a time, i.e., the intermediate 
days of a festival, traditionally rabbinically proscribed. The invention of electrical 
shavers allowed for a halakhically permissible way to remove facial hair due to technical, 
hair-splitting distinction between the forbidden shave of a straight-razor and the 
permissible hair-cutting action of an electrical shaver.60 Changing cultural norms in 
America led to the socialization of being clean shaven among religiously observant Jews. 
Additionally, work-place expectations to appear kempt and clean shaven added economic 
pressures to shave daily. All three led to a reanalysis of the original rabbinic decree that 
                                                 
60 Shaving with a straight-razor is halakhically proscribed by Leviticus 19:27: “You shall not round off the 
side-growth on your head, or destroy the side-growth of your beard,” and Leviticus 21:5: “They shall not 
shave smooth any part of their heads, or shave the side-growth of their beards, or make gashes in their 
flesh. Midrash Sifra, Kedoshim 6, and TB Makkot 21a reconcile the apparent redundancy of these two 
verses by positing that the second verse narrows the interpretation of the first verse, i.e., only destroying by 
shaving is proscribed. However, other forms of destruction, like cutting with a scissors, are excluded from 
the prohibition. Many electrical shavers are deemed to work by scissor-cutting action. 
212 
 
 
prohibited shaving on the intermediate days of a festival. In such a case, Broyde argues, 
the halakhic principles didn’t change, just their reassessed application. 
Similarly, Broyde (Broyde and Wagner 2000) explores the activities of showering 
and smoking on festival days, for which showering was traditionally prohibited and 
smoking permitted due to the idea that most people did not regularly bathe in past eras, 
while most people considered smoking salubrious and indulged in it as part of their 
festive enjoyment. Sociological change driven by advances in household plumbing 
technology and new understandings of the dangers of smoking have reversed common 
practice, thus, arguably creating, per Broyde, contemporary permission for showering and 
a new prohibition for smoking on festivals. Broyde claims that these are not truly 
examples of fundamental halakhic change since the permitting halakhic principle of 
“shaveh lechol nefesh – of benefit to all” has remained intact, only the circumstances of 
its application in the cases of showering and smoking have reversed. 
Broyde also argues thus in a series of articles on halakhic assessments of 
electricity and electrical technologies as they pertain to the laws of the Jewish Sabbath. 
Here too the essential question is how to apply the unchanging halakhic principles of 
Shabbat to new circumstances born of novel technologies (Broyde 1992, 1993a; Broyde 
and Jachter 1991, 1993, 1995). Similarly, the advent of printing and the proliferation of 
prayer books, along with safer environments, changed the need for short form prayers 
(Broyde 2010). Thus, technological, social, and economic factors generate circumstantial, 
but not fundamental, change and innovation. 
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 This caveat, however, is somewhat in tension with Broyde’s strong theory of 
interpretive innovation in which he does recognize bona fide halakhic changes. Broyde 
argues that, “a variety of factors, both internal and external to halachic texts, drive 
intellectual innovation” (Broyde 2010, 133). Study leads to interpretation, which relies on 
conceptual innovation, introducing new applications, adaptations, and novel 
understandings of and approaches to the law. Since Torah study is an ongoing religious 
duty demanded of Jewish scholar and layman alike, the entire halakhic system is set up 
for ongoing development. 
Broyde teases out the internal and external factors driving interpretive innovation. 
External factors include the aforementioned technological, social, and economic 
conditions. Broyde recognizes that, “taking the rules found in one technological setting 
and applying them to another setting is always very difficult. Such action is subject to 
disagreement about which [legal] analogies are apt and which analysis is accurate” (ibid., 
4). Similarly, Broyde highlights the influence of acculturation: “As Jews move through 
different lands, questions arise about the application of halachic rules to new 
surroundings and varied cultures. The cultural diversity and wider economic 
opportunities encountered by the Jewish community certainly have increased in light of 
emancipation” (ibid., 4). However, the modern era not only brought Jews political 
emancipation and social acculturation, but also intellectual enlightenment, i.e. access and 
exposure to modern modes of thinking and the accumulating knowledge of western 
thought.61 In the idiom of this dissertation, technology and sociology affect not only 
                                                 
61 See Katz 1971, 1973.  
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circumstances, but also epistemology. For example, in an article on, “Electrically 
Produced Fire or Light in Positive Commandments,” Broyde (Broyde and Jachter 1993, 
89) writes: “Advances in technology require halacha to apply previously developed 
principles to new settings. Frequently, in the process of drawing distinctions based on 
advances in technology, it is necessary to distinguish between terms that the classical 
texts did not explicitly separate.” Thus, the advent of different kinds of electrical lights, 
i.e., incandescent, halogen, LED, etc. …, compelled halakhists to factor out the 
halakhically significant qualities of fire, light, and heat to better ascertain how to 
conceptually categorize and apply Jewish law to these new technologies. These 
distinctions would have not come to mind when the sole source of visible radiance is fire.  
Technology and scientific understanding thus change not only circumstances, but expand 
and transform halakhic conceptualization. The imprint of scientific understanding on 
halakhic conceptualization will be shown below more strikingly in an epistemological 
and axiological consideration of Broyde’s own halakhic analysis of AI and IVF/ET. 
Additionally, as applied to Bleich as well, Broyde’s training and experience in secular 
legal thinking and analysis, and philosophy of law, are arguably themselves contributing 
factors to an epistemology that capacitates Broyde to conceive of and articulate his 
philosophy of halakhah and his theory of interpretive innovation. 
 Broyde (2010, 133-50) also analyzes the internal factors propelling interpretive 
innovation. He identifies the main ones as: one, the abstraction of case law and the 
extrapolation of its underlying legal concepts and principles toward novel applications; 
two, internal textual and legal ambiguity and inconclusive rulings; and three, textual and 
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legal contradictions. The case law of classical rabbinic texts and Jewish responsa 
literature is voluminous. In order to build off of extent case law, and apply its 
foundational legal concepts and principles to novel circumstances, sensitive analysis is 
required to separate out casuistic contingency and generalizable conceptualization. 
Halakhists often emerge from this process with different accounts, thus growing the legal 
corpus through innovative interpretation (ibid., 135-6; 139-140). Also, talmudic and legal 
texts, and their commentaries, will often contain ambiguous phraseology and unclear 
passages. Sometimes, there will be a continuity of terminology, but with variances in 
precise meaning. Generations of commentators will attempt to disambiguate such texts, 
further expanding the rabbinic-legal corpus. Additionally, more often than not, the 
Talmud serves as a repository of Jewish legal opinion, usually without resolving the 
plurality of interpretive approaches and legal positions. Here too commentators and 
codifiers stake positions, growing the body of halakhic commentary and rulings. 
Ambiguities within the writings of these commentators likewise fuel supra-commentary 
and further development (ibid., 136-7). Finally, any large collection of ancient texts, 
generations of commentary, and extensive codificatory and case law is likely to be filled 
with apparently contradictory material. There are two primary methods of resolving 
contradictions: one, harmonizing texts and/or laws by differentiating between them or by 
minimizing and resolving their conflicts; two, by choosing one over the other through 
decisive judicial ruling. Halakhists will often differentially employ both methods, leading 
to more nuanced, complex legal understandings (ibid., 134, 140-44).  
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 In sum, Broyde proposes a theory of evolutionary halakhic development and 
modest contextualism by which the natural process of textual interpretation grows the 
Jewish legal corpus, and advancing technologies, changing sociologies, and economic 
pressures induce creative applications of Jewish law to novel circumstances. Throughout, 
chiddush – Jewish legal innovative interpretation expands and develops the halakhic 
system and allows it to govern Jewish life in all its variety in constantly changing 
circumstances. The question remains, however, as to the epistemological and axiological 
influences of advances in scientific understanding, technological capability, and socio-
economic shifts on the evolution of halakhah within this theoretical framework. 
 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt 
 Broyde, like Bleich, aspires to halakhic certainty and the avoidance of 
judicial doubt. However, Broyde’s writings often convey an easier embrace of that 
which is novel and previously unknown, especially with regard to ART. In an 
article on, “Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law,” Broyde 
concludes: 
There is a natural tendency to prohibit that which is unknown, and that tendency 
is itself a morally commendable virtue lest one engage in activity that is 
prohibited because its consequences are not understood. However, permanently 
prohibiting that which one does not understand is a regrettable state of affairs. The 
Jewish tradition imposes a duty on those capable of resolving such matters to do 
so. (Broyde 2005d, 316)62 
 
                                                 
62 See also Broyde 1999a, 21. 
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This statement was shared, not in regard to more normative forms of ART, like AI 
and IVF/ET, but in regard to cloning. Similarly, in an article on, “Genetically 
Engineering People,” Broyde (2001a, 899) stakes out a position in favor of 
therapeutic genetic engineering as a legitimate expansion of the halakhic duty to 
heal.63 In the realm of ritual law, Broyde argues that there is a halakhic preference 
to perpetuate traditional observance in the face of opportunities for innovation and 
change born by technological advances. However, if technological advancements 
provide demonstrable human benefit and spiritual enhancement, there is license to 
embrace the new (Broyde and Jachter 1993, 124-6). Presumably, Broyde’s comfort 
with innovation, at least partially, stems from his evolutionary model of halakhah 
and modest contextualism, as well as his moral axiology. 
 
Halakhah and Ethics 
 While Broyde has written extensively on the philosophy and methodology of 
halakhah, he has not yet published a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship of 
halakhah and ethics. However, he does often refer to ethics in his legal writings. For 
example, at the beginning of “Modern Reproductive Technologies and Jewish Law,” 
Broyde writes: 
Jewish law insists that new technologies – and new reproductive technologies in 
particular – are neither definitionally prohibited nor definitionally permissible in 
the eyes of Jewish law, but rather are subject to a case-by-case analysis. Indeed, 
every legal, religious, or ethical system has to insist that advances in technologies 
                                                 
63 See also Broyde 2004, 56-58. Like Bleich, Broyde contrasts the procreative naturalism of Catholic 
Church doctrine with Jewish theologically mandated, human interventionism. 
 
218 
 
 
be evaluated against the touchstones of its moral systems. In the Jewish tradition, 
that touchstone is halakhah, the corpus of Jewish law and ethics. (Broyde 2005d, 
295) 
 
Like Bleich, Broyde locates the halakhic system as the source of Jewish ethics. However, 
Broyde’s evolutionary model of halakhah and modest contextualism also subject 
legitimate halakhic positions to independent ethical scrutiny. For example, in his essay, 
“Jewish Law and the Abandonment of Marriage: Diverse Models of Sexuality and 
Reproduction in the Jewish View, and the Return to Monogamy in the Modern Era,” 
which is part of a collection of articles that he co-edited on, Marriage, Sex, and Family in 
Judaism, Broyde (2005b) reviews permissible halakhic alternatives to marriage and 
models of sexuality and reproduction, such as concubinage and polygamy. In explaining 
why halakhic Judaism in the modern era ultimately legitimated monogamy as its sole 
model for companionship, sexuality, and reproduction, Broyde writes:  
The Jewish community voted with its feet by adopting a model of practice that 
validated monogamy with mutual consent or fault-based exit rights, and that 
functionally prohibits all forms of sexual activity outside the confines of 
monogamous marriage. … The life of law is experience, and the Jewish 
experience has concluded that monogamy with mutual consent or fault-based exit 
rights works. Jewish law did not reach (and still has not really reached) that 
conclusion. Jewish life did. (Broyde 2005b, 106)  
 
Whether the moral axiology at play here is deontological, virtuous, consequentialist, or 
pragmatic is left unsaid. However, what is clear here is that halakhah is not axiologically 
self-sufficient, but that experiential and theoretical knowledge, including Jewish meta-
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ethics, as well as social factors, impinge on axiological commitments and their real life 
consequences.64  
In the idiom of the philosophy of halakhah and ethics, there does exist an ethic 
independent of halakhah, and its valid applicability is recognized. However, Broyde, akin 
to Bleich (1985, 1987, 2013a) and Lichtenstein (1975) before him, would likely locate 
that axiological allowance within the larger halakhic system itself. In an article on, 
“Happiness – and Unhappiness – as Legally Significant Categories in Jewish Law,” 
Broyde explains that throughout the development of Jewish law, poskim contented with 
cases for which textual analysis and logical reasoning were insufficient to decision 
making. Second-order rules of decision making were thereby innovated and established, 
many of them guided by a halakhic axiology of meta-ethics and juridical values. Broyde 
observes: 
There are more than fifty such rules, and there is a great deal of interplay among 
them … Jewish law invokes principles that are neither deeply analytic nor probing 
of the truly correct opinion; rather, it uses social principles of community, such as 
the needs of the community, the fear of dire financial loss, or conduct permitted 
for the sake of the ill. Sometimes, one of the second-tier rules invoked is the 
promotion of happiness (or even unhappiness). (Broyde 2014, 49)65 
 
 Personal happiness as an ethical and legal-regulative value certainly pertains to 
issues of Family Law, as well as to the bioethics concerning ART, given the existential 
                                                 
64 Perhaps, it is Broyde’s appreciation of the social complexity of Jewish law and ethics that leads Broyde 
to often defend popular practices among the observant laity against more stringent demands born of 
narrow, legal interpretations and rulings. For example, in a monograph on the halakhah pertaining to 
married Jewish women covering their hair, Broyde (2009, 177) upholds the position espoused by many 
medieval talmudic commentaries, “that the prohibition for married women to go with uncovered hair is a 
subjective rabbinic violation dependent on societal norms of modesty (and dat yehudit), not a biblical 
prohibition (and dat moshe).” 
65 See also Broyde and Bedzow 2014, 3-4. 
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unhappiness often experienced by couples struggling with infertility.66 As one of the 
second-order, adjudicative values considered in bioethical analyses and halakhic 
decision-making, it arguably would incline the bioethicist and halakhist toward greater 
openness to the utilization of new technologies that enhance psychological contentment. 
In his editorial preface to Marriage, Sex, and Family in Judaism, whose collected 
essays “present a complex portrait of the Jewish family and the alternatives to it, both in 
historical and contemporary sense,” Broyde (Broyde and Ausubel 2005, ix) writes: 
“Considered as a totality, the chapters in this volume indicate that the way it is does not 
need to be the way it always will be or the way it always was.” The openness of this 
halakhic and ethical orientation toward family structures certainly is applicable to some 
of the social impacts created by ART. At the same time, lest one think that Broyde’s 
evolutionary halakhah and modest contextualism lend themselves to laissez-faire 
halakhic development, Broyde (2001b, xiii), ends the forward to his treatise, Marriage 
Divorce, and the Abandoned Wife in Jewish Law: A Conceptual Understanding of the 
Agunah Problems in America, with “a final, and intensely personal note … I think the 
secular community has undergone a vast and systemic decline in interpersonal sexual and 
marital ethics, particularly in the area of family structures and marital integrity. Rome has 
fallen. We must make sure that Jerusalem does not fall, too.” Broyde thus acknowledges 
both the impact of broader society on contemporary Jewish values and the role of one’s 
axiology, i.e., the intensely personal, on one’s halakhic analyses and moral judgments. 
 
                                                 
66 “Shalom Bayit,” a peaceful home life, is a related ethical and legal-regulative value. See Genesis Rabbah 
65:2 which teaches the value of domestic tranquility from Sarah and Abraham’s struggle with infertility. 
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Table 5.3. Summary of Epistemological and Axiological Findings for Affirmed Intellectual 
Orientation 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde’s Philosophy and Methodology of Halakhah and Jewish Bioethics 
Philosophy of Halakhah Formalist. 
Historical Contextualism Moderate Contextualism. 
Theory of Change Evolutionary halakhah through innovative interpretation. 
Scientific Epistemology Hard and soft sciences are epistemically special and 
moderately privileged. 
Jewish Moral Axiology Primarily self-sufficient but recognizes social context and 
external influences. 
Medical Halakhah and Jewish 
Bioethics 
Jewish Bioethics is Medical Halakhah. 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt Mitigate doubt through ruling. 
 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde on IVF/ET and Parenthood 
 Unlike Bleich, there is no indication that Broyde’s initial views on IVF/ET were 
cautiously negative. Broyde does not seemingly share the same ethical, medical, and 
religious concerns of Bleich’s early analysis. Part of this may be due to Broyde’s arriving 
at a consideration of AI and IVF/ET ten year later than Bleich when AI and IVF/ET were 
well established.67 Some of the early medical concerns and health risk factors had been 
significantly reduced by then, and social acceptance had been broadening. Part of 
Broyde’s general positivity is arguably due to Broyde’s own developing philosophy of 
evolutionary halakhah. Focusing less on the question of whether the new assisted 
                                                 
67 Bleich’s first publication on “Host-Mothers” and fetal transfer was published in 1974; on “Test-Tube 
Babies” in 1978. Broyde’s first publication on ART appeared in 1988. 
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reproductive and genetic technologies aid in the fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation 
per se, Broyde identifies them within the halakhic category of medical interventions, thus 
concluding one article on IVF with PGD:  
The combination of in vitro fertilization with PGD is a less than an ideal way to 
have children, as all assisted reproduction removes fertilization from loving 
sexuality, which is the Biblical ideal. Nonetheless Jewish tradition favors healing 
people from their illnesses even in situations where to effectuate a cure, deviation 
from the ideal is needed. Human life is sacred, and the eradication of an illness a 
mitsva. It is a brave and very new world in the medical sciences, and we await our 
opportunity to fix the world – by curing illness, inventing vaccines, and otherwise 
changing nature to make it more amenable to human life. [IVF with] PGD could 
be such. (Broyde 2004, 67-8) 
 
Licensing a medical interventional therapy and ART to alleviate the disease of infertility, 
however, leaves unresolved matters of religious law, family law, parental identification, 
and other bioethical considerations and halakhic consequences. Broyde’s legally oriented 
bioethical writing and his bioethically oriented legal writings contend with these as well. 
 
IVF/ET and Maternity (Non-Surrogacy) 
 In 1988, ten years after the birth of Louise Brown, the first “test-tube” baby, 
Broyde (1988) published an article (technically, a legal “Note”) on, “The Establishment 
of Maternity and Paternity in Jewish and American Law.” Beginning with the baseline of 
natural parenthood, Broyde explains that halakhah identifies a mother as “a women [who] 
provides the ovum and carries the child to term” (ibid., 133). Although the complicating 
case of surrogacy, to be discussed in the next chapter, introduced the halakhic question of 
whether maternal identification is fixed at conception or at birth, the essentialist 
definition of maternity as the ovum contributor and birth mother suffices for IVF/ET. In 
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Broyde’s words: “If conception occurs in a test tube, Jewish law focuses on birth as 
establishing motherhood” (ibid., 147). Broyde does not deal with the aforementioned 
solitary positions of Waldenberg (1990, vol. 15, no. 45) and Gershuni (1979; 1980, 361-
7) who deny an IVF/ET baby both a halakhic mother and father.68  
 
IVF/ET and Paternity with Husband and Donor sperm 
 Whereas Broyde’s discussion of maternity in a non-surrogacy case of IVF/ET is 
simple and straightforward, he presents a robust and nuanced discussion concerning the 
establishment of paternity in both homologous and heterologous AI and IVF/ET. Writing 
in 1988, Broyde (1988, 119) comments that, “currently, the only well-developed dispute 
in Jewish law concerning the establishment of paternity arises in the case of artificial 
insemination – however, the principles enunciated there solve almost all other ‘hard’ 
cases,” including IVF/ET. Broyde presents four opinions of revered twentieth-century 
poskim as to the ascription of halakhic paternity when conception occurs ex vivo, outside 
(something) alive. First, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who permits heterologous AI (and IVF), 
identifies the sperm donor as the halakhic father. In Broyde’s words: “the paternity of the 
child is established by the genetic relationship between the child and the father” (ibid.). 
Second, Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum, like Feinstein, acknowledges, “that the genetic 
relationship is of legal significance and the paternity is established solely through the 
genetic relationship” (ibid.). In vehement debate with Feinstein, however, Teitelbaum 
considers heterologous AI (and IVF) adultery, endowing any resultant child with the 
                                                 
68 See above pp. 200-1 and 200n45, 201n46 (in “Bleich: IVF/ET and Maternity (Non-Surrogacy)”). 
224 
 
 
stigma of halakhic bastardy.69 Third, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, concurs that 
heterologous AI transgresses adultery, though not through “the genetic mixing of sperm,” 
akin to Teitelbaum, but through the biblically unlawful and rabbinically proscribed 
immodest injection of non-husband sperm into a married woman’s vaginal tract (ibid., 
120). Broyde does not contend with Waldenberg’s denial of paternity to the sperm donor 
in both homologous and heterologous IVF. Fourth, Rabbi Mordechai Yaakov Breisch 
prohibits heterologous AI as a policy decision dictated by a negative moral judgment, and 
not due to an act of adultery.  
 In analyzing all four positions in 1988, and assessing their commonalities and 
dissimilarities in their halakhic methodologies, analyses, and rulings, Broyde develops a 
tripartite analytic rubric. He writes: 
This Note uses three terms to refer to the theoretically different types of parent: 
(a) Custodial Parent: This is the person who is currently functioning in loco 
parentis. 
(b) Genetic Parent: This is the person whose genetic material is used to initiate 
life. Currently there must be two genetic parents. 
(c) Biological Parent: This is the person with whom the procreative activity that 
led to the starting of life occurred. This last category currently typically 
overlaps with the genetic parent. It need not. In the case of ovarian or 
testicular transplant,70 they would not. In the case of artificial insemination 
there is no biological father. (Broyde 1988, 123n45) 
 
Broyde’s conceptual analysis utilizing this rubric leads him to the following summation: 
 
Jewish law maintains that paternity is established irrevocably as belonging to the 
natural parent. In the typical case in which the same person is both the genetic and 
biological father, Jewish law mandates that such a person is the legal father. In the 
case of artificial insemination, where there is no biological father but only a 
                                                 
69 Feinstein, Teitelbaum, Waldenberg, and Breisch’s views were presented more fully above, in Chapter 
Four, 155 ff.  
70 Spermatogenesis begins with precursor stem cells within testicular tissue, thus heterologous testicular 
transplants, like heterologous ovarian transplants, produce gametes with the genotype of the donor. For the 
history and current state of testicular transplantation, see Donati-Bourne, et al. 2015. 
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genetic father, almost all decisors maintain that Jewish law defaults to the 
principle of genetics to establish paternity. Furthermore, most of the 
commentators hold that in the absence of any intercourse there can be no 
illegitimacy. A significant minority of the commentators disagree and maintain 
that illegitimacy can be established through genetic relationships, absent 
intercourse. (Broyde 1988, 131) 
 
While in 1998 Broyde limits this analysis to AI, later, he explicitly applies his 
conclusions to IVF/ET as well: “One who donates sperm is the father – whether he 
wishes to be or not – as that is how fathers are defined” (Broyde 1999a, 4).71 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Dimensions: Broyde on IVF/ET and Parenthood 
Broyde, like Bleich, consistently demonstrates concerted research to understand 
the science and technology underlying his legally oriented bioethical inquiries and his 
bioethically oriented, comparative-legal analyses.72 Although Broyde, like Bleich, asserts 
that scientific, technological, and social changes alter circumstances and do not 
fundamentally change halakhah, Broyde’s theory of halakhic evolution through 
interpretive innovation challenges that conclusion. Not only does Broyde’s, like Bleich’s, 
greater scientific awareness and understanding influence the development of medical 
halakhah and Jewish bioethics by demanding greater sophistication and nuance of 
analysis, it also incurs epistemological changes that impinge upon the evolutionary 
development of halakhah in its abstract study, the primary arena that Broyde explicitly 
recognizes as driving intellectual innovation and halakhic change. 
                                                 
71 Note that Broyde 1999, 24n13, refers the reader back to Broyde 1988, 118-23, in his footnote to this 
quotation, thus indicating that even in 1988 he meant to apply this to IVF/ET. 
72 This holds true for all his writings. To cite one example, writing on IVF with PGD, and stem cells, 
Broyde (2004, 54-6) begins with a brief, yet thorough review of the science. His footnotes (ibid., 70-1nn1-
5) demonstrate his research of relevant popular and professional scientific literature. 
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Consider, for example, Broyde’s tripartite analytic rubric of parenthood: 
custodial, genetic, and biological. Broyde generates this conceptional schematization in 
his analysis of the halakhic positions of Feinstein, Teitelbaum, Waldenberg, and Breisch. 
It should be strongly noted that none of them use the words “gene” or “genetics” in any 
of their responsa. Instead, they perpetuate the classical, pre-modern, halakhic terminology 
of “seed” and lineage. It is unclear to what degree they were knowledgeable of modern 
genetic theory. Waldenberg, renowned for his responsa on medical issues and new 
technologies, was the resident-posek of Sha’arei Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem. In 
his 1975 landmark responsum on the permissibility of a late-term abortion (until month 
seven) of a Tay-Sachs fetus, Waldenberg (1990, Tzitz Eliezer 13:102) responds to the 
query of Professor Dr. M. Meir, General Manager of Sha’rei Tzedek, who himself 
references in his question “gene,” “genetics,” and “Mendelian inheritance.” Waldenberg, 
however, does not use any of these terms in his response.73 Broyde could have created a 
tripartite analytic rubric using more classical, halakhic equivalents, such as, “custodial, 
seminal, and sexual,” instead of “custodial, genetic, and biological.” His deliberate word 
choice, however, not only demonstrates that he is knowledgeable of current scientific 
theory, but also that he consciously introduces into the Jewish bioethical and medical 
halakhic discourse theory-laden terminology that can result in attendant scientific 
                                                 
73 Similarly, in a responsum (Waldenberg 1990, Tzitz Eliezer 11:78, dated 1971) on changing the gender 
phenotype of a genotypical male infant with ambiguous genitalia, the questioner mentions chromosomes 
and genetics, but Waldenberg avoids these terms in his response. In one other responsum (Waldenberg 
1990, Tzitz Eliezer 15:44, dated 1982), Waldenberg uses the word “inheritable” when considering a case 
concerning the advisability of marriage between two otherwise legally permitted, distantly related 
individuals who share a family history of blindness. For a study of the intersection of halakhah and science 
in Waldenberg’s legal writings, see Brand 2010; Jotkowitz 2015. 
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theoretical presuppositions driving intellectual interpretive innovation and halakhic 
change. Therefore, for example, when Broyde (1988, 131) writes, “In the case of artificial 
insemination, where there is no biological father but only a genetic father, almost all 
decisors maintain that Jewish law defaults to the principle of genetics to establish 
paternity,” Broyde is not simply reporting halakhic viewpoints, but through the 
introduction of genetic ideas, he is deepening the bioethical analysis and expanding the 
halakhic corpus. 
In the mid-twentieth century, several philosophers of science, influenced by 
Duhem-Quineian theoretical holism and advances in linguistics and semiotics, began to 
reconsider the relationship of theory and observation and its impact on epistemology. 
While philosophical foundationalists held that “seeing is believing,” philosophers of 
science were beginning to consider whether it is actually the other way around, that 
“believing is seeing.” “Seeing,” whether it be to make a scientific experimental 
observation, or while reading a legal text, is a “theory-laden” process. Thomas Kuhn 
proposed three different ways of understanding “theory-ladenness” (Bogen 2014, 14-21). 
“Perpetual theory-loading,” supported by the experimentation of perceptual 
psychologists, suggests that pre-conceived notions even shape visual experience and its 
subsequent interpretation (Kuhn 1962, 111-21). “Semantical theory-loading,” posits that 
theoretical commitments strongly influence what we see, how we think about what we 
see, and how we describe what we see. If we share our observational reports with others 
who utilize the same words, but have different theoretical presuppositions, our semantic 
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meanings may be incommensurable (ibid., 127-34).74 Finally, “salience” refers to what 
catches the eye of the observer, and likewise is influenced by larger theoretical 
commitments (ibid., 123-4).  
Similar theories were developing in the philosophy of language, literary criticism, 
and the philosophy of legal interpretation contemporaneous to the development of these 
views in the philosophy of science. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (2008) 1958 publication of 
Philosophical Investigations proposed through its theory of language games that the 
context of life’s activities and experiences give language its semantic meaning. 
Postmodern literary theory pointed to the role of the reader in constructing the meaning 
of the text.75 In the philosophy of law, theorists were likewise questioning to what degree 
the individual interpreter reads his or her world view into the text during its subjective 
analysis.76 Others modified this view, speaking less of individualistic readings, and more 
of interpretive communities, an idea supported by Wittgenstein’s writings.77 
When poskim in 1958 began to evaluate the halakhic implications of AI, not one 
utilized the word "genetics.”78 A digital search of all the responsa collected on the Bar 
Ilan University Responsa Project (2017), discovered only two poskim who utilize the 
                                                 
74 Popper (1959) and Hanson (1958), who were of the original conceivers of theory-ladenness, did not 
believe that the biases it endows to the observer are insurmountable, unlike Kuhn (1962) who strongly 
argued that scientific paradigms are near-totalizing, see Bogen 2014. 
75 See Fish 1980. 
76 See Llewellyn 1950, 1960. 
77 See Dworkin 1985, 159-77; and 2011; Wittgenstein 1966. See Schelly 1985, 158n1 who cites the 
relevant publications of Fish and Dworkin. See Solum 2010 for a critical review of Dworkin’s thesis, and 
Young 1987, for an analysis of the Fish and Dworkin debate. For application to Jewish interpretation, see 
Dorff 1995, 171-2, 175n18; 1998b, 9-11; and Dorff and Rosett 1988, 204-13. 
78 See Auerbach 1958; Hedaya 1958; Mintzberg 1958; and Shapiro 1968. 
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word “genetic,” both dated or published after 2002.79 Legally oriented Jewish bioethicists 
and secularly educated halakhists introduced genetic awareness into the medical halakhic 
discourse in America and in Israel in the 1980s, whose reference and terminology 
measurably increased in medical halakhic articles in specialized journals in the decades 
following.80 Jewish bioethics which uses the source material of medical halakhah, thus, in 
turn, influenced medical halakhah by expanding its epistemological resources and 
endowing it with deeper scientific understanding, including new terminology. A 
contemporaneous increase of genetic awareness in larger society due to advancements in 
science and technology also likely impinged upon this innovative, interpretive expansion. 
The dialogical interaction of religion and science in Jewish bioethics results not 
only in a better scientifically informed understanding of circumstances, but introduces 
subtle shifts of fundamental understanding. Per Broyde’s theory of evolutionary halakhic 
development, and the philosophy of science and semiotics’ insights into theory-
ladenness, increased scientific awareness and understanding necessarily impinges upon 
                                                 
79 A digital search of over 100,000 responsa, collected on the Bar Ilan University Responsa Project (2017), 
revealed only two poskim who utilize the word. It should be noted, however, that of the 100,000 responsa 
only a fraction of those are from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and an even smaller fraction of 
modern responsa deal with medical or biological matters. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef 2015, in a responsum dated 
2002 (Yabia Omer, Even Ha’ezer 10:12), invokes genetics in the context of a DNA paternity test. Rabbi 
Moshe Sternbuch, an English-speaking Israeli posek, invokes genetics in four responsa, and refers to his 
discussion with an expert in genetics, see Sternbuch 5:244, s.v. “umumcheh echad.”  
80 See Drori 1980, writing in Hebrew in Israel. Drori is currently an Israeli judge (civil, not rabbinical, 
court), and was then a young legal scholar. See also Soloveitchik 1980, a college educated rabbi writing in 
Hebrew in the United States. For specialized Hebrew and English periodicals and publications, see above, 
Chapter Two, “The History and Foundational Models of Contemporary Jewish Bioethics and Medical 
Halakhah (Jewish Law),” 39-40, nn4-7. Genetic paternity testing introduced genetic ideas into the Israeli 
Rabbinical Family Court system, as evidenced by court records available through the Bar Ilan University 
Responsa Project, see Steinberg 2003h, 778-80. Additionally, in the aftermath of 9/11, the Beth Din of 
America, located in New York City, considered whether DNA evidence is admissible and dispositive in 
establishing a presumption of death strong enough to allow a married woman to be considered a widow and 
thus be allowed to remarry. See Broyde 2011, 28-30; 40-5; 61nn8-9. 
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medical-halakhic and Jewish-bioethical analysis in fundamental ways. In time, it even 
allows for scientific knowledge to more fundamentally influence Jewish bioethical and 
halakhic considerations of maternal and paternal classifications, as will be shown to be 
the case in subsequent assisted reproductive technologies. 
Table 5.4. Summary of Attitudes Toward ART and Definitions and Account of Parenthood 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde’s Jewish Bioethical Views on Parenthood and Procreation Through 
AI/IVF 
Attitude Toward AI and IVF AIH/IVF-H: Positive and permitting. 
AID/IVF-D: Permitting 
Definition of Maternity  Monist Causal Account: Ovum contribution and 
gestation. 
Account of Paternity and its Definition  Monist Causal Account, but differentiates between the 
Genetic father of sexual and non-sexual procreation and 
the Biological father of sexual reproduction. 
Paternity is always the sperm donor who is the Genetic 
Father. 
 
 
 
 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff’s Epistemological and Axiological Orientation 
 
 Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff, like Bleich and Broyde, has published extensively on 
Jewish law and ethics, including Jewish Bioethics related to ART. His Matters of Life 
and Death: A Jewish Approach to Modern Medical Ethics (1998b) is particularly 
masterful at explicating halakhic discourse, biomedical information, and ethical 
considerations in a clear and accessible fashion. In addition to his articles and book on 
Jewish Bioethics, Dorff has also published two additional books on modern personal and 
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social ethics, respectively.81 Each of his three treatises on ethics ends with an appendix 
specifically detailing the book’s philosophical foundations and ethical methodology.82 
Additionally, Dorff has published two books on Jewish theology, as well as treatise on 
his philosophy of Jewish law.83 Dorff’s model of philosophical and methodological 
reflection and its lucid representation consistently make his discussion of difficult 
concepts intelligible, especially for readers unlearned in rabbinics or philosophical ethics. 
In addition to his academic career at American Jewish University and UCLA School of 
Law, Dorff, like Bleich and Broyde, is rabbinically active in the community, serving as 
the chair of the Jewish Conservative Movement’s Committee on Jewish Law and 
Standards, and is often called upon for rabbinical consultation by colleagues, students, 
and Jewish laity (Dorff 2016). Dorff has also served in numerous advisory roles to 
governmental agencies on bioethical matters. In order to assess the epistemological and 
axiological dimensions of Dorff’s bioethical writings on ART, it is necessary and helpful 
to review in brief Dorff’s theology, his philosophy and methodology of Jewish law and 
ethics, and the relationship of religion and science in his thought.   
 
Interpretive Freedom and Judicial Discretion 
 As a Conservative Jewish thinker, rabbinical jurist, and legally oriented ethicist, 
Dorff’s faith commitments and theology undergird his philosophy and methodology of 
                                                 
81 See Dorff 2002a, To Do the Right and the Good: A Jewish Approach to Modern Social Ethics; and 2003, 
Love Your Neighbor and Yourself: A Jewish Approach to Modern Personal Ethics. 
82 See Dorff 1998b, 395-423; 2002a, 241-287; 2003, 311-46. 
83 See Dorff, 1992a, Knowing God: Jewish Journeys to the Unknowable; Dorff and Rosett 1988, A Living 
Tree: The Roots and Growth of Jewish Law; and Dorff 2007, For the Love of God and People: A 
Philosophy of Jewish Law. 
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Jewish law and ethics.84 Although he does not share in Bleich and Broyde’s Orthodox 
Jewish theological doctrine of the Sinaitic revelation of the Written and Oral Torah, Dorff 
upholds a doctrine of divine revelation. He, however, maintains, “that the specific content 
of human theological ideas and codes of practice is created by human beings,” – 
“the Jewish community of the past and present” – “and hence is subject to error and 
change” (Dorff 2007, 31).85 Dorff’s religious epistemology is less concerned with 
rationally justifiable grounds of religious belief, as much as with the Jewish religious 
experience of the divine-human encounter through Torah-study, ritual observance, and a 
spiritual orientation of discerning divine action in history by recognizing the power of 
human agency to fulfill the divine will and thereby enact providential purpose (Dorff 
1992a). Dorff rejects a theology of legal and moral autonomy, and affirms a doctrine of 
heteronomous religious obligation through a covenantal system of mitzvah.86 Thus, Dorff 
asserts that his commitment to a Jewish approach to law and ethics is based on religious 
theology and duty, and not only for pragmatic, ethnic, and cultural reasons (Dorff 2002a, 
xv).87  
Dorff’s theory of Jewish law and ethics is not to be confused with a covenantal 
model (see above, Chapter Two, 43-5), which he negatively critiques, but as a Jewish-
judicial model and legally oriented method (Dorff 1995, 163-5). In addition to law being 
                                                 
84 For Dorff’s construction of the ideology and history of the Conservative Jewish movement, see Dorff 
1996a, 2005b. 
85 For Dorff’s theology of revelation, see 1992a, 91-128; 1996a, 110-57; 2007, 29-37. For Dorff’s embrace 
of the historical-critical method toward biblical and rabbinic literature, see Dorff and Rosett 1988, 20-1; 
Dorff 2003, 17.  
86 For Dorff’s covenantal theology and heteronomous authority of Jewish law, see Dorff 1988, 1989; 
1996a; 2007, 87-130. For his rejection of legal and moral autonomy, see Dorff 1995, 162-5. 
87 For a full exposition by Dorff on, “Motivations to Live by Jewish Law,” see Dorff 2007, 131-88. 
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central to Judaism’s theological narrative and historical experience, Dorff lists five 
reasons for retaining a legal method: “its inherent discipline, authority, continuity, 
coherence, and educational utility” (1998b, 404-16). Legal process gains its integrity 
from the discipline of its method. By assuming a heteronomous authoritative voice to 
guide our lives, Jewish law imposes duties and responsibilities, allowing for the wisdom 
of the past to inform the needs of the present. Law achieves continuity and preserves a 
shared national identity across space and time by uniting people through a common legal 
and ethical system. Finally, law is easily teachable and put into practice.  
Like Bleich and Broyde, Dorff too looks to interpretation as the primary vehicle 
of Jewish legal process. All three recognize the need to ply conceptual analysis to the 
original rabbinic texts, case law, and codes of the Jewish legal tradition to identify their 
underlying principles and ethical values that can then be reapplied to novel 
circumstances. Dorff differs from Bleich and Broyde in at least four significant ways: 1. 
the binding status of codified rules; 2. strong historical contextualization; 3. intentionality 
in innovative interpretation; and 4. broad interpretive license and judicial discretion.  
 
Rules, Principles, and Policies 
Dorff invokes the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin to explain how a legal 
model can maintain coherence, holding true to its foundational values, conservatively 
withstanding impulsive pressures for change, while progressively allowing for 
interpretive adaptation and change in a methodologically responsible and humanely 
responsive way. Dworkin distinguishes between “rules,” “principles,” and “policies.” 
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Rules demand unflinching obedience, principles express values, and policies direct 
toward an articulated goal (Dworkin 1977, 22-31). Dorff (1995, 167) argues that if 
Jewish law is understood more as principles and policies, than as timeless, binding, 
codified rules, it will maintain its coherence through generations of interpretation and 
necessary change: 
The methodological principles I have described – that we must retain a legal 
method with its inherent discipline in making our decisions; that we must 
recognize that Jewish law most often prescribes policies and principles, not 
inviolable rules, and we must interpret and apply Jewish law accordingly; that 
even general policies must be implemented with sensitivity to the context of a 
specific case; that we must be aware of the inevitable and proper impact of the 
reader and his or her context, goals, and values in interpreting and employing a 
text; and that this awareness does not vitiate the authority of the text, but it does 
open the door, with appropriate argumentation, for contemporary moral 
sensitivities – must all, in my view, shape the way in which we approach issues of 
bioethics in our time. Only then can our methodology be sufficiently dynamic to 
accommodate the revolutionary changes in the world of medicine on almost a 
daily basis and yet be unmistakably Jewish. Only then can we responsibly and 
wisely carry on the vital and religiously rooted tradition of medical care and 
adaptability which we have inherited. (Dorff 1995, 172) 
 
 
Halakhah as a Living Organism and Strong Historical Contextualism 
 Dorff is a proponent of the “positive-historical” method of Jewish studies, 
typically denominationally associated with Conservative Judaism, which historically 
contextualizes halakhic source material in space and time. This approach views Judaism 
as historically and culturally contingent, recognizes changes in ideas, values, and 
practices through the sweep of Jewish history, and proactively leverages this knowledge 
in contemporary halakhic and ethical decision-making. Dorff is avowedly not a legal-
positivist and does not believe that Jewish law should be construed as a self-enclosed 
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deductive system (Dorff 2007, 48-60).88 Rather, Jewish law, as a way of life, should be 
likened to a living organism whose corpus juris grows, changes, and ages – sometimes in 
growth spurts, other times more slowly – always in response to internal and external 
influences. Sometime immune reactions are triggered to preserve its health and integrity. 
Like an organism, throughout its growth and maturation it always retains its identity 
(ibid., 60-79). 
In his preface to Matters of Life and Death: A Jewish Approach to Modern 
Medical Ethics, Dorff writes:  
Depicting Judaism as a way of life also conveys its ever-developing nature, for 
just as the conditions of human life continually change, so too do Jewish views 
and patterns of action. … In each age, however, Judaism must earn the 
compliment of being valued as a complete way of life by remaining relevant to 
new sensitivities and circumstances. In the service of attaining that end, Jews who 
know and love the tradition must ever be willing to stretch it to address the old 
problems that now appear in new guises and the completely new problems 
produced by changing contexts, moral awareness, and technologies. … On the 
other hand, Jews who ignore their tradition altogether or identify it with whatever 
they happen to think at the moment also do a disservice to both Jews and Judaism. 
… A large part of the tradition’s value is precisely that it is normative, that it 
challenges us to think and act in ways that we would not otherwise imagine. The 
trick, then is to find a way to balance tradition with change … [this is] especially 
true for Jewish bioethics. … Questions about engendering and saving lives arise 
in ways today that our ancestors could not even imagine. This produces major 
problems of method, for how do you gain guidance from the tradition on 
questions it never contemplated? (Dorff 1998b, xiii-xv) 
 
Dorff answers his concluding methodological question of how do Jewish law and ethics 
respond to unanticipated challenges by outlining that first one identifies precedents in 
Jewish law, should they exist, relevant to the moral issue being considered. Then one 
                                                 
88 Here Dorff’s debate is not only with Orthodox halakhists like Bleich and Broyde, but also with his 
Conservative colleague Rabbi Joel Roth 1986, who constructs a legally positivistic model of Conservative 
Jewish law. 
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exercises “depth-theology,” uncovering the foundational Jewish values and legal 
principles in play, evaluating them in light of Jewish theology, ethical literature, and 
communal custom, and always taking into account historical context. Next an assessment 
should be made as to how the legal principles and Jewish values inform potential 
reinterpretations and application to contemporary situations. Dorff (2014, 421) proposes: 
“In both the slow, evolutionary changes and in the more metamorphic ones, the law must 
be shaped through continually interacting with Jewish theology and philosophy, historical 
realities, economic conditions, moral sensitivities, and Jewish goals, just as it has 
historically been shaped and reshaped.” In the absence of relevant precedents, Judaism’s 
foundational concepts and values can be applied to a novel circumstance to provide moral 
guidance.89 
 
Stretching the Law and Intentionality in Innovative Interpretation 
 One of the major methodological differences between Dorff, on the one hand, and 
Bleich and Broyde, on the other, is the question of intentionality in innovative 
interpretation. Bleich and Broyde respectively believe that interpretive creativity, whether 
characterized as rediscovery or innovation, methodologically occurs naturally through 
internal halakhic process, albeit sometimes in response to external stimuli. Dorff, on the 
other hand, believes that a halakhist and/or ethicist may, and sometimes should, 
intentionally facilitate Jewish legal change through “stretchy” interpretation. A “reasoned 
                                                 
89 See Dorff 2014, 422. Towards this goal, Dorff generates lists of Jewish foundational concepts and ethical 
values in each of his ethical treatises, see 1998b, chapter two; 2002a, chapter one; 2003, chapter one. 
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opinion” based on innovative readings would need to be confluent with the larger thrust 
of the tradition and persuasively be defended against other possible readings (Dorff 
1998b, 9-10). Dorff’s positive-historicism, along with his acute awareness of the impact 
of the reader on interpretation and the construction of textual meaning, lead him to 
challenge the epistemological integrity of ahistorical Orthodox Jewish halakhic 
methodology, which he characterizes as literalist.90 In a discussion of weighing the 
applicability of Jewish legal precedents, Dorff writes that an Orthodox Jewish approach 
to bioethics:  
… ignores the historical context of past medical decisions and the crucial 
differences between medical conditions then and now … The sources did not 
contemplate the realities of modern medicine; for that matter, American legal 
sources from as late as the 1940s did not do so either. Consequently, reading such 
laws and precedents closely to arrive at decisions about contemporary medical 
therapies all too often amounts to sheer sophistry. The texts themselves in such 
attempts are not providing clear guidance but are rather being twisted to mean 
whatever a particular rabbi or judge wants them to mean. (Dorff 1995, 171; italics 
mine)91 
 
In contrast to what he perceives as customary literalism and false naivete, Dorff says: 
 
One can do this without being devious or anachronistic if one does not pretend 
that one’s own interpretation is its originally intended meaning or its only 
possible reading. The Conservative objection to many Orthodox readings of texts 
is thus based on both tone and method: not only do many Orthodox responsa 
make such pretensions, often with an air of dogmatic certainty, they do so with 
blatant disregard for the effects of historical and literary context on the meaning 
of texts and indifference to the multitude of meanings that writings can often 
legitimately have.92 (Dorff 1998b, 413; italics original) 
 
                                                 
90 For Dorff’s views on the impact of the reader on interpretation, see Dorff 1995, 171-2, 175n18; 1998b, 9-
11; and Dorff and Rosett 1988, 204-13. 
91 Dorff 1998b, 412-3, repeats the accusation of sophistry.  
92 See also Dorff 2014, 418-9. 
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Therefore, Dorff (ibid., 414) says: “We must therefore first judge whether or not 
medicine has changed significantly in the area we are considering, and if it has, be 
prepared to stretch some halakhic and aggadic sources beyond their original meanings” 
(emphasis mine). Similarly, Dorff opines: “In the service of attaining that end, Jews who 
know and love the tradition must ever be willing to stretch it to address the old problems 
that now appear in new guises and the completely new problems produced by changing 
contexts, moral awareness, and technologies” (Dorff ibid., xiii; emphasis mine). Ancient 
rabbinic sources, claims Dorff, legitimately must sometimes be considerably extended to 
arrive at an apt decision, as long as procedurally legal form and substance are maintained 
and one is careful to declare that “ours is a possible reading,” and not the only reading 
(ibid., 415; italics original). Legal-stretchiness allows for broad interpretive license and 
judicial discretion. 
Dorff’s advocacy for intentional interpretive-stretchiness along with his polemical 
characterization of Orthodox halakhic methodology as unsophisticatedly literalist and 
indulging in sophistry strikes an ironic tone on two counts. First, in his own polemical 
moment, Bleich, as cited above, conversely decries rabbis and religious leaders, who he 
identifies as students inadequately trained in halakhic methodology, who seize “upon 
stray precedents, crude analogies, or sheer sophistry” (emphasis added), to yield 
contemporary halakhic decisions motivated by a preconceived, societally influenced 
conclusion (Bleich 2015b, 126-7). Does self-aware intentionality when interpretively 
stretching Jewish law in a pre-conceived direction lessen or increase a charge of 
sophistry? Second, Dorff utilizes the writings of Orthodox medical halakhists and 
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bioethicists, which overwhelmingly populate the literature to mine sources and learn from 
their views. He will often cite their views, opinions, and even halakhic rulings 
uncritically in his own Jewish bioethical writings.93 If indeed they were rife with 
unsophisticated literalism and sophistry, one would imagine that would undermine any 
shared substantive discourse.  
Scholars indeed may critique competing systems of interpretation, and contrast 
them with their own. However, a wiser course than polemics would arguably be to 
identify differences in the epistemologies and axiologies undergirding philosophy and 
method. One of the purposes of this chapter’s constructions and analyses of the 
philosophies and methodologies of halakhah and bioethics of this dissertation’s four 
Jewish bioethical exemplars is indeed to highlight the epistemological and axiological 
similarities and differences between them. Critical comparisons allow for scholarly 
dialogue and learning. The similarities and differences between them provide insight into 
ways of relating science and religion, and tradition and modernity, within Jewish 
bioethics. 
 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt 
 The plasticity of Jewish law in Dorff’s halakhic methodology reduces the 
need for legal certainty, and lessens the concern for the avoidance of judicial doubt. 
                                                 
93 For example, see Dorff 1998b, chapter three, “Having Children with One’s Own Genetic Materials,” 52: 
“Most rabbis who have written about AIH have not objected to it.” In n47, Dorff identifies who he is 
counting as “most rabbis” – six Orthodox halakhists and bioethicists! Further, forty-eight bibliographical 
entries of Dorff’s treatise on medical ethics are known Orthodox halakhists, bioethicists, theologians, and 
Jewish studies scholars. For more on the use of Orthodox sources of Jewish law in Conservative Judaism, 
see Hollander 2013, 315n37. 
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It also raises the concern of how to protect and preserve the coherence of a 
communally shared halakhic system. Dorff points to Conservative Judaism’s 
Committee on Jewish Laws and Standard as the professional and communal 
mechanism for establishing the boundaries of normative practice and legitimate 
dissent within the Conservative Jewish community (1998b, 402-3; 419-20n12). 
 
Halakhah and Ethics 
 For Dorff, a primary purpose of halakhah is to regulate Jewish ethics through 
normative moral living. Jewish law and ethics are inexorably knit up together. Jewish 
meta-ethics ground and guide halakhah, and halakhah is essential to moral practice. A 
positive-historical consciousness allows for the testing of Jewish law against external and 
independent ethics. Ethical ideals are actualized in law. Jewish law sets reasonable 
expectations through minimal standards. Law helps resolve conflicts between ethical 
values and helps set moral priorities. Law encapsulates ethics, thus serving as a valuable 
tool for ethical education. Law instantiates ethical ideals in real life, and law also 
provides for continuity of tradition, while allowing for flexible adaptability. Legal 
remedies aim to repair moral damage and create social peace (Dorff 2003, 337-44). Dorff 
believes that: 
Judaism has gone further than most other religious or secular systems of ethics in 
trying to deal with morality in legal terms. It is therefore not surprising that 
contemporary decisions in Jewish medical ethics flow out of the continuing 
interactions among Jewish religious thought, law, and morality. To isolate any 
one of these perspectives is to distort Jewish tradition. But to see and apply their 
interactions to contemporary concerns requires knowledge of and commitment to 
all three: a developed moral and legal sense; and the capacity for sound judgment, 
compassion, and wisdom. (Dorff 1998b, 404) 
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At the end of Dorff’s appendix detailing his approach to Jewish bioethics, he summarizes 
eight methodological principles “sufficiently dynamic to accommodate the revolutionary 
changes occurring in the world of medicine on an almost daily basis and yet remain 
unmistakably Jewish” (1998b, 416-7): 
1. Give “intelligibility, coherence, and meaning” to individual moral decisions 
within the larger context of our faith commitments and convictions. 
2. Maximize dialogue between ethics and religion. 
3. Apply legal method for its “inherent discipline, authority, continuity, 
coherence, and educational utility” (ibid.). 
4. Understand Jewish law as prescribing policy guidelines, not inviolate rules, 
allowing flexibility in applying principles to new circumstances. 
5. Be attuned to the nuances of the specific case. 
6. Read texts in historical context to allow intelligent applications to a modern 
setting. 
7. Be aware of influence of the reader on textual interpretation. 
8. Affirm that contemporary awareness need not reduce the authority of text or 
undermine tradition.  
Unlike Bleich and Broyde, Dorff thus believes that what is narrowly referred to as 
medical halakhah does not suffice as Jewish bioethics and that to arrive at a Jewish way 
of life requires a moral analysis in addition to a legal one.  
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Table 5.5 Summary of Epistemological and Axiological Findings for Affirmed Intellectual 
Orientation 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff’s Philosophy and Methodology of Halakhah and Jewish Bioethics 
Philosophy of Halakhah Non-Formalist. 
Historical Contextualism Strong Contextualism. 
Theory of Change Halakhah stretches in light of changes and 
innovations. 
Scientific Epistemology Hard and soft sciences are epistemically special and 
strongly privileged. 
Jewish Moral Axiology Internally insufficient. 
Medical Halakhah and Jewish 
Bioethics 
Jewish Bioethics scientifically and ethically informs 
and stretches Medical Halakhah. 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt Mitigate doubt through judicial license. 
 
 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff on IVF/ET and Parenthood 
 Dorff’s responsum on “Artificial Insemination, Egg Donation and Adoption” was 
approved by Conservative Judaism’s Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee on Jewish Law 
and Standards in March 1994, seventeen years after the first IVF/ET child was born, and 
forty-three years after the first halakhic opinions were published concerning AI (Dorff 
1994a, 17n*). Dorff makes full use of the extant bioethical and halakhic literature in 
formulating his comprehensive Jewish-bioethical analysis of assisted and collaborative 
reproduction and parenthood. As a rabbi and theologian, he extols the blessings of 
parenthood and laments the challenges of infertility. Dorff is avowedly pronatalist, 
especially for Jews whose demographic trends portend future existential challenges due 
to “late marriage, no marriage, intermarriage, low birthrates, and infertility” (2005, 219-
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21, 231-3).94 Like Broyde, and unlike Bleich, Dorff enthusiastically supports the 
voluntary and responsible use of reproductive medical technologies to overcome 
infertility, no different than any other medical remedy.95 He halakhically and ethically 
licenses AI and IVF with both husband and donor sperm, albeit in the case of donor 
sperm with several caveats (Dorff 1994a, 30; 1994b, 63). He is also the only one of this 
dissertation’s four exemplars in their treatment of the issues to discuss positively single 
mothers potentially utilizing donor sperm and AI/IVF technologies to bear and then raise 
children (Dorff 1998b, 111-5).96 He also permits the confidential donation of gametes by 
single and married men and women, as well as the donation of surplus embryos, to help 
others struggling with infertility (Dorff 1994c, 87-9; 1998b, 58; 103-7). 
 
IVF/ET and Maternity (Non-Surrogacy) 
 Dorff upholds the halakhic ruling of the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee on 
Jewish Law and Standards that parturition determines maternal identity.97 Although 
logical reasoning can argue for other alternatives, as we shall see in the next chapter on 
surrogacy, Dorff argues that biblical precedent is preferred to logical reasoning in Jewish 
legal methodology. The Torah consecrates the firstborn son, referring to him as “peter 
rechem – opening of the womb” (Exodus 13:2). The Torah’s sacred signification of birth 
                                                 
94 See also Dorff 1998b 40, 95-6. 
95 Like Bleich and Broyde, Dorff also contrasts the Catholic Church’s reproductive naturalism with 
Judaism’s interventionism.  
96 For changing attitudes and increased incidence of Jewishly observant single women pursuing 
motherhood through donor sperm and ART, see Ross 1998; Blumenthal 2015. 
97 See Mackler 1997b. 
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is taken as dispositive of maternal identity being determined as the bearing mother (Dorff 
1998b, 101).98 
 
IVF/ET and Paternity with Husband and Donor sperm 
 When it comes to paternal identification, however, Dorff finds halakhic and 
ethical complexity, where others, like Bleich and Broyde, decide the matter rather simply. 
For Bleich and Broyde, the sperm donor is always the halakhic father. As in the case of 
AID and IVF with donor sperm, the husband of a woman who bears the child conceived 
non-sexually with the sperm of another man may raise the resultant child. Per Bleich and 
Broyde, halakhah views such a man as “one who raises another’s child,” since the sperm 
donor is the only recognized halakhic father. Dorff, however, believes that ART has 
generated a situation fundamentally unlike anything that has ever existed prior, and thus 
Jewish law and ethics should recognize the fatherhood of both the social father, who 
raises the child, and the biological father, whose genetic material engendered the child. 
The biological father must be recognized for two reasons. First, it is no light matter to 
deny him halakhic paternal status. Jewish law holds incest as such a severe prohibition 
that it is one of three cardinal mitzvot for which one must give up one’s life rather than 
transgress. Halakhah and Jewish bioethics are concerned with unintended incest, thus 
                                                 
98 Mackler 1997b, 186n16, however, claims that this argument is a second-order support, and not the 
primary basis for maternal identity, which instead he ascribes to the transition from the status of a fetus 
who is merely an extension of the mother’s body to a new status of newborn child who gains independent 
personhood at birth, see ibid., 180. So, for example, per Mackler, the bearing mother who delivers via 
cesarean section, whose child is not “opening the womb” would still be considered the mother. Contra 
Dorff, Mackler privileges logical reasoning in Jewish legal methodology. 
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preferring accessible, disclosive records regarding the sperm donor’s identity. 
Furthermore: 
[It is an] incontrovertible genetic fact that it is the natural father’s DNA that the 
child inherits, not the social father’s. Modern research has made us increasingly 
aware of the impact of our genes on who we are as a people, not only biologically 
but in a number of character traits as well. The donor’s genes influence the 
medical history of the child, and they determine the identity of the people whom it 
is genetically dangerous to marry, let the children born of that marriage suffer 
from diseases rooted in their consanguineous union. Moreover, the donor’s genes 
will affect the child’s intelligence, height, general physical appearance, 
susceptibility to specific diseases, and even personality traits such as the tendency 
to get angry quickly or to laugh often. The genetic contribution of the semen 
donor, while modified by the child’s upbringing, is thus ultimately indelible. 
(Dorff 1998b, 75) 
 
 At the same time, AID and IVF-D “stretches our understanding of fatherhood” 
(ibid., 74, emphasis mine). From antiquity until ART, it was assumed that the natural 
father of a child would also be responsible to raise him or her. Even though there are four 
pre-modern rabbinic sources (see above, Chapter Four, pp. 153-6) that entertain an idea 
of non-sexual reproduction, “these sources are so unlike the contemporary conditions … 
one wonders whether they can seriously serve as a legal resource for our questions” 
(ibid., 51). Furthermore, in those cases, questions were raised post facto. Here, all the 
collaborating reproductive partners consent, intend, and expect to conceive a child (ibid.). 
It is for these reasons as well that AI and IVF-D cannot halakhically constitute adultery. 
Adultery is a sexual transgression that breaches the sacred trust between a woman and a 
man bound in the covenant of marriage. Here, there is no intimacy nor intercourse, and 
the husband knows of and supports the procreative proceedings because he intends to 
become the social father of the resultant child (ibid., 41).  
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 Dorff adduces several biblical and rabbinic textual supports to convey halakhic 
paternal significance upon the social father. First, the example of levirate marriage in the 
bible provides a precedent for which the sperm donor is not assigned paternity. When a 
man predeceases his wife having had no children, his surviving brother marries and 
inseminates his widow, so that, “the firstborn son that she bears shall be accounted to the 
dead brother, that his name may not be blotted out in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:6). Two, a 
midrash on Isaiah 64:7, “But now, O Lord, You are our Father,” compares God’s non-
biological paternal status to that of a guardian who raises an orphan girl, who can be 
listed as her father in her marriage contract: “for the one who raises is called father and 
not the one who begets” (Exodus Rabbah 46:5). Three, Jewish law recognizes the 
transformative power of renunciation, such as in the case of a pagan who renounces the 
idolatrous status of an idol, transforming it into a mere statue. Dorff stretches this concept 
to innovate an analogical idea of paternal renunciation by the sperm donor. Finally, at the 
end of Genesis, the patriarch Jacob elevates the status of Joseph’s sons Ephraim and 
Menashe from grandsons to tribal sons, thus also demonstrating the transferability of 
paternal-child relations: “Now, your two sons, who were born to you in the land of Egypt, 
shall be mine; Ephraim and Menashe shall be mine no less than Rueben and Simeon” 
(Genesis 48:5; Dorff 1998b, 75-6).99  
 In addition to these legal arguments, Dorff also adduces several moral arguments 
arising from contemporary realities. In cases of ART undertaken in a licensed fertility 
                                                 
99 It should be noted that all Dorff’s four supports are his own novel and innovative interpretations: two 
interpretations based on biblical precedent, i.e. proofs one and four; one based on a midrash, i.e. two; and 
one based on legal analogy, i.e., three. 
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clinic or hospital, as long as the husband consents, American law views him as the social 
father and as the sole legal father without even the need for formal adoption. Also, the 
larger community will only be aware of and recognize the paternity of social father. Dorff 
argues: “That is right and proper, for the social father, after all, invests a lifetime of 
energy, love, and substance in the child, whereas in most cases the donor never even 
meets the child” (ibid., 77). Dorff goes so far to suggest that the social father “should 
merit the status of fulfilling” the mitzvah of procreation, since “Jewish law generally 
awards privileges only to those who bear concomitant responsibilities, and that principle 
would certainly suggest in this case that the man who raises the child, rather than the man 
who merely ejaculates, should merit the status of fulfilling the commandment of 
propagation” (ibid.). In the end, though, Dorff acknowledges that because of the textual 
precedents of non-sexual conceptions in Jewish tradition, however dubious their 
pertinence, as well as the undeniable imprint of genetics on lineage and health, “for the 
purposes of the commandment of propagation, the semen donor must be seen as the 
father of the child” (ibid.).  
 Dorff therefore argues that both the biological father and the social father be 
halakhically affirmed as having paternal identity. Since Jewish identity is conveyed 
maternally, the Jewishness of the sperm donor is non-determinative. As a matter of 
lineage, priestly or Levitical status would depend on the biological father. Inheritance 
rights, Dorff says, are governed by the civil law of the land. Regarding incest, like Bleich 
and Broyde, Dorff agrees that marriage and sexual relations with individuals proscribed 
as relatives of a biological father are forbidden. However, in serious halakhic application 
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of his argument for ascribing paternal legal status to the social father, as well as in light 
of the emotional and educational relationships among members of the social family, 
Dorff wrote a responsum innovatively forbidding marriage and sexual relations with non-
biological siblings raised in the same household, including those relations of the social 
father who would be normally be proscribed were there a biological relation (ibid., 72, 
78-9; Dorff 1994c).100 
 One internal inconsistency in Dorff’s approach should be noted. Dorff, like Bleich 
and Broyde, affirms that, “If a couple cannot have children, the commandment to 
procreate no longer applies, for one can only be commanded to do only what one is 
capable of” (Dorff 1998b, 41). Dorff wants to emphasize that overcoming infertility 
through ART can be psychologically fraught, costly, painful, and entail health risks. 
Utilizing ART, such as AI or IVF, to have children is often appropriate and praiseworthy, 
but still a discretionary decision that needs to be made responsibly and not as an 
obligatory action, “for the duty to procreate devolves only upon those who can do so 
through sexual intercourse with their spouse” (ibid., 41-2).  
 At the same time, Dorff writes that he agrees with Conservative rabbi Morris 
Shapiro that in a case for which the sperm donor is the husband, he should be considered 
as fulfilling the mitzvah of procreation, which according to their conceptual analysis is 
result oriented and for which the manner of conception is preparatory and not 
fundamental. Dorff adds three supportive arguments. First, “according to all 
                                                 
100 Dorff categorizes these rabbinically prohibited relations as “sheniyot – second-order,” a term familiar 
from talmudic extensions of biblical incest law.  
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understandings of Jewish law,” the sperm donor is the biological father, and therefore a 
halakhic father (ibid., 50).101 Second, Dorff invokes a talmudic homiletical principle that 
says that good intentions are significant: “If a person intended to perform a mitzvah, but 
due to reasons beyond his control, he did not complete it, Scripture accounts it as if he 
fulfilled it” (TB Berakhot 6a). In the case of utilizing ART to overcome infertility, the 
husband intends to generate a child, and should thus be accordingly credited. Third, the 
husband is making a considerable psychological investment in the process, and 
compassion dictates that we support him: “the husband generally goes through 
considerable humiliation, pain, and perhaps depression in coming to terms with his 
inability to impregnate his wife through sexual intercourse, and we should do all we can 
to make him feel good about the process and the child that results” (Dorff 1998b, 52-3; 
344n50). In cases for which the donor sperm is not of the husband, as mentioned above, 
Dorff suggests, but doesn’t press, that perhaps the social father should likewise be 
credited with the mitzvah of procreation.  
 If, then, in a case of AI or IVF, a sperm-donating husband and thus biological 
father, and perhaps even the social father of the resultant child, should be considered as 
fulfilling the mitzvah of procreation through ART, and sexual relations are only 
preparatory and not fundamental, then why would Dorff limit the mitzvah to procreate to 
sexual reproduction? It would seem, per his halakhic and ethical analysis, that it would be 
more consistent to say that there is indeed a clear obligation for a AI/IVF-H, and a 
                                                 
101 Cf. Dorff 1998b, 344n51, though, in which he cites the opinions of rabbis Hadaya 1951 and Shapiro 
1951 who deny paternal status to a donor whose sperm inseminates non-sexually. See above, p. 202n48. 
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potential obligation for AI/IVF-D. Extenuating factors, such as inordinate cost, 
psychological harm, health risks, etc., may relieve said obligation, as appropriate to the 
nuances of the case, but an exempted obligation still begins as an obligation. Dorff’s 
compassion, which he identifies as a Jewish meta-ethic, presumably, leads him to avoid 
unnecessarily imposing burdensome obligations, while at the same time, somewhat 
inconsistently, reward the voluntary undertaking.102 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Dimensions: Dorff on IVF/ET and Parenthood 
As a legally oriented Jewish Bioethicist, Dorff sees his bioethical analyses as 
more than an exercise in medical halakhah, and thus in his writings on ART he introduces 
moral and psychological concerns and considerations beyond the technically halakhic. 
For example, after reviewing the legal issues related to “having children with donated 
genetic materials,” Dorff discusses negative judgments of using donated gametes as 
licentiousness; the impact of donated gametes and procreative asymmetry on the 
                                                 
102 To be fair, this critique applies to any halakhist or bioethicist who understands the mitzvah of 
procreation as result oriented. In defense of this critique, there are indeed examples in Jewish law of 
voluntary fulfillment of exempted commandments, i.e., “mitzvah kiyyumit – a fulfillable mitzvah,” in 
distinction to a mitzvah chiyyuvit – an obligatory mitzvah.” However, usually the exemption in such cases 
is intrinsic, rather than circumstantial. If one is intrinsically exempt, one can still voluntarily fulfill the 
commandment. If one is circumstantially exempt, then should the circumstances change or be reasonably 
overcome, perhaps the original obligation should reattach. Thus, if the mitzvah of procreation is result 
oriented, as Dorff claims, and there are two ways to achieve that result, one through sexual relations and 
one non-sexually, then should exemption from the first relieve the obligation of the second? For example, 
what would be Dorff’s halakhic ruling and bioethical guidance in the case of a man who fathered two 
children, a boy and a girl, through IVF/ET with his wife, who he later divorced, and then remarried a fertile 
woman? Would the man still have a mitzvah obligation of procreation to father naturally additional 
children through a sexual act, or would his having two biological children through IVF have exempted him 
from further obligation? See above, Chapter Four, p. 135 ff., for a possible parallel to a gentile father who 
converts. It may very well be that Dorff’s methodology is less high theory and more mid-level Jewish 
bioethical principles and pragmatic casuistic application, and thus does not require a conceptual framework 
for claims that consistently test in hypothetical scenarios.  
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relationship between spouses, and between parents and children; issues of confidentiality 
and secrecy; potential racism in donor selection; larger Jewish demographic concerns; 
and the necessity of compassion in both policy and pastoral support (Dorff 1998b, 80-
97). 
In both his halakhic and moral consideration of bioethical issues, Dorff grounds 
his analyses in contemporary scientific understanding, but then turns to the wider 
resources of the Jewish textual tradition, including midrash aggadah, rabbinic narratives 
and homilies, and moral literature, as well as to secular bioethics, philosophy, law, and 
psychology. He addresses individual, communal, and societal considerations, sometimes 
using policy concerns as a permitting factor. In defending the legitimacy of AI and 
IVF/ET with donor sperm, as mentioned above, Dorff cites larger existential 
demographic challenges facing the Jewish people. Dorff writes: 
This factor must enter into our moral evaluation of donor insemination, because a 
Jewish examination of any moral issue cannot adequately address Jewish 
concerns if it only narrowly considers the specific legal issues involved. Any 
tradition based on law must grapple with its sources if it is to be true to itself and 
if it is to reap the many benefits inherent in a legal system ... Interpreters of the 
law, though, must be fully cognizant of the broader context of the issue before 
them, for otherwise they risk two opposite dangers: the law could either be 
ignored and thus dishonored, or else – perhaps the greater danger – it could be 
obeyed despite the personal, social, and moral havoc it wreaks on the situation it 
was meant to guide with sensitivity and wisdom … In our case, then, when the 
demographic statistics are threatening as they are for the continuity of the Jewish 
tradition and the Jewish community, any opening in the law to enable Jews who 
are otherwise infertile to have children must be used. This concern, in other 
words, decisively tips the moral and halakhic scales in favor of donor 
insemination when the couple cannot have children in any other way. (ibid, 96; 
italics original)  
 
What fundamentally separates Dorff’s intellectual orientation from that of Bleich and 
Broyde is that he intentionally and dispositively utilizes his expansive epistemological 
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and axiological resources and commitments as arguments in his halakhic rulings and 
bioethical recommendations.  
 In Dorff’s consideration of paternity, he employs a legal methodology that admits 
a broad epistemology, and a moral axiology that recognizes ethical values and 
considerations beyond those encased within Jewish law, and that emerge out of extra-
legal Jewish texts. Thus, after a legal, moral, and psychological review of paternal 
identity and non-sexual reproduction, especially with donated sperm, Dorff moves 
beyond the monist standard of parenthood born of natural reproduction stipulating a 
unique father and mother, to a pluralist standard of paternity, halakhically and ethically 
recognizing the paternal standing of the biological and social father. For Dorff, the 
legality of the biological father is grounded in the Jewish traditional concept of lineage 
and the modern scientific causative factor of genetics. The legality of the social father, 
however, is innovatively based not on a causal account, but on a volitional, labor-based 
account, i.e., raising the child. Dorff (1994b) is not the first Jewish bioethicist or medical 
halakhist to conscience a pluralist account of parenthood with legal consequences. Bleich 
(1972), had already suggested the halakhic possibility of partible motherhood and a 
pluralist standard admitting two biological mothers two decades earlier. However, Dorff 
is the first to conceive of paternity in similar fashion. This is because he is the first legally 
oriented Jewish bioethicist to acknowledge a non-biological, labor-based accounting of 
parenthood.  
However, Dorff in his consideration of adoption, perpetuates the rabbinic view 
that adoptive parents function as agents of the child’s biological parents. He does not 
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utilize a volitional, labor-based account of parenthood to similarly ascribe to adoptive 
parents, who Dorff also recognizes as social parents, the same standing as the social 
father whose wife’s ovum with donor sperm generated the child that he will raise (Dorff 
1998b, 107-9). Presumably, this inconsistency can be accounted for by the constraining 
precedent of an extant legal model and precedent in rabbinic literature for adoption.  
Table 5.6. Summary of Attitudes Toward ART and Definitions and Account of Parenthood 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff’s Jewish Bioethical Views on Parenthood and Procreation Through 
AI/IVF 
Attitude Toward AI and IVF AIH/IVF-H: Positive and permitting. 
AID/IVF-D: Cautiously Positive and permitting. 
Definition of Maternity  Monist Causal Account of maternity: Parturition. 
Account of Paternity and its Definition  Pluralist Causal & Volitional/Labor Accounts of 
Paternity. 
AIH/IVF-H: sperm donor is father. 
AID/IVF-D: Two fathers:  
Biological father is sperm donor. 
Social Father is custodial father. 
 
 
Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler’s 
Epistemological and Axiological Orientation 
 
 For the past fifteen years, Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler have 
been publishing together on Jewish bioethics and the relationship of Torah and science. 
Tendler is a veteran professor of biology and medical ethics at Yeshiva University, as 
well as a Rosh Yeshiva in Yeshiva University’s affiliated rabbinical seminary. He has 
also served as long-time congregational rabbi, and is the son-in-law of the late renowned 
twentieth-century posek, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (d. 1986), for whom Tendler served as 
Feinstein’s chief scientific consultant. Tendler, like Bleich and Dorff, has served on 
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several bioethical commissions. Rabbinical colleagues and students, physicians and 
Jewishly observant lay people turn to Tendler for authoritative counsel on bioethical and 
halakhic matters.  
Loike, likewise, is an accomplished scientist and bioethicist, and teaches 
physiology and cellular biophysics, as well as bioethics, at Columbia University College 
of Physicians and Surgeons, in addition to pursuing his research interests. Unlike Bleich, 
Broyde, and Dorff, neither Tendler nor Loike has written extensively on the philosophy 
and methodology of halakhah. However, they have written on what they have called, 
“halakhic bioethics,” and thus a helpful intellectual orientation may be constructed for 
them, as well. Their partnered publications, along with their independent scholarship, 
combine to provide rich insight into their developing Jewish bioethical views within the 
context of religion and science relations.103 
 Tendler pioneered the teaching of medical ethics at Yeshiva College in 1953, and 
in 1969, with the support of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York, he 
distributed to NY-area hospitals a Compendium of Jewish Medical Ethics (1969), which 
went through several editions (Loike and Tendler, 2011, 93). Early on, Tendler believed 
that society has erroneously “assigned to the physician the role of theologian and moralist 
– a role for which he has no competence” (Tendler 1968, 6). Aiming to provide 
contemporary medicine with needed ethical guidelines, Tendler began to teach, lecture, 
and organize conferences on Jewish medical ethics. Tendler believed that the rabbinic 
literary tradition’s insights into human nature and behavior, as well as its commentaries 
                                                 
103 For more on Tendler and Loike, see above, Chapter Two, 63-5. 
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and case studies directly related to health and healing, were particularly suited to 
contribute to the burgeoning field of biomedical ethics (Gribetz and Tendler 1984, 1-2). 
Over the years, Tendler has sought out bioethical collaboration, as with Loike, and has 
continued to contribute to the development of Jewish bioethics.  
 
Halakhic Bioethics and Medical Halakhah 
Building off Beauchamp and Childress’s (2009) “Principlism,” Loike and Tendler 
(2011) propose six guidelines for halakhic bioethics, four drawn from Beauchamp and 
Childress, plus two additions: 1. beneficence. 2. non-maleficence; 3. justice through the 
allocation of scarce resources; 4. limited autonomy; 5. respect for the sanctity of human 
life and dignity; and 6. ethical relativism and the slippery slope.104 The principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence, of doing good and no harm, find numerous parallels 
and support within the Jewish ethical and legal tradition. Likewise, the rabbinic legal 
tradition developed principles for the allocation of scarce resources in pursuit of justice 
and equity. Because the Jewish tradition tends to conceptualize health in personal ethics 
through responsible custodianship, rather than personal ownership, autonomy will be 
limited per the dictates of Judaism’s heteronomous legal and ethical system.105  
Loike and Tendler add two additional guiding principles. Secular bioethics 
understands the concept of human dignity as relative to larger, cultural ethical constructs. 
                                                 
104 Beauchamp and Childress’s (2009) four principles are: beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and 
autonomy.  
105 For example, end-of-life decision making, including refusing treatment, deftly needs to navigate the 
prohibition of hastening death with the allowance not to delay it. See, Loike and Tendler 2011, 109-10; 
Loike, Gillick, Prager, Simon, Steinberg, Tendler, Willig, and Fischbach 2010; Tendler 2001. 
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Different ethnic cultures may thus judge dignity by their own subjective standards. The 
principle of autonomy permits an intrinsic definition of dignity, allowing even individuals 
to decide its meaning in their lives. Judaism, on the other hand, claim Loike and Tendler, 
conceives of dignity as extrinsic, inherent in the image of God in which humanity was 
fashioned, and articulated in the heteronomous laws of halakhah. As an example, Loike 
and Tendler cite attitudes toward emerging genetic biotechnologies, such as transgenic 
human spermatogenesis and oogenesis within animal gonadal tissues: 
From a halachic perspective this type of biotechnology infringes upon kevod 
heberiyot (human dignity) and would not be allowed for the following reason: In 
halacha, human reproduction requires, whenever possible, the involvement of a 
man and a woman (Niddah 31). The use of animals to create human fetuses would 
therefore infringe upon the uniqueness of humanhood or kevot haberiyot. In 
contrast, secular bioethicists might argue that this type of experimentation, if 
demonstrated to enhance fertility and be free from medical harm, would not 
infringe on any of the four bioethical guidelines. (Loike and Tendler 2011, 107)106 
 
Similarly, ethical relativism and the slippery slope is something with which halakhic 
bioethics concerns itself and protects against with foresight. 
Fundamentally, though, for Tendler and Loike, the purpose of halakhic bioethics 
is to provide scientifically and ethically informed formulations, “to help resolve, manage, 
or defuse real life dilemmas that occur in all bioethical arenas” (ibid., 93). They 
appreciate the ethical insights from secular bioethical literature, and at times from other 
faith traditions (Gribetz and Tendler 1984). However, active individual cases seek 
guidance not in bioethics, but in psak – legal decision, i.e., the application of medical 
halakhah. Since halakhic bioethics and medical halakhah synergistically inform one 
                                                 
106 For Jewish bioethical views on transgenic biotechnologies, see Loike and Tendler 2003; 2007; 2008; 
Loike 2013. 
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another, Tendler’s epistemological and axiological resources for both likewise seemingly 
influence each other.  
 
The Symbiosis of Torah and Science 
 Tendler and Loike locate their halakhic bioethics in the larger consideration of 
Torah uMadda, i.e., ways of relating Judaism and science. In “Torah and Science: 
Constructs and Methodology,” Tendler (1994) asserts an ultimate unity of religious and 
scientific knowledge, as both emanate from the single monotheistic source. Science is 
thus defined as the search for unity amidst nature’s seeming chaos. “As a result,” claims 
Tendler (ibid., 19-20), “our language should not allow for the question of whether Torah 
and madda (science) are ever in conflict – not if we restrict madda to God’s world of 
science and exclude man-made madda recorded in the literature of sociology, social 
biology, psychology and the arts and letters.” Tendler thus declares his belief in the 
epistemic specialness of both hard science and Torah, despite Torah’s fair share of arts 
and letters. Since both science and Torah reflect the same unified truth, then “there is 
never a conflict between science and Torah. If there is the appearance of a conflict, it is 
only due to one of three factors: ignorance of Torah principle; ignorance of scientific 
facts; or most commonly, ignorance of both” (ibid., 28). Tendler (ibid., 25) compares 
Torah and halakhah to mathematics and engineering: “Mathematics becomes useful when 
it is converted to engineering and Torah becomes meaningful when it is converted to 
Halakhah.” 
258 
 
 
 In 1988, Tendler (1988, 116-25) published an article, “Evolution, A Theory that 
Failed to Evolve: An Update for Torah Schools 5748.” He found two fundamental 
religious problems posed by Darwinian evolution: one, the age of the universe conflicts 
with tradition’s account of young universe, less than six-thousand years old; and two, 
“the other is randomness or undirected evolution that denies existence of a creator.” 
However, in 2007, Loike and Tendler (2006-07) published, “Molecular Genetics, 
Evolution, and Torah Principles,” in which they accept molecular genetics as the 
mechanism of evolution, and newly opine that “randomness is not a synonym for atheism 
and need not conflict with a Torah-based outlook” (Loike and Tendler 2006-07, 180).107 
They explicitly recognize that medical discoveries are possible because of the molecular 
genetic link between human beings and other life forms. This turnabout for Tendler 
attests to the seriousness in which he takes the intellectually symbiotic relationship, as he 
describes it, between Torah and science in his worldview. 
 
Nishtanah haTeva – Our Way of Understanding Nature Has Changed 
 Central to Tendler’s, and Loike’s, theology of Torah and science, and their 
methodology of halakhic bioethics and medical halakhah is the epistemological idea that 
there is progress to both scientific and halakhic knowledge: “Any discussion on bioethics 
or medical ethics must recognize that halacha respects new developments in scientific 
knowledge and technology … Applying unchanging halachic norms to new scientific 
realities can be termed nishtanah hateva, the ‘nature of things’ has changed” (Tendler 
                                                 
107 See Loike and Tendler 2014a, 43n14, for an example of recognizing evolutionary development. 
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2011). Tendler (2004) interprets “nishtanah hateva” to mean, not that nature has 
undergone a historical metamorphosis, but simply that our knowledge of science or 
medicine has changed.108 Tendler and Loike (2011, 116) claim that Rabbi Moshe 
Feinstein, Tendler’s father-in-law held this view, and applied it to his halakhic analyses 
and rulings, believing that, “under certain circumstances, we should follow the scientific 
knowledge of the times and rely on the assessment and rulings of the rabbis of every 
generation.”109 
 
New Science, Novel technologies, Legal Certainty, and Judicial Doubt 
 Recognizing progress in science and technology, Loike and Tendler likewise 
acknowledge that unprecedented phenomena raise concerns of halakhic certainty and 
doubt: “It is important to emphasize that halachic philosophy and its practical 
implications have profound effects in dealing with new and emerging bioethical 
challenges. For example, there are and will be situations where there are no halachic 
precedents in obtaining a solution…” (Loike and Tendler 2011, 117). In fact, Loike and 
Tendler (2003, 1) observe that complex biotechnological advances ironically have 
challenged and caused a reexamination of our simplest presumptions about “the basic 
definitions of human experience.” In the 1970s, the first heart transplant questioned the 
                                                 
108 See also Loike and Tendler 2011, 114-5, nn47-50, who credit Rabbi Moses Isserles (Responsum no. 6) 
with the notion that halachic principles can and should adapt to new scientific procedures and discoveries. 
They also find support for this view also in the writings of Rav Sherira Gaon, Otzar HaGeonim Gittin 68b, 
responsa section, 37b; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, “Hilkhot De’ot” 4:18; Rav Avraham ben HaRambam, 
Ma’amar ‘al HaAggadot s.v. Da Ki At; Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 173:1.  
109 See Loike and Tendler 2011, 116n58, citing Igrot Moshe, Even Ha’ezer, volume 2, 3:2; Choshen 
Mishpat, volume 2, 73:4; and Yoreh De’ah, volume 3, 36. 
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definition of death.110 Similarly, “the birth of the first test tube baby, Louise Brown, in 
1978, initiated halakhic discussions regarding the definition of motherhood, the halakhic 
status of surrogate mothers, and whether babies born by way of in vitro fertilization are 
included in the formal mitsva of reproduction” (ibid.). The advent of genetic technologies 
such as cloning, the human genome project, transgenic experimentation, and human-
animal chimera, have recently raised the question of the fundamental definition of human 
personhood. In response to all these advancements, Jewish bioethics turns to its moral 
axiology as developed in rabbinic literature and its halakhic conceptual precedents.  
Unanticipated phenomena, however, will sometimes mean that new definitions 
will need to expand old parameters, like in the case of parenthood and ART. Loike and 
Tendler’s reading of talmudic texts relevant to procreation and personhood, for example, 
lead them to posit a “mutil-faceted definition of Homo Sapiens” that “incorporates 
biological (being formed within or born from a human), cultural (expressing moral 
intelligence), and genetic (being capable of producing offspring with a human) criteria” 
(Loike and Tendler 2002, 349). Like Broyde, before them, they are eisegetically 
employing theory-laden language to generate innovative interpretations to address 
biotechnological advances. “Thus,” claim Loike and Tendler, “in this age of in vitro 
fertilization and cloning technology, the talmudic definition of humanness would include 
any organism formed utilizing somatic cells, germ line cells, or nuclei that were obtained 
from human beings” (Loike and Tendler 2002, 346). Loike and Tendler further assert 
                                                 
110 For the halakhic bioethical debate concerning the definition of death, see Tendler and Rosner 1989, 
1993; Bleich 1991b; and Shabtai 2012. For a historically informed analysis of the debate, see Reichman 
1993; and Reifman 2012, 2013. 
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that, were it technologically possible, a child conceived in vitro and gestated in an 
artificial incubating womb would earn full human status. However, lest one think that 
their interpretative process is intentionally revolutionary, they strike a triumphalist and 
protectionist note: “Within the context of a scientific definition of species we also show 
how the underlying characteristics, so-called modern theories of human identity, were in 
fact foreshadowed hundreds or thousands of years ago in halakhic literature” (Loike and 
Tendler 2003, 1). 
Table 5.7 Summary of Epistemological and Axiological Findings for Affirmed Intellectual 
Orientation 
Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler and Dr. John D. Loike’s Philosophy and Methodology of 
Halakhah and Jewish Bioethics 
Philosophy of Halakhah Formalist. 
Historical Contextualism Strong Scientific Contextualism. 
Theory of Change Halakhah adapts to and adopts advances in science. 
Scientific Epistemology Hard science is epistemically special and strongly 
privileged. 
Jewish Moral Axiology Primarily self-sufficient but external influences. 
Medical Halakhah and Jewish 
Bioethics 
Jewish Bioethics scientifically and ethically 
informs. Medical Halakhah rules and guides. 
Legal Certainty and Judicial Doubt Mitigate doubt through ruling. 
 
 
Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler’s on IVF and Parenthood 
 Tendler was an early advocate of AI and IVF, even with donor gametes, as a 
therapy for infertility (1984; 1988).111 Viewing ART through the lens of bioethics, 
                                                 
111 This positive attitude was licensed in great part by the halakhic rulings of Tendler’s father-in-law, Rabbi 
Moshe Feinstein. See Jotkowitz and Gesundheit, n.d.; and Rosner 1990. 
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Tendler believed that the rights, duties, and privileges of parenthood needed to be 
brought into balance in an ethical and equitable application: “These include the right of a 
husband and wife to procreate; the rights of a fetus or preembryo to life; the interest of 
society in preserving its ethical foundations; and the hard reality that scarce resources 
must be allocated amongst many worthy projects, thus pitting many goods against each 
other (Tendler 1988, 71). Like Bleich, Broyde, and Droff, Tendler and Loike affirm 
Judaism’s interventionist orientation toward the world, in general, and the duty to heal, in 
particular: “In Genesis 1:28 we learn that God blessed them and said to them: ‘Be fruitful 
and multiple, fill the earth and master it.’ There is a dual command in this verse. The first 
is to have children, to procreate. The second is [an] active interventionist role” (ibid., 72). 
These two commands come together in treating infertility with ART. 
 
IVF/ET and Maternity (Non-Surrogacy) 
Tendler, upon review of past medical studies, deems the potential health risks to 
both mother and child sufficiently minimal as to support strongly IVF/ET. Tendler 
writes: 
The transfer of an autologous embryo, as in the IVF technique using sperm from 
the husband, and egg from the wife, does not raise any serious ethical issues. … 
From the Judaeo-biblical heritage, these techniques conform with the Divine 
instruction to master the physical and biological world by lifting another veil from 
the face of nature. The oligospermic husband, the wife with blocked Fallopian 
tubes, can now be given the opportunity of having children whose cells contain 
their own hereditary material. (ibid., 72-3) 
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In the simple case of non-surrogacy AI and IVF/ET, the woman whose ovum is 
inseminated, and carries and births the resultant child, is unquestionably the halakhic 
mother.  
 
IVF/ET and Paternity with Husband and Donor sperm 
 Although Tendler is supportive of AI and IVF/ET, he does believe that, “the issue 
of legal paternity, however, does present religious ethical questions, especially to those 
who understand the religious consequence of knowing who your father is, the problem of 
consanguinity” (Tendler 1984, 9). However, he believes that, “The tumult on this issue is 
totally unwarranted. Taking a detour from the ovary to the uterus via a Petri plate doesn’t 
introduce any new factors” (ibid., 9). Tendler confidently asserts: “In any honest analysis 
using biblical ethics there is no doubt as to the legal paternity of this child. A child 
conceived by artificial insemination is clearly the child of the one who donated the 
genetic material. There is no question on that issue, nor is there really much of a question 
concerning bastardy” (ibid., emphasis mine).  
 Tendler (1988, 74-5) differentiates between adulterous and “unsanctified” sexual 
relations. Like Dorff, Tendler believes that adultery requires betrayal, and, “infidelity, an 
act of ‘betrayal’ of the husband’s trust does not occur under the medical protocol of 
embryo transfer using donor sperm for fertilization. There is no adultery with a 
hypodermic syringe!” (ibid.). Tendler, however, does exhibit concern about potential 
deleterious psychological impacts of using donor sperm, as well as the ethical slippery 
slope that would employ AI-D/IVF-D for eugenic purposes, preferring the superior 
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genetic stock of a donor to that of a fertile, but average husband, as well as in non-
traditional family structures (ibid.). Consanguinity and the specter of unintended incest 
by a child produced with donor gametes also persists as a concern for Tendler.112 In light 
of this, Loike and Tendler (2013a, 21) only permit a non-Jewish sperm donor. 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Dimensions: Loike and Tendler on IVF/ET and 
Parenthood 
 
 Tendler and Loike’s epistemic privileging of science, and their theology of Torah 
and science symbiotically representing a single truth, translates into an intellectual 
orientation of strong scientific contextualism which pulls them in contradictory 
directions. On the one hand, Tendler and Loike are prepared to recognize scientific 
progress and utilize their principles of halakhic bioethics, as well as the conceptual 
halakhic principles deduced from the texts, commentaries, codes, and case law of the 
rabbinic tradition, to align in realist fashion new scientific understandings with 
contemporary halakhic guidance. At the same time, their scientific worldview and faith in 
the verisimilitude of Torah traditions also allows them to read current scientific theory 
and observations into pre-modern rabbinic texts. In regard to the determination of 
paternity, they speak in terms of a monist-causal account of parenthood that focuses on 
genetics. Tendler has consistently identified paternity with genetics. Tendler (1988, 75) 
                                                 
112 Despite Tendler’s focus on genetics as a measure of paternity, in the case of testicular transplant, 
Tendler believes that halakhah views a transplanted organ as becoming legally subsumed by the 
transplantee, and thus the transplantee would be the father of any offspring born of sperm emanating from 
his body, despite having the genetic signature of the gonadal donor. At the same time, while this conceptual 
analysis and application resolve the question of halakhic paternity, biological inbreeding is still a concern, 
and thus good health records of both donor and recipient should be kept. See Tendler 1988, 76. 
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goes so far as to assert: “The sperm with its genetic material determines the paternity of 
the fetus. The ‘artificiality’ of AID or ET does not alter this conclusion, clearly held by 
all biblical authorities.” Even if the sages of antiquity had observed patterns of 
heritability and espoused contemporaneous theories of the role of male and female 
gametes in reproduction, they surely did not enjoy the knowledge of genetics born of 
scientific method and awakened in a unique, scientific-historical context.113 As 
emphasized above regarding Broyde’s similar use of genetic terminology, speaking of a 
genetic father, rather than of a sperm donor, impresses contemporary scientific awareness 
into the halakhic process, not only conveying that our knowledge of nature has changed, 
but also that our new-found knowledge of nature likewise changes medical halakhah and 
Jewish bioethics semiotically through the introduction of new theory-laden language. 
This will become more explicit in our analysis of Loike and Tendler’s halakhic bioethical 
views on surrogacy.  
Table 5.8. Summary of Attitudes Toward ART and Definitions and Account of Parenthood 
Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler and Dr. John D. Loike’s Jewish Bioethical Views on Parenthood and 
Procreation Through AI/IVF 
Attitude Toward AI and IVF AIH/IVF-H: Positive and permitting, 
AID/IVF-D: Permitting when sperm donor is non-
Jewish. 
Definition of Maternity  Monist Causal Account of maternity. 
Definition and Account of Paternity  Monist Causal Account of Paternity.  
Paternity is identified by the Genetic Father  
who is always the sperm donor. 
 
 
                                                 
113 For the history of genetics, see Mukherjee 2016. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
 
Modern in vitro fertilization, like its much older, chronological predecessor, 
artificial insemination, initially rattled the scholarly community of medical 
halakhists, especially with the introduction of third party gametes. Jewish bioethics 
was then a developing field in its earliest stages and new scientific knowledge was 
slowly being assimilated into the halakhic discussion. In the West, sexual mores 
were going through radical change challenging traditional Jewish axiologies. In our 
study of this dissertation’s four bioethical exemplars thus far, we constructed an 
intellection orientation for each based on their writings on the philosophy and 
methodology of halakhah and bioethics, and then evaluated the epistemological and 
axiological dimensions of their overall intellectual orientation, as well as their 
specific Jewish bioethical analyses of AI and/or IVF (see Table 5.9 below). Each, in 
his own way, demonstrates the imprint of scientific knowledge in developing a 
bioethical and halakhic discussion of greater nuance, as well as a more sophisticated 
philosophy and methodology of halakhah and bioethics. Their writings on AI/IVF 
also show how their growing and changing epistemologies and axiologies influence 
their readings of ancient and contemporary sources. Novel technologies force new 
considerations of definitions, like those of paternity and maternity, long considered 
clear and settled. The relationship between epistemology and moral axiology, as 
well as the Jewishly internal and external sourcing of knowledge and ethical values, 
likewise impact upon their contemporary Jewish bioethical and medical halakhic 
viewpoints regarding ART and its outcomes. Changing moral value-judgments 
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under the influence of evolving social attitudes and the increasing widespread use 
of new technologies also play a role in Jewish bioethical assessments of ART.  
 Each of the four exemplars also introduces methodological mechanisms that 
facilitate change in Jewish law and ethics in response to advances in science. Bleich 
introduces theoretic holism, which he posits regarding the halakhic system. However, 
holism must also allow for the impact of assimilated new scientific knowledge on the 
interconnected whole. Broyde introduces innovative interpretation as the primary engine 
of change in halakhah. Novel scientific awareness and understanding catalyze and 
empower such innovative interpretation, and thereby engender halakhic change. Dorff 
points to unanticipated scientific discovery and invention as creating indeterminate gaps 
within the halakhic system for which there may not be sufficient resources to provide apt 
legal precedent or analogy. Responding to those indeterminate gaps can introduce 
halakhic change. Tendler and Loike assert the need for realist realignment in face of 
changing scientific understanding to ensure that Torah is a Torat Emet – a Torah of truth. 
The Jewish bioethical analyses and medical halakhic adjudications of ART enlist these 
four methodological mechanisms as ART continues to develop and progress in 
unprecedented ways.   
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Table 5.9. Epistemological and Axiological Findings Matrix for Intellectual Orientation, Attitude 
Toward ART, and Definition of Parenthood for Four Exemplars 
 
x: Exemplar 
y: Intellection 
Orientation 
Rabbi J. David 
Bleich 
Rabbi Michael J. 
Broyde 
Rabbi Elliot N. 
Dorff 
Rabbi Moshe D. 
Tendler and Dr. 
John D. Loike 
Philosophy of 
Halakhah 
Legal Positivism Formalist Non-Formalist Formalist 
Historical 
Contextualism 
Anti-
Contextualism 
Moderate 
Contextualism 
Strong 
Contextualism 
Strong Scientific 
Contextualism 
Scientific 
Epistemology 
Hard science is 
epistemically 
special and 
moderately 
privileged 
Hard and soft 
sciences are 
epistemically 
special and 
moderately 
privileged 
Hard and soft 
sciences are 
epistemically 
special and 
strongly 
privileged 
Hard science is 
epistemically 
special and 
strongly 
privileged 
Jewish Ethical 
Moral Axiology 
Internally self-
sufficient  
 
Primarily self-
sufficient but 
external 
influences 
Internally 
insufficient 
Primarily self-
sufficient but 
external 
influences 
Medical 
Halakhah and 
Jewish Bioethics 
Jewish Bioethics 
is scientifically 
and comparative-
legally Informed 
Medical Halakhah 
Jewish Bioethics 
is scientifically 
and comparative-
legally informed 
Medical Halakhah 
Jewish Bioethics 
scientifically and 
ethically informs 
and stretches 
Medical Halakhah 
Jewish Bioethics 
scientifically and 
ethically informs. 
Medical 
Halakhah rules 
and guides. 
Legal Certainty 
and Judicial 
Doubt 
Strongly avoid 
doubt. 
Mitigate doubt 
through ruling. 
Mitigate doubt 
through judicial 
license. 
Mitigate doubt 
through ruling. 
Theory of 
Change 
Circumstances 
change, not 
halakhic 
fundamentals. 
Evolutionary 
Halakhah through 
innovative 
interpretation 
Halakhah 
stretches in light 
of changes and 
innovations. 
Halakhah adapts 
to and adopts 
advances in 
science. 
Attitude Toward 
AI and IVF 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Negative 
AID/IVF-D: 
Prohibiting 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Permitting 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Cautiously 
Positive 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Permitting if D 
non-Jewish 
Definition of 
Maternity  
Monist Causal 
Account 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Definition and 
Account of 
Paternity  
Always sperm 
donor. 
 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Always sperm 
donor. 
Monist Causal,  
but differentiates 
Genetic father of 
sexual and non-
sexual procreation 
Biological father 
of sexual 
reproduction. 
AIH/IVF-H: 
sperm donor 
AID/IVF-D: 
Two fathers: 
Biological father 
is sperm donor. 
Social Father is 
custodial father. 
Pluralist Causal & 
Volitional/Labor. 
Always sperm 
donor. 
 
Monist Causal 
Account: Genetic 
Father 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Gestational Surrogacy and Ovum Donation 
 
 Artificial insemination (AI) and in vitro fertilization (IVF) represent two 
assisted reproductive technologies (ART) that have advanced new approaches to 
overcoming fertility challenges for couples utilizing their own gametes. As modes 
of non-sexual reproduction, they have also introduced the possibility of the 
participation of third-parties in a collaborative reproductive process. AI and IVF 
allow for sperm donation from a third-party, as discussed in Chapter Five, and IVF 
also allows for a third-party ovum donor, as well as for a gestational surrogate.  
In this chapter, I focus on IVF with ovum donations and/or gestational 
surrogacy. In such cases, previously unified maternal processes – gamete provision, 
conception, gestation, and parturition – are further splintered into divided processes. 
Gestational surrogacy needs to be differentiated from other forms of surrogate 
motherhood discussed in the bioethical literature. Gestational surrogacy specifically 
refers to the case in which the woman who gestates and delivers the child is 
different from the woman whose ovum was utilized for conception. Thus, IVF with 
ovum donation is also categorized as a form of gestational surrogacy. In such cases, 
there is seemingly no genetic relationship between the gestational carrier and the 
resultant child.  Traditional surrogacy refers to a case in which the woman who 
gestates the child also contributes the ovum, and was inseminated either by a sperm 
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donor or by a married man.1 Here there is a direct genetic connection between the 
child and surrogate mother, and possibly between the child and the man who aspires 
to be the social father. In traditional surrogacy, the expectation is that after birth the 
biological mother will relinquish her custodial rights to the resultant child which a 
husband and wife wish to raise as their own (ASRM 2015). Table 10 summarizes 
possible cases of surrogacy.2 
Table 6.1. Forms of Surrogacy. TS = Traditional Surrogacy; GS = Gestational Surrogacy. 
 
Case 
# 
Surrogacy Conception Ovum 
Donor 
Sperm 
Donor 
Gestation/ 
Parturition 
Social 
Mother 
Social 
Father 
Collab-
orators 
1 TS AI/Natural Surrogate Husband Surrogate Wife Husband 3 
2 TS AI/Natural Surrogate Donor Surrogate Wife Husband 4 
3 GS IVF Wife Husband Surrogate Wife Husband 3 
4 GS IVF Wife Donor Surrogate Wife Husband 4 
5 GS IVF Donor Donor Surrogate Wife Husband 5 
6 GS IVF Donor Husband Wife Wife Husband 3 
7 GS IVF Donor Donor Wife Wife Husband 4 
8 GS after 
embryo/fetal 
transplant3 
AI/IVF or 
Natural 
Wife Husband 
 
Surrogate Wife Husband 3 
9 GS? 
Ovarian 
Transplant 
Natural Donor Husband Wife Wife Husband 3 
 
                                                 
1 Other nomenclature is also utilized in the bioethical and legal literature, such as “commercial surrogate” 
which identifies a woman who is paid to provide the labor of pregnancy, and after parturition, deliver the 
resultant child to the “commissioning parents”; a “partial surrogate” or “ovum surrogate,” other names for a 
traditional surrogate, provides both ovum and gestation; and a “full surrogate” provides gestation but no 
gametes. See, Singer and Wells 1985, 96; Arneson 1992, 132. 
2 See Broyde 1988, 131-2 who lists four cases of surrogacy, including ovarian transplants, and see Dorff 
1998b, 58 who lists six cases.  
3 In the early 1970s, some fertility specialists anticipated being able to transplant fetuses from one woman 
to another. While this made for interesting bioethical theorizing at the time, this project has been medically 
abandoned and deemed unfeasible.  
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Again, in all cases of gestational surrogacy, the ovum donor and the woman who gestates 
and delivers the child are different. Collaborative procreation thus raises anew the 
question of the nature of parenthood and its grounding, and gestational surrogacy 
particularly complicates maternal identification. As before, we will first understand the 
current science and its history, then identify issues of larger bioethical discussion, and 
then more particularly of Jewish bioethical concern, and finally evaluate the 
epistemological and axiological dimensions of the contemporary Jewish bioethical debate 
concerning maternal and paternal identity regarding gestational surrogacy.  
 
The History of Ovum Donation and Gestational Surrogacy  
 
 As presented in Chapter Five, some credit the first IVF of mammalian ova 
to Harvard biologist Gregory Goodwin Pincus and E. V. Enzmann’s in 1936. They 
successfully harvested an ovum from one doe rabbit, achieved IVF, and then 
embryo transfer (ET) to an unmated, second doe rabbit that subsequently gave birth. 
In other words, not only did they claim to achieve IVF, but also represent a first 
ever claim to gestational surrogacy!4 Immediately after the announcement of this 
feat on March 26, 1936, science journalist William L. Laurence wrote in the New 
York Times: 
As rabbits and men belong to the mammalian group, the work is viewed as 
pointing toward the possibility of human children being brought into the word by 
a “host-mother” not related by blood to the child. It is reasoned that eventually 
                                                 
4 As also mentioned in Chapter Five, later scientists doubted the veracity of these “first” claims given 
advances in the understanding of gamete physiology that make earlier successes unlikely. Pincus also 
claimed that he had parthenogenetically fertilized rabbit ova absent sperm, through a strong salt solution or 
high temperatures, thus making him the first ever claim of cloning as well! See Laurence 1936. For the 
possibility of mammalian parthenogenesis, see Kono 2004. 
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women capable of having children whose health does not permit them to do so 
may “hire” other women to bear their children for them, children actually their 
own flesh and blood. To one who desires to speculate at this point the Harvard 
experiment offers another possibility. Theoretically, at least, it may become 
possible for a woman so inclined, particularly in a country influenced by eugenic 
considerations, to bring into the world twelve children a year by “hiring” twelve 
“host-mothers” to bear their test-tube-conceived children for them. Advocates of 
“race betterment” might urge such procedures for men and women of special 
aptitudes, physical, mental or spiritual. (Laurence 1936) 
 
The New York Times followed up this article with a eugenically inclined editorial the 
next day entitled “Brave New World,” acknowledging that the “social implications … are 
not easily grasped … [but now,] human destiny, conscious and deliberate physical and 
mental improvement will be the concern of the race … the species will be more important 
than any individual.” The editorial also consolingly reassures its readership that love will 
never die even as it is sundered from parenthood: “It will be a different world, with a 
spirituality and a passion of its own” (New York Times 1936; Biggers 2013, 7).  
 In the 1970s, changing social-sexual mores and the ongoing development of 
fertility medicine created a scientific and social environment more open to collaborative 
reproduction, including traditional surrogacy through AI. Although some trace the history 
of traditional surrogacy throughout the ages all the way back to Genesis (16:1-15), when 
Sarai appoints her maidservant Hagar as a surrogate mother to Abraham, in the Modern 
Era, the first legal contract between a surrogate mother and a married couple was drafted 
in 1976 (Van Gelder 1997).5 Surrogate motherhood made headlines in 1987-8 with the 
infamous case of “Baby M,” a baby girl born on March 27, 1986, to Mary Beth 
Whitehead, who had contracted with William and Elizabeth Stern to be artificially 
                                                 
5 Rachel and Leah similarly use their maidservants Bilhah and Zilpah as surrogates, see Genesis 30:1-24. 
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inseminated with William Stern’s sperm, and then gestate and bear his child, which upon 
delivery would be given to the Sterns in consideration of a $10,000 payment. After the 
birth of the child, who Whitehead named Sara and the Sterns named Melissa, and some 
custodial back and forth, Whitehead had a change of heart and refused to relinquish her 
daughter to the Sterns. On March 31, 1987, Judge Harvey R. Sorkow declared the 
contract binding and issued an adoption order establishing Elizabeth Stern as Baby M’s 
legal mother. A year later, on February 3, 1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
overturned Sorkow’s previous ruling, invalidating surrogacy contracts more generally, 
and setting into motion a complicated history of judicial and legislative consideration of 
traditional surrogacy, procreative liberty, and contract law (Shanley 2001, 102-3; 177-
8nn1-4). 
 In 1985, in the United States, seven years after the birth of Louise Brown, the first 
successful human IVF/ET, Wulf H. Utian, Leon Sheean, James M. Goldfarb, and Robert 
Kiwi reported the first successful gestational-surrogate pregnancy utilizing an embryo 
conceived in vitro with an infertile women’s ovum and her husband’s sperm. The 
gestational surrogate was a married, twenty-two-year-old woman, who already had borne 
two healthy children (Utian, et al. 1985). Four years later, in 1989, Patrick Steptoe and 
Robert Edwards oversaw Europe’s first case of gestational surrogacy. Treatment 
guidelines, ethical considerations, legal adjudications, and regulatory directives 
followed.6 While traditional surrogacy has a track record of legal complications and 
                                                 
6 Surrogacy laws and governmental regulations vary greatly within the United States, and throughout the 
world. See Rao 2003 for an analysis of the “patchwork” of laws and regulations in the US. In the UK, 
surrogacy is fully regulated, see Brinsden 2003. Likewise, surrogacy is fully regulated in Israel, see Schuz 
2003. 
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conflicts, gestational surrogacy less so. Longitudinal follow-up studies for gestational 
surrogacy attest to largely positive outcomes (Goldfarb, et al. 2000; Brinsden 2003). 
 
The Science of Gestational Surrogacy 
 Gestational surrogacy is achieved through the same IVF reproductive technology 
presented above in Chapter Five. The clinical process of IVF/ET remains nearly the same 
for all cases of gestational surrogacy. The difference being that hormonal therapy is 
necessary to prepare two women for their respective contributing roles. The egg donor 
needs to undergo ovarian stimulation and oocyte retrieval, thereby assuming attendant 
health risks and inconvenience.7 The gestational surrogate needs hormonal manipulation 
to ready her uterus for implantation (ASRM 2015, 14). Beyond the health risks of 
hormonal treatment, the surrogate also bears health risks and inconveniences attendant to 
pregnancy and delivery. In ovum surrogacy, a woman lacking viable ova can gestate a 
fetus conceived via IVF from a donor ovum and her husband’s sperm, or a donor embryo. 
Whereas in gestational surrogacy, a woman can gestate a fetus conceived in vitro with the 
healthy ovum of a woman who is unable to carry a pregnancy to term for any number of 
reasons, such as missing or malformed uterus, or due to a disease or medical condition 
making pregnancy too high of a health risk to the ovum donor/social mother and/or to the 
fetus (Dorff 1998, 59).  
                                                 
7 Egg donors, like sperm donors, are also tested for infectious disease, as well as are screened for medical 
and genetic history. Recent advances in oocyte vitrification and cryopreservation have made it newly 
possible to freeze donated ova for an extended period before use to allow for a post-latency period re-
testing of the donor for infectious disease. Since egg donation entails both health risks and inconvenience, 
significant monetary compensation is often provided to the donor. In general, the IVF/ET costs are greater 
in cases of gestational surrogacy since more than one woman needs to be treated, see ASRM 2015, 14. 
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Issues of General and Jewish Bioethical Concerns Relating to Gestational Surrogacy 
 
While gestational surrogacy originally began as a method for a married couple to 
overcome infertility, over time it assumed other social uses, when legally permitted. 
Gestational surrogacy has become an option for same-sex couples to generate children 
genetically related to themselves through gamete donation, as well as an option for fetal 
incubation for a woman who desires a genetically related child, but prefers not to be 
burdened by pregnancy. Changing family constructs thus became an issue of social and 
ethical concern and regulation. The increasing medicalization of childbirth raised anew 
questions of artificiality and naturalness (Cook, Sclater, and Kaganas 2003, 5-6; Teman 
2003a,b).8 Popular, scholarly, and legal debates raged about the commodification of 
reproduction, the potential for exploitation of surrogates, discrimination in selection 
processes, distributive justice, procreative liberty, privacy, and bodily autonomy (Purdy 
1989, 1990; Ber 2000). Feminist ethicists themselves have been divided in their 
assessments of surrogacy, some adamantly against, and others in favor of legalization 
(Anderson 1990; Shalev 1989; McLeod 2009).9 Some ethicists seek to distinguish 
between commercial and altruistic surrogacy, i.e., “contract” and “gift” surrogacy, with 
the former considered a form of prostitution or contractual slavery, and the later an act of 
kindness. Others, however, argue that both types of arrangements curtail personal 
autonomy, entail risk, attenuate birth-mothers’ rights, and have the potential for 
exploitation (Anleu 1992; Lane 2003). Yet others acknowledge the exploitation implicit 
                                                 
8 In legal disputes, claims of naturalness and accusations of artificiality get caught up in the identification 
of legal parenthood, see Annas 1991. 
9 See also Arneson 1992; and Laufer-Ukeles 2002. 
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in the commodification and commercialization of reproduction, but argue that voluntary, 
mutually advantageous exploitation is not immoral and should be legal (Wertheimer 
1992). Medical professionals and bioethicists alike worry for long-term, negative, 
psychological impacts, as well as whether or not there should be ongoing familial 
entanglements between the child, the genetic and/or social parents, and the surrogate. 
Jewish bioethicists, jurists, and medical halakhists consider many of these issues, 
as well, especially in Israel which has legalized and regulated gestational surrogacy since 
1996.10 They also concern themselves with questions of confidentiality and disclosure 
regarding consanguinity and the later potential for unintended incest, and related 
questions pertaining to the use of donor gametes from relatives, and relatives serving as 
gestational surrogates. However, the primary issue that has engaged medical halakhists 
and Jewish bioethicists regarding gestational surrogacy, including IVF with ovum 
donation, is the question of maternal identification – who is the halakhic mother? 
Additionally, since halakhic Judaism asserts that Jewish identity is matrilineal, when 
collaborative reproduction utilizes the gamete and/or gestational services of non-Jews, 
the resultant child’s Jewish status and the possible need for religious ritual conversion are 
also at question (Steinberg 2003g, 581-3; Heisherik 1997; Kurztag 1999; Wahrburg 
2011). 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Shifman 1987; Kahn 1998, 2000; Clark and Silverman 1999; Schenker 2003; Schuz 2003; Sinclair 
2003, 113-20; Hashiloni-Dolev 2006. 
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Gestational Surrogacy and Parenthood: Epistemological and Axiological 
Considerations 
 
 Paternal identification in cases of traditional or gestational surrogacy is the 
same as in the case of AI and IVF with husband and donor sperm discussed above 
in Chapter Five. However, the question of maternal identity in cases of gestational 
surrogacy is virtually unprecedented. The closest medical analogy would be to 
ovarian transplantation, whose halakhic evaluation was analyzed above in Chapter 
Four. There too the gestational carrier does not share the same DNA with the ovum 
whose fertilization generated the child she will deliver. However, even this 
commonality only arises with new knowledge of the science of oogenesis and 
genetics. On the surface, the case of ovarian transplantation is fundamentally unlike 
the case of gestational surrogacy, given that conception is achieved naturally 
between a unique woman and man. Therefore, scientific awareness and the role of 
new knowledge are potentially poised to play an important epistemological role in 
the adjudication of maternal identification in gestational surrogacy. Additionally, 
philosophical and secular legal literacy may also aid in the conceptualization of 
collaborative reproduction and its application in legal reasoning.  
However, as legally oriented scholars, the first tack that medical halakhists 
and Jewish bioethicists will take to assess maternal identification in cases of 
gestational surrogacy is to mine the rabbinic-textual tradition for potential legal 
precedents and analogies. Such analogical findings are then tested and sifted over 
time in the crucible of scholarly debate. Once again, the imprint of scientific 
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knowledge and its awareness need to be epistemologically discerned for each 
discrete analysis of such legal precedents and analogies.  
Axiologically, in a way, we begin at the end and work backwards. Today, 
gestational surrogacy is widely supported within a broad spectrum of the Jewish 
community. There are indeed rabbinical leaders of the Haredi community in Israel 
and the United States who have utilized broadsides to prohibit sperm and ovum 
donation, and gestational surrogacy (Wosner 2009). However, the necessity of 
broadside proclamations may itself indicate increasing social acceptance amongst 
the grassroots. Furthermore, there are Haredi, Modern Orthodox, and Conservative 
halakhists who permit gestational surrogacy, and Orthodox fertility-consultation 
services that will assist couples seeking halakhic counsel regarding and assistance 
with gestational surrogacy, such as Machon Puah in Jerusalem.11 Yet, such was not 
the case upon gestational surrogacy’s arrival as a viable ART (Zohar 1991, 13-4).12 
What axiological dynamics account for the change in attitude and orientation? 
We now proceed to investigate this dissertation’s four Jewish bioethical 
exemplars on ovum donation and gestational surrogacy: Rabbis J. David Bleich, 
Michael J. Broyde, Elliot N. Dorff, and Moshe D. Tendler and Dr. John D. Loike. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See Nishmat’s “Women’s Health and Halacha” website, http://www.yoatzot.org/questions-and-
answers/answer.asp?id=1048. 
12 David Feldman and Fred Rosner were of the first Conservative and Orthodox, respectively, Jewish 
bioethicists to permit, see, Rosner 1991, 114. 
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Rabbi J. David Bleich on Gestational Surrogacy and Parenthood 
 
The question of maternal identity and gestational surrogacy in Jewish 
bioethics and medically halakhah preceded the first reported case of gestational 
surrogacy in 1985 by fifteen years. In March 1970, in England, there was 
“widespread public discussion” about test-tube babies and incubating host-mothers 
due to claims that such reproductive possibilities were imminent. Chief Rabbi of 
England Immanuel Jakobovitz released a statement at the time commenting: 
Hardly less offensive to moral susceptibilities is the proposal to abort a 
mother’s naturally fertilized egg and to re-implant it into a “host-mother” as 
a convenience for women who seek the gift of a child without the 
encumbrance and disfigurement of pregnancy. To use another person as an 
“incubator” and then take from her the child she carried and delivered for a 
fee is a revolting degradation of maternity and an affront to human dignity. 
(Jacobovitz 1975, 264-5)13 
 
While Jakobovitz does not add halakhic analysis to his moral denunciation, in 1972, 
J. David Bleich, published a preliminary halakhic analysis of “Host-Mothers” as 
part of his series surveying recent halakhic periodical literature. Bleich (1972, 127) 
considers medical factors beyond convenience for gestational surrogacy, 
theoretically asking regarding fetal transplantation: “Would Halakhah sanction the 
use of a ‘host-mother’ for the purpose of saving the fetus?” Additionally, Bleich 
inquires if gestational surrogacy took place regardless of its halakhic sanction, who 
would we identify as the halakhic mother? 
                                                 
13 In 1975, Jakobovitz updated his 1959 Jewish Medical Ethics with an additional chapter, “Recent 
Developments in Jewish Medical Ethics,” in which this quotation appears, see Jakobovitz 1975, 251-94. 
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 Absent any clear precedent or previous halakhic discussion, Bleich 
considers whether ovarian transplantation may serve as a legal analogy. Citing the 
prior analysis of Rabbi Yekutiel Ayreh Kamelhar of Chicago, who in 1932 wrote 
that he halakhically viewed a transplanted organ as having assimilated into, and 
thereby assuming the identity of the recipient’s body, Bleich (Bleich 1972, 129) 
states: “To a significant degree, the identical argumentation may be applied in 
determining the maternity of a child born of a fertilized ovum implanted in the 
womb of a host-mother.”14 Kamelhar himself had identified two possible legal 
analogies to support his ruling regarding ovarian transplantation. First, in 
agricultural halakhah, a limb of a less-than-three-year-old tree assumes the 
chronological age of an older tree upon which it is grafted. Second, in the laws of 
animal husbandry, only the mother is considered to establish the species of the 
offspring since she “nurtures and sustains the embryo” (ibid., 128). Kamelhar 
opined that even per the conflicting opinion that “the father’s seed is to be 
considered,” that is only because in inter-species mixing, the male seed plays a 
dynamic role. For Kamelhar, the ovary is distinct from dynamic seed and only 
functions by being situated in a body.15 Bleich asserts that in the case of gestational 
surrogacy, like for the halakhah of species determination, “it is the host-mother who 
nurtures the embryo and sustains gestation” (ibid., 129). 
                                                 
14 See above, Chapter Four, p. 146 ff., 146n34; Reichman 1998, 46-8. 
15 Knowledge of oogenesis postdates Kamelhar. Although Bleich does not refer to oogenesis here, he does 
so in his article on “Test-Tube Babies,” see Bleich 1978, 89-90. 
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Bleich, however, also distinguishes embryo transplantation from ovarian 
transplantation. He writes: 
However, the role of the natural mother in determination of identity is a dynamic 
one and analogous to that of "the seed of the father." It may therefore be argued 
that, according to those who assert with reference to classification of hybrids that 
"the seed of the father is to be considered" in the case of an already fertilized 
ovum the maternal relationship between the child and the donor mother is to be 
"considered" no less than "the seed of the father." Consideration must also be 
given to the possibility that perhaps two maternal relationships may exist 
simultaneously just as maternal and paternal relationships exist at one and the 
same time. The child would then in effect have two '"mothers," the donor mother 
and the host mother. 
According to some authorities, however, the donor mother alone may be 
viewed as the mother in the eyes of Jewish. law. There are those who maintain 
that the prohibition against feticide is applicable from the moment of conception 
and deem the fetus to be a nascent human being even in the earliest stages of 
gestation. According to this view, the zygote may perhaps be viewed as having 
already acquired identity and parentage. (ibid., 129) 
 
Bleich thus begins the Jewish bioethical consideration of maternal identity in cases of 
gestational surrogacy by making four important points while surveying the logical 
halakhic possibilities:16 First, perhaps the host-mother should be considered the halakhic 
mother because the embryo is assimilated into her body, and she gestates and nurtures it, 
suggesting a labor-based, causal account of maternity. Second, perhaps, the ovum donor, 
who in the case of embryo/fetal transplantation is also the “natural mother,” is the 
halakhic mother since she plays a dynamic role “in the determination of identity,” akin to 
“the seed of the father” (ibid.). In other words, although in 1972 Bleich does not yet 
invoke genetics, he recognizes a causal account of parenthood and personhood related to 
the gametic imprint upon identity. Third, perhaps the ovum donor should be considered 
                                                 
16 Note that here Bleich does not acknowledge the possibility that a child born through gestational 
surrogacy has no halakhic mother. He does contend with this possibility later in Bleich 1995a, 238-42. 
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the halakhic mother because parenthood arguably attaches along with personhood, and in 
the halakhic debate surrounding abortion, some halakhic authorities endow personhood, 
i.e., the status of, in Bleich’s words, “a nascent human being,” during the earliest stages 
of gestation and therefore prohibit abortion as feticide (ibid.; Bleich 1979d). Per Bleich, 
even a zygote may have “already acquired identity and parenthood, and thus the ovum 
donor’s maternal claim preempts that of the “host-mother” (Bleich 1972). Fourth, It may 
be possible that collaborative reproduction will create a new circumstance in which “two 
maternal relationships may exist simultaneously” (ibid.). Thus, for the first time in Jewish 
history, Bleich moves the halakhic and Jewish bioethical discourse from a monist to a 
pluralist standard of maternity.17 
In 1981, three years after the first successful IVF and his first article on “Test-
tube Babies,” and four years before the first successful gestational surrogacy, Bleich 
returned to the question of maternal identity in cases of host-mothers.18 Here he explicitly 
invokes genetics: “The question which must be considered is whether, for purposes of 
Jewish law, maternal identity is established by conception, by parturition or, perhaps, by 
genotype” (Bleich 1981b, 359). Bleich then adduces a talmudic support for parturition 
establishing maternal identity, and an aggadic support for conception as a determinant. 
                                                 
17 The earliest conception of a pluralist standard of biological maternity in Western medicine may possibly 
be attributed to Robert Tuttle Morris who used the phrase “treble parentage” in 1895 in a surgical treatise, 
that included a chapter on ovarian transplantation, see Morris 1895a, 156-9, cited in Simmer 1970, 321, 
327n55. Simmer, ibid., tells how ovarian transplantation aroused much controversy regarding maternal 
identification. See also Reichman 1998, 35-6. There is no indication that Bleich was aware of this history. 
See also S. Feldman 1992. 
18 Bleich’s 1981b article was reprinted in a slightly more expanded rendition in Bleich 1983. 
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Citing Rabbi Moshe Hershler (Hershler 1980, 1:316), Bleich brings in a talmudic 
passage (TB Yevamot 97b) that rules that twin sons born to a woman who had converted 
to Judaism after conception, but prior to parturition, have no obligation for levirate 
marriage if one brother would predecease his twin while childless, since, in utero, the 
“rebirth” of conversion halakhically severs parental ties. At the same time, they cannot 
marry each other’s wife after a divorce because their twin-birth established them as 
maternal brothers. Thus, opines Hershler, this talmudic passage establishes maternal 
identity and relations at parturition.  
After his full halakhic analysis, as an additional support, Hershler (ibid., 319-20) 
introduces an aggadic source into the Jewish bioethical discussion of gestational 
surrogacy. Genesis 30:23-4 identifies Joseph as the son of Rachel; Genesis 34:1 calls 
Dinah, “the daughter of Leah.” However, both the Babylonian and Palestinian talmudic 
traditions preserve a more complicated background to the birth of Dinah and Joseph. Per 
the aggadah, Rachel was pregnant with a girl and Leah with a boy. However, Leah knew 
through divine inspiration that Jacob would have twelve sons, and given that she already 
had six, and each of the maidservants, Bilhah and Zilpah, had two, if she would bear 
another son, then Rachel would only contribute, at best, one son to the twelve tribes. In 
order to for Rachel to contribute at least the same number of sons as the maidservants, 
Leah prayed to God to effectuate a switch. The Palestinian Talmud (Berakhot 9:3) 
understands that the gender of each fetus changed in utero. Some interpret the Babylonian 
Talmud (Berakhot 60a) similarly. However, Targum Yonatan (Genesis 30:21) 
interpolates into his Aramaic translation of Genesis that Leah prayed for, and was 
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granted, a fetal transfer.19 Thus, even though Leah was conceived by Rachel, since she 
was born of Leah, she is “the daughter of Leah,” further supporting parturition as the 
maternal indicator. 
Rabbi Menashe Grossberg (1925, 145-6) in his commentary on Targum Yonatan 
applies this aggadic tradition to uterine transplantation: “from here there is support for the 
halakhic consideration of a woman in whom physicians transplanted her daughter’s 
reproductive organs, whether she is permitted to her husband (for sexual relations), or 
whether she is incestuously prohibited.”20 Grossberg had previously cited Rabbi Meir 
Eisenstadt’s Kotnot Or (1891, 51) to resolve Rabbi Elijah Mizrachi’s question regarding 
Rashi’s commentary on Genesis 46:10 that stated Simeon married his sister Dinah, 
though they were both children of Leah. If, however, Leah was really Rachel’s daughter, 
and prior to Sinai only maternal siblings, but not paternal, were incestuously prohibited, 
then Simeon married her lawfully. Rabbi Bleich suggests that, per Grossberg, conception 
establishes maternity. It should be noted, though, that conception as a determinant need 
not be based on a genetic account per se.21 However, in light of Grossberg and Hershler’s 
utilization of the same aggadah to arrive at opposite conclusions, Bleich concludes that 
                                                 
19 For more information about Targum Yonatan, i.e. Pseudo-Jonathan, see Beattie and McNamara 1994. 
Rabbi Shmuel Eidels (1555-1641), in Maharsha, ad loc. Niddah 31a, interprets TB Berakhot 60a in light of 
Targum Yonatan’s fetal transfer. 
20 Grossberg doesn’t complete the application which presumably would prohibit a man from cohabiting 
with his wife into whom was transplanted her daughter’s reproductive organ since the original 
identification endures. It is also interesting that Grossberg reverses the medical scenario which originally 
positing the transplantation of a mother’s reproductive organ into her daughter, see above, Chapter Four, 
145 ff. 
21 This is made clear by Frimer 1982, 174, in a letter to the editor in response to Bleich 1981b. 
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this “illustrates the cogency of the position … that halakhic principles are not derivable 
from aggadic sources” (Bleich 1981b, 360).22 
In 1991, Bleich returned to consider ovum donation and gestational surrogacy, but 
this time frames the question of maternal identification in the idiom of modern medicine: 
“In each of these cases there is some question with regard to whether the genetic mother 
or the gestational mother is regarded as the child’s mother for matters in which such a 
relationship is significant in Jewish law…” (Bleich 1991a, 82). Bleich asserts that “the 
consensus of rabbinic opinion is that the maternal-filial relationship is generated between 
the gestational mother and the child, despite the absence of any genetic relationship, by 
virtue of parturition alone” (ibid.). He further states that it is an open question as to 
whether the resultant child may have two halakhic mothers. Bleich rehearses the possible 
options for maternal identification in an increasing variety of scenarios, copiously citing, 
elucidating, and critiquing the growing medical halakhic literature and its adduced legal 
analogies, precedents, and reasoning. For Bleich, “the crux of the question, however, is 
whether halakhah at all recognizes a maternal relationship based upon donation of an 
ovum, i.e. a relationship based solely upon genetic considerations” (ibid., 87). He 
acknowledges that there indeed may not be any rabbinic sources that can be marshalled 
as evidence for a genetic account of maternity. In his conclusion, Bleich restates his 
opening assertions: 
In the opinion of this writer, the preponderance of evidence adduced from 
rabbinic sources demonstrates that parturition, in and of itself, serves to establish 
                                                 
22 Bleich cites this conclusion in the name Rabbi Joshua Feigenbaum who critiqued Grossberg’s utilization 
of this aggadah for a halakhic application. Bleich argument is perplexing here because different halakhists 
will sometime utilize the same halakhic source and also arrive at opposite conclusions. 
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a maternal relationship. Nevertheless, the possibility that Jewish law may 
recognize a second maternal relationship based upon donation of an ovum cannot 
be excluded and indeed there is some evidence indicating that such an additional 
relationship is recognized. It is also possible that an additional non-genetic and 
non-parturitional relationship, or even multiple relationships of that nature, may 
be established on the basis of gestation. Thus, for purposes of Jewish law, the 
relationship arising from parturition must be regarded as firmly established 
whereas genetic and gestational relationships must be regarded as doubtful 
(safek). The primary effect, but by no means the sole implication, of recognition 
of this “doubtful” relationship is to prohibit marriage between genetic siblings and 
other genetic relatives. (Bleich 1991a, 95) 
 
Although Bleich’s knowledge of human reproduction leads him to consider maternal 
identifications brought to light by scientific advancement, in the end, his philosophy of 
“halakhic positivism” privileges a process of halakhic adjudication based on the received 
textual tradition. While his willingness to consider a pluralist standard of maternity seems 
to stem in part from his affirmative belief that science and Torah converge on a single 
truth, his advocacy for dual-maternity primarily comes from his approach to legal 
certainty and judicial doubt.23 As Bleich (2017a, 9-10) recently posited: “The most 
fundamental expression of “Zeh Keli ve-anvehu – This is my God and I will beautify 
Him” (Exodus 15:2) is scrupulous avoidance of halakhic doubt in performance of 
mitzvot.”24 This holds especially true in cases of ambiguous maternal identity given the 
halakhic fundamentality of Jewishness and severity of the laws of consanguinity.  
 In 1994, however, Bleich revisited maternal identification in light of Rabbi Ezra 
Bick’s (1993) published critique of his halakhic method and conclusions. Bick, a Rosh 
                                                 
23 See Sinclair 2003, 107, who believes Bleich’s theory of plural motherhood is “a response to the 
challenge to the traditional approach raised by modern genetics.” 
24 See Bleich 1994, 56, where he concludes that when “conventional halakhic methodology provides no 
solutions,” like in the matters of gestational surrogacy and ovum donation, “the matter is then to be treated 
by application of the halakhic canons governing situations of doubt.” 
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Metivta (Talmud instructor) at Yeshivat Har Etzion in Israel, asserts that the novel 
question of maternal identification in cases of gestational surrogacy and ovum donation 
“is not susceptible to the classic halakhic approach of analogy with an existent halakhic 
ruling” (ibid., 28). Contra Bleich, Bick denies that a “preponderance” of halakhic 
authorities support parturition as determining maternity; Bick claims that “practically 
speaking, no halakhic sources exist for this or any competing candidate for the 
determinant” (ibid.). Bick proceeds to show how the sources Bleich adduces in favor of 
parturition can also be read in support of the ovum donor, thereby making motherhood 
genetically indicated. Bick argues: “If conventional halakhic method fails, the result 
should not be desperate attempts to preserve a semblance of halakhic reasoning. There 
may be questions to which conventional halakhic methodology provides no sources, no 
solutions” (ibid., 32). Therefore, Bick suggests halakhic adjudication not by flawed legal 
analogies, but by conceptual models inspired by careful readings of primary source 
materials. Bick suggests that talmudic understandings of reproduction either support a 
“biological model,” in which both man and woman contribute seed, or, alternatively, an 
“agricultural model,” in which a man plants his seed in a fertile woman. In light of 
modern science, the first would lead to a genetic account of parenthood; the second to a 
gestational account of maternity.25 Bick further denies the possibility of multiple mothers, 
and finally asserts that conceptual modelling rather than adjudication by legal analogy 
                                                 
25 Paternity may still be assigned to the sperm donor. However, Bick also entertains the notion that per the 
agricultural model, there may only be motherhood, and no fatherhood, in cases of IVF absent a process 
akin to “seeding.” 
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allows for halakhah to be derived from aggadic sources and Jewish ethics to be distilled 
from halakhah.26 
 In response, Bleich disputes Bick’s points of critique finding his alternate 
readings unsupportable, and his characterization of Bleich’s legal method as inaccurate. 
Bleich (1994, 55) counters: “The methodology is not really reasoning by analogy at all, 
but rather the identification of an operative principle equally applicable…” Bleich turns 
Bick’s critique on itself, retorting: “The one thing we must not do is engage in “desperate 
attempts to preserve a semblance of halakhic reasoning” – including the drawing of 
inappropriate analogies, construction of conceptual models and derivation of halakhic 
norms from philosophical or aggadic notions” (ibid., 56). Bick’s preference for reading 
ancient texts in light of modern science leads Bleich to clarify the role of genetics in 
establishing maternal identification: “It must be clearly recognized that Halakhah takes 
no direct cognizance of genetics as a significant factor in and of itself” (ibid., 53). Bleich 
asserts that halakhic terminology therefore should reflect this, remarking that an ovum 
donor is “a term that I regard as, halakhically speaking, more precise than ‘genetic 
mother’” (ibid., 52).  
 A year later, Bleich (1995a) published his fourth volume of Contemporary 
Halakhic Problems, in which he reworked all his previous writings on IVF, gestational 
surrogacy, and ovum donation into a comprehensive treatment of the issues. He reiterates 
his preference for parturition as the maternal determinant, along with his concern of legal 
                                                 
26 Bick credits Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik as the source for his method of conceptual modelling, see Bick 
1993, 43.  
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uncertainty regarding gestation, ovum donation, and even genetics also serving as 
grounds for motherhood in a pluralist maternal model. In practice, per Bleich, the rules 
governing legal doubt require an approach of stringency, for example, in circumstantially 
relevant halakhic areas, such as conversion and consanguinity. In yet a later article on 
surrogate motherhood concerning bioethical issues broader than maternal identity, Bleich 
(1998b, 163), writes of a surrogate that, “she is a natural mother, both biologically and 
psychologically.” This assessment was born of Bleich’s scientific awareness of 
reproduction, as well as his psychological reading of traditional surrogacy in Genesis and 
of the human dimensions of surrogacy-related U.S. court cases.  
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Rabbi J. David Bleich on Gestational 
Surrogacy 
 
 From 1972 through the present, Bleich’s writings display a halakhic epistemology 
that is scientifically and medically informed. His scholarship on IVF, ovum donation, and 
gestational surrogacy not only records the contemporary development of medical 
halakhah and Jewish bioethics, but influentially shaped the field as well, especially with 
his introduction of a pluralist model of motherhood and his encyclopedic presentation of 
sources and opinions.27 At the very least, Bleich’s acute scientific awareness and 
understanding has led to greater sophistication and nuance of analysis. His comparative 
                                                 
27 For example, the late preeminent Israeli posek, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, ruled in line with 
Bleich’s theory of dual-maternity, see Avraham 1993, vol. 4., Evan Ha’Ezer 5:2; Steinberg 1997, 5. It 
should also be noted that Auerbach disapproved of such collaborative reproduction, deeming it contrary to 
Torah values, see Mashiach 2013, 106-8. 
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legal interests also have influenced his epistemology lending themselves to better framing 
of halakhic issues.28 
Although Bleich introduces the language of genetics into his Jewish bioethical 
analyses, his careful, legally positivistic halakhic methodology prevents him from 
eisegetically reading genetics into pre-modern sources, something seemingly done by 
other medical halakhists.29 However, genetic awareness and understanding does influence 
the questions Bleich raises, his review of sources, and even his judicial judgments. While 
legal uncertainty may have led him to advocate for dual-maternity, his concern for the 
status of the ovum donor is arguably influenced by his knowledge of genetics. This is 
seen in the language with which he frames his discussion of the issues.  
Axiologically, Bleich is quite conservative. While his initial hesitation toward 
IVF technology was rooted in the bioethical principle of maleficence-avoidance on behalf 
of both mother and child, even when IVF has proven largely safe with positive natal 
outcomes, Bleich still disapproves of its use with marital gametes, prohibits with donor 
sperm, and is avowedly unsupportive of surrogacy arrangements and ovum donation 
(Bleich 1998b). Bleich demonstrates that axiological conservativism can limit the 
progressive application of scientific knowledge and technological capability. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 This is true throughout his writings. For a recent example, see Bleich 2016c on the legal disposition of 
embryos. 
29 See Soloveitchik 1980; Kilav 1984; Bleich 1994, 54, regarding Bick; and Bleich 1995a, 255nn27-8, 
regarding Joshua Ben-Meir and Kilav, and the section on Broyde following below. 
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Rabbi Michael J. Broyde on Gestational Surrogacy and Parenthood 
 
 In 1988, three years after the first successful gestational surrogacy and shortly 
after the “Baby M” case was making headlines, Rabbi Michael J. Broyde published a 
legal note on, “The Establishment of Maternity and Paternity in Jewish and American 
Law.” In a section on, “The Establishment of Maternity and Surrogate Motherhood,” 
Broyde identifies four types of surrogates: one, where “the ‘surrogate’ mother is the 
genetic mother as well as the person in whom ovulation, conception, pregnancy, and birth 
occur;” two, ovarian transplantation in which “the child conceived from such a donation 
is genetically related to the donor, but is the product of ovulation, conception, pregnancy, 
and birth from the surrogate;” three, ovum donation, in which “a single egg is removed 
from the genetic mother and implanted in the surrogate mother;” and four, fetal 
transplant, in which, “the genetic mother’s ovum is naturally fertilized,” before being 
transferred to the surrogate (Broyde 1988, 131-2). It is noteworthy that Broyde frames his 
discussion by distinguishing between the genetic mother and the surrogate mother, 
something he does throughout his presentation. 
Broyde inquires as to the halakhic factors that determine motherhood and whether 
there is a consistent maternal standard for all aspects of Jewish law, including 
inheritance, incest, and redemption of the firstborn. Broyde initially sets out to 
demonstrate that, “although somewhat counter-intuitive, Jewish law does not 
automatically employ genetics to answer all questions of lineage” (ibid., 133). While 
Broyde is certainly writing to a broad readership given that his legal note was published 
in the National Jewish Law Review, rather than in a halakhic journal, once again, it is 
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epistemologically noteworthy that he speaks of assuming a genetic standard as 
“intuitive.” Broyde cites three examples in which Jewish law rejects genetics as 
determinative. First, conversion dissolves legal consanguinity. Second, Jewish law does 
not recognize legal paternity in the laws of animal husbandry. Third, in the agricultural 
laws of grafting, the genetics of tree branches become irrelevant after grafting. Broyde 
clearly considers the ancient concept of lineage and the modern notion of genetics as 
legally equivalent and exegetically interchangeable (ibid., 133-4). 
Regarding gestational surrogacy, Broyde believes that the weight of halakhah’s 
interpretive and codificatory history has established parturition, rather than conception as 
determining maternity, especially when conception isn’t “legally significant,” such as in 
the case of IVF. Thus, gestational surrogacy would be added to Broyde’s list of cases in 
which Jewish law does not employ genetics to determine lineage. Per Broyde, once 
Jewish law determines a particular mother and father to be the halakhic parents, each 
one’s parenthood, like that of natural parenthood, is irrevocable (ibid., 131). Although 
Broyde believes that most rabbinic sources support that maternity is determined by the 
birth mother, genetic awareness still plays an important role in his halakhic analysis of 
the issues (ibid., 134-40). 
In 1988, Broyde is familiar with much of the extant medical-halakhic and Jewish-
bioethical literature dealing with ART, collaborative reproduction, and genetic 
engineering.30 He cites several potential halakhic precedents and legal analogies dealt 
with in the relevant scholarship. The first source is the aforementioned aggadah 
                                                 
30 See Broyde 1988, 134-9nn125, 128, 131, 167, 169, 170. 
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concerning the birth of Joseph and Dinah by the matriarchs Rachel and Leah in the book 
of Genesis. Broyde believes that the talmudic rendition of the aggadah support the idea 
that “she who gives birth to the child is the mother” (ibid., 134). The non-talmudic 
rendition of this aggadah, what Broyde identifies as midrash, as cited by Targum 
Yonatan, which may support conception as a determinant, is even less authoritative than 
talmudic aggadah, whose own legal evidentiary legitimacy is denied by many 
authorities.31 Thus, Broyde dismisses this source as likely not being dispositive, nor even 
significant, in the adjudication of maternal identity (ibid., 135). 
Broyde also cites TB Yevamot 97b regarding the twin fetuses who were 
converted along with their mother in utero, originally cited by Hershler, and deemed by 
Bleich to be the strongest source indicating parturition as the halakhic maternal 
determinant.32 For Broyde, the importance of this source is two-fold. First, it shows that 
the Talmud views conversion as severing, “all previously established genetic 
relationships” (ibid.). Once again, Broyde speaks in the idiom of genetics. Second, said 
conversionary severance also makes the twins’ conception “legally insignificant,” 
creating, per Broyde, a legally analogous situation to conception via IVF, which he also 
deems as “legally insignificant” since it occurs ex vivo (ibid., 136, 139).  
Broyde, however, extensively interrogates a third talmudic support, which he 
deems as “an equally significant proof” for parturition as establishing halakhic 
motherhood. The Talmud (TB Yevamot 78a) states that a child born to a woman who 
                                                 
31 See ibid., 135n130. 
32 See above p. 283. 
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converted to Judaism while pregnant does not need a separate immersion, but is 
considered Jewish. Most commentators “adopt the intuitive explanation” that the child is 
Jewish having been born to a newly Jewish woman. The Jewish birthright of the child 
holds true regardless of one’s halakhic position concerning whether a fetus has the legal 
status of an appendage of its mother, or whether the fetus enjoys independent quasi-
personhood in utero. For Broyde, it also logically follows that she who confers upon a 
child Jewish identity at birth is the legal mother in all halakhic respects (Broyde 1988, 
136n142).  
The medieval Spanish Talmudist Moses Nachmanides, however, understands this 
talmudic passage differently. He accords to a fetus a status of legal independence, and 
furthermore believes that the mother’s conversionary immersion in a mikvah also 
constitutes an independently valid, conversionary immersion for the fetus. Even though, 
normally, the conversion of a male to Judaism requires circumcision before immersion, 
Nachmanides opines that in the case of a fetal conversion, a reversed sequence of 
immersion before circumcision is still valid.33 Others, however, debated Nachmanides’s 
novel talmudic interpretation, and his halakhic ruling on the sufficiency of immersion 
before circumcision. Broyde comments: 
This author believes that this dispute is significant in establishing whether Jewish 
law considers birth as critical for motherhood. If one accepts the position of 
Nachmanides’ opponents, then it follows that birth is definitive in establishing 
motherhood when conception is legally insignificant. According to these 
authorities, the birth mother is one’s true parent. If one accepts Nachmanides 
position, then birth is less significant than conception or even genetic 
                                                 
33 Nachmanides’s (d. 1270) view is known through the works of subsequent medieval Spanish talmudists 
who cite him. See Shlomo ben Aderet (d. 1310), Rashba, ad loc., TB Yevamot 47b-48a; Joseph ibn Habib 
(d. early-fifteenth century), Nimukei Yosef, ad loc. Rif Yevamot 16a. 
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relationships – they are Jewish because they converted. On the contrary, 
according to Nachmanides either conception or genetics fixes motherhood. (ibid., 
137, emphasis mine) 
 
In a footnote, Broyde (ibid., 137n148) points out that Nachmanides preference for a 
causal standard of maternity based on genetics aligns with his understanding that adultery 
is biblically forbidden not only because it constitutes a marital betrayal, but because it 
also creates lineage confusion.34 Once again, Broyde regards the ancient concept of 
lineage and the modern notion of genetics as legally equivalent and exegetically 
interchangeable. Broyde concludes that since the later codifiers rule against 
Nachmanides, “it appears that Jewish law focuses on birth, rather than genetic 
relationship” (ibid., 138). 
 However, the theoretical case of fetal-transfer surrogacy leads Broyde to one 
important refinement to establishing parturition as the halakhic determinant for maternity. 
The Talmud (TB Chulin 70a) confusingly asks what is the sanctity of a male firstling if 
two wombs were connected and the fetus mid-gestation transferred from one to the other? 
Maimonides interprets the talmudic scenario as follows:  
If one connected the wombs of two animals together and a fetus went out from 
one and entered the other, it is a legal doubt as to whether the animal into whose 
womb the firstling entered is exempted from the obligation of firstlings, for it 
issued from this womb, or whether is it not exempted until the womb issues its 
own offspring? (Mishneh Torah, “Hilchot Bekhorot,” 4:18) 
 
Rabbi Ezra Bick (1986) contends that this talmudic source demonstrates that parturition 
alone is insufficient and that it is only sufficient when it follows conception. Accordingly, 
Broyde contends that when conception occurs in vivo, it gains legal significance. 
                                                 
34 See Nachmanides Torah commentary on Leviticus 18:20. See above, Chapter Four, pp. 158-9. 
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Normally, conception’s legal significance is muted by parturition which fixes maternity. 
However, in the case of fetal-transfer surrogacy, the first woman in whom conception 
occurred and from whom the fetus was removed would be considered the unique mother, 
and not the subsequent gestational carrier who also will birth the baby. Significant 
conception plus partial gestation and early parturition defeats the maternal claim of 
gestation and secondary parturition (Broyde 1988, 138-9). The importance of this 
theoretically nuanced, albeit practically irrelevant reading is that it affords conception, 
and thereby genetics, fundamental legal significance. This conceptualization leads 
Broyde to formulate his ultimate conclusion: “In the case of surrogate motherhood, 
motherhood is fixed by determining when conception occurred, and where that is not 
legally dispositive, as in test tube conception, [then] where birth occurs…” (ibid., 157). 
This is an astounding turnabout conclusion. Despite Broyde’s affirmation of parturition’s 
normativity as a halakhic maternal determinant, he resolves that fundamentally, legally 
significant conception determines motherhood. Given Broyde’s clearly stated association 
of conception and genetics, Broyde thus establishes genetics as legally, if not 
metaphysically, fundamental to parenthood. 
  
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Rabbi Michael J. Broyde on Gestational 
Surrogacy 
 As in the case of Bleich, Broyde’s halakhic expertise, legal training, and scientific 
understanding leads him to present his Jewish bioethically oriented legal note with 
nuance and sophistication. Broyde consciously reads pre-Modern sources through the 
lens of modern science. This is an eisegetical practice that Bleich comes to decry, but 
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which Broyde arguably would justify with his later-formulated theory of evolutionary 
halakhah through innovative interpretation.35 Broyde models a dialogic and integrative 
relationship between religion and science and is thus more prone to consider halakhic 
maternal and paternal classifications informed by scientific knowledge. His conclusion 
granting genetics fundamental legal significance displays an epistemology that privileges 
scientific awareness and understanding along with Torah tradition. He gives legal 
expression to his original intuition that genetics should be dispositive of parenthood.36 
 While, in this legal note, Broyde does not explicitly endorse gestational surrogacy 
as a fertility option for observant Jews, he also does not exhibit any of the moral and 
halakhic opprobrium prevalent in Bleich’s writings. While silence is always difficult to 
interpret, here it may signify that Broyde, as a Jewish bioethicist who embraces a 
dialogical and integrative relationship of religion and science, may more easily license 
the utilization of novel assisted reproductive technologies. His later writings bear this 
out.37 
 Broyde also does not embrace Bleich’s dual-maternity theory, but asserts a monist 
standard of maternity. While this may indeed emerge from his reading of the proposed 
halakhic precedents and legal analogies, it also extends from his legal philosophy of 
resolving judicial doubt and achieving legal certainty through halakhic ruling. A dual-
maternity theory may make for religious scrupulosity, but also arguably makes for bad 
law, especially in a society that condones ovum donation and gestational surrogacy. 
                                                 
35 See above p. 290n29; Broyde 2010; and above, Chapter Five, p. 206 ff. 
36 In the same legal note, Broyde also discusses “sex-change” and sees genetics as dispositive of halakhic 
gender identity, see Broyde 1988, 153-7. 
37 See Broyde 1999a, 21; 2005d, 316; and above Chapter Five, p. 221 ff. 
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Broyde contrasts American law which assigns legal paternity and maternity by looking at 
“fact-specific equities,” and Jewish law, whose “most significant feature … is its 
methodological consistency for dealing with questions of maternity, paternity, and 
parental status” (Broyde 1988, 157). Broyde concludes: 
While justice to the litigants and the promotion of equity to the parties is a 
valuable goal, consistency on a more global basis has many virtues. Inconsistency 
of methodology in similar cases, and rules too complicated to be applied, do not 
promote the interests of justice on a societal scale. Jewish law has clearly opted 
for simplicity of its fundamental rules in the belief that this will promote justice 
on a broader societal scale. (ibid., 158) 
 
Here Broyde invokes a meta-ethical aspiration of distributive justice beyond strict 
halakhic analysis to evaluate the consequences of law in light of its telos. Broyde’s 
axiological judgment in favor of Jewish law’s preference for “theoretical consistency and 
ease in the applications of its rules” likely also leads him, at least initially, not to embrace 
a complicating standard of dual-maternity (ibid.).  
 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff on Gestational Surrogacy and Parenthood 
 
 In the early 1990s, Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff began to publish on Jewish medical 
ethics. He was developing in earnest his bioethical methodology and applying it to topics 
regarding the end and beginning of life (Dorff 1991, 1992b 1993, 1994a,b,c). During the 
mid-to-late 1990s, Dorff actively participated in the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee 
on Jewish Law and Standards’ consideration of AI, IVF, and gestational surrogacy 
(Mackler 2012, 15-187).38 Dorff addressed IVF and ovum donation in a 1994 responsum 
                                                 
38 In the mid-1980s, the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards considered abortion and traditional 
surrogacy, see Mackler 2012, 188-232; Lincoln 1985, 188-92. 
299 
 
 
approved by the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, which was republished in 
1996 for a broader audience in Conservative Judaism (Dorff 1994c; 1996b). In his 1998 
publication, Matters of Life and Death: A Jewish Approach to Modern Medical Ethics, 
Dorff reworked and expanded his previous studies of assisted reproduction, and included 
a discussion of gestational surrogacy (1998b, 66-115). Dorff’s Jewish bioethical scholarly 
contributions and active participation in the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards 
have had an influential role in the development of Conservative Judaism’s bioethical-
halakhic policies in general, and specifically in regard to AI, IVF, and gestational 
surrogacy. 
 Dorff is consistently supportive of ART, including with donor gametes and 
gestational surrogates, as long as informed and understanding decisions are being 
responsibly made and ethically executed by the parties involved. Ovum donation affords 
a woman who can gestate and deliver a healthy child the opportunity to experience 
pregnancy, and if her husband’s sperm is used to fertilize a donor ovum, then, at least 
there is genetic continuity of one of the parents (ibid., 98). Like with AI/IVF with donor 
sperm, Dorff worries here too for genetic parental asymmetry vis a vis their child. 
However, unlike in the case of donor sperm, with ovum donation a woman biologically 
bonds with her child during pregnancy regardless of the lack of genetic connection (ibid., 
98-9). Therefore, if both intended parents are infertile and a donor embryo is gestated by 
the intended social mother, the challenge of parental asymmetry still obtains. However, 
with proper counselling and support, parents and child alike can deal with their atypical, 
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and possibly asymmetrical, social, genetic, and biological relations (ibid., 90-93, 98-100, 
110-1). 
 Since Dorff (1998b, 67-9, 80-1) embraces the halakhic and bioethical view that 
absent sexual relations, collaborative reproduction with donor gametes constitutes neither 
adultery nor licentiousness, he permits gametic donation by relatives. Dorff writes:  
May a fertile brother donate sperm for the impregnation of his infertile brother’s 
wife? That would have the advantage of carrying on the husband’s family genes 
and the likelihood of producing a child who resembles the husband as much as 
any biological child of his would. Nevertheless, such donations are generally 
inadvisable, for while they are not technically incest, they feel very close to it and 
raise all kinds of boundary problems for the brothers and the child later on (Is 
Uncle Barry really only my uncle, or is he my substitute father when I want him 
to be?).” (ibid., 99) 
 
Since donor sperm of non-relatives is easily accessible and relatively inexpensive, it 
should be preferred. However, unlike donor sperm, donor ova are much costlier and more 
difficult to access. Therefore, Dorff is open to ovum donation from a sister: 
An egg donation from a fertile sister to an infertile one involves the same 
boundary issues for both the sisters and the child. Since donated eggs are 
relatively scarce and expensive, though, and since the lack of genital contact 
means that legally there is no taint of incest, a fertile sister may donate eggs to her 
infertile sibling, but only after appropriate counseling and careful consideration of 
how the sisters are going to handle these boundary questions as the child grows. 
(ibid., 99-100) 
 
In general, Dorff (ibid., 103-4) believes that donating gametes to help people overcome 
infertility challenges is a noble act of kindness, and should be done, “with a sense of 
mitzvah, duly appreciative of the awesomeness of the human ability to procreate and of 
his role in helping an infertile couple make that happen.” To avoid unintended incest, it 
would be best to disclose donor identity. However, if not disclosing donor identity, then it 
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is necessary to share a thorough medical history when donating gametes to prevent 
genetic disease (ibid., 104-7).  
 Dorff (1998b, 58, 60) expresses that he is cognizant of the fact that in the 1990s 
there seemed to be, at best, hesitant support across the denominations for gestational 
surrogacy, in which, “the surrogate mother is allowing her womb to act as the fetus’s 
incubator during the nine months of gestation without contributing any of her own 
genetic materials to the fetus.” Dorff understands the primary rabbinical objections to 
gestational surrogacy are based on moral grounds, concerned with the degradation of 
women, the sanctity of the family, distributive justice, equal access, and the potential for 
exploitation (ibid., 60-62). Dorff is concerned for these, as well, however, he believes 
that actual data from studies of gestational surrogacy, as well as persuasive counter-
arguments, undermine the strength of these negative moral claims (ibid., 62-5). Dorff 
opines: “The major argument in favor of surrogacy, of course, is that it enables infertile 
couples to have children with the gametes of at least one of them. Not only is surrogacy 
thus a response to the pain of infertility for the couples involved; it is also a way for that 
couple to fulfill an important Jewish value and hope” (ibid., 60).39  
In June 1997, the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee on Jewish Law and 
Standards approved two responsa concerning surrogacy: one in favor of permitting the 
practice by Rabbi Elie Kaplan Spitz, and one opposing the practice by Rabbi Aaron L. 
Mackler. Dorff supports the conclusion reached by Spitz, whose pro-gestational 
                                                 
39 Dorff is aware of gestational surrogacy with a donor embryo, but speaks here to the more usual case in 
which at least one intended parent’s gametes are utilized, see Dorff 1998b, 58. 
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surrogacy responsum he considers to be based on reasoned argumentation and supported 
by the available sociological and public health data (ibid., 62, 346nn72-3). 
Dorff doesn’t directly speak to the question of maternal identity in his section on 
gestational surrogacy, but does take up the issue in the context of ovum donation, which 
technically is a form of gestational surrogacy in which the intended social mother 
gestates an ovum of another woman, fertilized by either husband or donor sperm (ibid., 
100-1). Dorff begins his analysis by positing that the only source he legitimates as a 
potential legal precedent is the aforementioned aggadah about Rachel and Leah’s 
pregnancies. He credits Bleich (1981b) for calling attention to the story, and 
acknowledges Bleich’s doubt regarding its legitimacy in halakhic adjudication (ibid., 
101). In the main body of his bioethical exposition, Dorff seemingly agrees with Bleich:  
The question is whether this interpretation of the story, ultimately built on the 
Torah’s identification of Dina as Leah’s daughter, should serve as a precedent for 
determining the identity of the mother of a child conceived through egg donation. 
Even if we assume that the story is indeed one of embryo transfer, and even if we 
ignore the fact that in the story it is God, rather than human beings, who effects 
the embryo transfer, there are real questions as to whether any story should be 
used for legal rulings, and all the more so like this, which is really only one 
possible interpretation of a Talmudic tale. (ibid., 100-1)  
 
However, in a footnote to this passage, while he agrees with Bleich regarding the dubious 
applicability of this aggadah, he vehemently disagrees with Bleich regarding the 
admissibility of midrash and aggadah in halakhic adjudication: 
I think that we not only can use aggadic material as the source of general 
principles but commonly do so in halakhic practice. Moreover, I think we should 
do so, for only then can our beliefs have impact on our actions. We must just be 
intelligent enough to understand the stories, unlike laws and judicial precedents, 
are not generally told in a form intended to be examined in legal detail but rather 
are to be read as articulating general principles; and we must also remember that 
stories, perhaps even more than legal precedents, may conflict with each other. 
303 
 
 
Furthermore, in the use of stories for legal purposes, we must examine them, as 
we analyze potential precedents, for the analogies and dissimilarities between 
them and the case at hand. In the case here, though, I would agree with Rabbi 
Bleich that this story is a very thin reed on which to determine the mother’s 
identity, not so much because it is aggadic but because it represent only one 
reading of what is already a fantastic tale, designed more to indicate the kindness 
of Leah and the miracles of God that the way rabbis should rule in cases of egg 
donation. (ibid., 356n66) 40 
 
 While Dorff considers assigning halakhic maternity to the ovum donor for 
purposes of parity since paternity is primarily assigned to the sperm donor, Dorff sides 
with the view that parturition establishes halakhic motherhood. He concludes: 
Even though it is possible to argue in both directions, the Conservative 
movement’s Committee on Jewish Law and Standards has determined that it is 
the Torah’s phrase, peter rehem (“opening the womb”) that should be 
determinative. In doing so, the committee, following the general trend in Jewish 
law, preferred explicit precedent (gezerat ha-katuv) to logical reasoning as the 
basis of the law. It is thus the bearing mother who determines the Jewish identity 
of the child; if she is Jewish, the child is Jewish, regardless of the source of the 
egg used in the child’s conception; if she is not Jewish (as in many cases of 
surrogacy), the child is not Jewish by birth and must undergo the rites of 
conversion to become Jewish. (ibid., 101)41 
 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff on Gestational 
Surrogacy 
 
 Dorff’s writings on gestational surrogacy and ovum donation represents a full 
Jewish bioethical consideration of the range of attendant halakhic, moral, social, and 
psychological issues. Bleich and Broyde are usually much more attuned to the high 
theory of halakhah, scrutinize the extant halakhic literature and proposed legal precedents 
                                                 
40 For Dorff’s view on the role of aggadah in halakhic reasoning, see Dorff 1991, 4-7; 1992b. 
41 Interestingly, Rabbi Aaron L. Mackler, who wrote the responsum in favor of parturition as the halakhic 
maternal determinant adopted by the Committee on Law and Standards cites six reasons to support 
parturition, of which Mackler identifies “peter rechem” (first womb issue) as a secondarily supportive 
reason. See Mackler 1997b, 186n16. 
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and analogies, and clearly demonstrate that for them Jewish bioethics is primarily 
medical halakhah. Dorff, on the other hand, approaches the issues as more of an ethicist 
than a halakhist, expanding the focus of legally oriented Jewish bioethics. While Dorff, 
like Bleich and Broyde, manifests an epistemology that includes both Torah and general 
scholarship, Dorff weighs more heavily a wider-scope of bioethical, philosophical, 
psychological, and sociological concerns, and particularly distinguishes his method for 
correlating theory with the data of social-scientific studies. 
 Like Bleich and Broyde, Dorff exhibits a self-aware, scientific mindset, and thus 
easily weaves the modern ideas of genetics into his analyses, conceptualizations, and 
terminology. His principled Jewish values, social progressiveness, and compassionate 
humanism lead him to permit that which is not clearly forbidden. His moral axiology, like 
his epistemology, is influenced by a synthesis of Torah and Western wisdom. It is 
therefore somewhat surprising that he affirms parturition as the sole determinant of 
halakhic maternity. Dorff does not, like Broyde, innovate an exegetically nuanced way to 
endow genetics with fundamental halakhic import, even if, in practice, parturition 
remains the sole maternal determinant. And unlike Bleich, who arguably gives credence 
to the imprint of genetics in his dual-maternity theory, Dorff does not acknowledge dual-
maternity.42 This is in spite of the fact that he originates a pluralist standard for paternity 
in his discussion of sperm donation.  
                                                 
42 Mackler 1995, 109, 121n54, Dorff’s colleague and co-member of the Committee on Law and Standards, 
explicitly rejects dual-maternity because he thinks that it makes for bad policy.  
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 This is further perplexing since Dorff’s primary resource for his positive Jewish 
bioethical assessment of gestational surrogacy relies on the research and reasoned 
responsum of Spitz, who in 1997 had submitted a second responsum to the Committee on 
Law and Standards, which he withdrew prior to its being voted upon, that argued for a 
volitional standard for parenthood, recognizing the maternal status of the genetic ovum 
donor, rather than a causal standard based on parturition by the gestational surrogate. 
Spitz contends that in ART intentions should be determinative for maternal identity, thus 
establishing the genetic mother as the halakhic mother when in a case of gestational 
surrogacy the Jewish ovum provider is the intended social mother (Spitz 1996; Mackler 
1997c, 182).43 Dorff himself in his earliest writing on IVF wrote regarding adoption: 
“One Rabbinic source, however, states that the people who raise the child, and not the 
natural father and mother, are called the parents; perhaps Jewish law will develop in that 
direction” (Dorff 1993, 58, emphasis mine). 
 Dorff’s religious axiology in this particular case apparently privileges the value of 
communal consensus on matters of Jewish identity and maternal identification, and thus 
he supports the determination of Rabbi Aaron L. Mackler’s 1997 responsum on 
“Maternal Identity and the Religious Status of Children Born to a Surrogate Mother,” 
approved by the Committee on Law and Standards. He most likely also agrees with 
Mackler’s policy considerations in rejecting a dual-maternity standard (Mackler 1997, 
181-2). However, in upholding Mackler’s responsum, Dorff still implicitly conveys to 
                                                 
43 Thus, for example, Spitz would argue based on a volitional account of parenthood that in a case of a 
Jewish ovum donor who intends to be the social mother, and a non-Jewish gestational surrogate, that the 
child not need religious conversion, since the child’s halakhic mother, the genetic/social mother is Jewish. 
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genetics halakhic import since Mackler’s responsum rules that people with first-degree 
genetic and social relations should not marry each other in order to avoid genetic disease 
transmission and unhealthy psychological consequences. Mackler’s responsum reads: 
While the genetic mother should not be viewed as mother halakhically, genetic 
siblings should not marry (or engage in sexual relations with) each other … 
Combining this ruling with those found in Rabbi Elliot Dorff’s paper on artificial 
insemination, one comes to the unsurprising conclusion that one should not marry 
(or engage in sexual relations with) children of one’s genetic, gestational, or 
social parents. (ibid.) 44 
 
 
 
Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moses D. Tendler on Gestational Surrogacy and 
Parenthood 
 
 Rabbi Moses D. Tendler’s views on ovum donation and gestational surrogacy 
have undergone dramatic turnabouts over the past four decades. In the proceedings of a 
medical ethic conference that he convened in 1984 at Mount Sinai Medical Center, a year 
before the first IVF child was born through gestational surrogacy, Tendler (1984, 9) said 
regarding gestational surrogates: “Clearly, if there ever were a situation in which a 
woman wanted to incubate an egg, as an act of kindness, to allow the woman who 
otherwise couldn’t possibly conceive have the experience of motherhood, the act would 
be a charitable act. It would be a wise thing to do.” Three years later, however, Tendler 
(1987, 110) opposed “Surrogate and Incubator Mothers,” writing: “These are modified 
adoptive modalities not designed to cure the illness of infertility. As such, they introduce 
a new illness, a societal pathology or social iatrogenesis.” He thinks traditional surrogacy 
                                                 
44 See Dorff 1994b, 47-8; 1998b, 108-9; 2002b. 
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exploitative, and if the surrogate is a married woman, as psychologically harmful, and 
raises “religious concerns for adultery, bastardy and consanguinity” (ibid.). In 1987, 
Tendler (ibid.) distrusted the motivations of gestational surrogacy arrangements, 
imagining brave new-worldish scenarios of “a woman, unwilling to endure the physical 
demands of pregnancy,” who along with her husband purchase gametes, and hire an 
incubator mother to gestate the embryo.45 He asks: “What will happen to the ‘flesh and 
blood’ bond that is the glue of family obligation and support?” (ibid.) In the case “in 
which all participants have only the most altruistic motivations,” then, “such unique, rare 
circumstance can be responded to in accord with the traditional methodology of rabbinic 
responsum” (ibid). Tendler considered gestational surrogacy an “adoptive modality” that 
is at odds with the Judeo-rabbinic tradition’s personal and societal ethics. Further, he 
advocated for societal legislation against surrogate and incubator motherhood, since they 
violate “the sensibilities of a free, democratic people” (ibid.). By calling both traditional 
and gestational surrogacy “adoptive modalities,” Tendler implies that he considers 
parturition the halakhic determinant of maternity, as parturition, and not genetics, is 
common to both types of surrogacy.  
 In 1984, Tendler (1984, 9) considered ovum donation “a problem that still 
requires much analysis.” Four years later, he considered maternal identification in case of 
IVF with ovum donation complex and still unresolved: “For the first time in human 
history, gestational motherhood can be separated from genetic motherhood. Surely the 
contributions of the gestational mother are quite consequential. Legal (halachic) 
                                                 
45 This echoes Jakobovits’s opprobrium against gestational surrogacy, see above p. 279.  
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authorities in Judaism have not been able to clarify this dilemma, and therefore 
consanguinity prohibitions must be applied to “‘both’ mother’s families” (1988, 75). 
Note that Tendler frames the complexity not in the pre-modern halakhic categories of 
seed or lineage, conception or parturition, but like Broyde, in scientific terms – i.e., 
genetic verses gestational. 
 Flash forward twenty-six years, and Tendler, in a 2010 interview with the Wall 
Street Journal regarding an alleged shift, especially in Israel, of rabbis halakhically 
defining maternity genetically, rather than by parturition, Tender said: “Genetics provide 
only the blueprint, and for the next nine months the work is done by the gestational 
mother. While the gestational mother is in labor, the egg donor could be on the beach in 
Miami” (Birkner 2010). Once again, Tendler frames the halakhic debate in terms of 
genetics and gestation, rather than pre-modern halakhic categories. 
In 2011, writing now in partnership with Dr. John D. Loike, Tendler and Loike 
uphold gestational surrogacy as an example of a situation for which there is no halakhic 
precedent that can definitively resolve halakhic doubt. They write: 
The issue whether a surrogate (e.g., gestational mother) is the halachic mother is 
a controversial and complex issues without any explicit halachic precedence. 
This is why Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach rules that in this situation we are 
in doubt as how to determine the criteria of motherhood, and in practice we 
must be stringent. He ruled that both the surrogate and biological mothers have 
a status of halachic parents, and if one of these individuals in not Jewish, then 
she must convert. The above example highlights a case where it may be difficult 
to resolve the underlying halachic guidelines, and yet, practical and viable 
halachic solutions can nonetheless be established. (Loike and Tendler 2011, 
117). 
 
One would have imagined that in the above paragraph, Tendler and Loike would have 
framed the doubt pertaining to the genetic mother, rather than the gestational mother, 
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given the broadly attested preference for parturition as the primary maternal determinant 
in medical halakhah, as well as Tendler’s much earlier writings of the 1980s which also 
side with parturition. The seeming reasons for this turnabout emerges in two articles that 
Tendler and Loike penned together in 2013 – namely, the emerging field of epigenetics 
and the recognition of maternal fetal cell transfer. Tendler and Loike believe this new 
scientific knowledge is a halakhic game-changer. 
When DNA was discovered and began to be deciphered, early interpretations of 
the burgeoning science focused on the genetic code of nature as the author of all things 
organic from the beginning through the end of the life cycle. However, in time, nurture, 
or environment, was redeemed and seen as playing a decisive role within the realm of 
genetics. The genome isn’t a linear program code, but responds to epigenetic triggers that 
activate gene expression in a unique symbiosis of nature and nurture – of genetics and 
epigenetics (Mukherjee 2016, 393-410). Thus, when considering the case of gestational 
surrogacy in light of this new scientific awareness, the gamete providers contribute the 
genetics, but far from being an inert incubator, the gestational surrogate is now 
appreciated as contributing the epigenetic influence on gene activation during, literally, 
the most formative period of life – i.e., gestation. 
Furthermore, while fetal maternal cell exchange was identified as early as 1893 as 
being responsible for fatal cases of eclampsia, i.e., seizures during pregnancy, it was only 
in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century that maternal fetal cell transfer has 
begun to be understood and appreciated in terms of its immunological benefits during 
pregnancy, and its positive and negative life-long health impacts for both the gestational 
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mother and child (Loike and Tendler 20013b, 115-120). Maternal fetal cellular 
trafficking (MFCT) results in fetal and maternal microchimerism, in which cells with 
genomes foreign to its host take up lifelong residence. During pregnancy, bidirectional 
microchimerism is thought to prime immuno-tolerance of the fetus during gestation, as 
well as aid in the development of the fetal immune system. Later in life, these 
immunological benefits can protect against disease and deter heterologous transplantation 
rejection from maternal tissue, as well as trigger autoimmune disease and possibly 
maternal cancers (Jeanty, Derderian, and MacKenzie 2014; Callier 2015). 
In an article on “Recruiting a Surrogate for an Infertile Jewish Couple,” Loike and 
Tendler, therefore, write: “Current scientific research reveals that the surrogate is not 
merely an incubator, but contributes biologically and genetically to the physiology and 
psychology of the fetus that is growing and developing in her uterus” (2013a, 5). 
Similarly, in an article on “Gestational Surrogacy,” they assert: “Emerging scientific data 
on maternal fetal cellular transfer and epigenetics transform the role of a surrogate as a 
substitute womb into a cooperative health partnership between the surrogate, the fetus, 
and the biological parents … maternal fetal cell exchange and epigenetic processes create 
lifelong biological and genetic connections between the surrogate and the fetus.” (Loike 
and Tendler, 2013b, 113). Tendler and Loike proceed to assess the halakhic impact of 
epigenetics and maternal fetal cell transfer on maternal identity, as well as on the a priori 
permissibility of the truly collaborative reproduction of gestational surrogacy. They also 
question whether this new scientific knowledge will also change the perceptions of both 
gamete providers and surrogate in gestational surrogacy arrangements (ibid., 120).  
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 Reevaluating the definition of halakhic motherhood, Tendler and Loike posit: 
Historically there have been three major positions regarding the issue who the 
halakhic mother of the child is: 
1. The genetic mother (i.e., the woman who donated the egg for IVF), 
2. The gestational surrogate who gave birth to the child,  
3. Both the genetic and gestational women. (ibid., 121)  
 
While this schematization is descriptively correct, it solely utilizes modern scientific 
categories, rather than the traditional halakhic categories of conception and parturition, 
ovum donor and birth mother, seed and lineage, found in the earlier Jewish bioethical and 
medical halakhic literature. 
 Tendler and Loike cite five rabbinic sources in favor of the genetic mother: four 
talmudic sources, of which two are aggadic and two halakhic, and one medieval source 
(ibid., 122-3).46 All these sources, at best, support conception as a parental determinant. 
In Tendler and Loike’s scientific worldview, however, conception and genetics are 
exegetically interchangeable. They also cite one biblical source and six rabbinic sources 
in favor of “the gestational surrogate who gives birth to the child.” Of the rabbinic 
sources, five are talmudic, of which two are aggadic, and one from midrash halakhah 
(ibid., 123-4).47 All these sources, at best, support parturition as a maternal determinant. 
Once again, in Tendler and Loike’s scientific worldview, they reread parturition as the 
more developmentally and causatively significant process of gestation. In favor of dual-
maternity recognizing “both the genetic and gestational women,” they cite the halakhic 
                                                 
46 TB Sanhedrin 91b (aggadic); TB Niddah 31a (aggadic); TB Yevamot 78a (halakhic); TB Yevamot 42a 
(halakhic); and Rambam, Mishneh Torah, “Hilkhot Issurei Biah,” 19:7. 
47 Exodus 21:22; TB Yevamot 97b (halakhic); TB Megillah 13a (aggadic); TB Yevamot 69b (halakhic); TB 
Berakhot 60a (aggadic), along with its parallel in TJ Berakhot 9:3, and in Targum Yonatan; the talmudic 
concept of “uber yerekh imo” (the fetus is an appendage of its mother) which they do not locate in an 
explicit textual attribution; and Midrash Sifra, ad loc., Leviticus 12:2 (halakhic).  
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position of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, who they report “supports the view that 
there are no definitive halakhic precedents that would define motherhood in the case of 
surrogacy,” and thus inclines toward stringency due to fundamental halakhic doubt.48 
Interestingly, they do not credit Bleich for this view, even though he has been its 
originator and most prominent advocate. This is likely because Bleich and Auerbach’s 
views on dual-maternity are fundamentally different. Bleich principally supports 
parturition as the halakhic maternal determinant, and out of legal doubt, also worries for 
the ovum donor/genetic mother. Auerbach believes the legal doubt is fundamental given 
the unprecedented novelty of gestational surrogacy.49 At the same time, Bleich, Tendler, 
and Loike, all entertain the possibility of a pluralist, causal account of maternity. 
 Tendler and Loike’s unresolved legal doubt as to maternal indication in cases of 
gestational surrogacy, as well as several halakhic and moral-axiological reservations 
regarding surrogacy, lead them to discourage a Jewish woman, let alone a married Jewish 
woman, to serve as a surrogate. First, since there may be longterm negative health 
outcomes due to maternal microchimerism, absent a marital context with a mitzvah of 
reproduction, the prohibition against self-injury mitigates against discretionarily serving 
as a surrogate. Second, Tendler and Loike cite a 1999 study alleging psychological harms 
given expressed dissatisfaction by surrogates. Third, Tendler and Loike allege that there 
is a significant risk that a sexual relationship can develop between the surrogate and the 
contracting genetic father. For them, non-maleficence outweighs altruistic beneficence. 
                                                 
48 See Avraham 1993, vol. 4, 186; 2004, 16-7. 
49 It should also be noted that Tendler and Bleich have publicly been at vehement odds with each other 
regarding medical halakhah, most notably regarding the halakhic definition of death, see Tendler 1990; 
Bleich 1991b; Shabtai 2012. 
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They surprisingly have less concern for these risks if the surrogate is non-Jewish, 
manifesting a particularistic moral axiology exhibiting ethical asymmetry towards Jews 
and non-Jews (2013b, 129-132; 2013a). They also recommend a computer-based registry 
of all biological parties to collaborative reproduction that can maintain anonymity, but 
also be used, along with genetic testing, to ascertain that one’s marriage prospect is not 
an immediate genetic relative. Children born to a non-Jewish gestational surrogate should 
be converted out of fundamental doubt (2013b, 131-2).  
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moses D. 
Tendler on Gestational Surrogacy 
 
 Tendler and Loike, like this dissertation’s other exemplars, display thorough 
familiarity with the secular-bioethical and scientific literature, in addition to the Jewish 
bioethical and medical-halakhic scholarship. Tendler’s turnabouts regarding the halakhic 
determinant of maternity in cases of ovum donation and gestational surrogacy manifest 
his epistemic privileging of hard science, accepting pro tanto its findings and their 
halakhic and bioethical implications, unapologetically shifting his opinion when new 
scientific theories update or replace earlier ones. This correlates well with his 
methodology of realist realignment and theory of “nishtaneh hatevah” as “our 
understanding of science has changed,” leading halakhah to adapt to and adopt advances 
in science. Tendler and Loike thus exhibit strong scientific contextualism, consequently, 
though not explicitly, recognizing a strong historical and scientific contextualization of 
halakhah as a mechanism for interpretive innovation and halakhic change. Tendler and 
Loike consciously and intentionally read pre-modern sources through the lens of modern 
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science, translating pre-modern terms into theory-laden, scientifically informed 
correlates.  
 Axiologically, Tendler’s views have also changed over time, sometimes in line 
with, and sometimes in contradistinction to contemporary mores. For example, in 1984 
he was in favor of gestational surrogacy, by 1987 he opposed it, and by 2013 Tendler and 
Loike supported gestational surrogacy, preferentially, however, with a non-Jewish 
surrogate for both technical halakhic reasons of consanguinity and adultery, as well as 
particularistic protectionism. Tendler and Loike thus manifest a moral axiology that is 
both informed by the universalism of science, as well as by exclusivist trends of Jewish 
partiality in halakhah. As opposed to Bleich and Broyde whose writings more clearly 
reflect a medical-halakhic modality of Jewish Bioethics, Tendler and Loike, like Dorff, 
exhibit less high-theory legal analysis, and more of a mid-level halakhic-bioethical 
principlism.  
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
 In January of 2010, Rabbi Dr. Mordechai Halperin, chief officer of medical ethics 
for the Israeli Ministry of Health and Director of the Falk-Schlesinger Institute for 
Medical-Halachic Research at Shaare Zedek Medical Center in Jerusalem, spoke at the 
tenth annual Jerusalem conference of the Puah Institute for Fertility and Medicine. He 
advocated for the passage of new Israeli governmental legislation allowing for domestic 
ovum donation. Previous legislation from 1981 only allowed the harvesting of additional 
eggs, with consent, from a woman already undergoing fertility treatment. In the 
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intervening twenty-nine years, this meant that infertile women in need of donor ova 
looked to purchase gametes abroad, usually from non-Jewish donors. Halperin contended 
that while earlier halakhic authorities established parturition as the maternal determinant, 
more recently, several eminent Haredi poskim in Israel had switched rabbinical opinion 
in favor of the ovum donor.50 Among them were the late Rabbi Meir Brandsdorfer, the 
late Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv, and Rabbi Abraham Sherman, all of whose 
rabbinically authoritative influence holds sway worldwide.51 Therefore, Halperin opined, 
it should be legal for young Israeli women, who presumably would be Jewish, to donate 
ova in Israel. Since maternity has been halakhically reassessed and established in favor of 
the ovum donor and genetic mother, children born of ova donated by a Jewish donor 
would not need conversion. Some objected to the racial overtones of Halperin’s rationale 
to make available “Jewish eggs.” Yet others argued that shifting a relatively longstanding 
halakhic policy of parturition as indicating maternal identity betrays those who have 
heretofore relied upon this standard (Birkner 2010; Siegel-Itzkovich 2010).  
 Relatedly, in June 2006, the then Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, Shlomo Amar, 
consented to allowing an impoverished infertile woman to engage a Jewish, married, 
gestational surrogate, upending long-established Israeli policy to prohibit such 
                                                 
50 See Halperin 2011, 278-98. Westreich 2016, 106n30 cites a private conversation with Bleich, in which 
Bleich asserted that Halperin’s assessment is not accurate. However, Sinclair 2003, 107 ff. proposed a 
similar observation to Halperin’s regarding a shift toward genetics ten years earlier. 
51 See Ariel, 1996; Brandsdorfer 2008; Sherman 2008; Brand 2011a,b. However, for an opposing 
viewpoint, see Fisher 2004; Goldberg 2008, 2010; and Katz 2011. It must strongly be noted, though, that 
most Haredi poskim who have identified the ovum donor as the halakhic mother do not utilize genetics in 
formulating their position, indicating that it is more of a social shift, than an epistemological paradigm 
shift. 
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arrangements (Levinson 2006; Teman 2010, 115; Knohl 2016).52 Jews facing fertility 
challenges in the United States and in Israel increasingly have utilized gestational 
surrogates, including Orthodox Jews, often with rabbinical approbation. Despite Tendler 
and Loike’s published opposition to Jewish women, especially when married, from 
serving as gestational surrogates, anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that such 
reproductive altruism is on the rise (Katzman 2017).  
What axiological and epistemological dynamics account for the change in 
rabbinical, Jewish bioethical attitude and orientation? First, the history of ART 
demonstrates that what was initially perceived as outlandish gradually achieves social 
acceptance.53 This is especially true when initial judgments portending horrendous moral 
and social consequences do not materialize over time. Suspicions of improper 
motivations of those seeking assistance through ART, especially of women, subside 
when they remain unrealized, such as women seeking gestational surrogates to avoid the 
burdens of pregnancy. Changing social and sexual mores, including an acceptance of 
more complex and varied family constructs, also tempers the negative judgments of some 
of the social changes that ART indeed has wrought. Popular Jewish social and religious 
acclimation to gestational surrogacy arguably is in line with larger societal acceptance. 
Rabbis and bioethicists are not immune to shifting cultural perceptions, as well as 
                                                 
52 See Knohl 2016 regarding the debate of Rabbi Amar’s attribution of his lenient position to the late, 
former Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel, Ovadia Yosef. 
53 See Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 361, quoting Kleegmand and Kaufman 1966, 178, who describe the path 
of reaction from “horrified negation” to “negation without horror” to “slow and gradual curiosity, study, 
and evaluation,” to “very slow but steady acceptance.” In fact, recently the halakhic discourse on ART has 
shifted from fundamental questions of permitted or forbidden, to how best to pursue ART with halakhic 
guidance, see Dovid Sukenik 2010. 
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grassroots pressures to allow that which is not explicitly forbidden. Indeed, the subjective 
moral intuition of individuals is profoundly affected by changing understandings of the 
world, by turns in societal attitudes, and by personal experience.  
Second, in the Israeli context especially, there is a manifest social pressure to 
make ART available to those with fertility challenges in ways that are financially 
accessible, and that are blessed with rabbinical approbation. Israel’s socialist origins, 
communitarian values, and strong ethos of shared destiny also express themselves in 
reproductive liberty, and according to anthropologist Elly Teman, create “a nationalist 
discourse that frames women’s central role as ‘biological reproducers’ of the collectivity” 
(Teman 2010, 113). The shadow of the Holocaust, in which two out of three Eastern-
European Jews were murdered, has had profound impact upon Jewish and Israeli 
pronatalism. Ronit Irshai (2012) has convincingly demonstrated the overall, positive 
halakhic orientation of contemporary medical halakhists toward assisted reproduction, 
and a concomitant, negative halakhic attitude toward contraception. Jewish demographic 
concerns and pronatalism, in both Israel and the United States, thus likewise lead to 
increasing rabbinical endorsement of ART, including gestational surrogacy and ovum 
donation. A proud religious and ethnic culture of medical achievement and 
interventionism lends further support to the Jewish reception of ART and more liberal 
reproductive policies (Birenbaum-Carmeli 2004).54  
                                                 
54 Teman 2010, supports these contentions, but notes with irony that despite the greater social acceptance of 
ART in Israel, a culture of procreative liberty, and increasing rabbinical approval of ART’s many 
permutations, the Israeli government has yet to legislate global, rather than exceptional, approval of single 
women and gay couples hiring gestational surrogates, or permitting married women to be commissioned as 
gestational surrogates. Teman, ibid., 116-22, theorizes that the Israeli government sees itself as the gate-
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Third, the popular, epistemic privileging of science can be discerned in the 
literature of Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah, as demonstrated through the writings 
of the four exemplars of this dissertation. When IVF novelly divided conception and 
gestation/parturition, and then ovum donation and gestational surrogacy proceeded to 
further distinguish between genetics and gestation, medical halakhists and Jewish 
bioethicists began to revisit contemporary bioethical dilemmas and pre-modern rabbinic 
sources within a new scientific paradigm. Bleich started to use genetic categories, but in 
the aftermath of Bick’s critique, catches himself and recommits to non-anachronistic 
readings of pre-modern sources. However, his dual-maternity theory still acknowledges 
that the new knowledge of genetics cannot be fully ignored in halakhah. Broyde 
consciously re-conceptualizes parenthood in genetic terms and endeavors greatly to make 
room for a genetic indication of maternity through the theoretically powerful notion, even 
if currently practically irrelevant, that conception is halakhically indicative of maternity 
when it is significant, i.e. fertilization in vivo. Dorff explicitly endorses the new genetic 
categories, but chooses not to recategorize maternity in deference to the values of 
communal consensus and consistent policy by upholding the Committee on Law and 
Standards’ commitment to parturition as the maternal determinant, and surprisingly 
doesn't extend volitional parental categories for cases of a woman’s ovum donation and 
gestational surrogacy, like he did for men in the cases of the sperm donor and social 
father. Tendler and Loike completely re-conceptualize maternity in light of scientific 
                                                 
keepers protecting the traditional categories of motherhood and family that gestational surrogacy and 
reproductive liberty potentially threaten. 
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advancements, embracing a pluralist standard for maternity not out of circumstantial 
doubt, but out of fundamental doubt as to how to define parenthood in the unprecedented 
contexts of ART. 
While each exemplar manifests a differentially nuanced philosophy, 
methodology, and application of Jewish law and ethics (see Table 6.2 below), common to 
all of them is an affirmative, dialogical relationship of religion and science that recasts 
ancient texts in the light of new scientific knowledge. Three out of four of the exemplars 
(Broyde, Dorff, and Tendler and Loike), consciously adapt halakhah and Jewish ethics to 
new scientific knowledge, and one (Bleich) gives credence to scientific advancement, 
even while guarding Jewish tradition’s legal patrimony. Not only do religion and science 
relations make for a more sophisticated, scientifically informed, Jewish bioethical 
analysis, but also when matched with axiological progressivism, more easily halakhically 
license the new ARTs. Furthermore, expanding Jewish bioethical and medical-halakhic 
epistemologies fundamentally transform halakhic and ethical discourse, allow for the 
organic development of Jewish law and ethics, and sometimes even engender innovative 
rabbinic interpretations and unprecedented halakhic rulings.  
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Table 6.2. Summary of Attitudes Toward Ovum Donation and Gestational Surrogacy, Account of 
Parenthood, and Epistemological and Axiological Findings for Four Exemplars 
x: Exemplar 
y: Intellection 
Orientation 
Rabbi J. David 
Bleich 
Rabbi Michael 
Broyde 
Rabbi Elliot N. 
Dorff 
Rabbi Moshe D. 
Tendler and Dr. 
John D. Loike 
Attitude Toward 
AI and IVF 
  From 
 Chapter Five 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Negative 
AID/IVF-D: 
Prohibiting 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Permitting 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Cautiously Positive 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Permitting if D is 
non-Jewish 
Def. of Maternity  Monist Causal  Monist Causal  Monist Causal  Monist Causal  
Definition and 
Account of 
Paternity  
Always sperm 
donor. 
 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Always sperm 
donor. 
Monist Causal but 
differentiates 
Genetic father of 
sexual and non-
sexual procreation 
Biological father 
through sexual 
reproduction. 
AIH/IVF-H: 
sperm donor 
AID/IVF-D: 
Two fathers: 
Biological father is 
sperm donor. 
Social Father is 
custodial father. 
Pluralist Causal & 
Volitional/Labor. 
Always sperm 
donor. 
 
Monist Causal 
Account: Genetic 
Father 
Attitude Toward 
Ovum Donation 
(OD) and 
Gestational 
Surrogacy (GS) 
  From  
  Chapter Six 
OD: Negative 
GS: Negative 
OD: Permitting 
GS: Permitting 
Unclear from 
published work if 
preference for 
Jewish or non-
Jewish OD & GS 
OD: Positive to 
both receive & 
donate. 
GS: Positive to 
commission & 
serve as. No 
preference for 
Jewish or non-J. 
OD & GS: 
Permissible to 
receive and 
commission if OD 
& GS non-Jewish.  
Account of 
Parenthood 
Pluralist Causal 
Account 
Pluralist Causal 
Account 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Pluralist Causal 
Account 
Definition of 
Maternity 
Dual-maternity, 
principally 
parturition, but 
in legal doubt 
as to adding 
OD. 
Parturition when 
conception legally 
insignificant. 
Conception when 
legally significant. 
Parturition. 
 
Surprising that not 
Pluralist Causal & 
Volitional/Labor, 
like in AI/IVF-D. 
Begins as Monist: 
parturition.  
Currently, 
Pluralist-Causal 
with fundamental 
doubt. 
Methodological 
Basis 
Halakhic high-
theory. Legal 
analogy & 
reasoning. 
Avoids 
anachronistic 
readings. 
Rejects 
aggadah as 
legal source. 
Halakhic high-
theory. Legal 
analogy & 
reasoning. 
Interpretive 
innovation by 
conceptualizing 
pre-modern 
sources through 
contemporary 
science.  
Legal precedent 
and bioethical 
principlism. 
Intentional 
stretching of both 
halakhic and 
aggadic sources.  
Suspicious of 
specious legal 
analogies. Policy 
consensus. 
Halakhic-
bioethical 
principlism. Pro 
Tanto privileged 
credence to 
science. 
Conceptualize 
pre-modern 
sources through 
contemporary 
science. 
Epistemological 
Dimensions 
Torah with 
science. 
Torah and 
science. 
Torah + science = 
Jewish bioethics 
Torah through 
scientific progress 
Axiological 
Dimensions 
Traditional-
conservative. 
Traditional-
progressive 
Liberal- 
progressive. 
Tradi.-conserv. & 
progressive 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy (MRT) combine 
emerging genetic technologies with established ARTs to overcome infertility and 
health challenges. Cloning can have several meanings. It can refer to the laboratory 
generation of a copy of a genetic sequence, or a complete genome.1 It can also 
mean reproductive twinning by embryonic fission, i.e., splitting a morula or 
blastocyst in vitro so that both parts can develop into embryos that will grow into 
fetuses and be born as twin children.2 Monozygotic identical twins are the outcome 
of a natural version of such a process, and are, in fact, clones of each other.3 
However, the cloning under consideration here is that achieved by a technique 
known as somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). This is when a full genome encased 
in an adult somatic cell’s nucleus is transplanted into an enucleated oocyte – that is, 
an ovum whose own nucleus, with its nuclear DNA (nDNA), has been removed. 
The combined oocyte is prompted through electroporation, i.e., electrical 
stimulation, to fuse, i.e., whole-cell electrofusion, and then act like a fertilized egg 
(Evans, Gurer, Loike, et al. 1999). Therapeutic cloning could then produce for a 
person numerous embryonic stem cells that could be used to heal disease without 
                                                 
1 Drugs and vaccines, such as human insulin, interferon to combat viral infection, and human blood factors 
to regenerate red blood cells, have been produced by genetically modifying, and then cloning, viruses or 
bacteria, see Scott and Weissman 2008. 
2 See Illmensee and Levanduski 2010. 
3 There are several varieties of monozygotic twins, depending at what developmental stage the embryonic 
splitting takes place. Recent studies have preliminarily demonstrated that the natural incidence of twinning 
following ART is no greater than that of normal conception. See Wu, et al. 2014. 
322 
 
 
fear of immunological rejection (Scott and Weissman 2008).4 Reproductive cloning 
could develop the embryo into a clone of the person from whom the somatic cell’s 
nucleus was harvested (Devolder 2016, 2-3). To our knowledge, there has yet to be 
born a human clone, although reproductive cloning research continues with animal 
subjects. 
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy (MRT) is another recent innovation in 
reproductive and genetic technologies that also entails the genetic manipulation and 
manufacture of human gametes using multiple genetic donors. This new therapeutic 
reproductive technology utilizes the cloning techniques of SCNT, and is alternatively 
called: Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, Mitochondrial Transfer, Egg Cell Nuclear 
Transfer, Ooplasmic and Nuclear Transfer, and Three-Parent Babies/Embryos/IVF. 
Mitochondria are cellular organelles present in every human cell except red blood cells. 
Mitochondria are regulated by their own genome, i.e., mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), 
which encodes for thirty-seven genes.5 All mtDNA are maternally inherited. Their 
primary function is energy conversion essential to metabolic processes necessary for life 
through oxidative phosphorylation (OXPHOS) (Mitalipov and Wolf 2014, 5).  
The primary motivation for the assisted reproductive and genetic technology of 
MRT is to facilitate a woman suffering from non-nDNA-caused mitochondrial disease to 
reproduce healthy offspring who will not suffer the same malady (Claiborne 2016; Kelly 
2013). Individuals with mitochondrial disease or disorders experience metabolic 
                                                 
4 See Bonnicksen 2009. 
5 Thirteen proteins, two rRNAs, and twenty-two tRNAs, see Mitalipov and Wolf 2014, 5. mtDNA was 
discovered in the 1960s, see Bleich 2015a, 60. 
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dysfunction that leads to cellular death, may ultimately cause organ system failure, and 
throughout its progression can manifest itself through a host of physiological 
complications from muscular dystrophy to GI tract dysfunction to respiratory difficulties 
and other maladies (Kurt and Topal 2013). The number of people born vulnerable to 
mitochondrial disease is unclear. Some claim as many as 1 in 400 (Poulton and Oakeshott 
2012); others as few as 1 in 5000-10,000 (Mitalipov and Wolf 2014).6 Additionally, 
mitochondrial disease often manifests later in life further complicating our understanding 
of its pathology, as well as skewing accurate data collection. 
 MRT enables a woman afflicted with mitochondrial disease to contribute her 
nDNA to the fertilization of an ovum, and have her mtDNA replaced with the mtDNA 
from a second non-diseased woman. Thus, in MRT, the intended father contributes his 
spermatic haploid-nDNA, the intended mother contributes her haploid-nDNA, and an 
third-party ovum donor contributes the enucleated ovum, with her cytoplasmic mtDNA, 
engendering so-called “three-parent” children. If the gestator is a surrogate other than one 
of the gamete donors, the resultant child arguably has four biological parents. The child 
would not only be free of the intended mother’s mtDNA, protecting the child from 
mitochondrial disease, but also will not transmit her disease-prone mtDNA to future 
generations (Claiborne, 2016; Kelly 2013). While tri-gametic embryos aim to free the 
                                                 
6 Darnovsky 2013 claims that advocates for the technology tell the press that as many as 1 in 200 children 
inherit disease-prone mtDNA in order to win public support. See, e.g., Gross 2015. Bioethicists Glenn 
McGee (McGee and McGee 1998), Francoise Baylis (2013), and Tina Rulli (2016) believe that the 
numbers of those afflicted with mitochondrial disease are too low to justify extensive research given more 
pressing needs. They also argue that it focuses parenthood on the need to transfer genes rather than on 
raising an individual child. For articles on mitochondrial diseases, their pathology, clinical diagnosis, and 
treatment, see St. John 2013. 
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resultant child of its mother’s disease-prone mtDNA and affiliated disease, the artificial 
manufacture of gametes from multiple donors also constitutes an example of germline 
modification in that laboratory-induced changes may be passed on to future offspring.7 
Table 7.1 summarizes possible basic cases of cloning and MRT. 
Table 7.1. Cloning = C; Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy = MRT 
 
Case 
# 
Technology nDNA 
mtDNA 
 
Sperm 
Donor 
Gestation/ 
Parturition 
Collab-
orators 
1 C 
Woman’s 
Somatic Cell 
Woman’s 
Ovum 
None Woman 1 
2 C 
Woman’s 
Somatic Cell 
Ovum 
Donor 
None 
Woman, 
Ovum 
Donor, or 
Surrogate 
2-3 
all 
women 
3 C 
Man’s 
Somatic Cell 
Ovum 
Donor 
None 
Ovum Donor 
or Surrogate 
2-3 
4 MRT Wife 
Ovum 
Donor 
Husband Wife 3 
5 MRT Wife 
Ovum 
Donor 
Husband Surrogate 4 
6 MRT Wife/Woman 
Ovum 
Donor 
Sperm 
Donor 
Wife/Woman 
or Surrogate 
3-4 
 
Thus, in cases of cloning, there may be a single, female biological parent, or up-
to-three female biological parents. Would this mean that the resultant child has no father? 
Can there be fatherhood absent a man? Are parental designations biologically defined, or 
social constructs subject to change? Is parenthood accounted for by causality or volition? 
Cloning also returns us to the question of whether parenthood adheres to a monist 
                                                 
7 Since spermatic mitochondria are degraded during fertilization, only female offspring produced through 
MRT could transmit mtDNA to a new generation, thus leading scientists and bioethicists to recommend 
initially limiting MRT trials to male embryos, see Claiborne 2016, 88-95; 119-121. For an explanation of 
the biological mechanism leading to the degradation of paternal mtDNA, see Zhou, et al. 2016. For the 
ethics of crossing the germline barrier, see Krimsky 2015. See also Bonnicksen 1998a,b; Knoppers 1998; 
Cole-Turner 2008. 
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standard, or is open to a pluralist one allowing for more than one mother. In cases of 
MRT, there may be as many as three or four biological progenitors. If the intended social 
father and/or mother are not biological participants in the collaborative reproductive 
process, the resultant child may have as many as five or six parents. Collaborative 
procreation with genetic technologies therefore extends the question of the nature of 
parenthood and its grounding to novel scenarios. Cloning and MRT sharpen the question 
of whether genetics determines parental identification by forcing a pronounced 
distinction between the ovum-mtDNA donor and ovum-nDNA donor. Thus, the 
complications of maternal identification originally introduced by gestational surrogacy 
and ovum donation multiply, forcing a renewed consideration of the determinative 
importance of causal reproductive contributions, especially genetic, in Jewish law and 
bioethics. As before, we will first understand the current science and its history, then 
identify issues of larger bioethical discussion, and of more particularly Jewish bioethical 
concern, and finally evaluate the epistemological and axiological dimensions of the 
contemporary Jewish bioethical debate concerning maternal and paternal identification 
regarding cloning and MRT for this dissertation’s four Jewish bioethical exemplars.  
 
The History and Science of Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
 When considering the history of human cloning and MRT, it is important to 
appreciate that these novel technologies build-off two centuries of advances in scientific 
understanding, experimentation, and technical refinement. To adequately account for 
their invention would require rehearsing the history of developmental, cellular, and 
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molecular biology; embryology; animal husbandry; biochemistry; genetics; and ART 
(The President’s Council on Bioethics 2002). Hans Spemann, a German embryologist at 
the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, whose work on cellular differentiation earned 
him the 1935 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine, was the first to speculate about 
cloning through SCNT in his 1938 book on Embryonic Development and Induction: 
“Decisive information about this question may perhaps be afforded by an experiment 
which appears, at first sight, to be somewhat fantastical. This experiment might possibly 
show that even nuclei of differentiated cells can initiate normal development in the egg 
protoplasms” (Spemann 1938; Nobel Media 2014).8 In 1952, two scientists in 
Philadelphia, Robert Briggs and Thomas J. King, made Spemann’s theorizing a reality 
when they successfully cloned leopard frogs by transplanting the embryonic nucleus of a 
frog blastula into an enucleated frog ovum. Although they successfully cloned frogs, their 
scientific interest laid in better understanding embryonic differentiation (Briggs and 
King, 1952). After conception, the fertilized egg undergoes a process of cellular cleavage, 
during which totipotent cells begin to differentiate. As the embryo develops into a fetus, 
differentiated cells (e.g., skin, bone, muscles, nerves) retain their particularity, despite 
sharing the same genome with all other cells. This process of differentiation was thought 
to be irreversible. Briggs and King were testing this presumption. Six years later, in 1958, 
John Gurdon, a graduate student at Oxford, began to apply Briggs and King’s nuclear-
transfer technique to his own experimentation, this time transferring adult-frog nuclei into 
                                                 
8 Given popular associations of cloning with Nazi eugenics, such as in Ira Levin’s 1976 novel, The Boys 
from Brazil, it is worth noting that Spemann resigned his position in protest after the Nazi ascension to 
power, see Sander 1997, 66-75. 
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enucleated ova. Like Briggs and King before him, Gurdon achieved successful cloning of 
frogs, but he also demonstrated that fully differentiated adult nuclei could be 
reprogramed to function like totipotent embryonic cells – at least, in amphibians. Gurdon 
won the Noble Prize in 2012 for his contributions to developmental embryology (Gurdon 
2015; Mukherjee 2016, 397-9).  
In the late 1960s, Gurdon’s successes, as well as his high failure rate, engendered 
lively bioethical debate among ethicists, scientists, and theologians. Nobel laureate 
Joshua Lederberg (1966), for example, sought to educate the populace and promote 
“clonal reproduction.” Theologian and ethicist Paul Ramsey (1970) took pen to paper 
against cloning. In a congressional testimony in 1971, Nobel laureate geneticist James D. 
Watson advocated for an open and transparent global discussion regarding the pros and 
cons of cloning. Others, were aghast at the Huxleyan possibility of mass human 
reproduction through cloning, as demonstrated by The New York Times Magazine 1972 
article entitled, “The Frankenstein Myth Becomes a Reality: We have the Awful 
Knowledge to Make Exact Copies of Human Beings” (Gaylin 1972).9 In quiet 
laboratories, the science of cloning and MRT progressed, and in the loud precincts of the 
public square the debate continued.10 
                                                 
9 Aldous Huxley’s (1998, 6-7) 1932 Brave New World’s “Bokanovsky’s Process,” futuristically describes 
reproductive cloning as: “One egg, one embryo, one adult – normality. But a bokanovskified egg will bud, 
will proliferate, will divide . . . becoming anywhere from eight to ninety-six embryos – a prodigious 
improvement, you will agree, on nature. Identical twins – but not in piddling twos and threes . . . Standard 
men and women; in uniform batches.” Willard Gaylin was a co-founder of the Institute of Society, Ethics, 
and the Life Sciences, which later was renamed the Hastings Center. See The President’s Council on 
Bioethics 2002. 
10 For a fuller account of the subsequent history, see The President’s Council on Bioethics 2002. 
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In 1995, Keith Campbell and Ian Wilmut led a research team at the Roslin 
Institute in Edinburgh, Scotland, that achieved the first successful nuclear transfer of 
embryonic sheep cells into enucleated ova.11 They demonstrated that mammalian cell 
differentiation is also not irreversible (Campbell, et al. 1996). In 1997, they applied their 
technique of nuclear transfer to adult, mammalian, somatic cells. They enucleated the 
ovum of a Scottish Blackface ewe. They then placed somatic cells from the mammary 
glands of a second, Finn Dorset, white-faced ewe into a nutrient-deficient culture medium 
that stimulated the somatic cells to reorganize their nDNA into a gametic configuration. 
Electrical current was applied to transfer the reprogrammed somatic cell nucleus into the 
enucleated oocyte and begin cellular cleavage, differentiation, and embryogenesis. When 
the resultant embryo ripened into a six-day blastocyst, they transferred it into the uterus 
of a surrogate sheep for gestation and parturition. Dolly the sheep, a Finn Dorset, was 
born on July 5, 1996. Her birth was publicized on February 27, 1997, in Nature, and 
made international headlines, unlike the earlier-described cloning successes. In popular 
imagination, Dolly represented scientific proof that human cloning was within the realm 
of the possible (Wilmut, et al. 1997; Wilmut and Campbell 2001).12  
 On November 11, 1997, at its twenty-ninth General Conference, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), unanimously 
adopted its “Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.” Article 
                                                 
11 Previously, in 1984, Danish scientist Steen Willadsen reported the successfully cloning of a sheep, 
though his claimed achievement failed to capture popular attention. See Scott and Weissman 2008, 27. 
12 Wilmut and Campbell’s research was sponsored by PPL Therapeutics Ltd., toward the goal of cloning 
genetically adapted sheep to mass-produce therapeutic bio-pharmaceuticals, see Kolata 1998, 25-7. Post-
Dolly, cloning animal experimentation continued, see Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 359-361. 
329 
 
 
11 reads: “Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive cloning of 
human beings, shall not be permitted” (UNESCO 1997).13 In 2004, a Korean scientist, 
Hwang Woo-Suk, stunned the world by claiming to have cloned the first human embryo 
through SCNT. He claimed that his intent was not reproductive cloning, but solely for 
stem cell research. However, shortly later it was discovered that Hwang had fabricated 
his results, and had even pressured his female research assistants to donate ova for 
experimentation (Devolder 2016, 11). In 2005, the United Nations called for a human 
cloning ban in its “Declaration on Human Cloning,” and many countries have created 
regulations regarding human cloning research, some forbidding it outright, and others, 
like France and Singapore, even criminalizing such experimentation (ibid., 1). In the 
aftermath of the Hwang scandal and international condemnation of human cloning, some 
refocused their attention on reprogramming adult somatic cells to act embryonically, 
thereby generating induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS) (Scott and Weissman 2008, 27).14 
In 2013, Dr. Shoukhrat Mitalipov’s team at the Oregon Health and Science University 
used SCNT to create human embryos from which stem cells were isolated (Tachibana, et 
al. 2013).  
 Dolly the sheep, and all SCNT clones to date, however, have not been true clones. 
This is because the enucleated oocyte into which a somatic cell nucleus is transferred 
                                                 
13 Article 11 continues: “States and competent international organizations are invited to co-operate in 
identifying such practices and in taking, at national or international level, the measures necessary to ensure 
that the principles set out in this Declaration are respected.” In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly 
endorsed the declaration. 
14 iPS are superior to therapeutically cloned stem cells in that their mtDNA matches the person from whom 
the somatic cells originated, whereas in therapeutically cloned stem cells the mtDNA matches the ovum 
donor, see Scott and Weissman 2008, 27. 
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retains its cytoplasm, and with it, its mitochondria. Although human reproductive cloning 
has not yet been sanctioned within the scientific and medical communities, cloning 
technologies have found more acceptable application in MRT.  
The first attempt at mitochondrial transfer was not for mtDNA replacement, but 
augmentation. In the late-1990s, a New Jersey fertility clinic attempted ooplasmic 
transfer – that is, harvesting an ovum from an infertile woman for IVF, but first injecting 
it with some cytoplasm from a second woman’s ovum, thereby transferring additional 
healthy mitochondria.15 The intent here was to “energize” the eggs of infertile women by 
injecting them with cytoplasm of younger donors. The FDA stopped this practice in 2002 
since it was an experimental gene therapy and needed specific FDA approval, but not 
before thirty to fifty children had been born of this technique (Bleich 2015a, 62). Two of 
the first seventeen fetuses conceived using this method had Turner’s syndrome, in which 
one X-chromosome is either missing or partial.16 Two healthy children, however, were 
also conceived and brought to term through this treatment. It should be noted, however, 
that this fertility treatment mixes two types of maternal mtDNA, whereas MRT to avoid 
disease aims to create an embryo with only one type of mtDNA (Aldhous 2009). 
 The most promising procedures for mitochondrial replacement utilize techniques 
developed in cloning research, in addition to in vitro fertilization. In Pronuclear Transfer 
(PNT), the gametes of the intended father and mother are brought together through in 
                                                 
15 Ooplasim transfer is sometimes alternatively referred to as cytoplasic transfer, see Bleich 2015a, 62. 
16 Since older, ineffective ova were being utilized, it is likely that there were confounding factors 
contributing to chromosomal abnormalities. 
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vitro fertilization to create an embryo.17 A second embryo from a donor egg and sperm is 
simultaneously created. The pronuclei of both embryos are removed on day one, at the 
single-cell stage, and the pronuclei with the conjoined nDNA of the intended father and 
mother is inserted into the enucleated embryo that contains healthy mtDNA from the 
second ovum donor. Although sperm do contain some mitochondria, they do not 
contribute to the mtDNA of the developing embryo (Yabuuchi, et al. 2012; Craven, et al. 
2010).18 In Nuclear Genome Transfer (NGT), a donor ovum is denucleated and the 
nucleus of the intended mother containing her nDNA is inserted into the donor ovum 
containing cytoplasm and healthy mtDNA. In vitro fertilization is then applied using the 
intended father’s sperm (Amato, et al. 2014).19  
  While the potential therapeutic benefits of cloning failed to persuade many to 
license human reproductive cloning, MRT which utilizes cloning technology may seem 
like a more sophisticated version of IVF with two donor ova. The seriousness of 
mitochondrial disease also has given supportive argument to its allowance. On February 
24, 2015, the House of Lords in Britain approved MRT, and the United Kingdom’s 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority began to develop pertinent regulations 
                                                 
17 Research in MRT began as early as the 1980s with animal trials before it was approved in the United 
Kingdom in February 2015 for use with humans. In 1983, PNT was successfully achieved with mice; in 
2009, with four macaque monkeys. In 2012, Shoukhrat Mitalipov of the Oregon National Primate Resarch 
Center in Beaverton performed nuclear genome transfer (NGT) by replacing the nuclei of ova that contain 
healthy mtDNA with that of the primate donor. He fertilized the nucleated eggs with sperm and grew them 
in culture into blastocysts of 100 cells over 5 or 6 days, when they would normally be implanted into the 
womb. Of the 65 eggs, 48% grew into healthy looking blastocysts, but over 50% developed abnormally as 
the result of faulty cell division. Mitalipov argued that his success rate was sufficient to proceed to human 
clinical trials, see Coghlan 2012. With such success/failure rates one could understand the tensions between 
eager researchers and clinicians, conservative policy makers, and cautious but hopeful bioethicists. 
18 See above, 326n7. 
19 Other techniques utilized in the recent past include Maternal Spindle Transfer (MST), Metaphase 
Chromosome Transfer (CT) and Germinal Vesicle Transfer (GVT), see Yabuuchi, et al. 2012.  
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which they approvingly publicized on December 15, 2016 (Gallagher 2015; Herbert and 
Turnbill 2017).20 On February 3, 2016, an advisory committee of the Washington, D.C.-
based National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommended 
approval of limited MRT (Claiborne 2016).21 However, the Congressional omnibus fiscal 
2016 budget bill contained language that prohibits the FDA and other government 
agencies from reviewing applications for, let alone funding of, experiments that 
genetically alter human embryos (Achenbach, 2016a).  
In September of 2016, it was revealed that on April 6, 2016, scientist John Zhang 
and his US team of the New Hope Fertility Center in New York City, working with an 
infertile Jordanian couple in Mexico, delivered the world’s first three-parent baby boy 
(Hamzelou 2016). Zhang subsequently reported that some of the intended mother’s 
disease-prone mtDNA was inadvertently transferred during Oocyte Spindle Transfer, 
potentially imperiling the future health of the child (Zhang, et al. 2017; Reardon 2017).22 
However, since mtDNA is maternally inherited, the resultant baby boy does not 
constitute an occurrence of germline modification. In January 2017, though, it was 
reported that the Nadiya Clinic for Reproductive Medicine in Kiev, Ukraine used PNT to 
help an idiopathically infertile woman deliver a baby girl, thus producing the first three-
parent baby girl, and the first MRT occurrence of germline modification (Scutti 2017).  
                                                 
20 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of the United States held public hearings on MRT in 2014, 
which concluded without a formal decision or recommendation, see Bleich 2015a, 63. 
21 In December 2015, however, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, took a 
more cautious stance on gene editing, i.e., Crisper Cas9, when it would constitute a germline modification, 
see Bleich 2015a, 64, n11. 
22 See Alikani, et al. 2107, for a critical editorial that was published in the same issue in Reproductive 
BioMedicine Online as Zhang, et al. 2017. For heteroplasmy resulting from SCNT, see Evans, Gurer, 
Loike, et al. 1999.  
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Issues of General and Jewish Bioethical Concerns Relating to Cloning and 
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
 The primary bioethical objection to cloning and MRT is the principle of non-
maleficence. Although cloning research advances genetic understanding of human 
development and disease, animal-experimental failure rates raise serious concerns about 
SCNT’s morality for humans. Consider, for example, the case of Dolly the sheep, who 
was the only successful birth among 277 attempts. Dolly only lived half her expected 
lifespan and died from cancer. It is unclear if her demise was a direct result of being a 
clone, but cloned animals, when they survive to birth, experience a range of serious 
anatomical and physiological abnormalities (Devolder 2014, 15-6). Non-maleficence is 
one of the primary reasons that the scientific, bioethical, and regulatory communities 
have been unsupportive of human reproductive cloning (Scott and Weissman 2008, 27).23 
 However, even if SCNT was sufficiently mastered to produce healthy outcomes, 
there are still those who object to therapeutic cloning due to religious-metaphysical 
concerns regarding the personhood of human embryos. Human reproductive cloning is 
also perceived by some bioethicists as a threat to individual identity since clones are not 
genetically unique. If clones are generated for specific goals, human autonomy is 
compromised, perhaps even leading to new forms of enslavement. Cloning may 
legitimate eugenics, giving rise to designer babies and master races.24 Being a clone also 
                                                 
23 A related concern is non-maleficence on a larger scale – namely, the precautionary principle, which 
argues for conservativism and conservationism when facing scientific uncertainty. Genetic engineering of 
all types may unleash unanticipated global ills. See Steel 2014. 
24 Especially for Jewish bioethicists, mass enhancement-eugenics raises the specter of the Holocaust. For 
literature on Nazi eugenics, science, and medicine, and their legal aftermath, see Kevles 1985; Lifton 1986; 
Proctor 1988; Grodin and Annas 1992, 2007; Mukherjee 2016, 128-38. For eugenics, more generally, see 
Bashford and Levine 2010. 
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may result in social stigmatization. Further, asexual reproduction obviates coupling, 
undermining traditional mating patterns and family structures, thus introducing complex 
family dynamics. Cloning also reduces genetic diversity. A robust bioethical literature 
debates these and other concerns (Devolder 2014, 16-26). If applied toward mass human 
reproduction, cloning arguably compromises the fundamental dignity of humanity. 
However, as a therapeutic and assisted reproductive intervention on an occasional, need 
basis, many of these arguments lose their strength, or end up relying on slippery slope 
argumentation.   
As with cloning before it, mitochondrial replacement therapy has generated 
scholarly research papers;25 bioethical reports from government appointed committees, 
bioethics institutes, and science policy think-tanks;26 summary and review articles and 
opinion pieces published in professional, generalized scientific journals like Nature or 
Science;27 and, non-specialized reports published in news media or popular scientific 
magazines online or in print.28 Each genre of sources plays its role and all contribute to 
the larger societal bioethical discussion. Summary and review articles make arcane 
scientific papers and their conclusions accessible. News media and science journalism 
further expand the public knowledge of laboratory achievements and bring transparency 
to the field of reproductive and genetic technologies. Through popular interviews and 
                                                 
25 First-generation research papers on this new technology include Amato, et al. 2014; Bredenoord, 
Pennings, and de Wert 2008; Burgstaller, Johnston, and Poulton 2014; Craven, et al. 2010; Cree and Loi 
2014; Evans, Gurer, Loike, et al. 1999; Mitalipov and Wolf 2014; Moraes, Bacman, and Williams 2014; 
Yabuuchi, et al. 2012.  
26 See The President’s Council on Bioethics 2014; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2012a,b; Hallowell 2012. 
27 See Check Hayden 2013; Cyranoski 2012; Darnovsky 2013; Personette 2014; Reinhardt, Dowling, and 
Morrow 2013; Tachibana, et al. 2009. 
28 See Aldhous 2009; Coghlan 2012; Berezow 2013, 2014; Raeburn 2014; Kelland and MacLellan 2015. 
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sound bites, scientists and practitioners share personal opinions that otherwise would not 
be communicated through their scientific publications. Moreover, contemporary 
bioethicists often emphasize the need for a new social framework to consider the ethical 
dimensions of these new technologies, as well as to help make medical decisions. Beyond 
the medical and academic scientific communities, other stakeholders include government 
regulators and legislators, the health care industry, and most importantly, the people 
whose lives stand to benefit from therapeutic interventions and reproductive 
technological advancements (Beradelli 1997).29 
 The arguments against MRT combine some of the arguments previously waged 
against ovum donation and gestational surrogacy, with some newly raised in regard to 
cloning technologies. Bioethicist Francoise Baylis (2013) identifies four ethical 
objections to MRT: one, harms to egg providers; two, harms to potential offspring and 
future generations; three, harms to specific interest groups; and four, harms to society. 
“Harms to egg providers” raises ethical concerns not only about mitochondrial 
replacement, but any reproductive technology that requires harvesting donor ova. While 
there are indeed ethical concerns regarding safety and unnecessary risk, the 
commodification of body parts, and distributive justice, this argument falters in specific 
opposition to this genetic therapy which aims to serve a select patient-group. For “harms 
to specific interest groups,” Baylis cites the need to maintain uncorrupted mtDNA 
lineages for DNA genealogists and researchers of migration patterns and demographic 
                                                 
29 See Fischbach, Benston, and Loike 2014, who use MRT as a bioethical case study to create 
multidisciplinary dialogue among researchers, scholars, and students to promote ethically responsible 
experimentation and clinical practice. 
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history. However important these disciplines, this too appears as a weak argument in the 
face of human suffering. For “harms to society,” Baylis wages three arguments. First, the 
slippery slope argument that this will lead to non-therapeutic uses, such as lesbian 
couples who desire to mix their DNA to create a child, as well as other efforts toward 
germline modification including enhancement. Second, tampering with the human gene 
pool violates the open-future rights of future generations. Third, scientific resources 
should be expended on more pressings needs of human health and welfare. Each of these 
is subject to counter-argumentation, especially the slippery slope argument. 30  
 Baylis’s strongest concern is the harm to potential offspring and future 
generations, a concern strongly articulated by others, but in truth shared by all parties to 
the debate (Genetics and Society 2014, Human Genetics Aler t2014, Right to Life 
2014).31 A. Bredenoord and A. Braude (2011) warn that we do not yet fully understand 
the interactions between nDNA and mtDNA, and fear that interposing a third-party’s 
mtDNA may yield unforeseen deleterious consequences. Evolutionary biologists Klaus 
Reinhardt (et al. 2013) and Jonci Wolff (et al. 2014) likewise argue that mtDNA and 
nDNA “talk to each other,” mtDNA affects the expression of nuclear genes, and thus 
impact upon development, lifespan, fertility – especially in males, and cognition. Studies 
                                                 
30 See Raeburn 2014, who dismisses the slippery slope argument since it can be applied to any new 
technology, and proper regulation can distinguish between therapeutic genetic engineering and designer 
babies. Darnovsky 2013, on the other hand, opines that until now there has been an international consensus 
that genetic engineering may be used to treat an individual’s medical condition, but not germline 
modification. Modifying gametes and early embryos transgresses the current agreement and opens the door 
to full-out germline modification and its attendant eugenic social dynamics. See also Quintavalle 2002; 
Sandel 2007; Schichor, Simonet, and Canono 2012. 
31 The Right to Life organization is likewise concerned about the harm to embryos whether in research or 
during treatment given their Christian theology of personhood attaching at conception. See also Berezow 
2013, 2014. 
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of the negative effects of mismatched nuclear and mitochondrial genomes have been 
performed with fruit flies, mice, seed beetles, and copepods. Mitochondrial transfer may 
even possibly introduce new genetic diseases into the gene pool (Nuffield Council 
2012a,b). The challenge of an individual choosing to assume this risk is that replacing 
mitochondria constitutes a heritable genetic change. The only way to avoid heritable, 
genetically altered mitochondria is to sex-select for XY embryos during the ART phase 
of the process since any future offspring of a male “three-parent baby” will inherit its 
mtDNA from its non-genetically modified mother (Nuffield Council 2012).32 The ethics 
of sex selection obviously pertain.  
 While mitochondrial transfer is indeed a form of germline genetic engineering, 
supportive bioethicists argue that mitochondrial engineering is different from nuclear 
germline modification since the mitochondrial genome is small and contributes less than 
one-percent to the genetic make-up of a person. MtDNA do not make direct contributions 
to the traits that make us human: personality, intelligence, appearance. Blood transfusions 
also transfer “alien” DNA, but similarly do not effect personhood (New Scientist 2013). 
However, this may be too glib. Metabolism certainly does impact upon human activity, 
and thereby both person and personality (Darnovsky 2013). Additionally, it is unknown 
whether knowledge of having multiple sources of DNA will psychologically affect 
someone’s sense of identity (Holtug 1998). Changing family structures in larger society 
more generally further complicates the unknown social consequences of the new 
reproductive technologies. While some warn that children born of three (or more) sources 
                                                 
32 See Beekman, et al. 2014 for a study about male-expression mtDNA mutations. 
338 
 
 
of genetic material will suffer psychological damage, a similar concern applies to 
children born through gestational surrogacy and of donor gametes. 
Questions of identity not only arise in the realm of psychology, but also in law. 
The establishment of maternal and paternal parenthood for a child conceived and gestated 
with the help of additional parties raises both secular and religious legal issues. 
Biological and social concepts of parenthood may clash, just like in classical adoption. 
Legislation, by necessity, must step-in to regulate the establishment of parenthood, and 
decide the legal, and even ethical obligations and rights involved in parenthood (Andrews 
2005; Eekelaar and Sarcevic 1993; Rothstein, et al. 2005). The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethic’s (2012a,b) six-month investigation into mitochondrial replacement 
recommended that the mitochondrial donor should not have the same status of an ovum 
or sperm donor, but rather should be seen as making a tissue donation. Accordingly, a 
mitochondrial donor needs to be anonymized and should not create any biological or 
legal notion of a child having a third parent or second mother. Therefore, children born 
through such reproductive technology should also not have the right to find out the 
identity of the donor.  
 In Judaism, since halakhah understands Jewish identity as maternally conferred, 
the identification of maternity is of primary importance, though paternity also has 
significant Jewish religious implications. Bastardy is also of great legal concern since 
halakhah identifies a bastard as the offspring of biblically illicit unions such as adultery 
or incest, though not of extra-marital pregnancies. If children born of reproductive 
technologies are deemed to have unknown, anonymous parents, there is fear of the 
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potential for unintended incest with a future mate, and the progeneration of bastards, 
especially given the relatively small size of the Jewish community and the preference for 
endogamy. Per halakhah, individuals with bastard status are unable to marry individuals 
without such status. It is important to note that a desire to avoid potential for bastardy 
may have an influential impact in the formation of halakhic positions on the 
determination of paternity and maternity in the new reproductive and genetic 
technologies. There has been extensive discussion, but little consensus, among Jewish 
bioethicists and medical halakhists regarding the parental implications of gamete 
donation and gestational surrogacy.  
 Similarly, parental-identity questions arise when manufacturing gametes from 
stem cells or creating embryos through cloning to treat cases of infertility. Just as 
gestation can have epigenetic impact, so too ovum donor mtDNA may influence gene 
activation and expression of the other donor’s nDNA. Artificial gamete manufacture and 
therapeutic cloning thus raise many ethical questions impacting upon moral and legal 
concepts of kinship, family structures, and the relationship between parents and children 
(Newson and Smajdor 2005). 
 
Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy: Epistemological and Axiological 
Considerations 
 
 Cloning and MRT significantly complicate the Jewish-bioethical and medical-
halakhic discussion heretofore. As genetic technologies, in addition to being ARTs, there 
are added valences to their larger bioethical consideration, as described above. Genetic 
engineering and gamete creation allow for additional genetic reproductive collaborators, 
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forcing a renewed consideration of a pluralist standard not only for maternity, but 
possibly also for paternity. Cloning likewise challenges traditional notions of dual 
parenthood, especially if a single woman’s somatic cell and ovum are utilized, making 
her the sole nDNA and mtDNA donor, and if she gestates and delivers the resultant child. 
Therefore, scientific awareness and the role of new knowledge are potentially poised to 
play an important epistemological role in the adjudication of maternal and paternal 
identification in these novel assisted reproductive and genetic technologies. Once again, 
as legally oriented scholars, medical halakhists and Jewish bioethicists will seek out legal 
precedents and analogies to assess parental identification in cases of cloning and MRT. 
The imprint of scientific knowledge and its awareness need to be epistemologically 
discerned for each discrete analysis of such legal precedents and analogies. However, the 
unimagined novelty of these technologies raises the question of whether the received 
halakhic tradition has sufficient resources to adjudicate unanticipated phenomena born of 
scientific advancement. What methodological responses might emerge to accommodate 
such occurrences? 
Axiologically, do Jewish bioethicists and medical halakhists view the 
reproductive and therapeutic benefits promised by such technologies as outweighing the 
potential harms and dangers? What ethical methodologies and discreet values do they 
apply to evaluate the legitimacy and morality of cloning and MRT? We now proceed to 
investigate this dissertation’s four Jewish bioethical exemplars on cloning and MRT: 
Rabbis J. David Bleich, Michael J. Broyde, Elliot N. Dorff, Moshe D. Tendler, and Dr. 
John D. Loike. 
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Rabbi J. David Bleich on Cloning, Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, and 
Parenthood 
 
 Bleich first wrote on cloning in 1998 in the aftermath of Dolly the Sheep. He 
republished this essay with minor edits in 2006 and 2015 (Bleich 1998c, 2006a, 1-56; 
Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 357-99).33 As the United States and the United Kingdom 
began to consider permitting MRT in 2014 and 2015, Bleich (2015a) addressed MRT 
through the lens of Jewish bioethics and halakhah in the journal Tradition, in his column, 
“Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature.” We will first critically review his 
approach to cloning, then to MRT, especially regarding parental identification. Then we 
will assess the epistemological and axiological dimensions of both together. 
 
Bleich on Cloning 
 The Talmud (TB Kiddushin 30b) teaches: “There are three partners [in the 
formation] of a person: The Holy One blessed be He, his father, and his mother.” Bleich 
understanding this statement as not only establishing natural parenthood as the ideal 
paradigm, but also as depicting humanity as partners with God in creation. “The 
question,” Bleich (Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 369) asks, “is whether procreative license 
is limited to sexual reproduction or whether it encompasses asexual or homologous 
reproduction as well.” Bleich points out, once again, that Judaism, unlike Catholicism, 
does not subscribe to a doctrine of natural law, and encourages beneficent intervention 
                                                 
33 Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 395-9, adds discussion questions, and an appendix, “note,” on halakhic 
sources. 
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within the natural order, even regarding procreation.34 Although the Torah does prohibit 
certain forms of botanical hybridization and mammalian interbreeding, Judaism largely 
affirms a theology of divinely mandated interventionism, especially regarding matters of 
health (ibid., 362-8; Bleich 1979b). Bleich avers that “there is ample reason” to believe 
that “Jewish teaching” would “not frown upon cloning either animals or humans simply 
because it is a form of asexual, and hence ‘unnatural,’ reproduction” (ibid., 368). To 
support this initial contention, Bleich points to talmudic and post-talmudic legends about 
the creation of a golem (artificial anthropoid), which while not quite an exact legal 
analogy, still represents a form of asexual reproduction approvingly discussed by Jewish 
sages (ibid., 369-82).  
 The Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 65b) relates that, “Rava created a person, and sent 
him before Rav Zeira. Rav Zeira tried speaking to him, but he would not reply. Rav Zeira 
said to him: ‘You are from one of my colleagues, return to your dust.” Immediately 
following this passage, the Talmud (ibid.) tells: “Rav Chanina and Rav Ush’aya would sit 
[together] every Sabbath eve, delving into Sefer Yetzirah – The Book of Creation, and 
would create for themselves a third-grown calf, which they would eat.” Most 
commentators understand both incidents as born of applications of Jewish mystical 
knowledge.35  
                                                 
34 Regarding cloning, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (1987, 1:6) states: “Techniques of 
fertilization in vitro … are contrary to the human dignity proper to the embryo … attempts or hypotheses 
for obtaining a human being without any connection with sexuality through ‘twin fission,’ cloning or 
parthenogenesis are to be considered contrary to the moral law, since they are in opposition to the dignity 
both of human procreation and of the conjugal union.”  
35 For Jewish mystical beliefs regarding a golem, legendary reports of golem creation, and their application 
to bioethics, see Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 369-82, 370nn35-6; 373n44; Rosenberg, 1909, translated in 
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These passages, and other legends of golem creation and destruction, have 
inspired numerous metaphysical, ethical, and legal questions: Does a golem have soul? Is 
an artificial anthropoid human?36 If so, how could Rav Zeira destroy him? Wouldn’t that 
be murder? Can a living golem count in a prayer quorum? Does a dead golem impart 
ritual impurity? Is a mystically created animal kosher? Does it require ritual slaughter? 
May its meat be eaten with milk? In the time of the Temple, could it have been offered as 
a sacrifice? (Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 373). 
 Bleich disclaims that a golem doesn’t provide a legal precedent or analogy for 
cloning, but “is instructive for the purpose of establishing a framework in which the 
contemporary problem can be examined” (ibid., 369). On the procreative spectrum, 
Bleich see parthenogenesis and embryonic fission as involving minimal intervention in 
nature, cloning through SCNT as engineering nature, and the creation of a golem as 
complete artificiality. Bleich identifies a golem as the “least natural” because “replication 
of existing human genetic material is completely lacking” (ibid.). A clone, on the other 
hand, not only has the same genetic make-up of a naturally reproduced human being, but 
until ex vivo artificial incubators are produced, clones also are products of human 
gametes, gestated in vivo, and delivered like any other child (ibid., 373). Thus, what 
holds true for a golem as an artificial anthropoid might all the more pertain to a child 
cloned through artificial genetic engineering. Here Bleich’s scientifically oriented 
                                                 
Neugroschel 1976; Winkler 1980; Scholem 1996, 158-204; Idel 1989; Sherwin 1985, 2004; Kieval 1997; 
Leiman 2002.   
36 Azriel Rosenfeld 1966, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1977, was one of the first writers on futuristic Jewish 
bioethics, considering, for example, in addition to cloning, human personhood and artificial intelligence, 
for which he also cites golem literature. 
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epistemology impinges on his “issue-spotting” and analysis, allowing him to heuristically 
employ pre-modern sources, while recognizing fundamental differences. 
 Bleich reviews the mystical and halakhic literature concerning golems. Of 
particular note is his analysis of Rabbi Tzvi Ashkenazi’s (1658-1718) short responsum on 
whether a golem may count toward a prayer quorum. Ashkenazi writes: 
I am in doubt as to whether a person created [mystically] through The 
Book of Creation, like the case that the [Sages] told in [TB] Sanhedrin (65b), 
“Rava created a person…,” and as they attest regarding my grandfather, our 
illustrious master and teacher Rabbi Eliyahu, chief justice of the holy community 
of Chelm,37 if [such a creature] may count toward the ten [required for a prayer 
quorum] … Since [the requirement of a quorum is based on] the verse “I will be 
sanctified amidst the Children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:32), he should not join in, 
or perhaps since they uphold in [TB] Sanhedrin (19a), “Whoever raises an orphan 
in his home, Scripture accounts it as if he had begotten him...,” here too since [the 
golem] is the handiwork of righteous ones, the [golem] is included in the Children 
of Israel since the handiwork of the righteous are in fact their progeny.  
It appears to me, since we find that Rav Zeira said, “you are [the creation] 
of my colleagues, return to your dust” (TB Sandhedrin 65a), and we see he killed 
him, and if it should enter your mind that there was a benefit to add him to the ten 
[of a prayer quorum] for sacred matters, then Rav Zeira would not have removed 
him from the world, even though there is no prohibition of spilling [its] blood, as 
Scripture specifically [requires] “Whoever sheds the blood of haAdam beAdam – 
a person [born from] within a person, his blood shall be shed” (Genesis 9:6),38 
[meaning that] only a person who was formed within a person – that is, a fetus 
that was formed in its mother’s womb – is someone for whose killing one is 
culpable of bloodshedding. … (Ashkenazi 1712, no. 93) 
 
Bleich takes note of several points. First, Ashkenazi doesn’t dismiss the golem’s 
humanity, per se. He even is willing to consider a volitional account of parenthood strong 
                                                 
37 For more on Rabbi Elijah Ba’al Shem of Chelm’s golem, see Bleich and Jacobson 374, nn45-6. 
38 Gensis 9:6 reads: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in His image did 
God make man.” The Rabbis midrashically read the verse with alternate syntax as, “Whoever sheds the 
blood of a person within a person…,” thus establishing a Noahide prohibition against feticide. Ashkenazi 
here seems to extend that midrashic reading as limiting the prohibition against murder to people who were 
gestated within and delivered by a woman.  
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enough to confer Jewish identity.39 In the end, despite asserting a technical exemption 
from a charge of homicide for the destruction of a golem, Ashkenazi concludes his 
responsum in the negative, judging by inference that were a golem able to count toward a 
prayer quorum, then the righteous rabbi would not have taken its life (Bleich and 
Jacobson 2015, 374-8).40  
 Bleich identifies four positions regarding the metaphysical and legal status of a 
mystically created golem: one, it neither human nor a living creature; two, it has the 
status of a “brute animal” or slightly above it; three, he has full human status; four, he has 
full human status, including a soul, if he can speak.41 In relating these positions to a 
consideration of a human clone, Bleich states:  
As stated at the outset, discussion of the halakhic status of a golem may appear to 
be esoteric and irrelevant to the status of a clone animal or person. That 
presumption, however, is incorrect. The golem literature demonstrates the 
unassailability of the status of a cloned human as a human being according to the 
view of Maharsha, R. Zadok ha-Kohen and R. Gershon Leiner [who believe a 
golem is fully human]. In order to establish the humanity of a human clone 
according to the authorities who espouse a conflicting view of the status of an 
anthropoid it is necessary to distinguish between a clone and a golem. (Bleich and 
Jacobson 2015, 382) 
 
The primary difference between a clone and a golem, avers Bleich, is that a clone has a 
human progenitor, even if reproduced asexually. Bleich returns to the talmudic debate 
                                                 
39 See Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 388n81, where Bleich says that even per this initial consideration, 
Ashkenazi would not credit the person who raises an orphan with the fulfillment of the mitzvah of 
procreation. Bleich’s comment speaks to the difficulty of Ashkenazi’s seeming taking of homiletical, 
figurative statements as literal, and, therefore, as halakhically significant.   
40 Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 375, also cites the critique of Rabbi Gershon Leiner, the Radzyner Chassidic 
Rebbe (Sidrei Taharot, Ohalot 5a), who challenges Ashkenazi’s requirement of homicide requiring human 
gestation and birthing by the example of Adam, who was created of earth by God. How could we resolve 
that would someone have killed the first person that one would not be culpable? 
41 See Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 381-2. Respectively, the four positions are held by: one, Tzofnat 
Pa’aneach; two, Chesed LeAvraham, She’eilat Ya’avetz, and possibly Chakham Tzvi; three, possibly 
Chakham Tzvi and Rabbi Tzadok haKohen of Lublin; and four, Maharsha and Rabbi Gershon Leiner. 
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(TB Chullin 79a) regarding species identification in cases of mammalian interbreeding. 
While there is debate concerning the determinacy of “the seed of the father,” all agree 
that the offspring is identified as belonging to the same species as its birth mother. 
Further, Bleich invokes the halakhic principle of “yotzei – outgrowth,” which posits that 
an outgrowth shares the identity of its origin. Bleich quotes Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman 
(1874-1941) who claims that this principle is not confined to matters of forbidden and 
permitted foodstuffs, but is a universalizable conceptualization.42 Thus, a clone, gestated 
and born of a woman, and an outgrowth of human-cellular tissue, enjoys full human 
status. Bleich identifies transspecies incubation as a practical difference between the 
principle of “outgrowth” and maternal indication by parturition, i.e., a cloned pig 
incubated in a cow would be non-kosher per the first principle, but kosher per the second 
(ibid., 384). Theoretically, Bleich admits the possibility that geno-and-phenotypical 
cloned animals, such as primates, xenotransplanted and incubated in a woman, would 
upon birth be legally regarded as human. Conversely, a human clone carried and 
delivered by a primate, would be of doubtful humanity, since parturition is an agreed 
upon determinant for species determination, and the determinacy of “the seed of the 
father” is contested (ibid., 387). 
Regarding parenthood, since ex vivo and transspecies incubation are not currently 
possible, Bleich reiterates his primary position that parturition determines maternity. At 
the same time, since per one opinion in the Talmud, “the seed of the father must be 
                                                 
42 See Bleich 2015a, 383n69, citing Kovetz He’arot, no. 33, sec.8, and no. 59, sec. 12; Kovetz Inyanim, 
Chullin 17a; and Kovetz Shiurim, vol 1., Pesachim, sec. 120. 
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considered,” Bleich believes that this determining principle in species identification in 
interbred animals may also pertain to human reproductive cloning. This is especially true 
if the conceptual basis of “the seed of the father must be considered” is itself 
fundamentally an alternate formulation of the principle of “outgrowth.” He writes:  
It would appear that the principle of hosheshin le-zera ha-av (the seed of the 
father must be considered) is not founded on the fact that the father literally 
contributes zera (or sperm in a literal sense), but upon whether the father’s 
donation of chromosomes or perhaps even of cytoplasm is of sufficient halakhic 
significance to cause the developing embryo to be regarded as the … outgrowth 
of the father. If so, the principle … is applicable to any and all sources of genetic 
material that contribute to the development of an animal. Accordingly, from the 
viewpoint of Halakhah, the animal, male or female, from which the cloned cell is 
taken is regarded as the “father” regardless of the organ from which the cell is 
taken.” (ibid., 385) 
 
However, when Bleich applies this argument to human beings, he is only willing to 
identify the nDNA donor of a clone as a “parent,” and not necessarily as a father. In a 
lengthy footnote, Bleich explains: 
If the individual from whom the cell is taken is a male, his status is clearly that of 
a “father.” If the individual is a female, it would be reasonable to assume that her 
status is that of a “mother” and that the clone, in effect, has two mothers. This 
assumption is based upon the premise that hosheshin le-zera ha-av (the seed of 
the father must be considered) is a principle concerning parenthood rather than 
with regard to paternity specifically. … On the other hand, one might insist that a 
non-gestational parent is, by definition, a “father” rather than a “mother.” (ibid., 
385-6n76) 
 
Bleich clearly does not want to disrupt the traditional gender alignment of fatherhood 
with males and motherhood with females, though intellectually he recognizes this as a 
conceptual possibility. Bleich also denies to a person who creates offspring through 
cloning the fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation. Even if a sexual act is not required 
for the mitzvah, Bleich argues, children must still be begotten of human semen. In cases 
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of in vitro fertilization, even if conception is unnatural, the biological processes at play 
are fully natural, which cannot be said of SCNT.43 While Judaism approves of 
intervention in the natural order, fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation does entail, per 
Bleich, a degree of sexual naturalism. 
 
Bleich’s Halakhic and Bioethical Disapproval of Cloning 
 Bleich assails cloning mainly due to the significant risk of harm to the resultant 
child born of this immature technology. He supports therapeutic cloning for tissue and 
organ generation, but argues that reproductive cloning cannot be construed as a cure, as it 
is “not restorative in nature” (ibid., 391-3). It does not fulfill the mitzvah of procreation, 
and the emotional pain of infertility cannot justify an immoral risk. However, this line of 
argumentation would possibly permit reproductive cloning in limited therapeutic cases, 
such as, for example, cloning a healthy human counterpart to a child ill with leukemia in 
need of an exact bone marrow match (ibid., 392-3).44 Bleich opposes cloning as a 
hubristic endeavor. It will likely cause serious harm to future generations. It is likely to 
be misused, such as for eugenic purposes. It may lead to demographic imbalances, and 
undermine familial and social structures that give stability and moral purpose to society. 
Therefore, per Bleich, society “has both the right and the obligation to regulate 
experimental endeavors,” and make sure that they are of societal benefit, and not 
detriment (ibid., 393-4). 
                                                 
43 See Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 387-8, 388n80.  
44 See Bleich 1995a, 273-315, on whether tissue donations may be compelled.  
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Bleich on Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 For Bleich, MRT raises anew all of the morally and halakhically problematic 
issues of collaborative reproduction in cases of gestational surrogacy and ovum donation: 
non-natural procreation may inflict currently unknown harms upon the resultant child; 
third-party gamete contributions disrupt the “traditional bionormative,” heterosexual-
marital, family structure; IVF requires halakhically challenging semen procurement, and 
ovum harvesting and donation; questions regarding the ownership and disposition of 
excess or abnormal embryos; the bioethics of fetal reduction; and the conundrum of 
parental identity (Bleich 2015a, 65-6). He writes:  
A "three-parent" implantation procedure presents a halakhic issue of maternal 
identity echoing a similar question that arose much earlier with regard to 
surrogate motherhood. Surrogate motherhood presents a fairly clear-cut issue. 
Who is the mother, the biological mother, i.e., the genetic mother, or the 
gestational mother who gives birth to the child by means of parturition? In 
instances of mitochondrial DNA donation, the issue is whether it is the donor of 
maternal mitochondrial DNA or the woman whose nuclear DNA is present in the 
child who is the mother, or both? It may also be possible to combine 
mitochondrial DNA from multiple donors. If that becomes actual, would 
Halakhah recognize multiple maternal relationships? (ibid., 66) 
 
Here, Bleich, in framing the question of maternal identification for cases of MRT, not 
only continues to espouse a causal, pluralist standard of motherhood, but also more 
openly embraces genetic determinants as halakhically significant, something that he 
backed off from in his later assessments of IVF with ovum donation and gestational 
surrogacy, when he opined: “It must be clearly recognized that halakhah takes no direct 
cognizance of genetics as a significant factor in and of itself” (Bleich 1994, 53).  
 Although Bleich first proposed a partible maternal model in 1972 in the context of 
fetal transfer and “host-mothers,” in his 2015 consideration of MRT, for the first time, he 
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cites in support of a pluralist standard of paternity the medieval, Franco-German 
commentary, Tosafot, on a midrash agaddah cited in the Talmud. The Bible calls Goliath 
in Hebrew “ish habeinayim,” literally rendered as “man of the in-between” (Samuel I, 
17:4), the exact meaning of which is uncertain,45 but which the Babylonian Talmud (TB 
Sota 42b) understands as referring to the notion that Goliath’s extraordinary physical 
prowess was due to having multiple biological fathers. Goliath’s mother, who the rabbis 
identify as Orpah the Moabite, sister of Ruth and daughter-in-law of Naomi,46 sometime 
after her return to her family in Moab had sexual relations with numerous male partners 
on the night of Goliath’s conception: “What is the meaning of ‘beinyaim’? … Rabbi 
Yochanan said, ‘He was the son of a hundred papi, fathers, and one nanai, mother.’”47 
The medieval talmudic commentator, Rashi (ad loc., s.v. “Bar Meah”) denies the 
possibility of multiple fathers and understands the talmudic passage as identifying 
Goliath as being of obscure paternity: “one was his father, all of them were adulterers.” 
Tosafot (ad loc., s.v. “Meah”), on the other hand, entertain the idea that the sperm of 
multiple men can contribute to a single pregnancy. Notably, Bleich utilizes this midrash, 
                                                 
45 See Stein 2003, 607, whose Jewish Publication Society Hebrew-English TaNaKh (Hebrew Bible) 
tentatively translates the phrase as “the man of spaces between.” 
46 See Ruth 1:1-15. 
47 The talmudic Aramaic phrase is ambiguous. Tosafot follow Rabbi Natan ben Yechiel’s ‘Arukh (n.d., vol. 
5, 296) which translates “nanai” as a dog, yielding “he was the son of a hundred fathers and one dog,” with 
either literal meaning (Tosafot), or pejorative reference to Goliath’s mother. Rashi translates “papi” as step-
father, and “nanai” as father, yielding “one hundred would-be fathers and one (actual) father.” My 
translation, “he was the son of one hundred fathers and one mother,” following its potential relevance to 
MRT, follows Jastrow (1903, 866), who understands “nanai” as a corrupt form of mamma, which parallels 
“papi – fathers.” This is a scientifically unsupported claim of viable polyspermy, which is different from 
superfetation, i.e., a woman’s multiple ova can be inseminated by different male sexual partners, either in 
the case of twins, see Mueller 2015; or months apart within a single state of pregnancy, see Reichman 
2009. Interestingly, tri-and-tetra-gametic chimerism, does occur in nature, even for humans, albeit usually 
with negative consequence, see Yunis, Zuniga, and Romero 2007. For genetically engineered chimeric 
rhesus monkeys, see Trounson and Grieshammer 2012. For others who cite this midrash aggadah regarding 
Goliath’s polygenomic paternity, see Dovid Lichtenstein 2014a; Loike and Tendler 2014a, 57n40.  
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presumably because of its citation in Tosafot, despite previous disavowals against using 
such non-halakhic sources, to support fundamentally a pluralist account of both paternity 
and maternity. He writes: “Tosafot’s analysis, even if rejected as empirically incorrect, is 
significant because it reflects Tosafot’s willingness to entertain halakhic recognition of 
two fathers” (Bleich 2015a, 67n16).48  
 Bleich, however, recognizes that it may now become possible to create an embryo 
using an enucleated oocyte and nDNA formed from the genetic materials of two males, 
thus potentially creating a situation of multiple fatherhood (ibid., 76-7n31).49 Regarding 
multiple motherhood, Bleich asks again: 
In instances of mitochondrial DNA replacement, who is the mother? Is the mother 
the woman who produced the ovum from which the nucleus was taken or the 
donor of the mitochondrial DNA? If only some defective mitochondrial genes are 
replaced, who is the mother? In as yet unanticipated situations in which 
replacement genes are donated by multiple women, who is the mother? Is it 
possible that the infant may have multiple mothers since each donor of genetic 
material is to be considered to be one of the neonate's mothers? (ibid., 76) 
 
Once again, Bleich embraces the theory-laden terminology of genetics, in part because 
the scientific technological advance of MRT cannot simply be considered using the 
traditional language of the pre-modern halakhic corpus. Bleich would claim that scientific 
understanding simply better details and defines the circumstances to which the 
unchanging halakhah can be more precisely applied. While it is indeed true that scientific 
awareness and understanding allows for a more sophisticated halakhic and Jewish 
                                                 
48 Bleich thereby disputes noted Israeli posek, Rabbi Asher Weiss (2013), who opined: “It appears to me to 
be clear and simple, that, from the vantage point of halakhah, it is not at all possible for a person to have 
two mothers, just as it is impossible that he have two fathers” (translation by Bleich 2015a, 67n16). 
49 Bleich cites Orentlicher 2000-01, and Aloni 2011, regarding same-sex couples using ART and genetic 
technologies to produce chimeric tri-gametic offspring. 
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bioethical analysis, the impress of new knowledge goes beyond sharper terminology and 
better understood circumstance. The very act of interpreting halakhic sources is shaped 
by reading them through the lens of scientific understanding and awareness. 
For example, Rabbi Asher Weiss (2013), a renowned Israeli posek, in a 
responsum appearing online, permits MRT, and argues that by the halakhic principle of 
“identification by majority,” nDNA defines maternity. The contribution of genetic 
material made by mtDNA, per Weiss, is quantitatively negligible, and therefore doesn’t 
impact upon maternal identity. In his responsum, Weiss displays rudimentary knowledge 
of the science involved, which when coupled with his insistence on a monist halakhic 
standard of parenthood, leads him to a self-admitted flawed application, in this instance, 
of “identification by majority.” Bleich, however, demonstrably fully knowledgeable of 
mtDNA and the essentiality of mitochondria to physiological viability, negates the 
application of the halakhic concepts of “nullification of minority” and “identification by 
majority” (bittul and rov, respectively), because “that principle does not apply in 
situations in which the lesser component remains readily discernible in the composite 
mixture” (Bleich 2015a, 77). Additionally, extending the legal analogy, Bleich likens 
mtDNA to a “davar ha-ma’amid,” literally, ‘a substance that holds up’ or stabilizes other 
substances,” which cannot be nullified because it fundamentally affects the mixture, even 
if, as a minority contribution, it is not immediately perceivable (ibid., 77-8). Bleich 
opines: “Arguably, genes that preserve physical or physiological integrity ‘stabilize’ the 
health of offspring with the result that those genes should be regarded as perceivable in 
the functioning of a normal, healthy human body” (ibid., 78). 
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Bleich also argues that the halakhic principles of “minority nullification” and 
“identification by majority” are limited in their halakhic application to admixtures with 
forbidden substances (issur), and not more globally to other areas of halakhah, especially 
those concerning constitutive identity (ibid., 78). While this last methodological assertion 
is debatable, Bleich arguably is motivated to wage this argument because he believes that 
genetics is fundamentally different than cases of forbidden mixtures. In forbidden 
mixtures, the question is factual – can the minority component be discerned? In genetics, 
the complex interplay between genotype and phenotype, between inherited DNA and 
environmental influences regarding gene activation and expression, and the differential 
importance of genetic sequences and their chromosomal or mitochondrial location, make 
genetics subject to alternate consideration. To think of genetics in terms of minority and 
majority is to perpetrate a category error. 
 As in the earlier ARTs of ovum donation and gestational surrogacy, in the case of 
MRT, Bleich reasserts parturition as the primary determinant of halakhic maternity.50 
Although cloning and MRT are novel technologies, as long as it is a woman who gestates 
and delivers the resultant child, Bleich see the question of maternal identity in cloning 
and MRT as fundamentally similar to the earlier cases of ART. However, as before, 
Bleich also proposes that there may be a pluralist standard to parenthood, and in cases of 
collaborative reproduction there may be more than one mother. Bleich once again cites 
                                                 
50 See above, Chapter Six, p. 283 ff., for Bleich’s talmudic prooftexts in support of parturition. Bleich 
2015a, 80n37 asks whether it is the actual delivery per se, whether vaginally or by caesarian section, that 
establishes maternal identity, or the culmination of pregnancy. The practical difference being a case in 
which a woman carries a fetus to term, but dies before the actual birth, whereupon the living baby is 
successfully removed from the expired woman. If parturition per se establishes maternity, can motherhood 
attach after death? 
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the talmudic discussion (TB Chullin 79a) of species classification in cases of 
interbreeding. One view defines species by maternal descent. Another view asserts that 
the “seed of the father is to be considered,” thereby implying that parturition is not the 
only determinant of identity. Bleich then argues: 
The "seed" that transfers identity as a member of a species is clearly the male 
gamete. If that "seed" is to be regarded as a source for transmission of identity it 
would stand to reason that the female gamete should be regarded in a similar 
manner, i.e., the female seed should be recognized as a source of parental identity 
no less so than the male seed. In effect, the genetic mother would have a status 
comparable to that of a genetic father. (Bleich 2015a, 81-2) 
 
Bleich’s scientifically altered “web of belief” lets him read genetics into talmudic 
considerations of identity, thereby allowing him to propose dual-maternity based on both 
parturition and genetics. If genetics serves as a determinant of motherhood, then in cases 
of MRT in which two or more women genetically contribute to the resultant embryo, 
there may indeed be a parturitional mother, as well as two genetic mothers. Bleich 
concludes that maternal identification in cases of assisted reproductive and genetic 
technologies remains legally uncertain. There is doubt as to whether there is a monist or 
pluralist standard to parenthood. There are also competing halakhic opinions as to the 
primary determinant of maternity. Further, there are poskim who believe that these novel 
scenarios cannot be resolved by pre-modern halakhic sources, and thus maternal 
identification in such cases are fundamentally in doubt. For Bleich, and others, legal 
doubt demands stringent accommodation of possible resolutions. Therefore, whether in 
principle, or in responding to legal uncertainty through stringent accommodation, 
essential collaborative reproductive partners to assisted reproductive and genetic 
technologies should all be considered halakhic parents. 
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Bleich’s Halakhic and Bioethical Disapproval of Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 Bleich unequivocally disapproves of MRT. He writes that, “even if not formally 
interdicted, is antithetical to moral principles announced by the Sages of the Talmud” 
(Bleich 2015a, 84). Bleich provides five “moral and halakhic problems” as the basis for 
his opposition: family values, lineage confusion, potential harm to the unborn, parental 
ambiguity, and adulterous parenthood, the last of which he identifies as a “novel 
concern” (ibid., 65-76, 82-4). Bleich opines that collaborative reproduction’s utilization 
of donor gametes and genetic materials, “do not conform to traditional notions of the 
nuclear family and, arguably, do not conform to notions of family values so deeply 
engrained in the social fabric as to be regarded by some as dictated by natural law” (ibid., 
65). He upholds this hetero-and-bionormative standard for society at large, and especially 
for the Jewish community. He points over and over to the talmudic pronouncement that, 
“the Holy One, blessed be He, does not cause His Shekhinah (Divine presence) to rest 
other than upon genealogically identifiable families (mishpachot meyuchasot) of Israel” 
(TB Kiddushin 70b). Bleich contends: “The Creator established the institution of the 
family as the norm; confusion of parental identity and blurring of family lines thwarts the 
divine will and is a corruption of the divine blueprint for the development of civilization 
… A clearly identified family unit is the grundnorm upon which all family values 
depend” (Bleich 2015a, 70).51 All of the above arguments may indeed oppose a Huxleyan 
                                                 
51 Bleich 2015a, 70, emphasizes that the family relationship is the ideal vehicle to transmit “the way of the 
Lord” from generation to generation. Bleich cites as a prooftext Genesis 18:19, in which God says of 
Abraham, “For I have singled him out, that he may instruct his children and his posterity to keep the way of 
the Lord by doing what is just and right, in order that the Lord may bring about for Abraham what He has 
promised him.” 
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reformation of normal human reproduction. However, it is unclear why any of the above 
propositions, other than safety, should proscribe MRT as an occasional medical 
intervention to assist an infertile couple or a woman struggling with mitochondrial 
disease. 
Bleich also cites Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron (b. 1941), a former Sephardic 
Chief Rabbi of Israel, as newly formulating a prohibition against creating parental 
ambiguity, even if that uncertainty is fundamental, and not just factual (ibid., 82-3).52 
Even worse than this prohibition, per Bleich, is that collaborative reproduction utilizing 
third-party gametes may constitute a novel form of adulterous parenthood. The late, 
prominent Israeli posek Rabbi Shmuel HaLevi Wosner (1913-2015; 2002, 221-4) 
understands Genesis 2:24, “Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother, and 
cleave to his wife, and they shall become one flesh,” as requiring that their child be solely 
generated of their reproductive materials. The Talmud (TB Sanhedrin 58a) interprets 
“one flesh” as referring to the child born of husband and wife. Thus, AID, gestational 
surrogacy by a married woman, ovum donation, and the “utilization of any somatic 
material contributed by a married woman for purposes of conceiving a child,” should be 
prohibited as a form of adultery, despite the absence of a sexual act or the intent to betray 
the marriage covenant (Bleich 2015a, 83-4). 
                                                 
52 See Bakshi-Doron 2002, 441-5. The prohibition against creating parental ambiguity is based on Genesis 
17:7, in which God says to Abraham: “I will maintain my covenant between Me and you, and your progeny 
after you, as an everlasting covenant throughout the ages, to be God to you and to your progeny after you.” 
Bleich 2015a, 82, writes: [This verse] “serves to establish a prohibition against suppressing family 
relationships…” See TB Yevamot 41a, 42b, which cites this verse to require a three-month waiting period 
after divorce or the death of a husband before remarriage to be able to identify clearly the paternity of any 
subsequent children. 
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 Beyond halakhic lineage-related concerns, Bleich objects to the risk of potential 
unknown harms to a cloned or MRT child, as well as to future generations in cases of 
germline modification. Bleich legitimates the risks attendant to natural child-bearing as 
inherent to the “divine design” (Bleich 2015a, 71-6). However, despite his expressed 
empathy for the those struggling with infertility, “there is absolutely no obligation to 
harness use of heroic or artificial measures in the genesis of life,” and the alleviation of 
emotional pain, “does not justify the risk of imposing congenital burdens upon the yet to 
be born” (ibid., 72, 72n20). Although Bleich does not espouse naturalism or natural law, 
and upholds Judaism’s interventionist mandate in medicine, he self-identifies as having 
been a “prophet of doom” time and again throughout the history of ART (ibid., 73). 
Bleich, like Paul Rasmey (1970, 1975) who he frequently quotes, considers ART 
immoral fetal experimentation which may inflict unintended suffering upon its subjects. 
The fact that ART has made safe and significant strides does not inductively lead Bleich 
to trust older technologies, let alone new ones. While he posits that he is of open to being 
proven wrong, he opines that it has been too short a time to make conclusive judgments 
about ART’s safety.  
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Rabbi J. David Bleich on Cloning and 
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
 Bleich’s masterful, comprehensive Jewish bioethical analyses consistently display 
a scholar whose epistemological resources are wide-ranging and varied. In his “high-
theory” writings on cloning and MRT, he utilizes acute scientific understanding to 
interrogate the relevant bioethical and halakhic issues. Although he accepts scientific 
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claims pro tanto, he is also confident enough as an ethicist to challenge the surety of their 
findings, especially regarding social and long-range health consequences. His concerns 
would be more justifiable would he cite current longitudinal studies statistically reporting 
on health and social outcomes. As with earlier ARTs, axiologically, Bleich’s moral 
judgments and affirmed values are quite conservative, and, in his view, fully based on the 
values ensconced within Judaism’s heteronomous legal tradition, and its robust aggadic 
and midrashic sources. As presented in Chapter Five, Bleich denies halakhic change. 
Scientific and technological advances, per Bleich, only alter circumstance, not 
fundamentals. However, Bleich’s writings on cloning and MRT, even more than his 
earlier writings on ART, manifest how deeply his scientific understanding and awareness 
have been assimilated into his “web of belief,” how much they impact on how he reads 
pre-modern and contemporary halakhic sources, and how they contribute to his 
interpretive choices and conceptual formulations.  
 For example, in his article on cloning, Bleich applies the halakhic principle of 
“yotzei – outgrowth,” which originates in talmudic discussions regarding permitted and 
forbidden foodstuffs, to validate the parental significance of genetic contributions toward 
reproduction, whether such contributions are gametes or somatic cells with nDNA, or 
cytoplasm with mtDNA. However, in his article on MRT, when a contemporary Israeli 
posek similarly applies a halakhic principle that originated in discussions of permitted 
and forbidden foodstuffs, i.e., identity by majority and minority nullification, Bleich says 
that its application overreaches since it is limited to admixtures with forbidden 
substances, as well as of faulty application given the scientific understanding of mtDNA 
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and its metabolic role.53 Bleich’s interpretive choice to embrace one principle’s pertinent 
application to genetic technologies, and reject another principle’s application, is arguably 
influenced by his scientific understanding and awareness. The dialogic encounter of 
science and religion in Bleich’s thought thus directly impacts upon halakhic 
development.   
 In considering parental identification, the novel assisted reproductive and genetic 
technologies of cloning and MRT forces Bleich to move beyond pre-modern conceptual 
frameworks of conception, gestation, and parturition, and more fully engage the halakhic 
significance of new genetic knowledge. Table 7.2 shows the practical impact of this 
engagement on Bleich’s analysis of paternal and maternal identification for cloning and 
MRT. For the first time, Bleich considers a pluralist standard of fatherhood, in addition to 
motherhood. He questions the gendered designations of motherhood and fatherhood in 
cases in which genetic material beyond gametes is contributed. In his analysis of 
Ashkenazi’s responsum, Bleich considers, albeit rejects, Ashkenazi’s claim of a 
volitional account of halakhic parenthood. The encounter of science and religion in 
Bleich’s Jewish bioethical writings thus develops, and even changes, Jewish law and 
ethics. 
 
 
                                                 
53 For non-food and non-forbidden substance applications of “bittul – minority nullification“ and “rov – 
identification by majority,” see Berlin and Zevin, eds. 1982, Talmudic Encyclopedia, vol. 3., 70, s.v. “pasul 
bekasher,” and 70n84. For a non-compositional application of identification by majority in establishing 
identity and personal status, see Tosafot, ad loc., TB Yevamot 47a, s.v. “bemuchzak lakh,” and Tosafot, ad 
loc., TB Pesachim 3b, s.v. “va’ana.” 
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Table 7.2. Summary of Attitudes Toward Cloning and MRT with Definitions and Account of 
Parenthood 
 
Rabbi J. David Bleich 
Attitude Toward Cloning and MRT Reproductive Cloning: Negative 
Therapeutic Cloning: Positive 
Reproductive-Therapeutic Cloning: Hesitant 
MRT: Negative 
Definition of Maternity  Pluralist Causal Account, crediting primary motherhood 
to parturition by gestational surrogate, and secondary 
motherhood to ova donors of nDNA and mtDNA, and 
possibly other female genetic contributors. 
Definition and Account of Paternity  Newly considers a pluralist causal account of multiple 
male genetic donors. 
Definition of Parenthood  In cases of cloning and multiple genetic donors, possibly 
dispenses with gendered parental designations, preferring 
“parent.” Also, entertains, but rejects, a volitional 
definition of parenthood. 
 
 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde on Cloning, Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, and 
Parenthood 
 
 Broyde first published on cloning in 1997, shortly after the cloned sheep Dolly’s 
birth was announced. In the preface to his “preliminary analysis,” he shared that, “it is 
designed not to advance a rule that represents itself as definitive normative Jewish law, 
but rather to outline some of the issues in the hope that others will focus on the problems 
and analysis found in this paper and will sharpen or correct that analysis” (Broyde 1997a, 
27). Broyde republished three updated versions of his cloning article (1998a; 1999a; 
2005d), each time reiterating this point. Beginning with his second iteration in 1998, and 
thereafter, he added a preliminary epigraph from Proverbs 19:2: “A person without 
knowledge is surely not good; he who moves hurriedly blunders.” Broyde (2001a) also 
published on “Genetically Engineering People: A Jewish Law Analysis of Personhood,” 
in which he adumbrates more fully his definition of human personhood, which he started 
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in his studies of cloning.54 Broyde references MRT in his writings on cloning, as well as 
in a post-script to his 2004 article on “Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, Stems Cells 
and Jewish Law.” Throughout these writings he emphasizes their exploratory, rather than 
authoritative, voice. While this reflects a sincere humility befitting “the way that Jewish 
law seeks truth,” it also arguably stems from an uncertainty as to how halakhah and 
Jewish ethics should respond to revolutionary scientific knowledge and technological 
capabilities (Broyde 1997a, 28).  
 
Broyde on Cloning 
 As a legally oriented Jewish bioethicist, Broyde (2005d, 309) asks whether 
cloning is an affirmative duty (mitzvah chiyuvit), a commendable duty (mitzvah kiyumit), 
a permissible act (mutar), to be discouraged but not forbidden (bittul mitzvah), or 
prohibited (assur)? Does cloning help a Jewish male fulfill his biblical obligation to 
procreate, or a Jewish man or woman to settle the world?55 Since this is a question 
without precedent in the annals of Jewish law, innovative interpretation is required. 
Armed with the knowledge of genetics, Broyde (ibid., 310) opines: “One could argue that 
the activity which defines the obligation to be fruitful and multiply solely involves a man 
giving genetic material to produce a child who lives. … Why then should no mitzvah be 
fulfilled, or at least a child born that exempts one from the future obligation to 
procreate?” One could also argue conversely, says Broyde (ibid.), that to fulfill the 
                                                 
54 He also prefaces this article with his earlier articulation of a “preliminary analysis,” see Broyde 2001a, 
878. 
55 For the affirmative religious duty to procreate, see Chapter Four, p. 129 ff. 
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biblical commandment of procreation requires, at least, “the combination of the genetic 
materials of a man and a woman,” perhaps through sexual intercourse, but maybe even 
asexually in vitro. Broyde (ibid.), however, declares that, “It seems to me that the first 
approach is superior to the second.” Notice that even in the counter-argument, Broyde 
focuses on “genetic contributions,” and not on “gametic contributions,” i.e., sperm and 
ovum, or in the language of pre-modern rabbinic sources, “seed.” Thus, in his 
preliminary analysis, Broyde concludes that in cases in which reproductive cloning is the 
only option available to a man to bring a child into the world, it would be a commendable 
act, if not a full fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation.56 For women who are not 
biblically obligated to procreate, Broyde (ibid., 311) judges cloning as “religiously 
neutral” and “simply permissible,” though it is unclear why Broyde wouldn’t see a 
woman’s reproductive cloning as religiously net-positive given that she is helping to 
settle the world, which per many authorities is a rabbinical affirmative duty incumbent 
upon women.57 
 Broyde also considers the definition of human personhood. The common 
rabbinical definition of humanness is whether the person was born of a woman, 
regardless of cognitive function or physical appearance. This standard still obtains for 
cloning in which the embryo is implanted in a woman’s uterus, and develops through 
gestation and parturition (ibid., 306-8; 2000, 209). However, should ex vivo artificial 
                                                 
56 See Broyde 2005d, 301-2. 
57 See Chapter Four, p. 130, regarding the “mitzvah of shevet – settling the world.” 
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incubation be developed, or embryonic xenotransplantation and incubation within an 
animal, Broyde argues for a secondary determination based on the Palestinian Talmud: 
Rabbi Yasa [said] in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: “If it is entirely human, but 
with an animal face, it is not [human] progeny. If it is entirely animal, but with a 
human face, it is [human] progency.” [The Talmud then challenges:] If it is 
entirely human, but with an animal face, and it is standing and reading the Torah, 
[shall] we say, “come to be slaughtered”? If it is entirely animal, but with a 
human face, and it is standing and plowing in the field, [shall] we say, “come 
divorce your dead brother’s wife or perform levirate marriage”? (TJ Niddah 3:2) 
 
From this passage, the Talmud concludes that there is no list of necessary conditions for 
humanness, but some indicators which then must be contextually assessed. Broyde 
(2005d, 307) interprets this passage as establishing a functional definition of human 
personhood: “By that (i.e., the Talmud’s) measure, a clone, even one fully incubated 
artificially, would be human, as it would have human intellectual ability, and human 
attributes.”58  
Broyde, like Bleich, also points to rabbinic analyses of legendary creatures, such 
as golems, mermaids, and primate-like creatures, to ground a halakhic and Jewish 
bioethical consideration of the definition of humanness in cases of artificially created or 
unconventionally interbred and incubated human life. For Broyde, these sources are 
halakhically significant for their theoretical conceptualization, regardless of their 
                                                 
58 Broyde 2005d, 321n56, cites Hershler 1980, 4:90-5, as contending that an artificially incubated clone 
who is fully incapacitated or severely cognitively impaired may not meet this functional standard of 
humanness. However, one can counter that given the Talmud’s recommendation of contextual adjudication, 
if under normal circumstances such a clone would be defined as human, then this should hold true in 
abnormal incidences, as well.  
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historical verisimilitude. They too, per Broyde, mostly attest to a functional standard of 
human personhood (2001, 888-93).59  
 Regarding parenthood and cloning, Broyde first turns to the traditional maternal 
determinant of gestation and parturition: 
The Jewish legal tradition would, in my opinion, be inclined to label the 
gestational mother (the one who served as an incubator for this cloned individual) 
as the legal mother of the child, as this woman has most of the apparent indicia of 
motherhood to Jewish law. While this child bears no genetic relationship to its 
gestational mother, particularly when the donor is a male, there are no other 
possible candidates whom Jewish law could label the mother.… (2005d, 298-9) 
 
Broyde references the criteria he established for motherhood in his 1988 article on “The 
Establishment of Maternity and Paternity in Jewish and American Law.”60 Since in both 
the cases of IVF and cloning, conception occurs in vitro, and thus, in Broyde’s view, is 
not halakhically significant, then despite the absence of a genetic relationship, gestation 
and parturition determine maternity. In support, he cites ovarian transplantion as 
establishing a maternal model in which genetics is not always determinative. However, 
Broyde also acknowledges that in the fifteen years since his original consideration of 
parenthood in ART for which he adhered to a monist account of parenthood, Bleich, and 
others halakhists following Bleich’s example, have upheld a pluralist account of, at least, 
maternity. Broyde writes: 
If such was the (Jewish) law, there would be little doubt that the one who 
contributes the genetic materials would also be considered the mother according 
to Jewish law were she a woman – as her contribution is clearly greater than the 
egg donor, who is considered a mother by this analysis. Indeed, it is quite possible 
                                                 
59 A functional standard may create too broad a definition absent further constraining qualifications, 
especially should robotic and artificial intelligence develop to a human-like level, see above n36. 
60 See Broyde 1988, 139-40. 
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to argue that both the cloner and the egg donor, who contributes the mitochondrial 
DNA, would be considered “mothers” … (ibid., 300) 
 
Even per those who insist on a monist standard of parturition as the halakhic maternal 
determinant, Broyde wonders whether in a case of cloning if the female genetic donor 
should be preferred to the gestational surrogate given that in a standard case of surrogacy, 
the ovum donor only contributes half the nDNA, with the other half coming from the 
sperm donor. In a case of cloning by a solitary woman, however, she is contributing all 
the genetic material (ibid.). 
Although Broyde prefers to resolve legal uncertainty through definitive ruling, in 
cases of cloning, the legal doubt is substantial enough that he recommends considering 
the female nDNA contributor a mother, thereby prohibiting consanguineous relationships 
with her and her family, and possibly even recognizing the mtDNA contributor also as a 
mother, pending a better understanding of the role of mtDNA. Regarding mtDNA, 
Broyde (2005d, 320n33) writes: “Mitochondrial DNA contains the encoded information 
for a variety of proteins or protein portions. How changes in one person’s mitochondrial 
DNA would subtly affect that person’s characteristics is quite unknown.” Broyde 
explicitly conditions maternal identification on perceivable genetic causality. Similarly, 
in a case of a male cloning himself, while the gestational surrogate would be the resultant 
child’s mother, the male genetic contributor should be considered the father, because if in 
IVF the sperm donor who contributes half of the nDNA is always the father, then even 
more so here where a man provides all the nDNA. 
Broyde recognizes that assigning gestation and parturition the role of primary 
maternal determinant for women, and genetic donation paternal determination for men, 
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leads to a problem of parity, i.e. there is a different account of parenthood for men and 
women. For Broyde this leads to “a normative rule of Jewish law,” that only men can be 
fathers and only women can be mothers. Broyde (ibid., 302) writes that “this seems 
consistent with the normative values found within Jewish law.” While Broyde entertains 
the idea that the genetic donor should be considered the father regardless of gender, he 
ultimately rejects this possibility, as he does the notion that a clone and its genetic 
provider should be considered time-lapsed, identical twin siblings, rather than parent and 
child (ibid., 302-5). While Broyde privileges genetics as new knowledge helpfully 
informing the Jewish-bioethical and medical-halakhic analysis of unprecedented cases 
born of modern technology, he still believes that halakhic and bioethical conclusions 
must be formulated in light of parental traditions in Jewish law and ethics. 
 
Broyde on Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
Although Broyde references MRT in his articles on cloning, he has yet to publish 
a full treatment of this assisted reproductive and genetic technology. In a post-script to a 
2004 article on “Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, Stem Cells and Jewish Law,” 
Broyde anticipatorily considers five future assisted reproductive and genetic 
technologies: human artificial chromosomes (HAC); “ooplasmic transfer,” i.e., MRT; 
intentional human-chimerism; human-animal chimeras; and reproductive 
xenotransplantation for fetal incubation (Broyde 2004, 68-70). In HAC, scientists 
synthesize a human genome, which can then be utilized to create an embryo through a 
genetic reproductive technology akin to SCNT. Broyde (ibid., 68) writes: “It would seem 
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to this author that there is no father according to Jewish law in that situation.” Broyde 
(ibid.) assign maternity to the gestational mother, “independent of any other genetic 
contribution,” though he acknowledges that “this matter is quite disputed.” 
Regarding MRT, Broyde writes (ibid., 69): “This creates complex models of 
motherhood, in that one has to evaluate the various contributions of the possible mothers. 
However, as noted above, the author’s view is that the mother is the person who carries 
the child to term independent of any other genetic contribution.” Axiologically, Broyde 
believes it proper halakhic protocol and good social policy to resolve legal uncertainty 
through adjudicative principles that allow for consistent rulings. Thus, he reasserts his 
preference for gestation/parturition as a maternal determinant. However, his scientific 
appreciation of genetics moves him to qualify the certainty of his position by admitting 
that better knowledge will lead to a more conclusive determination.  
Intentional human-chimerism involves the creation of an embryo by fusing the 
embryonic cells of two fertilized ova. While this might be done therapeutically to correct 
an anticipated immune deficiency, Broyde says it is being requested by single-sex 
couples who wish to create a poly-genomic child generated from both partners’ genetic 
materials, as well as donor gametes (ibid., 69, 75n52).61 Broyde writes:  
This child would appear to have more than one father and/or maybe more than 
one mother, depending on the genetic contributors in each case, and depending 
further on one’s view of the birth mother as the mother according to Jewish law, 
at least as a matter of doubt, and maybe even as a matter of certainty. There is 
some precedent in halakha for the possibility of more than one mother or father, 
and doubt about these matters is clearly a possibility in halakha. On the other 
                                                 
61 In 2010, Masahito Tachibana and his team used a similar technique to create poly-genomic monkeys by 
injecting two early-stage monkey embryos into a seven-day monkey embryo, generating a six-genome 
embryo that was implanted, gestated, and successfully delivered. See Margalit, Levy, and Loike 2014, 
131n88.  
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hand, one could well see halakha simply following the rule of majority to 
determine who is a parent, and the other potential parent is just a ‘safek’ 
(uncertain). (ibid., 69) 
 
Although here too, only one woman would gestate and deliver the resultant child, Broyde 
doesn’t reiterate his normative ruling of gestation and parturition as the maternal 
determinant. The halakhically significant role of genetics cannot be ignored. Note also 
that contra Bleich’s later opinion, Broyde applies to genetic influence the halakhic 
principle of “identity by majority.” 
Human-animal chimerism involves the creation of a poly-genomic entity utilizing 
both animal and human DNA. Xenotransplantation refers to a case of a fully human fetus 
being incubated within an animal, creating a situation in which there is no 
gestational/parturitional human mother. Here Broyde applies his developed definition of 
human personhood to affirm the humanity of a child born of an animal or who looks and 
functions like a human being, even though the child has a chimeric genome. Broyde 
doesn’t address the question of parentage. However, based on his analysis of the previous 
cases, here too he may apply to genetics the principle of majority to determine parental 
identity. It is also possible that Broyde would say in such cases that the child has no legal 
parentage. 
 
Broyde’s Halakhic and Bioethical Approval of Cloning and Mitochondrial 
Replacement Therapy and Parental Identity 
 
 As opposed to Bleich, Broyde approves of cloning as “a form of assisted 
reproduction – no different from artificial insemination or surrogate motherhood – which, 
when technologically feasible, should be made available to individuals who need assisted 
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reproduction” (Broyde 2005d, 298).62 Whereas Bleich claims that alleviating infertility is 
not a restorative cure, Broyde, viewing infertility as illness, disagrees.63 Similarly, 
regarding MRT, Broyde argues: “Indeed, consider what is most likely to be the first use 
of this new technology, the donation of an oocyte to a woman who has a mitochondrial 
disease, where her embryo is transplanted into a disease-free oocyte, thus eliminating the 
mitochondrial disease from the fetus. Why should that be opposed?” (Broyde 2000, 208-
9). 
 Bleich had provided at least three reasons why cloning and MRT should be 
opposed: non-maleficence, slippery slope, and a prohibition of creating parental 
confusion. Broyde addresses each concern. First, the biblical mandate to heal permits the 
assumption of reasonable risk. Prohibiting something permanently because its 
consequences are unknown stifles human creativity and medical intervention (Broyde 
2005d, 316-7; 2004, 67-8). Second, slippery slopes can be managed with proper 
regulation and supervision. Reproductive cloning and MRT are treatments “for drastic 
infertility,” and help fulfill humanity’s charge to improve the world (Broyde 2000, 209-
10). Third, Broyde recognizes that there is an unresolved, robust Jewish bioethical and 
medical halakhic debate as to the determination of parenthood for cloning, MRT, and 
most ARTs. Broyde argues that, “the fact one is not sure exactly what the family tree 
looks like is no reason to stop the process in its tracks. Surrogate motherhood also has its 
                                                 
62 However, Broyde also raises the possibility that even if cloning technologies are permissible, or even “a 
good deed (mitzvah),” there is license for authorities to prohibit temporarily practices that may lead to 
destructive outcomes or other violations, see Broyde 2005d, 298.  
63 Both Broyde and Bleich concur that cloning a person to both create an immunological match is curative 
and moral, such as in the case of cloning a child with leukemia in need of a bone marrow transplant, see 
Broyde 2000, 210.  
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uncertainties about who is the mother, yet it serves a valuable role in allowing those 
unable to reproduce naturally to have children. Cloning will serve the same function and 
should not be prohibited because of this uncertainty” (Broyde 2000, 209). 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Rabbi Michael J. Broyde on Cloning and 
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
 Bleich might be categorized as a conservative-traditionalist, intellectually open to 
a broad array of high-minded conceptualizations, but, in practice, quite restrictive. 
Broyde, in contrast, presents as a progressive traditionalist, more hesitant to create new 
conceptual paradigms of parenthood, perhaps because he more freely licenses the new 
assisted reproductive and genetic technologies as practical therapies for extreme cases of 
infertility and illness. Practical implementation requires formulating halakhic rulings 
which are clear, decisive, and relatively easy to apply.  
Broyde welcomes the dialogic encounter of religion and science to deepen 
knowledge, accepts pro tanto scientific claims, and unlike Bleich, speaking approvingly 
of “the march of scientific progress,” thus trusting in medical science to overcome 
obstacles and unintended harmful consequences (Broyde 2005d, 313). At times, Broyde 
highlights the tentativeness of his analysis pending advances in scientific knowledge.64 
Broyde’s epistemological resources, as before, include scientific literature, secular 
bioethics, and western law, in addition to Torah sources. While Broyde, like Bleich, looks 
primarily to Jewish law as the “touchstone” of its “moral system,” Broyde and Bleich 
                                                 
64 For example, see Broyde 2005d, 326n92, “… If the scientific data indicates that the mitochondrial DNA 
is significant then logic would analogize the egg donor to the genetic donor.” 
371 
 
 
emphasize different Jewish meta-ethical values that are informed by secular bioethics. 
Bleich focuses on the Hippocratic imperative of “do no harm,” while Broyde emphasizes 
“the obligation to help those in need,” extending it to infertility (ibid., 296-7).  
Like his teacher Bleich, Broyde appreciates the “general inherent moral 
conservativism associated with the Jewish tradition’s insistence that there is an objective, 
God-given morality, and that not everything that humanity wants or can do is proper” 
(ibid.). What then accounts for the fact that Bleich, the teacher, prohibits, and Broyde, the 
pupil, permits? While it is impossible to account comprehensively for their differing 
orientations, one major self-articulated epistemological and axiological difference 
between them is that Bleich denies halakhic change and Broyde embraces its responsible 
implementation when done with integrity per the interpretive rules of the halakhic 
system. In practice, as this dissertation continues to endeavor to demonstrate, both Bleich 
and Broyde develop, and even change halakhah by incorporating scientific knowledge 
and awareness into their theoretical system which in turn impinges upon and influences 
their reading of pre-modern sources and their innovative interpretation. 
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Table 7.3. Summary of Attitudes Toward Cloning and MRT with Definitions and Account of 
Parenthood 
 
Rabbi Michael J. Broyde 
Attitude Toward Cloning 
and MRT 
Reproductive Cloning: Positive 
Therapeutic Cloning and Genetic Engineering: Positive 
Reproductive-Therapeutic Cloning: Positive 
MRT: Positive 
Definition of Maternity  Primarily a Monist Causal account, however, newly considers a 
Pluralist Causal Account, crediting primary motherhood to 
gestation/parturition, and secondary motherhood to ova donors of 
nDNA and mtDNA, and possibly other female genetic contributors. 
Definition and Account of 
Paternity  
Primarily a Monist Causal account of genetic provision, but newly open 
to a Pluralist Causal account.  
Definition of Parenthood  Constrains fatherhood to males and motherhood to females in keeping 
with perceived normative values of Jewish law. 
 
 
 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff on Cloning, Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, and 
Parenthood 
 
 On March 14, 1997, fifteen days after Dolly’s birth made headlines, Dorff 
traveled to Washington D.C. and presented a paper on Jewish bioethical views on 
reproductive cloning to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Dorff 1998a, 117). 
In 1998, Dorff published an article in a law journal, “Human Cloning: A Jewish 
Perspective,” based on his prior presentation (ibid.). Later that year, Dorff republished an 
expanded version of that article in his book-length treatise, Matters of Life and Death: A 
Jewish Approach to Modern Medical Ethics (1998b). Dorff did not place his discussion 
of reproductive cloning in “Part Two: Moral Issues at the Beginning of Life,” where one 
might have expected it. Rather, he framed it as “Medical Research: The Case of 
Cloning,” and placed it within “Part Four: The Communal Context of Medical Care,” in a 
chapter on “Nonmedical Aspects of Medical Care,” along with a discussion of the 
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distribution and cost of health care (ibid., 310-24). It should therefore not come as a 
surprise that Dorff does not address the question of paternal and maternal identification in 
the cases of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies of reproductive cloning and 
MRT. 
For Dorff, unlike AI, IVF, and gestational surrogacy, human reproductive cloning 
is not a live issue, and thus he does not address its reproductive halakhic aspects within 
his bioethical treatment.65 Likewise, the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the 
Rabbinical Assembly, which Dorff has chaired since 2007, has not to date published any 
responsa directly speaking to reproductive cloning or MRT. In a responsum approved by 
the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards penned by Dorff on “Stem Cell Research,” 
Dorff permits and advocates for therapeutic cloning, while writing of reproductive 
cloning: “We clearly do not want to support reproductive cloning, at least at this stage of 
development of the technique, for it is neither safe nor effective” (Dorff 2002c, 14).66 
Theoretically, would reproductive cloning be proven safe, Dorff (1998b, 319-20) would 
endorse its occasional application “to cure disease or overcome infertility,” as “it is a 
permissible activity for us as God’s partners, on condition that we take due regard of the 
moral issues” relating to cloning. Dorff adumbrates those moral issues as including: 
distributive justice and equitable access; foresightful consideration of environmental 
consequences on the genetic diversity of the biosphere; treating the resulting cloned 
human beings with full dignity and rights, especially for less than successful results; 
                                                 
65 MRT, however, has recently become a contemporary issue of practical concern, although Dorff may 
judge this technology too immature to be used on humans. 
66 On Dorff’s views on Stem Cell research, including therapeutic cloning, see Dorff 2000; 2002c; and 
Rabbinical Assembly 2011.  
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regulating cloning so as not to allow for eugenic enhancement, i.e., designer babies, or 
the commodification of cloned human beings (ibid., 313-8).67  
 In March 2015, when the United Kingdom legalized MRT, Dorff was interviewed 
by The Washington Jewish Week. In reporting Dorff’s answer to questions regarding 
maternal identity and Jewishness in cases of MRT given the quantitative and qualitative 
differences between nDNA and mtDNA, the article states: 
Such distinctions don’t concern Rabbi Elliot Dorff, a medical ethicist and 
professor of philosophy at American Jewish University in Los Angeles. About 20 
years ago, the Conservative movement’s Committee on Jewish Law and 
Standards, which Dorff currently chairs, published an opinion that religious 
inheritance should pass from the mother who carries and bears the child, rather 
than the one who donates her egg. (Kotz 2015) 
 
Assuming this reporting to be accurate, one wonders why “such distinctions don’t 
concern” Dorff? Absent a fuller exposition by Dorff, one cannot answer for certain. 
However, three plausible reasons come to mind.  
First, Dorff’s halakhic methodology resolves legal doubt through the Rabbinical 
Assembly’s Committee on Jewish Law and Standards. For Dorff, it is good religious and 
social policy to promote an easily understandable and implementable consistent position. 
Always pointing to the birth mother as the halakhic mother makes maternal 
determinations simple and fair. A child’s Jewishness may always be resolved through 
conversion.  
Second, for Dorff, it is quite possible that he views Jewish parental designations 
not as ontological verities, but as conventional social constructs. While Jewish law and 
                                                 
67 For Dorff’s policy recommendations, see Dorff 1998a, 128-9; 1998b, 322-4. Cf. English and 
Sommerville 2002. 
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tradition compels him to take such social constructs seriously, as constructs he is less 
concerned by fine distinctions.  
Third, for Dorff, there is a moral cost to over-focusing on causal accounts of 
parenthood, especially genetic-based ones. As early as 1993, Dorff (1993, 58) writing on 
AI highlighted aggadic sources that emphasize, “that the people who raise the child, and 
not the natural father and mother, are called the parents.” He thereupon expressed 
hopefully: “perhaps Jewish law will develop in that direction” (ibid.). Dorff (1998b, 70, 
93-5) has also already warned that over-occupation with genetics in assisted reproduction 
may induce racist views. Dorff might very well judge the Orthodox Jewish bioethical 
occupation with parental determinants as “leading to blind legalism without a sense of the 
law’s context or purpose” (Dorff 2000, C-3). In Dorff’s (ibid.) testimony on “Human 
Stem Cell Research” to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, he prefatorily 
states his “fundamental theological conviction” that, “the Jewish tradition uses both 
theology and law to discern what God wants of us.” Legalism without theological 
guidance and theology that ignores Jewish law, for Dorff, both fail the task. It is possible 
that for Dorff the question of who is the causal halakhic mother and father is less 
important than the question who volitionally will act as the mother and father in nurturing 
and rearing the child. 
At the same time, in cases of AI/IVF with donor semen, adoption, and possibly 
ovum donation and gestational surrogacy, Dorff advocated for rabbinically decreeing that 
adoptive parents, and the direct collaborators in ART, as well as their immediate 
relatives, all be considered the child’s sheniyot, secondary relatives, regarding 
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consanguineous relationships. As the number of collaborators increase in poly-genomic 
offspring, would Dorff halakhically rule and bioethically advise similarly?68 Or would he 
constrain this rabbinical decree to certain cases or specific contributors? For now, Dorff 
views both therapeutic and reproductive cloning, as well as MRT, as medical 
experimentation rather than clinical assisted reproduction.69 Further elaboration awaits. 
 
Dorff’s Provisional Disapproval of Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
Although generally progressive, Dorff applies mid-level bioethical norms to his 
bioethical assessments. The principle of non-maleficence strongly impinges upon his 
trust in the safety of the current state of the genetic technology.70 Were the technology to 
advance within ethical experimental parameters to a sufficiently safe level, Dorff would 
endorse human reproductive cloning, and presumably MRT, to treat infertility and illness 
if responsibly considered, supported, and implemented. 
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff on Cloning and 
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
 Dorff here demonstrates that, for him, Jewish bioethics transcends medical 
halakhah and he concerns himself solely with moral issues. In his responsum on stem 
                                                 
68 Cloning, of course, can have fewer genetic contributors, especially is the clone is female. 
69 See Dorff and Zoloth 2015, 241, where in their introduction to “The Science of Genetic Intervention,” 
Dorff and Zoloth write of MRT: “Given the still very investigatory state of the science and the regulatory 
barriers to human subject experimentation, such fears seemed then, and still, to be designed for a future that 
is still extraordinarily distant.” Experimentation’s primary goal is to gain knowledge, even if the purpose of 
that knowledge is to ultimately develop therapies. Human experimentation, therefore, requires Institutional 
Review Board oversight, as well as a heightened sense of informed, understanding, and knowing consent.  
70 See Botelho 2013. 
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cells, Dorff (2002c, 1-7) displays in-depth knowledge of the current science which fully 
informs his bioethical analysis. He accepts the knowledge as sufficient, and subject to 
further development pending further, hopefully ethical, experimentation. Although he 
doesn’t explicitly cite the secular bioethical literature in his writings on cloning, he is 
clearly familiar with the primary issues engaging bioethicists, and as a participant in the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission he is sharing ideas and concerns in an interfaith 
setting within a larger bioethical consideration of the issues. For Dorff, the scientific 
theory and technology is morally neutral, with moral-axiological commitments manifest 
in the goals of its experimental and clinical application. Dorff looks to the metaethical 
values of Judaism, within a context of larger ethical consideration, to make his ultimate 
moral judgments. Jewish metaethics, are likewise sharpened and informed by larger 
philosophical consideration. Dorff does not exhibit his methodology of scientifically and 
ethically informed halakhic stretchiness because he is solely in bioethical mode, and not 
making halakhic recommendations regarding human reproductive cloning. His reported 
remarks about being uninterested in the question of parental identification may indicate 
that as assisted reproductive and genetic technologies continue to complexify procreation 
that he would advocate for Jewish law and ethics to switch from focusing on causal 
biological accounts of parenthood to social, volitional accounts, but this is admittedly 
speculative. The dialogic, bi-directional encounter of science and religion as experienced 
through bioethics, for Dorff, makes for a more humane scientific practice, and a better 
informed and more sophisticated Jewish way of life.  
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Table 7.4. Summary of Attitudes Toward Cloning and MRT with Definitions and Account of 
Parenthood 
 
Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff 
Attitude Toward Cloning and MRT Reproductive Cloning: Provisionally Negative 
Therapeutic Cloning: Positive 
Genetic Engineering: Provisionally Negative 
Reproductive-Therapeutic Cloning: Provisionally 
Negative MRT: Presumably, Provisionally Hesitant 
Definition of Maternity  Monist Causal Account: Parturitional.  
Definition and Account of Paternity  Monist Causal Account, unclear in cases of cloning 
Definition of Parenthood  Maternity determined by birth-mother. Paternity by 
genetic contribution, though not discussed in poly-
genomic context.  
Interested in social parenthood, i.e., who raises the child. 
 
 
 
Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler on Cloning, Mitochondrial 
Replacement Therapy, and Parenthood 
 
 
 Tendler, like Dorff, also testified in the immediate aftermath of Dolly’s birth in 
Washington in March 1997 at the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Tendler 
1997a). Shortly thereafter, Loike independently began to publish on Jewish views on 
reproductive cloning, jointly authoring an article on the subject with Dr. Avraham 
Steinberg, a noted Jerusalem-based physician and bioethicist, and participating in a Torah 
u-Madda journal symposium in 2000 (Loike and Steinberg 1998; Loike 2000).71 Tendler 
and Loike joined forces in 2002, co-authoring six articles over the next seven years on 
different types of genetic engineering, especially addressing the definition of humanness 
(Loike and Tendler 2002, 2003, 2006-7, 2007, 2008, 2009). In 2014 and 2015, they 
                                                 
71 For other notable submissions to the symposium, see Adlerstein 2000; Fiorino 2000; Grazi 2000; 
Jakobovitz 2000; Kaplan 2000; Rosner 2000; Rosner and Shafran 2000; Shatz and Wolowelsky 2000; 
Steinberg 2000; Waxman 2000. 
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jointly authored three Jewish bioethical articles on cloning, gene editing, and MRT 
(Loike and Tendler 2014a, 2014b, 2015). In 2013 and 2014, Loike also authored and co-
authored several secular-bioethical treatments of transspecies chimerism, MRT, and 
multiple parenthood (Loike 2013; Loik, Hirano, and Margalit 2013; Margalit, Levy, and 
Loike 2013; Fishbach, Benston, and Loike 2014). Beyond manifesting great interest in 
the subject matter, Loike and Tendler’s prolific output on these subjects attest to the 
maturation of Jewish bioethics, as well as to the cultivation of a broad and varied 
audience interested in Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah.  
 
Loike and Tendler on Cloning 
 In 1997, Tendler expressed opposition to most reproductive cloning based on both 
pragmatic and theological grounds. In his testimony to the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission, he recognized potential benefit in reproductive cloning to overcome 
infertility, but in the shadow of Nazi eugenics, he expressed wariness. “Are we good 
enough to handle this good technology?” Tendler rhetorically asked. “Of course, we are, 
if we can set limits on it,” to which he added sarcastically, “and when we can train a 
generation of children not to murder or steal, we can prepare them not to use this 
technology to the detriment of mankind” (Tendler 1997a). Tendler cited the Talmud as 
teaching that sometimes we must say to the bee, “We want neither of your honey, nor of 
your sting” (ibid.).72 In a letter to The New York Times, several months later, Tendler 
                                                 
72 The source is midrashic and not talmudic, see Midrash Tanchuma, Parshat Balak, 6, cited by Rashi, ad 
loc., Numbers 22:12. 
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wrote: “As an Orthodox Jew and rabbi, I oppose ‘elective’ or ‘autonomous’ cloning on 
biblical grounds. … As a professor of biology, I see it as a form of assisted sexual 
reproduction. But the salient issue for me is under what circumstances cloning could be 
morally acceptable” (1997b). In addition to the case of cloning a bone marrow match for 
a child stricken with Leukemia, Tendler also cites a case of “a young man who is sterile, 
whose family was wiped out in the Holocaust, and [who] is the last of a genetic line.” For 
which, Tendler asserted: “I would certainly clone him” (Tendler 1997a).73  
 If Tendler expressed ambivalence about reproductive cloning, he was unequivocal 
in his support of therapeutic cloning and stem cell research in his testimony on the 
subject for the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in 2000, as well as at the Senate 
in 2001 (Tendler 2000; Pew Research Center 2001). Tendler argued that the separation of 
Church and State in the United States should not only safeguard minority rights, but also 
prevent the establishment of Christian theological views on the personhood of embryonic 
cells from deciding scientific policy (ibid.).74 Tendler forcefully advocated for stem cell 
research, which he sees as crucial to the development of life-saving therapies (ibid.).75  
 While Tendler was serving as an unofficial bioethical spokesperson on behalf of 
the Jewish community, Loike co-authored with Avram Steinberg (1998) an article on 
                                                 
73 See Tendler 1997b, where Tendler reiterates this position in his letter to the New York Times. See also 
Bleich and Jacobson 2015, 392, where Bleich deems reproductive cloning immoral even, “in order to 
preserve the family line of a Holocaust survivor who has no other living relatives.” 
74 At the same time, Tendler defended stem-cell research from a Jewish point of view, arguing that per 
biblical morality the embryo enjoys no metaphysical status before quickening at forty days, whether in vivo 
or in vitro. He also asserted that using legally aborted tissue, even in cases in which religious authorities 
would not have condoned the abortion, is not unethical, nor does it promote discretionary abortion (Tendler 
2000). 
75 See also the policy statements of the Rabbinical Council of America (2004, 2009) on Stem Cell research, 
which we drafted in consultation with Tendler. 
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“Human Cloning and Halakhic Perspectives.” After rehearsing the basic science, they 
explain therapeutic and reproductive cloning’s benefit to treat and cure disease, including 
cancers, infertility, and organ and tissue regeneration. In favor of human cloning, they 
advance two primary supports for permitting this genetic technology: first, halakhically, 
safe activities not explicitly prohibited should be permissible;76 second, theologically, 
Jewish law and ethics generally favor medical interventionism, allowing humanity to 
master and further develop natural processes to heal illness. They also acknowledge that 
there are counter-viewpoints that limit interventionism to within certain naturalistic 
parameters. Asexual reproduction that utilizes gametes from a man and a woman, or 
perhaps even from more gametic collaborators, is arguably still within the realm of 
natural processes. Autonomous homologous reproduction is not.77 They too discuss the 
concerns of unintentional harms, eugenics, and other issues (ibid., 31-9).  
 Loike and Steinberg explore the question of the parentage of a cloned child 
through a test-case of a woman who clones herself, using nDNA derived from her own 
somatic mammary cell. Regarding paternity, they offer three possibilities: one, the 
mother’s father, since half of her nDNA came from her own father; two, the nDNA donor 
would also be the halakhic father, even though she is also the halakhic mother; or three, 
no one can claim halakhic paternity. Although they find options one and two more 
                                                 
76 See Lifshitz, Tiferet Israel, ad loc., Mishnah Yadayim 4:3. 
77 Loike and Steinberg 1998, 37, distinguish between cloning a male through SCNT, which still requires a 
female ovum, in addition to a male somatic cell, and cloning a female which only uses the cellular and 
genetic materials of one or more women. However, Loike and Tendler 2014a, 43n14, point out that in 
nature both simple organisms, such as bacteria, and complex species such as worms, fish, lizards, and 
frogs, reproduce by parthenogenic cloning. 
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logically compelling than three, one and two have no precedent in Jewish law, while 
there are occasions in Jewish law in which a child is deemed to have no halakhic father.78  
Regarding maternity, the mother would clearly be the sole woman who donated 
all the genetic and cellular materials, and gestated and delivered the child. However, 
maternity is harder to decipher in more complex cases of multiple genetic donors, 
especially if there is a different gestational carrier. If not all the female reproductive 
collaborators are Jewish, there may also be questions concerning the resultant child’s 
Jewishness (ibid., 41-3). Loike and Steinberg end their essay on cloning by calling for the 
creation of an international committee of “leading rabbinical figures and religious 
scientific experts to discuss the halakhic ramifications of cloning using these 
technologies” (ibid., 45). They recognize the social importance of communal consensus 
on halakhic paternal identity, and Jewishness-conferring maternity.  
 Sixteen years later, in 2014, Loike and Tendler (2014a) co-authored an article on, 
“Creating Human Embryos Using Reproductive Cloning Technologies.” The primary 
focus of the article is an analysis of “Halachic Parenthood” (ibid., 47-60).  They state:  
Specifically, this technology raises two related halachic issues that are rarely 
discussed.79 First, what is the role of genetics in establishing a parental halachic 
relationship? Second, what is the role of zerah (sperm) in establishing fatherhood? 
Specifically, does halacha recognize fatherhood (paternity) status only in 
situations when a man provides sperm or can the status of halachic paternity be 
established when a man donates a non-sperm cell to generate an embryo that leads 
to a live birth? (ibid., 48) 
 
                                                 
78 A shetuki is a child who knows not his paternity. A convert is considered akin to a newborn babe, 
without familial relations. See Loike and Steinberg 1998, 42. 
79 Strangely, they do not reference the well-known writings of Bleich and Broyde, and others, but only cite 
Steinberg 2009. See Loike and Tendler 2014a, 48n24, 41n8. 
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Absent dispositive halakhic precedent, they turn to contemporary science to refine 
halakhic understandings of parenthood: “The current consensus within the scientific 
community regarding the definition of human reproduction can be summarized as ‘the 
union of two nuclei in an egg to produce an embryo that can be gestated and where the 
mitochondrial genes are provided by the egg’” (ibid.).80 Thus, the genetic donor of a 
somatic cell’s nDNA “can be considered the halachic father of the child” (ibid.). This is a 
revolutionary halakhic methodological approach that privileges scientific knowledge in 
its historical and social context over legal formalism and positivism. Fatherhood is 
redefined as genetic contribution, even when not gametic. 
Loike and Tendler apply their newly conceived genetic-based definition of 
halakhic parenthood to four cases: one, SCNT with husband’s somatic cell and wife’s 
ovum; two, MRT with two females and one male; three, one woman using her own 
somatic cell and ovum to clone herself; four, SCNT with a man’s somatic cell and a non-
spousal, married woman’s ovum. In case one, Tendler and Loike determine that the male 
somatic cell donor is the father, and the ovum donor is the mother. Since they are 
married, this cloning technique, if safe, would be a permitted treatment of infertility. 
Furthermore, Loike and Tendler credit the father in such a case of reproductive cloning 
with fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation, which they understand is “concerned not 
with how the union is carried out but rather with the result – the birth of a living child” 
                                                 
80 They do not cite the golem literature in this article, though Loike had previously explored its pertinence 
as a precedent, see Loike and Steinberg 1998, 40; Loike 2000. Loike 2000, 240-1, surmises that if a golem 
is defined by a being created through unnatural processes, i.e., Jewish mystical prayer, rather than 
asexually, then a genetically human clone incubated within a woman, or even incubated within an animal, 
would be considered human. 
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(ibid., 50). In case two of MRT, since the procedure is therapeutic in intent, it “might be 
halachically permissible” (ibid., 57). Lacking clear precedent, all genetic donors, as well 
as the gestational carrier, should be considered halakhic parents out of legal doubt. In the 
third case of a woman cloning herself, since she is the sole genetic donor, and will carry 
and bear the child, she is certainly the unique halakhic mother. However, since “there is 
no halachic precedent to claim that this mother could serve as both the halachic mother 
and father,” then it is likely that paternity will not attach and the child will be fatherless 
(ibid., 59). In the fourth case of SCNT utilizing the ovum of a non-spousal married 
woman, Tendler and Loike opine that it is likely, absent forbidden sexual relations, that 
the resultant child is not a mamzer, i.e., bastard, just as Rabbi Moshe Feinstein ruled in 
cases of AID.81 The genetic donor is the father, and the ovum donor is the mother (ibid.). 
If a gestator is involved, she would also be considered a doubtful mother (ibid., 50n26). 
Tendler and Loike adjudicate these cases by their new definition of halakhic parenthood 
as primarily genetic contribution. They also seek to maintain the correlation of traditional 
gender roles and identifications of paternity and maternity. 
 However, Loike and Tendler also importantly ask: “Should genetics be the sole 
determinant of parenthood?” (ibid., 49). Should halakhah consider non-causal accounts of 
parenthood, akin to secular law which acknowledges both genetic parental relationships, 
as well as adoptive relationships. They coyly let this question hover unresolved, other 
than to identify instances in halakhah when genetics are ignored, such as in conversion to 
Judaism which severs previous familial ties since a convert is likened to a newborn babe, 
                                                 
81 See Chapter Four, p. 157 ff. 
385 
 
 
as well as in several other atypical and/or transgressive procreative relationships (ibid.). 
They do, however, reference here in a footnote (ibid., 49n25) Loike’s co-authored article, 
“The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal 
Parenthood” (Margalit, Levy, and Loike 2014).82  
 Loike, along with Yehezkel Margalit of Tel Aviv University Law School, and 
Bronx Assistant District Attorney, Orrie Levy, argue that poly-genomic children born of 
advanced ARTs, i.e., cloning technologies, challenge bionormative parental 
determinations by fragmenting parental causal contributions like genetics and gestation, 
as well as obfuscating the intentions of collaborating parties, leading to untenable legal 
conundrums with potentially multiple competing claims of parenthood (ibid., 112-5). 
They propose that to avoid these costly conflicts damaging to all involved, law courts 
should adopt an “intent-based approach” to parenthood, that “transfers the source of 
parental designation from the auspices of biology and the traditional martial presumption 
to the realm of freedom of contract and market principles” (ibid., 116). This model of 
pre-procreative, court pre-authorized, contractually determined social parentage, which 
takes both biological-causal and volitional factors into account, best avoids legal gridlock 
and human suffering. An intent-based approach also is flexible enough to accommodate 
both bionormative and non-traditional family structures, including same-sex couples, as 
well as multiple parenthood arrangements (ibid., 129-39).  
                                                 
82 See also Loike, Hirano, and Margalit 2013, which Loike and Tendler (2014a, 45n20) referenced earlier in 
their article. 
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 Returning to Loike and Tendler’s halakhic bioethical analysis, it is not entirely 
clear what they are theoretically proposing. They footnote Margalit, Levy, and Loike’s 
article to a sentence asserting that legal parenthood in secular law can be established 
through adoption, thereby legally overriding genetics. However, this is too great a 
simplification of Margalit, Levy, and Loike’s legal proposal. For them, advanced ARTs 
fragment parenthood into indeterminate parental associations with the resulting child. If 
parenthood is simply a social and legal construct, their proposal aims for construct 
reconstruction: “The paradigm of intentional parenthood is largely premised on 
incorporating contract law and its principles of agency and self-determination into family 
law” (Margalit, Levy, and Loike 2014, 137). However, for Tendler and Loike, halakhic 
parenthood is likely an ontological verity with metaphysical consequences. The 
theological unity of God’s revelation through both Torah and nature provides the 
epistemological license to redefine halakhic parenthood as genetic contribution in light of 
advanced scientific understanding. For Tendler and Loike to consider parenthood simply 
as a social construct subject to intent-based determinations would surely constitute an 
even greater interpretive revolution. 
 
Loike and Tendler’s Qualified Approval of Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement 
Therapy 
 
 Despite Tendler’s early objections to reproductive cloning, in 2014, Loike and 
Tendler express their qualified approval of human reproductive and therapeutic cloning 
and MRT. As research scientists, they value the benefit of advancing biological 
understanding and medical technological capability. Cloning technologies hold great 
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promise for the development of patient specific treatments, organ and tissue regeneration, 
infertility treatment, and allowing women afflicted with mitochondrial diseases to bear 
healthy children. Although they affirm Judaism’s interventionist attitude toward nature, 
they also assert that cloning “is an established biological phenomenon” found within 
nature, and thus, self-legitimating (ibid., 43-44, 43n14). While MRT has no normative 
biological parallel in nature, Loike and Tendler subsume its license under the duty to 
heal.  
 
Epistemological and Axiological Analysis of Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. 
Tendler Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy 
 
Loike and Tendler continue to espouse an integrationist model of the Torah and 
science relationship, paradoxically claiming, on the one hand, that halakhah must 
accommodate new scientific knowledge, while, on the other hand, claiming that the 
Jewish sages of yore had advanced scientific understanding beyond their times. Loike 
and Tendler rehearse in brief the scientific history of reproductive understanding from 
Aristotle to Galen in the Greco-Roman Era, to Harvey, Von Leeuwenhoek, and Hertwig 
in the Modern Period.83 They then cite the Talmud (TB Niddah 17b, 30b) as viewing both 
male and female equally contributing, along with God, to the conception of a child, 
writing triumphally: “The Talmudic description … preceded the secular world’s 
understanding of human conception by about 1500 years” (Loike and Tendler 2014, 40). 
However, they reference Dr. Edward Reichman’s scholarship (1996) as a source for their 
                                                 
83 See Chapter Four, p. 141 ff. 
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general and Jewish history of conception and embryology. Reichman’s method 
specifically seeks to demonstrate that the rabbis of every age base their views on the 
scientific knowledge of their times, and were not autonomous generators of natural 
philosophy, i.e., science.84 Loike and Tendler avowedly affirm this historical truism in 
their own halakhic bioethical method. They further forcefully assert that proper halakhic 
methodology requires scientific consultation: 
In response to a scientific-or-medically-based halachic question, a posek must 
navigate information obtained from medical scientists. If the information is 
accurate, then the halacha generated can be based on that information. If the 
factual accuracy of the scientific or medical information is questionable or 
controversial, then the posek must rely on established halachic principles to arrive 
at a psak. ... If that (i.e., scientific) information changes over time, halacha must 
reevaluate its conclusions in accordance with halachic principles. Thus, scientific 
consensus can serve as the basis of halachic decisions and as a precedent in 
addressing new halachic issues including those emerging from new reproductive 
biotechnologies. (Loike and Tendler 2014a, 42-3) 
 
They themselves attest that, “regrettably few of our halachic decisors have the scientific 
background to render a p’sak on” assisted reproductive and genetic technologies (Loike 
and Tendler 2015, 6). Perforce, if the scientific knowledge of the talmudic rabbis 
preceded secular scientific enterprise by 1500 years, Tendler and Loike would have to 
claim that the rabbis were prophets with access to hermetic scientific knowledge. Tendler 
and Loike understand full well that scientific advancement is born of a historical process 
of theorizing and experimentation, failures, successes, and reformulations. Despite their 
penchant for Jewish triumphalism, their epistemological position is to accept pro tanto 
scientific consensus as a valid baseline for halakhic bioethical analysis and adjudication. 
                                                 
84 See Chapter Four, pp. 151-2. 
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 Loike and Tendler’s enthusiastic support for the research, therapeutic, and 
reproductive applications of cloning technologies is noteworthy. Arguably, they are 
epistemologically and axiologically influenced by their knowledge of secular bioethics 
and bio-law, as well as by their professional callings as research scientists. Their 
commitment to mid-level halakhic bioethical norms, rather than high theory, likewise 
lead them to more easily license and adjudicate the permissibility and consequences of 
assisted-reproductive and genetic technologies. While they frame their Jewish bioethical 
principlism in Jewish sources, their idiom of discourse and methodological application 
likewise demonstrate the shaping influence of halakhically independent metaethical 
evaluation. Their revolutionary halakhic-bioethical methodology of realigning halakhah 
with advances in scientific understanding epistemically privileges hard science, which 
they then overlay upon their Torah knowledge. Their mere raising the question of 
whether parenthood should be accounted for causally, or possibly based on intent, 
displays an intellectual openness to changing paradigms of parenthood born of advanced 
ARTs. It also manifests a commitment to a societally workable halakhic bioethic that 
allows for the utilization of beneficial medical technologies that severely complicate 
traditional parental paradigms.  
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Table 7.5. Summary of Attitudes Toward Cloning and MRT with Definitions and Account of 
Parenthood 
 
Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler 
Attitude Toward Cloning and MRT Reproductive Cloning: Positive 
Therapeutic Cloning: Positive 
Genetic Engineering: Positive 
Reproductive-Therapeutic Cloning: Positive 
MRT: Positive 
Definition of Maternity  Pluralist Genetic and Gestational-Causal Account.  
Definition and Account of Paternity  Fundamentally Monist Genetic-Causal Account. No 
paternity in cases of female cloning. Possibly Pluralist 
Genetic-Causal Account in cases of multiple male genetic 
contributors. 
Definition of Parenthood  Redefine parenthood primarily by genetic contribution. 
Surprisingly, raise question of non-genetic social 
parenthood, i.e., who raises the child. 
 
 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
 The introduction of genetic technologies into ARTs represents a major 
development that not only holds great promise for disease treatment, prevention, and 
cure, but also for overcoming previously insurmountable forms of infertility. While the 
science of cloning and MRT and their clinical applications are still in their infancy, as a 
now more mature field, Jewish bioethics readily engages their attendant bioethical and 
halakhic issues, with many new voices participating, and an expectant broad readership 
awaiting further publications.85 American Jewry is also more established, and 
communally and politically confident, bringing Jewish bioethical opinion into the public 
                                                 
85 See Shatz and Wolowelsky 2000, who edited a forum on “Judaism, Genetic Engineering and the Cloning 
of Humans.” See also Werber 2000; and Breitowitz 2002. 
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square, as demonstrated by Dorff and Tendler’s testimonies in Washington D.C.86 
American Jewry, even its Orthodox communities, confront a social-cultural landscape in 
which there have been seemingly irreversible, cultural seismic shifts over the past forty 
years regarding sexuality, reproduction, and family structures. The fragmentation of 
parenthood claims engendered by assisted reproductive and genetic technologies has 
required of Jewish bioethicists and medical halakhists to reevaluate the grounds of 
parenthood, to consider pluralist accounts of maternity, and with genetic engineering 
technologies, even of paternity. While considering the cloning technologies under study, 
new conceptualizations of parenthood and innovative interpretations of pre-modern and 
contemporary rabbinic sources has led to further anticipatory bioethical reflection upon 
experimental and futuristic technologies, such as artificial wombs, synthetic human 
genomes, and human-animal chimeras.  
 Table 7.6 (below) demonstrates the evolution of each exemplar’s views of 
maternal and paternal identification in the ARTs we have studied. Three of the four 
(Bleich, Broyde, and Tendler/Loike) have adopted de facto, if not de jure, pluralist 
accounts of parenthood. All four (Bleich, Broyde, Dorff, and Tendler/Loike) have 
contemplated, even if summarily dismissed, intent-based accounts of parenthood. Both 
these observations raise questions about the sociology of knowledge and its impact upon 
epistemology. The Jewish bioethical writings of this dissertation’s four exemplars 
continue to demonstrate the imprint of scientific knowledge in developing a bioethical 
and halakhic discussion of greater nuance, as well as a more sophisticated philosophy and 
                                                 
86 See, for example, Diament 2004. 
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methodology of halakhah and bioethics. Their writings ART also show how their 
growing and changing epistemologies and axiologies influence their readings of ancient 
and contemporary sources. Novel technologies force new considerations of definitions, 
like those of paternity and maternity, considered clear and settled for much of human 
history. The relationship between epistemology and axiology, as well as the Jewishly 
internal and external sourcing of knowledge and ethical values, likewise impact upon 
their contemporary Jewish bioethical and medical halakhic viewpoints regarding ART 
and its outcomes. Changing moral value judgments under the influence of evolving social 
and cultural attitudes, and the increasing widespread use of new technologies, also play 
roles in Jewish bioethical assessments of ART.  
 While each exemplar manifests a differentially nuanced philosophy, 
methodology, and application of Jewish law and ethics, common to all of them is an 
affirmative, dialogical relationship of religion and science that recasts ancient texts in the 
light of new scientific knowledge. Three out of four of the exemplars (Broyde, Dorff, and 
Tendler/Loike), consciously adapt halakhah and Jewish ethics to new scientific 
knowledge, representing more of an integrationist approach to science and religion, and 
one (Bleich) gives credence to scientific advancement, even while guarding Jewish 
tradition’s legal patrimony, at times defending religion and science’s independence from 
one another. Not only do religion and science relations make for a more sophisticated, 
scientifically informed, Jewish bioethical analysis, but also when matched with 
axiological progressivism, more easily halakhically license the new ARTs. Furthermore, 
the expansion of Jewish bioethical and medical-halakhic epistemologies fundamentally 
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transforms halakhic and ethical discourse, allowing for the organic development of 
Jewish law and ethics, and sometimes even engendering innovative rabbinic 
interpretations and unprecedented halakhic rulings.  
Table 7.6. Summary of Attitudes Toward Cloning and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, 
Account of Parenthood, and Epistemological and Axiological Findings for Four Exemplars 
  
  C = Cloning; R = Reproductive; T = Therapuetic  
x: Exemplar 
y: Intellection 
Orientation 
Rabbi J. David 
Bleich 
Rabbi Michael J. 
Broyde 
Rabbi Elliot N. 
Dorff 
Rabbi Moshe 
D. Tendler and 
Dr. John D. 
Loike 
Attitude Toward 
AI and IVF 
  From 
 Chapter Five 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Negative 
AID/IVF-D: 
Prohibiting 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Permitting 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Cautiously 
Positive 
AIH/IVF-H: 
Positive 
AID/IVF-D: 
Permitting if D 
is non-Jewish 
Def. of Maternity  Monist Causal  Monist Causal  Monist Causal  Monist Causal  
Definition of 
Paternity  
Always sperm 
donor. 
 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Always sperm 
donor. 
Monist Causal but 
differentiates 
Genetic father of 
sexual and non-
sexual procreation 
Biological father 
through sexual 
reproduction. 
AIH/IVF-H: 
sperm donor 
AID/IVF-D: 
Two fathers: 
Biological father 
is sperm donor. 
Social Father is 
custodial father. 
Pluralist Causal & 
Volitional/Labor. 
Always sperm 
donor. 
 
Monist Causal 
Account: 
Genetic Father 
Attitude Toward 
Ovum Donation 
(OD) and 
Gestational 
Surrogacy (GS) 
  From  
  Chapter Six 
OD: Negative 
GS: Negative 
OD: Permitting 
GS: Permitting 
Unclear from 
published work if 
preference for 
Jewish or non-
Jewish OD & GS 
OD: Positive to 
both receive & 
donate. 
GS: Positive to 
commission & 
serve as. No 
preference for 
Jewish or non-J. 
OD & GS: 
Permissible to 
receive and 
commission if 
OD & GS non-
Jewish.  
Account of 
Parenthood 
Pluralist Causal 
Account 
Pluralist Causal 
Account 
Monist Causal 
Account 
Pluralist Causal 
Account 
Definition of 
Maternity 
Dual-maternity, 
principally 
parturition, but in 
legal doubt as to 
adding OD. 
Parturition when 
conception legally 
insignificant. 
Conception when 
legally significant. 
Parturition. 
 
Surprising that not 
Pluralist Causal & 
Volitional/Labor, 
like in AI/IVF-D. 
Begins as 
Monist: 
parturition.  
Currently, 
Pluralist Causal 
with 
fundamental 
doubt. 
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Attitude Toward 
Cloning (C) and 
MRT 
  From  
  Chapter Seven 
R-C and MRT:  
  Negative 
T-C:  
  Positive 
R-T C: Hesitant 
Positive for all. R-C and MRT: 
Provisionally 
negative due to 
safety concerns. 
T-C: Positive 
Positive for all. 
Def. of Maternity  Pluralist Causal Primarily Monist, 
but possibly 
Pluralist 
Monist Causal: 
Parturition  
Pluralist 
Account: 
Genetic and 
Gestational 
Definition of 
Paternity  
Newly Pluralist 
Causal. 
Primarily Monist, 
but possibly 
Pluralist 
Monist-Causal 
Genetic 
Contribution. 
 
Genetic-Causal, 
possibly 
Pluralist. 
x: Exemplar 
y: Intellection 
Orientation 
Rabbi J. David 
Bleich 
Rabbi Michael 
Broyde 
Rabbi Elliot N. 
Dorff 
Rabbi Moshe 
D. Tendler and 
Dr. John D. 
Loike 
Account of 
Parenthood in 
RC and MRT 
Pluralist Causal, 
possibly non-
gendered, 
entertains, but 
rejects volitional 
definition. 
Constrains causal 
fatherhood to 
males and 
motherhood to 
females. 
Committed to 
traditional 
bionormative 
categories, but 
likely interested in 
social parenthood. 
Redefines 
parenthood 
primarily as 
genetic 
contribution. 
Newly 
interested in 
social 
parenthood. 
Methodological 
Basis 
Halakhic high-
theory. Legal 
analogy & 
reasoning. Avoids 
anachronistic 
readings. Rejects 
aggadah as legal 
source. 
Halakhic high-
theory. Legal 
analogy & 
reasoning. 
Interpretive 
innovation by 
conceptualizing 
pre-modern 
sources through 
contemporary 
science.  
Legal precedent 
and bioethical 
principlism. 
Intentional 
stretching of both 
Halakhic and 
aggadic sources.  
Suspicious of 
specious legal 
analogies. Policy 
consensus. 
Halakhic-
bioethical 
principlism. Pro 
Tanto privileged 
credence to 
science. 
Conceptualize 
pre-modern 
sources through 
contemporary 
science. 
Epistemological 
Dimensions 
Torah with 
science. 
Torah and science. Torah + science = 
Jewish bioethics 
Torah through 
scientific 
progress 
Axiological 
Dimensions 
Traditional-
conservative. 
Traditional-
progressive 
Liberal- 
progressive. 
Tradi.-conserv. 
& progressive 
 
395 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the dialogic junction of religion and science stand competing sources of 
authority, epistemologies, axiologies, and worldviews. The study of the relationship 
of religion and science thus invites a multi-disciplinary investigation into the 
cognitive challenge of assimilating new knowledge within a longstanding religious 
tradition of theology, law, and ethics. Likewise, moving in the other direction, the 
encounter of science with religion, especially in bioethics, encourages an evaluation 
of the ethical application of scientific experimentation and invention rooted in 
skillful, seasoned wisdom traditions. Religious bioethics helps society attune 
science to its particularistic religious cultures, as well as mediate both science and 
religion’s posture in our shared human experience.1 This is true for Judaism, no less 
than for other religions. Rapidly evolving scientific understandings and biomedical 
technologies, amidst changing moral judgments in larger society, may perturb 
religion and science relations, requiring ongoing bioethical reevaluation. For the 
devout Jew, such reassessments likewise empower personal-life and public-policy 
decision-making in line with Jewish covenantal commitments.2 This dissertation 
has examined how Judaism’s robust textual tradition, creative legal process, 
                                                 
1 Religion and science relations, in this sense, serve to countervail scientism, the belief that science is the 
best source of true knowledge and human learning, and the most effective basis for decision making. See 
Sorell 1991 for a full philosophical analysis of scientism. See Burnett 2017, for a short introduction.  
2 This statement raises the questions of whether and how religious groups should advocate for public 
policies conditioned by their religious convictions within a polity that separates church and state per both 
the religious anti-establishment and free-exercise clauses of the first amendment of the United States 
Constitution. For a Jewish view, see Broyde 1997b, and 2005c. 
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historical legal precedents, and religious and ethical instruction, respond to and 
develop in light of scientific and technological advancement.  
 The interaction of religion and science is especially prominent at life’s 
beginning, and even more so, when the genesis of life is assisted through 
laboratory-based, asexual, collaborative reproduction, and scientific technologies 
that engineer our genetic make-up. The new knowledge of molecular genetics, 
biochemistry, cell biology, physiology, and bioengineering fundamentally impact 
upon the way we understand conception, gestation, and fetal development. Our 
novel, scientific awareness and understanding alters our perception, comprehension, 
and appreciation of our causal, generative, biological relationships. It also more 
deeply highlights the essential role of human intentionality in child-rearing, and 
recasts our sense of personal, and even human, identity. The fragmentation of 
natural parenthood in ART, the artificial manufacture of human embryos, and the 
reaffirmed role of social parenthood in human development, thus presents a fruitful 
study of how advances in science challenge and change the modes and 
methodologies of Jewish legal and bioethical inquiry. The observational and 
analytic findings of such a case study, in turn, are arguably extrapolatable, thereby 
informing a larger, farther-reaching consideration of Jewish religion and science 
relations, more generally.  
To gauge how advances in science change Jewish law and ethics, this dissertation 
has sought to analyze the epistemological and axiological dimensions of the 
contemporary Jewish bioethical debate concerning the identification of maternity and 
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paternity in four current cases of ART: in vitro fertilization, gestational surrogacy, 
cloning, and mitochondrial replacement therapy, for four Jewish bioethical 
exemplars: Rabbi J. David Bleich; Rabbi Michael J. Broyde; Rabbi Elliot N. Dorff; and 
the collaborative writings of Dr. John D. Loike and Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler. These cases 
of ART were chosen because the first two are older, now more commonplace, with ample 
Jewish bioethical literature; while the second two are more cutting-edge. As scientific 
research experimentation, fertility treatments, and medical therapies, the respective cases 
developed successively and cumulatively, allowing the tracking of Jewish bioethical 
development in line with scientific and technological advancement. This select group of 
Jewish bioethicists were chosen because of their prolific scholarship regarding the 
aforementioned four cases of ART, and halakhic and bioethical methodology, as well as 
for their contextualizing oeuvre of Jewish-bioethical and medical-halakhic writings.  
This study proceeded in two parts. Part I, “Context and Method: Jewish Bioethics, 
Epistemology, and Moral Axiology,” developed a conceptual scaffolding for the pressing 
practical Jewish bioethical issues to be interrogated in the discrete analyses of Part II. 
Part I thus surveyed: the philosophical, historical, and halakhic grounds of parenthood; 
the history and foundational models of contemporary Jewish bioethics and medical 
halakhah; the gendered nature of legally oriented Jewish bioethics; introduced this 
dissertation’s four exemplars of the legally oriented model of Jewish bioethics; and 
outlined the scope of the larger bioethical consideration of assisted reproductive and 
genetic ethics within which this dissertation’s bioethical focus fits. Part I also clarified 
more precisely what is meant by “epistemological and axiological dimensions,” and 
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contextualized this investigative dialectic by critically reviewing: the process and 
methodologies of halakhah; schemata of religion and science relations; strategies for 
contending with conflicts between Torah and science; the interrelationship of ethics and 
halakhah; and methodological parallels in contemporary bioethics.  
In Part II, “Application and Analysis: The Identification of Maternity and 
Paternity in Four Current Cases of Assisted Reproductive and Genetic Technologies,” for 
each case of ART, I examined the relevant, biological science and biotechnology in 
historical context. Jewish bioethical concerns were also located within the larger 
bioethical discussion. Finally, and more focusedly, this study scrutinized the 
epistemological and axiological dimensions of the legally oriented bioethical analyses of 
the four Jewish bioethical exemplars as they considered parental identity in ART, and 
redefined parenthood in Jewish law and bioethics. This dissertation demonstrated four 
ways in which advances in science change Jewish law and ethics. One, scientific 
awareness leads to greater sophistication and nuance of analysis. Two, Jewish bioethicists 
grapple with religion and science relations, and speak directly to these overarching 
considerations. Three, the epistemological and axiological influence of religion and 
science relations correlate with greater openness to new technologies, theoretical 
conceptualizations, and their practical applications. Four, advances in science change 
Jewish legal and bioethical analyses and outcomes through (at least) four possible 
methodological mechanisms – namely, theoretic holism, innovative interpretation, 
indeterminate gaps, and realist realignment. Jewish bioethics are thus shown to illumine 
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the intricate interrelationship between religion and science and its impact on Jewish law 
and ethics.  
In this conclusion, I will review in broader strokes the redefinition of parenthood 
as ART progressed, and the manifest sociology of knowledge and subjective intuitionism 
at play within the epistemological and axiological dimensions of the contemporary 
Jewish bioethical debate among this dissertation’s four Jewish bioethical exemplars 
concerning the identification of maternity and paternity in ART. I will also explain in 
summative greater detail the four methodological ways that advances in science change 
Jewish law and ethics. Finally, I will close with an assessment of this dissertation’s 
importance and implication, as well as recommendations for further study. 
 
The Redefinition of Parenthood 
in the Assisted Reproductive and Genetic Technologies 
 
 Before the advent of ART, there were two primary Jewish paradigms of 
parenthood: natural and social. Within natural parenthood, paternity and maternity are 
respectively defined by a man (i.e., the father) whose seed inseminated a woman through 
sexual intercourse (i.e., the mother), who in turn conceived, gestated, and gave birth to a 
child. In other words, natural procreation begets natural parenthood, and every child, 
therefore, has but one natural father and one natural mother. Social parenthood speaks to 
who raises the child to independence. With the rise of ART, the complexities of 
collaborative reproduction have challenged viewing parenthood solely through the lens of 
natural and social parenthood. Collaborative reproduction involves many participating 
actors and agents, thus fragmenting the procreative process. Furthermore, the new 
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scientific knowledge that helped develop the biotechnologies of ART has changed the 
way we understand the partible process of procreation, and endowed us with new theory-
laden language we now use to describe procreation’s dissevered parts. Thus, new 
scientific knowledge, joined with unanticipated biotechnological capability, coming 
together in an increasingly complex, collaborative reproductive process, all challenge 
earlier conceptions of paternity and maternity, forcing redefinitions of parenthood.  
Just as there are monist and pluralist accounts of maternity and paternity, so too 
for definitions of parenthood. In other words, have advances in scientific understanding 
and technological capability forced a global, fundamental redefinition of paternity, 
maternity, and parenthood? Must one monist definition fit all cases? Or, has ART created 
a pluralist ladder of definitional options, depending on the biological processes and 
technologies involved, as well as the number of reproductive collaborators? If the clear 
majority of children born are products of natural procreation, why should the 
complexities of occasionally used ART redefine parenthood for everyone? A benefit of a 
definitional ladder and a pluralist standard is that such an account more accurately speaks 
to situational complexity. A deficit of promoting a variety of case-specific definitions of 
parenthood is that they encumber law, and thereby may be difficult to manage or monitor. 
Since parental-child relations are also an important constituent of personal identity, 
having variable definitions of parenthood psychologically and socially complicate one’s 
sense of self and familial ties.3  
                                                 
3 Cf. Haslanger 2009. 
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 When AI was first introduced as a modern fertility treatment, asexual 
reproduction dislocated a definition of parenthood dependent on natural procreation. This 
intensified when IVF was next introduced as a fertility treatment, since now both female, 
in addition to male, participation occurred ex vivo, through IVF. Some medical halakhists 
claimed that fatherhood was fundamentally defined by natural procreation, and thus cases 
of AI and IVF negated the possibility of legal fatherhood. However, most affirmed the 
contributor of male seed as the father, whether he was the husband or not. Judgments of 
whether adultery is transgressed through AI or IVF are secondary to the identification of 
paternity. While Hebrew does not linguistically distinguish between the pre-modern 
notion of generative “male seed” and the modern genetic conception of “sperm,” calling 
both “zer’a,” Jewish bioethicists writing in English adopted the theory-laden language of 
“sperm donor,” rather than “inseminator” or “seed contributor.” “Sperm” now points to 
cellular spermatozoa, and the genetic information they carry. 
While IVF, unlike AI, dislocates motherhood from natural procreation because of 
ex vivo conception, subsequent in vivo gestation and parturition re-naturalizes 
motherhood, perhaps partially inclining Jewish bioethicists, at least initially, to prefer 
natural processes, such as gestation and parturition, as maternal determinants, which 
logically would also be more easily supported by pre-modern rabbinic sources. Here too, 
Jewish bioethicists writing in English utilize the nomenclature not only of natural 
reproduction, such as gestation and parturition, but also of modern science, speaking of 
“ovum contribution,” “genetic mothers,” “genetic fathers,” and “biological fathers.” The 
very act of reading ancient sources through the lens of modern science, and writing in 
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such terms, constitutes an act of innovative interpretation. This is prevalent in the 
writings of all this dissertation’s exemplars. 
 Gestational surrogacy and ovum donation further fragmented the procreative 
process and increased the number of procreative collaborators. While each pregnancy 
required a unique sperm donor, and thus father, now more than one woman could be 
biologically involved in bringing a child to life. Those who embraced a monist standard 
for maternity needed to decide which female reproductive collaborator makes the best 
claim for unique motherhood: the ovum donor/genetic contributor or the gestational 
carrier/parturitional actor? Parenthood is still being accounted for causally, but Bleich 
argued early-on for the possibility of a pluralist-causal account of maternity, whether out 
of legal doubt or acknowledged complexity. In the ensuing Jewish bioethical and 
halakhic debate, classical rabbinic sources were marshalled to argue for all the different 
possibilities, often using the theory-laden language of modern science: ovum/genetic 
donor; gestational mother; birth mother; no mother; multiple mothers. Tendler who 
earlier embraced monist conceptions of parenthood, likewise, in partnership with Loike, 
came to consider pluralist accounts considering the emerging field of epigenetics, which 
gave new appreciation to the genetically influential role that gestation plays. As the new 
knowledge of genetics proliferated among halakhists, a preference for genetic-causal 
accounts of parenthood, especially maternity, increased in Jewish bioethical writings and 
medical halakhic responsa and articles. This is arguably due to the epistemic privileging 
of scientific knowledge, and the realist, theological belief that both science and Torah 
originate in, and thereby necessarily reflect, a single divine truth. 
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 Orthodox Jewish bioethicists and medical halakhists only considered causal 
biological accounts of paternity and maternity, finding possible precedents for modern 
scientific scenarios in pre-modern, rabbinic exegesis and talmudic legal discussions. 
Dorff, a Conservative Jewish bioethicist expressed his skepticism regarding the 
methodological propriety of what he considered were farfetched legal analogies and 
precedents. His assessment recognized indeterminate gaps within Jewish law born of new 
knowledge and scientific progress. He argued that such indeterminate gaps require 
adjudication through novel, intentionally creative, “stretchy,” interpretive readings of 
both legal and narrative rabbinic-textual traditions, guided by Jewish metaethics. Broyde 
argued that innovative interpretation is native to the Jewish legal process and doesn’t 
require intentional, pre-conceived, interpretive-stretchiness. The late Israeli posek, Rabbi 
Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, likewise opined that there may be fundamental legal doubts 
born of unprecedented technological achievements and new knowledge which cannot be 
easily accommodated within a halakhic tradition that could not have envisioned or 
anticipated these scientific developments. In this instance, his approach to fundamental 
legal doubt required stringent accommodation of a pluralist account of possible parental 
determinations, rather than adjudication by creative interpretation and halakhic ruling.4 
Tendler, along with Loike, moved from an avowedly monist standard to a pluralist 
standard in deference to Auerbach’s assessment and advances in scientific knowledge. 
                                                 
4 See Avraham 1993, vol. 4., Evan Ha’Ezer 5:2: 186; 2004, 17; and Steinberg 1997, 5. It should also be 
noted that Auerbach disapproved of such collaborative reproduction, deeming it contrary to Torah values, 
see Mashiach 2013, 106-8. 
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 When cloning technologies advanced ART to new frontiers, they altered the 
natural, genetic processes preserved ex vivo in the earlier ARTs of AI and IVF, further 
fragmenting the procreative process. Until the advent of an artificial incubator, there still 
needs to be a maternal biological process of human gestation and parturition, thus 
maintaining these procreative stages as a baseline maternal standard. However, genetic 
accounts of parenthood in the new ART of reproductive cloning and MRT grow more 
complicated. Now there are questions about how to define fatherhood, absent male 
gametic, genetic contribution. Fatherhood is either neutralized in such cases, and 
therefore legally, and possibly, even metaphysically negated, or must now be halakhically 
redefined as a genetic contributor, rather than a sperm donor or male seed inseminator. 
Pluralist standards of motherhood, which were previously developed in the consideration 
of gestational surrogacy and ovum donation, are now are extended to plural, genetic 
donors and ova contributors. In even more extreme cases, such as laboratory engineered, 
intentionally created, human chimeras, for which there are more than one nDNA 
contributor of each sex, there may very well be a pluralist standard of paternity, in 
addition to maternity. Once parenthood is redefined as genetic contribution, rather than 
gametic contribution, then non-gametic nDNA donation also raises the question of 
whether fatherhood is male-sex dependent or possibly gender-neutral in such extreme 
cases of ART. Broyde rejects this possibility as contrary to Torah ethics. Bleich too, 
preferentially dismisses it, though conceptually entertains its possibility. 
 When AI and IVF introduced the prospect of non-adulterous sperm donation by a 
non-husband donor, Dorff began to reconsider the importance of social parenthood, 
405 
 
 
leading Conservative Judaism’s Committee for Jewish Law and Standards to rabbinically 
endow the social father with greater standing than simply “one who raises another’s 
child.” When the Jewish bioethical considerations of cloning, and other futuristic 
reproductive options, such as synthetic genomes, manufactured gametes, and artificial 
incubators, recognize that such technologies completely upset standard definitions of 
biological parenthood, each of this dissertation’s bioethical exemplars, either explicitly or 
implicitly, raise the possibility of redefining parenthood in terms of social agency – at 
least, in cases akin to a golem – that is, in which there are no biological parents.5 Even 
though this was rejected by all of this dissertation’s exemplars, the raising of the question 
is noteworthy, and further invites the question of whether in the future parenthood may 
still be halakhically redefined in social terms in such extreme cases, should they ever 
become common modes of human reproduction.6 
 Table C.1 (next page) presents the changing lexicon of Jewish bioethical 
definitions of parenthood. Table C.2 (page after next), once again, surveys the evolving 
views on maternal and paternal identification for this dissertation’s four exemplars. 
  
                                                 
5 Chakham Tzvi (Ashkenazi 1712, no. 93) raises the possibility that a golem may be Jewish, human, and 
“parented,” by virtue of having been literally and figuratively raised by a righteous sage. See above, 
Chapter Seven, p. 344 ff. 
6 Irhsai 2012, 311n87, cites Shifman 1987, 132, and Zohar 1997, 78-82, per his analysis of the first 
Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel Benzion Uziel (1880-1953), as potentially supporting a volitional, labor-
based account of halakhic paternity. 
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Table C.1 A Changing Lexicon: The Redefinition of Parenthood in ART 
 
pre-ART 
 
Parenthood. A human being that sexually generates another. 
Father. A man who inseminates a woman, who herself carries a child to 
live-birth. 
Mother. A woman who conceived, gestates, and delivers a living child. 
 
Post-AI/IVF 
 
Parenthood. A human being that asexually generates another. 
Father. A man whose seed inseminates a woman. 
Mother. A woman whose inseminated fertilized ovum develops into a 
live-birthed child. 
Or A woman who gestates a fetus and delivers a living child. Possibly 
neither or both. 
Post-Cloning 
 
Parenthood. A human being whose genetic material generates another. 
Father. A man or person who contributes (somatic) nDNA to an embryo 
that develops into a live-birthed child. This may be a new global 
definition or restricted to cases of cloning. 
Mother. A woman who contributes an ovum with either nDNA or 
mtDNA to an embryo that develops into a live-birthed child. This may be 
a new global definition or restricted to cases of cloning. 
Or a woman who gestates an embryo/ fetus and delivers a living child. 
Possibly neither or both. 
Post-MRT 
 
Parenthood. A human being whose genetic material generates another. 
Father. A man or person who contributes (somatic) nDNA to an embryo 
that develops into a live-birthed child. This may be a new global 
definition or restricted to cases of cloning technologies. 
Mother. A woman who contributes part of an ovum, either nDNA or 
mtDNA, to an embryo that develops into a live-birthed child. This may 
be a new global definition or restricted to cases of MRT. 
Or a woman who gestates an embryo/fetus and delivers a living child. 
Possibly neither or both. 
Futuristic Reproductive 
Modalities, such as 
synthetic DNA, 
manufactured gametes, 
artificial incubators. 
Parenthood. Father and Mother. Any biologic contribution? Creative 
agency, such as DNA designer or lab technician? Social parenthood? 
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Table C.2 The Redefinition of Parenthood in ART Per the Four Exemplars. 
 
 IVF Gestational Surrogacy 
and Ovum Donation 
Reproductive 
Cloning and MRT 
Account of 
Parenthood 
Rabbi 
J. 
David 
Bleich 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal: Sperm 
Donor 
 
Maternity:  
Monist-Causal: 
Parturition 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal: Sperm Donor 
 
Maternity:  
Pluralist-Causal: Dual-
maternity, principally 
parturition, but in legal 
doubt as to adding ovum 
donor. 
Paternity: Pluralist-
Causal: Male (?) 
Genetic Donor(s) 
 
Maternity:  
Pluralist-Causal: 
Parturitional, ova 
donors, female genetic 
donors. 
Pre-Modern 
categories => 
genetics. 
Pluralist-
causal, 
possibly non-
gendered, 
entertains, but 
rejects 
volitional 
definition. 
Rabbi 
Michael 
J. 
Broyde 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal. 
Differentiates 
Genetic father of 
sexual and non-
sexual procreation 
Biological father 
through sexual 
reproduction. 
 
Maternity: Monist-
Causal. Parturition 
when conception 
legally insignificant. 
Conception when 
legally significant. 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal. Differentiates 
Genetic father of sexual 
and non-sexual 
procreation  
Biological father 
through sexual 
reproduction. 
 
Maternity: Monist-
Causal. Parturition when 
conception legally 
insignificant.  
Paternity: Monist-
Causal. Male genetic 
donor. Possibly 
pluralist. 
 
Maternity: Monist-
Causal. Female 
Genetic donor. Though 
in deference to Bleich 
and Auerbach, possibly 
Pluralist-Causal. 
Constrains 
causal 
fatherhood to 
males and 
motherhood 
to females. 
Introduces 
genetic 
definitions 
early on. 
 
Rabbi 
Elliot 
N. 
Dorff 
Paternity: Two 
fathers: Biological 
father is sperm 
donor. Social 
Father is custodial 
father.  
Pluralist-Causal & 
Volitional-Labor. 
 
Maternity:  
Monist-Causal 
Parturitional. 
Paternity: Two fathers: 
Biological father is 
sperm donor. Social 
Father is custodial 
father. Pluralist-Causal 
& Volitional-Labor. 
Maternity: Monist-
Causal Parturition. 
Surprising that not 
Pluralist-Causal & 
Volitional-Labor, like in 
AI/IVF-D for paternity. 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal Genetic 
Contribution. 
 
 
Maternity: Monist- 
Causal: Parturition 
 
Committed to 
traditional 
bionormative 
categories, but 
likely 
interested in 
social 
parenthood. 
Introduces 
Genetic 
definitions 
early on. 
Rabbi 
Moshe 
D. 
Tendler 
and Dr. 
John D. 
Loike 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal 
Sperm Donor 
 
Maternity:  
Monist-Causal, 
gestation/parturition  
 
Paternity: Monist-
Causal 
Sperm Donor 
Maternity: 
Begins as Monist- 
Causal, parturition.  
Later, Pluralist-Causal 
with fundamental doubt. 
Paternity: Genetic-
Causal, possibly 
Pluralist. 
 
Maternity: Pluralist 
Account: Genetic and 
Gestational 
Redefines 
parenthood 
primarily as 
genetic 
contribution. 
Newly 
interested in 
social 
parenthood. 
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The Sociology of Knowledge, Subjective Intuitionism, and Embodied Experience 
 
Ever since Emile Durkheim, sociologists have shown how each society 
constructs its own values, norms, and webs of meaning, often including what is 
perceived as “natural.”7 Scientists, as members of larger society, as well as of 
scientific society, do the same. There is a fundamental sociality to scientific inquiry, 
which per some philosophers of science, needs to be accounted for 
epistemologically and axiologically. This sociality affects: the method and manner 
of scientific investigation and enterprise; the saliency of issues addressed; the 
respective roles and values of consensus and disagreement; and the impacts of 
result-based conclusions upon society at large, as well as upon the social life of a 
particular community and its individual participants (Longino 1990; 2016, 1). 
Whether working with a realist, consensualist, or constructivist theory of truth, an 
epistemology recognizing the sociology of knowledge acknowledges that sociality 
is, at least partly, constitutive of rationality, and affirms that “critical interaction” 
between scholars is central to the production of knowledge and its justification 
(ibid., 2-5).8 Historical, cultural, sociological, and feminist studies of science raise 
new questions about the objectivity of science, the nature of truth and rationality, 
and the roles that meta and discrete values play in knowledge production, its 
justification, and warranted application (ibid., 17-22).9 
                                                 
7 See Durkheim 1972; Giddens and Duneier 2016. 
8 Longino credits John Stuart Mill, Charles Sanders Peirce, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and their 
successors in the sociology of science for this view. For a survey of theories of truth, see Kirkham 1995; 
Lynch 2001. 
9 Scientists, to one degree or another, recognize this, and that is partly why scientific method insists upon 
experiments that can be independently reproduced with the same results. This sociological critique of 
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What is true of science, arguably is even more accurately descriptive of the 
humanities and divinities, including religious traditions. Rabbi Joseph B. 
Soloveitchik (1903-1993), the twentieth-century talmudist and theologian who 
shaped American Jewish Modern Orthodoxy, espoused such an epistemology of 
cognitive pluralism to articulate a theology of Jewish law (1984, 1986).10 The social 
processes involved in the production of Jewish knowledge, more generally, and of 
Jewish law and ethics, more specifically, are often the subjects of intellectual, 
cultural, and social Jewish history, as well as of feminist critique.11 Thus, like for 
science, there is a fundamental sociality to halakhic and Jewish bioethical 
investigation, which likewise needs to be accounted for epistemologically and 
axiologically. 
For the purposes of this dissertation’s conclusion, we need to account for 
four observations. First, over the past five-decade-long, Jewish-bioethical and 
medical-halakhic consideration of the identification of paternity and maternity in 
ART, there has been an identifiable shift toward the incorporation of genetic 
awareness into halakhic and Jewish-bioethical conceptualization, analysis, and 
adjudication.12 Second, for three of this dissertation’s four Jewish bioethical 
                                                 
context-independent objectivity need not relativize all human inquiry and knowledge, nor deny universal 
principles of evidence or rationality, see Longino 2016, 24-35. 
10 See Sacks 1988; and Shatz 2016. The complexity of Soloveitchik’s overall philosophical theology 
requires further analysis and exposition because in addition to cognitive pluralism, his theology also 
exhibits religiously informed, strong, ontological commitments, while simultaneously espousing a 
phenomenological focus on the radical individualism of religious experience, see Soloveitchik 1964, 1965, 
and Zeigler 2012. 
11 See Irshai 2010; 2012, 269-75; and Ross 2004. 
12 See Halperin 2011, 278-98. Westreich 2016, 106n30 cites a private conversation with Bleich, in which 
Bleich asserted that Halperin’s assessment is not accurate. However, Sinclair 2003, 107 ff. had proposed a 
similar observation to Halperin’s regarding a shift toward genetics ten years earlier. See Irshai 2012, 266-7, 
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exemplars, Bleich, Broyde, and Loike-Tendler – all Orthodox – there has been a 
halakhic convergence of upholding, at least in stringent response to legal 
uncertainty, a pluralist account of parenthood. This is so even though in their 
detailed, discrete analyses they each propose different conceptualizations, and even 
differing definitions of parenthood. Third, said three exemplars, articulate different 
moral judgments concerning the practical utilization of the different ARTs despite 
sharing the same textual Torah tradition, being educated, trained, and employed as 
rabbis and teachers in shared educational and communal institutions, and belonging 
to a common, Jewish denominational community. Four, the vast majority of legally 
oriented Jewish bioethicists writing on ART, including those studied in this 
dissertation, are men, with the consequence that the primary Jewish-bioethical and 
medical-halakhic consideration of reproductive ethics lacks the insight, influence, 
and embodied experience of female readers and interpreters.13 
These observations can be explained by the recognition of the social 
production, justification, and application of Jewish legal and ethical knowledge. 
Robust technical debate and convergent, stringent, normative practice, especially 
regarding communally important matters of Jewishness, lineage, personal status, 
and identity, speak to a shared tradition of “critical interaction,” intellectually, 
experientially, and socially. On the one hand, the mitzvah, i.e., affirmative duty, of 
the study of Torah encourages intellectual pluralism with multiple viewpoints and 
                                                 
who posits that until 2006, her read of “mainstream halakhic discourse” favored the birth mother, which 
she interprets as advancing the pronatalist interests of Orthodox Jewish society. However, she 
acknowledges that post-2006, genetic factors may be ascendant in halakhic deliberations. 
13 Ronit Irshai calls this the “maleness” of Jewish law and commentary (Irshai 2012, 1-21). 
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opinions. On the other hand, communal cohesion demands normative standards and 
behaviors, especially regarding matters affecting personal status. Differing moral 
judgments likewise point to a certain measure of axiological pluralism within a 
shared religious tradition, as well as admits a role for subjective moral intuition 
born of societal influence and personal experience. Lastly, legally oriented Jewish 
bioethics and medical halakhah generated within Jewish Orthodoxy have heretofore 
been primarily the domain of male readers, interpreters, and decisors, due to the 
privileging of men’s halakhically obligatory Torah study, the gender-differentiated 
religious culture shaping the institutions and curricula of male and female 
education, and the male-oriented authority and social structures inhering in the 
media of traditional Jewish textual scholarship. The sociology of knowledge in its 
epistemological and axiological dimensions thus acknowledges a process in which 
social factors help account for both overall coherence, individual differentiation, as 
well as its gender biases. 
For Dorff, this dissertation’s sole Conservative Jewish bioethicist, the 
sociology of Jewish knowledge, its production, justification, and application, also 
play a pronounced role. Dorff processes his Jewish bioethical adjudications and 
recommendations through the Rabbinical Assembly’s Committee on Jewish Law 
and Standards to establish denominationally authoritative legitimatized options for 
personal praxis and normative communal standards. While Conservative Judaism 
acknowledges the authority of individual rabbis to make their own halakhic rulings, 
“the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards sets halakhic policy for Rabbinical 
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Assembly rabbis and for the Conservative movement as a whole” (Rabbinical 
Assembly 2011). Dorff credits the need for communal consensus by way of the 
Committee on Jewish Law and Standards as the reason for his adherence to a 
monist-causal definition of maternity, i.e. parturition, despite the increasing 
fragmentation of parenthood and genetic awareness. While his advocacy for a more 
significant status within Judaism for social parenthood arguably stems from his own 
moral intuition, as well as from larger trends within American culture and 
jurisprudence, once again, he turned to the Committee on Jewish Law and 
Standards to give his view communal recognition and normative force. Similarly, 
the sociality of Jewish Conservative halakhic process has likewise, heretofore, 
prevented the endorsement of Rabbi Elie Kaplan Spitz’s recommendation to adopt 
intentionality, i.e. social parenthood, as a basis for legal parenthood.14 
Finally, as more Jewish women enter the heretofore male province of the 
talmudic academy and begin to contribute writings to the halakhic corpus (see 
above pp. 49-50), female voices will increasingly impact upon Jewish legal and 
ethical analyses and adjudications, especially regarding gender-sensitive topics such 
as reproduction. Professor Ronit Irshai questions why medical halakhists primarily 
focus on parental identification, however important, given the overall moral 
complexity of collaborative reproduction. She opines that many ethical 
considerations, especially from a woman’s gender-oriented perspective, are ignored 
in the medical halakhic and Jewish bioethical analyses. She writes: 
                                                 
14 See Mackler 1997c, 182; above, p. 305. 
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What are the psychological and emotional aspects of “dividing” 
motherhood, and are they not likely to have a bearing on the halakhic 
determination regarding the offspring’s maternity? What are the halakhic 
aspects of commerce in a woman’s reproductive organs? What are the likely 
effects of surrogacy on the family life of the couple employing it and on the 
surrogate and her partner? Do any of the decisors consider the 
objectification of women and their transformation into receptacles for 
almost anything designed to increase fertility and birth, be it sperm from an 
outside donor or a fertilized egg that is not in any way hers and her partner’s 
and that will not belong to her after it is born? Doesn’t fertility therapy, 
under prevailing patriarchal notions, construe the primary role of women to 
be that of bearing and raising children? Doesn’t it entail excessive control of 
women’s procreative abilities? … the decisors’ silence only heightens the 
sense that if the establishment entrusted with formulating and interpreting 
the halakhah had not been exclusively male, the picture we see today might 
have been significantly different. (Irshai 265, 268) 
 
Dr. Michal Raucher (2013), in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, likewise, 
argues that the raw textual analyses endemic to legally oriented Jewish bioethics 
ignores the contextual, embodied, reproductive experiences of women, i.e., the 
anthropology of reproduction. Text may be the hallowed precincts of male religious 
Jewish culture, but reproduction, especially for women, is experienced, not just 
studied. She advocates for an ethnographically based Jewish bioethic that takes into 
account narrative subjectivity and its socio-cultural context.15 For example, 
Professor Pamela Laufer-Ukeles (2016) argues that if Jewish law asserts multiple 
motherhood in cases of collaborative reproduction, then Jewish communal society, 
family structures, and parenting arrangements, should grant some measure of 
responsibilities and rights to all those designated as legal parents, in addition to 
those who voluntarily assume social parenthood. If there is indeed a sociality to 
                                                 
15 See also Levine 2003; Kahn 2000; Seeman 2010; Lockshin and Winberg 2013. 
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knowledge production, justification, and application in Jewish law and ethics, 
expanding the society of learned participants to scholars of both genders will likely 
impact learning processes and outcomes. 
 
Four Ways Advances in Science Change Jewish Law and Ethics  
 
Greater Sophistication and Nuance of Analysis 
 
 The first way in which advances in science change Jewish law and ethics relates 
to how scientific awareness and understanding influence the development of medical 
halakhah and Jewish bioethics by demanding greater sophistication and nuance of 
analysis. It is a well-worn bioethical truism that good information makes for good 
decisions. The same holds true for halakhah, whether the needed data is theoretical or 
circumstantial, foundational or contextual, citational or logical. Jewish bioethics and 
medical halakhah, therefore, not only require expertise in Jewish law and values, but also 
in scientific knowledge, and its experimental and clinical application. Tendler and Loike 
emphasize several times the need for halakhists to consult with scientists and 
physicians.16 Scientific knowledge must be sufficiently understood to ground adequately 
the context and circumstance for competent Jewish legal and ethical consideration and 
adjudication.17 Similarly, familiarity with bioethical principles and argumentation, more 
general philosophical conceptualization, and civil-legal analysis, also impinge upon the 
way Jewish bioethicists think about the subjects of their study, and influence their 
                                                 
16 See above, p. 387 ff. 
17 This is a challenge in secular bioethics too, see Bacchetta and Richter 2012. 
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analyses and conventions of literary expression. Each of this dissertation’s exemplars 
demonstrate that they researched the relevant science, conferred with pertinent bioethical 
treatments, and at times, even reviewed the applicable family law in America and Israel. 
Such consultation impacts one’s epistemology and axiology, and thereby shapes thinking 
and influences presentation. 
 Here the sociology of knowledge, once again, impresses upon an appreciation of 
the Jewish-bioethical and medical-halakhic process. Poskim unschooled in science will 
adjudicate questions of medical halakhah in their non-scientifically informed frame of 
reference. Their scholarship will then in turn be utilized by Jewish bioethicists. Jewish 
bioethicists count among their important readers medical and scientific professionals, 
demanding a high level of scientific knowledge, in addition to Jewish textual and 
intellectual competency. Jewish bioethicists may also count among their important 
readers other niche audiences, such as scholars or practitioners of secular civil-
jurisprudence, adding disciplinary dimensionality to their analysis and presentation. 
Comparative law, for example, is of special interest to Bleich and Broyde, both of whom 
teach in law schools, highlighting a social dimension particular to their academic 
careers.18  
 Legally oriented Jewish bioethical writings, especially published in Hebrew, in 
turn will be utilized by second and third generation medical halakhists, building a more 
scientifically based analysis. Additionally, the proliferation of legally oriented Jewish 
                                                 
18 See Sinclair 2003 who also models and demonstrates this. Westreich 2017 argues that the very 
interaction of civil law and Jewish law regarding family law matters in Israel has substantively changed 
both. 
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bioethics and the recent specialization of medical halakhah arguably pressures non-
specialized poskim of wider-scoped expertise to consult with medical and scientific 
resources. Broad access to scientific knowledge, as well as to Jewish-bioethical and 
medical-halakhic scholarship, through electronic archives and internet media, likewise 
expands the epistemological and axiological resources of interested scholars and lay 
readers. This pattern conjoins with a larger trend of the past century of the influence of 
academic writing conventions on halakhic scholarship, discerned in the formatting of 
Torah journals, the modern academic layout of constructive argumentation in Torah 
articles that is substantively different from the literary conventions of traditional talmudic 
commentary and responsa literature, as well as in the near-ubiquitous use of footnotes or 
endnotes. The epistemic privileging of scientific knowledge among nearly all strata of 
Jewish religious society legitimates using such knowledge and the conventions of their 
academic study and communication.19 
 
Jewish Religion and Science Relations 
 The second way in which advances in science change Jewish law and ethics 
directly concerns Jewish religion and science relations. While most medical halakhists 
operating within the narrow confines of Jewish legal analysis may seem to ignore larger 
questions of epistemology and moral axiology, Jewish bioethicists indeed grapple with 
religion and science relations, and speak to these overarching considerations in their 
                                                 
19 For the qualification, “nearly all,” see below, “Strategies for Contending with Conflicts between Torah 
and Science,” p. 107 ff. 
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respective analyses. Each of this dissertation’s Jewish bioethical exemplars deliberate the 
ways science and religion relate in Judaism, more generally, and specifically in the 
context of Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah. Bleich philosophically utilized the 
metaphor of “Science and Art” to describe halakhic method. While he emphasized the 
primacy of Torah within his epistemology, he also recognized the importance of science 
to establish credible context and to illuminate circumstance. Although Bleich denies 
halakhic change, Part II of this dissertation has endeavored to demonstrate how advances 
in science have impinged upon and influenced his Jewish-bioethical and medical-
halakhic analyses and adjudications. While Bleich’s way of relating science and religion 
may perhaps be represented by “Torah with science,” Broyde embraces more of a “Torah 
and science” orientation. Broyde reads and conceptualizes pre-modern, as well as 
modern, talmudic and halakhic sources through the lens of science, as demonstrated in 
the chapters of Part II. For both Bleich and Broyde, Jewish bioethics is primarily an 
exercise in medical halakhah. Dorff, like Bleich, is suspect of anachronistically endowing 
pre-modern sources with current scientific awareness. However, in Dorff’s view, Jewish 
bioethics requires a synthesis of Torah knowledge with scientific understanding, Jewish 
values, human philosophical insights, and social-scientific findings, to yield a competent 
and relevant, modern Jewish bioethic. Tendler and Loike, as both Torah scholars and 
research scientists, conceive of “Halakhic Bioethics” as an exercise in realistically 
realigning Torah with the progressive findings of science, all considered in light of Torah 
values. All the above exemplars espouse a “Torah u-Madda,” i.e., Torah and science, 
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worldview, however, each thinker conceives of the philosophical and functional 
relationships of Torah and science in different ways. 
 Utilizing Ian Barbour’s (see above, pp. 99-100) reductionist four-fold 
typology of “Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and Integration,” all four exemplars 
model “dialogue,” or in Ted Peters’s (see above, pp. 100-1) slightly more expanded 
phenomenology, “hypothetical consonance,” with Tendler and Loike leaning more 
toward integration. However, as Willem Drees (see above, pp. 101-2) argues, this 
minimalist categorization too narrowly only tracks new knowledge with cognitive 
claims. New knowledge also affects religious experience and changes linguistic-
cultural traditions by expanding the holistic “web of beliefs” through the newly 
embedded interaction of new and old ideas, and the adoption of theory-laden 
terminology. Per the study of this dissertation, the redefinition of parenthood, social 
changes in reproductive processes and family structures, and larger-scale impacts of 
biotechnological achievement on social mores demonstrate that religion and science 
relations extend beyond cognitive claims. Drees additionally argues that religion 
and science relations do not only focus on the content of new knowledge, but also 
on new ideas about the nature of knowledge, and new appreciations of our world 
and universe, as these advances in awareness and perspective also impact upon 
cognitive claims, religious experience, and lived linguistic-cultural traditions. 
Regarding cognitive claims, new scientific knowledge and technological 
capability may lead one to a critical-realist perspective, which ultimately aspires to 
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a unity of knowledge of which science and religion are a part.20 All the bioethical 
exemplars match this description to a great degree. The success of science in 
medicine and biotechnologies certainly supports this, and endows science with 
epistemic privilege. At the same time, new ideas about the nature of knowledge, its 
production, justification, acquisition, and application, may also lead to an embrace 
of cognitive pluralism, as it did for Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, allowing Jewish 
law and ethics to fashion its own religio-cultural reality. Niels Henrik Gregersen 
(see above, pp. 104-5) proposes a “contextual coherence theory” in which science 
and theology interface when the consequences of science are interpreted in cultures. 
In the context of Jewish bioethics, science and Judaism interface when the 
consequences of science are interpreted in the religio-cultural tradition of Jewish 
law and ethics. Although Tendler and Loike most strongly seek to realign halakhah 
with a realist account of science, all the Jewish bioethical exemplars also recognize 
that in their theological view the religious categories and regulations of Jewish law 
affect how a scholar reads the collected data, meaningfully correlates data with 
theory, and ultimately arrives at an interpretation and conclusion. For example, in 
the Jewish bioethical consideration of parenthood, the fragmentation of human 
reproduction in ART, along with new scientific understandings of genetics, 
epigenetics, and biological processes, must first be read, understood, and 
                                                 
20 Critical realism affirms a correspondence theory of truth and reality, but recognizes that since all data are 
theory-laden, theoretical truth claims must be evaluated by a complex set of (Kuhnian) criteria, such as: 
agreement with data; coherence; scope; and fertility. Thus, critical realism is confident in its realism, but 
humbly tentative and critical in its certainty about specific truth claims. See Barbour 1997, 106-10. 
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assimilated, then correlated with Jewish legal categories, then squared with meta 
and discrete Jewish values, and finally interpreted toward an operative conclusion.  
 
Correlating Scientific Understanding and Awareness 
 with Jewish Legal and Bioethical Outcomes 
 
The third way in which advances in science change Jewish law and ethics 
addresses how the epistemological and axiological influences of religion and 
science relations correlate with greater openness to new technologies, theoretical 
conceptualizations, and their practical application. In the analyses of the four 
exemplars’ scholarship regarding the four ARTs in Part II, this dissertation has tried 
to identify patterns pointing to larger axiological orientations, in addition to discrete 
values, in order to discover such correlations. In general, Bleich disapproves of the 
various ARTs studied as immoral fetal experimentation, risking unknown health 
hazards, and as intrinsically immoral per the Jewish values of modesty, and clarity 
and purity of lineage. Broyde, Bleich’s student, considers infertility as disease, and 
ART therefore as restorative. Medical fertility therapies are thus legitimated by the 
Jewish values of safeguarding human health and life, as well as honoring the 
dignity of human beings and their existential personal aspirations. Dorff, like 
Broyde, considers fertility treatments through ART Jewishly licensed medical 
interventionism, but, also like Bleich, is warier of the still experimental status of 
some ARTs, thereby currently recommending against the more advanced ARTs, 
and requiring for all a high degree of voluntary, informed, and understanding 
consent. Loike and Tendler, like Broyde and Dorff, value ART as legitimate 
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medical interventions, though they also worry for unintended harms, albeit to a 
lesser degree. They license utilization of all the ARTs reviewed, at least in certain 
circumstances, and concern themselves with the halakhic principles of participant 
selection, such as whether to use a Jewish or non-Jewish genetic contributor or 
gestational surrogate. Thus, great nuance attends to the larger patterns discernable 
for each exemplar. 
Here the sociology of knowledge and subjective intuition likely impinge 
upon individual orientations and determined outcomes. Loike and Tendler actively 
participate in the scientific and medical communities, for whom ongoing scientific 
research, ethical human trials, and utilization of available therapies comprise the 
ambition and purpose of their profession. It is not surprising that they are supportive 
of ART’s utilization. Broyde is a scholar and practitioner of family law, and in his 
communal rabbinate has supported and counseled couples desirous of overcoming 
fertility challenges. His philosophy of Jewish law and his analysis of its 
methodology and evolution depict him as a progressive traditionalist, open to 
halakhic responsiveness to both scientific and sociological change. Bleich, like his 
student Broyde, is also a scholar and practitioner of family law, with copious 
experience in the communal rabbinate, and yet his axiological orientation is much 
more conservative than that of Broyde, Loike, and Tendler. One would expect 
Dorff, a traditionally grounded thinker functioning as a rabbi, philosopher, and 
ethicist within a liberal Jewish denomination, would accordingly be more 
permissive regarding the utilization of ART. While this assessment holds true to a 
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great extent, Dorff’s expertise in general bioethics and active participation in its 
society attunes him, like Bleich, to constraining concerns, such as his judgment that 
cloning technologies, including MRT, are very much still in an experimental stage.  
Simple correlations therefore are defied by nuanced thinking and complex 
orientations confounded by multiple factors. What can be stated in generalized 
conclusion is that the epistemological and axiological influence of religion and 
science relations do indeed correlate with greater openness to new technologies, 
theoretical conceptualizations, and their practical applications. However, it is more 
precise and accurate to qualify this generalization by opining that those Jewish 
bioethicists who embrace a more dialogical or integrative relationship of religion 
and science, and whose axiological commitments are likewise influenced by new 
knowledge and cultural norms, and for whom meta-ethics guide moral judgment 
independent of strict halakhic analysis, more easily license utilization of novel, 
assisted reproductive technologies, and/or are more prone to consider new halakhic 
maternal and paternal classifications informed by scientific knowledge. Axiological 
conservatism, however, will limit the progressive application of scientific 
knowledge and technological capability. Conversely, it logically follows that 
scientific ignorance combined with either axiological liberalness or conservatism 
will lead to underdeveloped medical halakhah and Jewish bioethics.  
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Four Mechanisms of Halakhic Change 
Finally, the fourth way that advances in science change Jewish law and 
ethics is through its impact on bioethical and halakhic analysis and adjudication by 
way of (at least) four possible methodological mechanisms, derived from the 
bioethical writings of this dissertation’s four exemplars – namely, theoretic holism, 
innovative interpretation, indeterminate gaps, and realist realignment.  
 
Theoretic Holism 
 In his reflections on halakhic methodology, Bleich invokes theoretic holism, 
often associated with the thinking of Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000): 
In order to appreciate the nature of Jewish law, it is necessary to recognize 
that it constitutes a self-contained system. It is founded upon a complex set 
of axiological premises, or grundnorms, that serve as the matrix of its 
internal coherence. A philosopher of science understands full well that the 
entire complement of the laws of nature as posited by science cannot be 
tested simultaneously. Any given hypothesis can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed only by assuming, at least for the purposes of that 
investigation, the constancy of all other axioms comprising the corpus of 
scientific knowledge.…Much the same is true of the nature of halakhic 
discussion and dialectic. (Bleich and Jacobson 2015, vii) 
 
Quineian Holism goes even further. It posits that that theoretic holism is 
undergirded by semantic holism – that is, the meanings of words are also 
interdependent.21 Furthermore, words themselves, especially scientifically 
specialized nouns, are theory-laden. Their specific meaning relies on a larger 
theoretical matrix. For example, body parts, such as reproductive organs, will derive 
                                                 
21 See Jackman 2017 for an introduction to “Meaning Holism.” 
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their meaning from a larger anatomical mapping, and an understanding of the 
physiological processes which involve them. The words signifying bodily exudates, 
like sperm, “the generative substance or seed of male animals,” derived from the 
Latin “sperma,” and Greek, “σπέρμα,” both meaning seed, will also change in 
semantic meaning depending on the contextualizing understandings of 
physiological processes, or what Thomas Kuhn calls, “the scientific paradigm.” 
Chaucer’s use of “mannes sperme,” i.e., man’s sperm, in “the Monk’s Tale” of The 
Canterbury Tales, circa 1386, the oldest known literary usage of the word in 
English, points to the same bodily issuance, but signifies something very different 
to a twenty-first-century Jewish bioethicist, knowledgeable of molecular genetics, 
thinking of haploid spermatozoa, carrying a genetic code of ordered 
deoxyribonucleic acid base-pairs (OED 2017, s.v. sperm).  
Scientifically aware and knowledgeable Jewish bioethicists and medical 
halakhists think about reproductive issues within a Torah and science holistic 
framework, using theory-laden terminology.22 This dissertation has endeavored to 
demonstrate that the scientific-theory infused, halakhically oriented, Jewish 
bioethical analysis of the identification of maternity and paternity in ART has led to 
an ongoing redefinition of parenthood.23 The same words signify new meanings 
with marked legal and ethical consequences. The Jewish bioethical exemplars of 
                                                 
22 See Reifman 2012, 2013 for a similar critique regarding the use of terminology in the halakhic debate 
surrounding brainstem death. For a comparable phenomenon in the history of biological sciences, see 
LaPorte 2003. 
23 See, for example, above, p. 354, regarding Bleich’s developing and expanding semantic interpretation of 
the word “zer’a – seed.” 
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this dissertation often have adopted the new terminology of modern science. 
However, even when there has been a continuity of terminology, new holistic 
theoretical frameworks create variance in semantic meaning. Advances in science 
thus change Jewish law and bioethics in the subtle exercise of theory-laden word 
choice and meaning signification, which in turn affect understanding, 
conceptualization, analysis, adjudication, and communication. 
 
Innovative Interpretation 
 In his theory of halakhic evolution, Broyde opines that Jewish law, like 
Constitutional Law in the United States, changes less through legislation, and more 
through innovative interpretation (Broyde 2010, 1-3). Consider the below passage 
by the former Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British 
Commonwealth, Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, in his weekly Torah series, “Covenant 
and Conversation,” writing on Leviticus, chapter 12: 
Which is decisive: nature or nurture? Medical science has developed in 
astonishing new directions since Mendel’s nineteenth-century research into genes, 
Crick and Watsons 1953 discovery of DNA, and the decoding of the human 
genome. In February 2001, it was announced that the human genome contains not 
100,000 genes, as originally postulated, but only 30,000. This surprising result led 
scientists to conclude that there are not enough human genes to account for the 
different ways people behave. We are shaped by nurture as well as nature. The 
two are not separate, but interact in complex and still not yet fully understood 
ways (for an excellent survey, see Matt Ridley’s Nature via Nurture, 2003). 
Contemporary science is thus writing a new commentary to the ancient phrase in 
this week’s sedra: “when a woman conceives and gives birth.” Conception 
(genetic endowment) and gestation (the foetus’ pre-birth biological environment) 
both play a part in the formation of a child. There are two aspects of maternity, 
not one – genetic and gestational; nature and nurture. Thus does science reveal 
new depths of meaning in the ancient but ever-renewed word of G-d. (Sacks 
2010) 
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Sacks’s Torah commentary demonstrates two things: one, semantic holism, i.e., reading 
the ancient words of the Torah through the lens of modern science; and two, innovative 
interpretation, i.e., consciously, deliberately, and innovatively reinterpreting the Torah – 
what Sack’s calls “revealing new depths of meaning.”  
Sacks’s commentary belongs to the genre of homiletics. However, this 
dissertation has endeavored to demonstrate that what Sacks does in a sermon, the four 
Jewish bioethical exemplars do, to one degree or another, in their bioethical and halakhic 
analyses. Broyde, and Tendler and Loike, reinterpret pre-modern sources this way, with 
Tendler and Loike at times even claiming that such new meanings were the original 
intent of pre-modern sources. Bleich and Dorff display conscientiousness of avoiding 
anachronistic readings, with Bleich protesting such innovative readings, and Dorff 
supporting self-aware, deliberate, “stretchy,” novel interpretations. All, however, engage 
in innovative interpretation, which per Broyde, is endemic to halakhic process and Jewish 
commentary. This is especially true and necessary when confronting unprecedented and 
unanticipated scenarios born of advances in scientific understanding and biotechnological 
capability. Without the license and legitimacy of innovative interpretation, whether 
through creatively identifying legal analogies, relatable precedents, novel readings, and 
fresh conceptualizations, Jewish law and ethics would not be able to accommodate 
change amidst continuity. 
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Indeterminate Gaps 
 Sometimes changes engendered by advances in scientific understanding and 
technological capability, such as those of ART, are so dramatic, even revolutionary, 
that they fundamentally challenge the capacity of a longstanding tradition to 
accommodate new knowledge and new realities. Such radical changes generate 
what may be referred to as “indeterminate gaps.” There can exist many types of 
legal doubt. The law may be clear, but the circumstances ambiguous. The 
circumstances may be evident, but the law contested. Then, there may be times 
when the circumstances are so eccentric and unparalleled that no cogent legal 
precedents may be found, legal analogies remain unpersuasive, and innovative 
interpretation may feel forced or factitious. In such circumstances, halakhists may 
look to mine the larger Jewish rabbinic tradition for halakhically non-normative 
precedents, analogies, and opportunities for interpretation, such as in midrash 
aggadah and rabbinic narrative. Of the four exemplars, Dorff was the first to posit 
indeterminate gaps, but believes that intentional, inventive interpretation can stretch 
the meanings of pre-modern texts to designedly meet unexampled challenges. 
Bleich seems to deny the existence of indeterminate gaps, and believes that 
precedents, analogies, and legitimate, credible interpretations can always be found 
within a theologically pluripotent, divinely revealed tradition. Broyde explicitly 
believes that innovative interpretation can responsibly be marshalled to meet novel 
challenges. It is precisely through such legal exercise that Jewish law grows, adapts, 
and evolves. Tendler and Loike acknowledge the possibility of indeterminate gaps 
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and are willing to create new Jewish legal opinions that integrate legal 
indeterminism into a determined legal outcome, such as upholding plural maternity 
not out of legal doubt or acknowledged complexity, but out of fundamental 
indeterminism.  
 Here the relationship between Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah 
potentially may experience strain, because ethical judgments of unprecedented 
biomedical conundrums may be arbitrated by metaethical analysis or by application 
of principlism, whereas legal determinations in halakhah are constrained by more 
narrow rules of legal analysis and adjudication. This strain may be alleviated 
depending on how formalistic, positivistic, or contextualist one’s legal philosophy 
and methodology. A legal method that grants ethical review halakhic significance 
may more easily navigate indeterminate gaps without requiring the stringent 
accommodation of all possible positions. For example, in the case of indeterminate 
maternity, plural motherhood may cover all bases, but arguably engenders an 
unwieldly complex of intimate family relations with individuals with whom the 
resultant child will have no relationship, as well as endows multiple women with 
legal motherhood, while situationally depriving such designated mothers of the 
rights and responsibilities attendant to parenthood.24 A axiologically conservative 
Jewish bioethicist, like Bleich, might assert that it is indeed for these reasons, and 
more, that these ARTs should not be utilized for non-Torah-obligated, discretionary 
procreation. For more progressively oriented Jewish bioethicists who license the 
                                                 
24 See Laufer-Ukeles 2016. Cf. Bayne 2003. 
429 
 
 
utilization of such technologies, they are arguably obligated to arrive at Jewish legal 
and ethical determinations of halakhic integrity and moral responsibility that are 
also realistically manageable.  
 
Realist Realignment 
 Advances in scientific knowledge and technological capability can also be 
accommodated by “realist realignment.” Tendler and Loike model this 
methodological mechanism most consistently. Adopting a theological cosmology 
and epistemology of critical realism that posits science and religion share in a 
common divine truth, they assert that halakhah can and should be updated to align 
with the contemporary findings of science. Tendler largely arrives at this notion 
through an innovative interpretation of the medieval Tosafist principle of 
“nishtaneh ha-teva,” i.e., “nature has changed.” Affirming that the talmudic sages 
enjoy no privilege of infallibility when it comes to scientific theory or medicinal 
therapies, Tendler and Loike embrace “the empirical knowledge approach” toward 
conflicts between Torah and science (see above, pp. 109-10). Every generation of 
Torah scholars, including medical halakhists and Jewish bioethicists, have a right, 
even an obligation, to accord with the consensus of the scientific community, and 
reread traditional Jewish sources in light of new scientific knowledge. They argue 
that nature indeed is perceptually and conceptually transformed when our 
understanding of science changes (see above, pp. 109-10; 259-61; 313-4). All four 
bioethical exemplars subscribe to scientific progress in biological understanding 
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and biotechnological capability, and do not insist upon rabbinical inerrancy in 
scientific and medical matters. While Dorff likely would espouse Tendler and 
Loike’s method here, Bleich and Broyde do not believe that Jewish legal 
methodology allows for unfettered realist realignment, but would require its 
justification through the normative rules of Jewish legal process.  
 
Significance of this Dissertation and Implications for Further Study 
 
 I believe that the meta-analysis of this multi-disciplinary dissertation is 
significant for several reasons. First, it represents a study of the historical reception 
of assisted reproductive and genetic technologies in Jewish bioethics and medical 
halakhah in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries. In broader strokes, it 
also tells of the evolution of legally oriented Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah 
over the past seven decades. Jewish history is the study of continuities and 
discontinuities, and the adaptive negotiation of tradition and change. The 
redefinition of parenthood in the Jewish bioethical consideration of ART presents a 
fertile study of a specific topic bearing larger historiographic implications. 
Second, this dissertation demonstrates the central roles epistemology and 
axiology play in Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah. It highlights the challenge 
of assimilating new scientific knowledge into a longstanding religious tradition, the 
changes incurred, and the methodological mechanisms by which such changes 
transpire. It also underscores the tensions between: critical realism and cognitive 
pluralism in the Jewish religious epistemology; formalism and contextualism in 
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Jewish law and ethics; and the sociology of knowledge and moral intuitionism. It 
also invites feminist critique of the missing perspective of the embodied experience 
of women in legally oriented Jewish bioethical deliberations. The responsibility to 
incorporate the perspective afforded by women’s embodied experiences into 
bioethical and medical halakhic analyses applies to male scholars, and not just 
female scholars and feminist critics. 
Third, this dissertation illumines Jewish ways of relating religion and 
science and accentuates the importance of the ongoing symbiotic dialogue between 
them. Finally, and more focusedly, this “Science and Religion” dissertation raises 
the question of whether greater scientific awareness, changes in scientific 
understanding, and advances in technological ability challenge the fundamental 
methodology of Jewish legal and bioethical inquiry. There is an extant literature 
discussing cases of long known phenomena in which current understandings need to 
be reconciled with past, conflicting, rabbinical understandings, but there is precious 
little written in the philosophy of halakhah and Jewish bioethics about anticipating 
paradigmatic changes in scientific understanding, and novel, emergent 
biotechnologies. The meta-analysis of this dissertation invites contemplation of the 
development of a halakhic-bioethical methodology that can better process and 
respond to such changes. Such a theoretic-holistic method would require the 
formulation of a theory and theology of knowledge, including the relationship of 
law and ethics, as a philosophy and methodology of halakhah, all in light of a 
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philosophically attuned understanding of scientific progress and achievement: a 
Jewish bioethic promoting halakhic-bioethical methodological holism. 
 
Halakhic-Bioethical Methodological Holism 
Halakhic-bioethical methodological holism requires four stages of deliberation: 
epistemic orientation, axiological clarification, halakhic analysis, and bioethical 
consideration. Subscribing to a theory and theology of knowledge that affirms Torah and 
science, revelation and reason, as sources of knowledge, wisdom, and truth, the first stage 
of “epistemic orientation” directly confronts the mixing of old and new knowledge. Does 
the bioethical issue or dilemma being examined represent a case of new scientific 
understanding or unforeseen technological capability? Is the new knowledge tentative, 
sufficient, or complete? How does it align with previous scientific and traditional Jewish 
understandings? Is the relationship one of conflict, independence, integration, or 
dialogue? It would also take into account not only new knowledge, but multiple 
perspectives and ways of knowing. “Axiological clarification” intends to elucidate Jewish 
values and metaethics. It presupposes three foundational propositions: one, that there 
exists an ethic independent of Jewish law; two, that halakhic and Jewish bioethical 
investigation are related, yet distinct activities; and three, that it is legitimate for one’s 
clarified values and ethics to help direct both halakhic and bioethical examination.25 Both 
stages of “epistemic orientation” and “axiological clarification” seek to assess how new 
                                                 
25 See Shatz 2013b for a similar Jewish ethical framework and protocol. 
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scientific understandings and elucidated values and ethics impact upon the anticipated 
halakhic analysis and bioethical consideration. “Halakhic analysis” entails a proficient 
evaluation of the relevant Jewish legal issues, a thorough review of their discussion in 
rabbinic textual sources, and the formation of a halakhic argument and/or 
recommendation. “Bioethical consideration” will explore any pertinent extra-halakhic 
concerns, consult with germane general and Jewish bioethical literature, and likewise 
arrive at a recommendation complementary to the halakhic conclusions. “Methodological 
holism” denotes an openness to multiple perspectives and the synergy born of the 
interaction of all four stages of deliberation. The rigorous development of such a Jewish 
bioethical methodology would make for a worthy future project, and be of positive 
contribution to Jewish bioethics and medical halakhah. 
 
New Generations of Jewish Reproductive Bioethics and Medical Halakhah 
 
 “One generation goes, another comes, but the earth remains the same forever. … 
Only that shall happen which has happened, only that occur which has occurred; there is 
nothing new beneath the sun!” – so laments the wise king, Qohelet (Ecclesiastes 1:4). 
This ancient, observation-based lament seems to deny the advancement of knowledge and 
technological capability. Contrarily, ART demonstrates that in our time, with the coming 
of new generations, there is indeed something new under the sun. Never before have 
human beings been capable of generating human life in such earthshaking manners. Yet, 
the epistemological and axiological reception and assimilation of new knowledge and 
technology into an abiding religious tradition helps maintain and stabilize a sense of 
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continuity with the past, while acclimating community and society to a brave new 
world.26 Novel understandings give rise to new-fashioned questions, demanding 
education, elucidation, legal determination, and ethical judgment. Redefinitions of 
parenthood perpetuate familiar familial roles and structures, amid fractured natural 
processes and ethically fraught invention. Reproductive Jewish bioethics and medical 
halakhah represent a successful model of open, even if guarded, religion and science 
interrelations. 
Reading the Bible with contemporary scientific awareness, the verse, “Be fruitful 
and multiply, fill the earth, and master it,” appears to link human reproduction with 
human progress and development (Genesis 1:28). The scientific enterprise aspires to 
advance humanity’s cause even to the extent of mastering the very matrix of life itself. 
Yet, this verse only signals the beginning of a much longer and involved human story, 
whose larger message is that integral to the process of human advancement is ethical 
refinement. This dissertation represents a narrative of how advances in science change 
Jewish law and ethics. However, it also tells of how Jewish law and ethics aspires to 
guide adherents through scientific change. 
  
                                                 
26 See Berger 1967, regarding world construction and maintenance, and the roles of plausibility structures. 
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